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(i)
ABSTRACT
The stimulus for this study was the contention of 
many development economists, that small businesses form an 
important facet of the economy. However, there is 
relatively little information on this matter for developing 
countries in general, and apaucity of data on Africa in 
particular. This study addresses this knowledge gap.
The objectives of the research are:-
To study the financing experience and financial profile of 
indigenous small manufacturing firms at inception and growing 
stage of development, as well as large private enterprises 
in The Sudan.
To consider the financial institutions' behaviour towards 
small business financing in developing countries, and,
To provide knowledge on the interaction between financing, 
financial control profile and entrepreneurial typology.
The research findings have been based on empirical data, 
obtained from personal interviews with 45 small firms,
15 large private firms, 11 financial institutions and other 
relevant bodies. This research is in two volumes. Volume I 
stands as the main body of the thesis and Volume II is on 
the research case studies.
Volume Is
The first two chapters cover the objectives, the research 
problems and provide practical and academic justification of 
the research.
Chapter three is on the analysis of the research case 
studies, and consequently the development of the analytical
(ii)
research framework and the research hypotheses.
Chapter four outlines the research methodology.
Chapter five discusses the main sources of finance 
available to small and large firms. The financial profile 
based on ratio analysis has been addressed in chapter six.
Chapter seven has been devoted to the examination of the 
small business financing gap and chapter eight addresses 
the financial institutions' behaviour towards small business 
financing. These two chapters provide conclusive empirical 
evidence of the existence of the finance gap from the 
perspective of both demand and supply-side on multi­
dimensional approach. The findings from these two chapters 
provide empirical evidence of the existence of "Bolton Gap" 
in The Sudan.
Chapter nine gives insight into the understanding of 
the Sudanese entrepreneurs in the manufacturing industry.
Chapter ten covers the financial planning and control 
practice in the small firm at various stages of development. 
This study provides empirical evidence that the financial 
control profile of the small firms is rudimentary and is 
partially responsible for the identified finance gap.
Specific summary conclusions and their theoretical 
implications have been made in chapter eleven. It is apparent 
that all Government policies and development plans ignored 
this vital sector of the economy. To this end, chapter twelve 
is devoted to practical policy implications arising from 
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY:
Small en terprise  developm ent as an issue has become 
increasing ly im po rtan t in recent years in developed and developing 
economies. The study o f developm ent o f sm all enterprises has in v ited  
the a tte n tio n  o f many people in the academic and professional circus, 
as in recent years big enterprises got in to  trou b le  and proved to  be too 
in fle x ib le  and r ig id  when con fron ting  environm ent and economic 
turbulence and change. 'Sm all is b e a u tifu l' - 'schumacherion' - is a 
more p reva iling  slogan in the recent years. This view has challenged 
the tra d it io n a l economic theory on the prom otion o f economic 
developm ent, in both developing and developed economies.
The stim ulus fo r th is  study was the  con ten tion  and the argum ent 
o f many developm ent economists th a t sm all businesses form  an 
im po rtan t face t o f the economy. However, many recent studies in 
developed and developing countries (Boswell, 1970; B irth , 1970; Bolton, 
1971; Besong, 1978; Osaze, 1981) have shown th a t the lead ing sector in 
any economy is the sm all indigenous business sector. Given tha t 
cogent reasons can be o ffe red  in support o f developing sm all 
enterprises as a veh ic le  fo r  econom ic developm ent in under-developed 
countries, the re  are, nevertheless, m ajor problems fac ing  th is  sector.
The question o f sm all business financ ing  has been singled out by 
researchers in developed and developing economies as a most c r it ic a l 
fac to r in sm all en terprise  developm ent. The genera l ob jective  o f th is
- 2 -
research is to study the financ ing  characte ris tics  and finan c ia l 
behaviour o f sm all firm s a t various stages o f developm ent (incep tion  
and growing) in developing economies - Sudan - and to  make such 
comparisons as are possible between sm all firm s  c lass ified  in to  
inception  and growing and th e ir  la rge r bre thern . Thus, in th is  study 
la rge  enterprises were taken as a con tro l group. Curren and Stanworth 
(1985) sta te  th a t: "In the explosion o f research on the sm all f irm  over 
the last decade or so, the tendency has been to  concentra te  almost 
exclus ive ly on the sm all f irm  its e lf  w ith  l i t t le  or no system atic
comparison w ith  its  coun te rpa rt, the  large f irm ...............Now, however,
w ith  the emergence of a m ature body o f theo ry  and find ings  on the 
sm all en te rp rise , the problem  o f s itu a tin g  the sm all f irm  in its  w ider 
environm ent has re-em erged."
It has been argued th a t the fin a n c ia l behaviour o f a sm all f irm  
in any economy is a re fle c tio n  o f stage o f deve lopm ent and the li fe  
cycle o f the f irm . If  these contentions and observations could be 
e m p irica lly  confirm ed by data from  less developed coun tries lik e  
Sudan, then i t  could be concluded th a t th is  p ro f ile  characterises sm all 
business regardless o f the economy and stage o f developm ent o f the 
ca p ita l m arke t.
Furtherm ore , the study is designed to  address the controvers ia l 
issue o f financ ing , in an a tte m p t to  provide an answer to  the question : 
is sm all business a t a disadvantage in ob ta in ing  adequate financ ing , or 
in o ther words, does a "sm all business financ ing  gap" ex is t in  the 
Sudan? It has been argued th a t the sm all business financ ing  gap is 
a ttr ib u ta b le  to  the norm al ca p ita l m arket opera tions (G rafer, 1968) 
and fin a n c ia l con tro l systems m ain ta ined by sm all business (Bolton,
- 3 -
1971). This study aims at exam in ing the nature o f finance  gap, i f  any, 
and the reasons o f its  existence.
It  is w ith in  the capacity  o f th is research e f fo r t  th a t the 
researcher is to  form  an opin ion on fin a n c ia l co n tro l cha rac te ris tics  of 
the sm all f irm s  and the degree o f in te ra c tio n  between finan c ing  and 
f in a n c ia l con tro l p ro file  o f sm all businesses. In th is  study an a tte m p t 
is made to  provide understanding o f the Sudanese entrepreneurs 
(elsuive heffa lum p).
In order to provide w e ll documented find ings and to  make 
genera lisations more m ean ing fu l, the issue o f the sm all business 
financ ing  has been tack led  in  th is  study from  demand and supply-side 
perspective. The fin a n c ia l in s titu tio n s  behaviour towards sm all 
business measured in to  po licy , financ ing , leve l o f docum entation, 
financ ing  instrum ents and m on ito ring  techniques and sm all business 
advisory services has been exam ined in th is study (see F igure 4.1). 
Thus, th is  study w ill exam ine to  what ex ten t sm all business is 
accommodated in the c a p ita l m arket.
In an a tte m p t to establish a model fo r sm all enterprise  
development in  the Sudan, a po licy  proposal derived from  the research 
find ings and based on in te g ra tive  approach w il l  be pro jected, ta k in g  
in to  consideration the relevancy and p ra c tic a lity  o f the proposal.
The research is set out in it ia l ly  to  address sm all businesses at 
inception , growing and dec lin ing  stage o f developm ent. The 
investiga tion  o f the dec lin ing  stage is confined to  the developm ent o f 
research case studies at the in it ia l stage o f the research process,
-  k -
because o f data co lle c tio n  problems and n o n -a v a ila b ility  o f data on 
dec lin ing  firm s  in a poor-data developing coun try lik e  Sudan.
1.2 PR AC TIC AL JUSTIFICATION OF THE SELECTION
OF SMALL BUSINESS AS A RESEARCH TOPIC
The p rospe rity  and the higher per cap ita  income in developed 
coun tries has been a ttr ib u te d  by economists to  th e ir  h igh ly  indus­
tr ia lis e d  nature . C orrespondingly the economic backwardness o f less 
developed coun tries  is considered to  be because o f lack o f in dus tria ­
lisa tio n  in those countries. The notion tha t economic developm ent is 
lin ked  to  in d u s tria lisa tio n , led less developed coun tries to  put more 
emphasis on in d u s tria l developm ent and the Sudan is no exception.
Due to  the size o f the m arket and the nature o f the services 
provided in the Sudan as a te x t exam ple o f less developed countries, 
sm all en terprises in the f ie ld  o f m anufacturing, trade  and services 
stand as a backbone o f the Sudan economy, in the sense th a t the 
success and fa ilu re  o f sm all enterprises has a great im pact on 
em ploym ent, GDP and the economy as such. Thus, the pos ition  o f 
sm all en terprises and th e ir  dom inant ro le  in the Sudan economy is the 
main argum ent behind the se lection o f th is  area o f study.
Concern ing la rge and pub lic  corporations in the Sudan, a number 
o f studies and research e ffo rts  have been conducted on sectora l and 
cross sectora l basis. On the o ther hand, there  is no comprehensive 
study in the f ie ld  o f sm all firm s  in general and sm all m anufacturing 
firm s  in p a rtic u la r, and th is  is why Government po lic ies stated and 
preceded w ith o u t adequate knowledge of the functions perform ed by
-  5 -
th is  sector. This could be a ttr ib u te d  to  con trovers ia l issues of 
econom ic developm ent. The lite ra tu re  o f econom ic developm ent (G. 
M yrda l, 1969; Nurkse, Lewis, 1955; Bangs, 1968), shows th a t the re  is 
yet no agreem ent between leading developm ent economists on which 
economic sector plays a leading ro le  in the process o f a country 's 
developm ent (Besong, 1978). Many developm ent economists tend to 
hold the view th a t the sm all indigenous business has o u tlived  its  
usefulness w h ile  others believe th a t sm all businesses form  an 
im po rtan t face t o f the economy. The econom ic development po licy  of 
the Sudan has been b u ilt  round la rge enterprises under pub lic  sector 
dom ination.
This is not to say th a t the sm all business sector in the Sudan 
encountered a com ple te  ignorance; an association has been established 
in 1980 as a trade  union fo r cra ftsm en, and in the ca p ita l m arke t 
circus, Faisal Is lam ic Bank has launched experience o f se tting  
specialised branch fo r provid ing  finance to  cra ftsm en and artisans. 
The World Bank and the European Developm ent Fund made an a tte m p t 
to  prom ote sm all scale industries in the Sudan in the la te  '70's, at 
inves tiga tion  leve l. The Management Developm ent Centre, under the 
d irec tio n  and sponsorship o f the In te rn a tio n a l Labour O rganisation 
'I.L .O ', made an unsuccessful endeavour and a tte m p t to  establish a 
sm all business section fo r provid ing  m anageria l services to  the sector 
(1976).
A ll these a ttem p ts  to  develop and enhance the ro le  o f the sm all 
business sector, have been hampered by the absence o f c lear 
Government po lic ies and finan c ia l in s titu tio n s  po lic ies towards th is  
sector. In the Sudan there is no c lea r d e fin it io n  and even the M in is try
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o f Industry has no fo rm a l d e fin it io n  o f sm all business and small 
m anufacturing f irm  in p a rticu la r. The Government po lic ies re fle c te d  
in the Investment Act 1980, and the Bank o f Sudan rules and 
regu la tions, favour big producers.
From th is  review, we could conclude th a t there is a b ig  gap 
between economic developm ent theory and practice  in connection w ith  
sm all enterprise developm ent in the Sudan. Curran and Stenworth 
(1984) expla ined th a t research should bridge the somewhat m eaning­
less d ivis ion between those who do and those who theorise . The v ita l 
question to  be raised in th is  con tex t is what symptoms or phemomena 
need to  be researched.
In the Sudan, as a te x t-b o o k  exam ple o f less developed coun tries 
w ith  a low per cap ita  income, ($200, 1976, IBRD), and consequently a 
very low margin o f savings, sm all enterprises have been developed by 
personal savings and fa m ily  w ealth . In add ition , ou t o f sm all fa m ily -  
owned m anufacturing firm s, as w e ll as sm all trad ing  enterprises, have 
grown a considerable number o f medium-sized and ra p id ly  growing 
firm s . In exp la in ing , co n tro llin g  and p red ic ting  these phenomena, a 
series o f v ita l and p e rtine n t questions need to  be raised. In th is  
research e ffo r t ,  sm all f irm  phenomena w ill be discussed w ith in  the 
con tex t o f financ ing  and fin a n c ia l con tro l as a main face t o f sm all 
en terprise  development, id e n tif ie d  by scholars (Bolton, 1971; Boswell, 
1970; Ray and Hutchinson, 1983).
The main question to be answered on the p rac tica l and 
the o re tica l level is - why financ ing  and fin a n c ia l con tro l?  In the 
Sudan, th is  is a fe r t i le  f ie ld  o f research, not on ly in sm all firm s, but
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also in pub lic and p riva te  la rge enterprises. The issue o f financ ing  and 
fin a n c ia l con tro l o f pub lic  and p riva te  enterprises, has been raised in 
the F irs t Economic Summit (1982) and the N a tiona l Economic Summit 
(1986 - March) by academics and professionals as a main reason behind 
the poor perform ance and decline o f most pub lic  and priva te
enterprises in the Sudan.
From th is  review, i t  appears th a t the theme of th is  study has an 
em p irica l ju s tif ic a tio n , in the sense th a t there  is a need to provide 
ins igh t and give a b e tte r understanding o f some o f the financ ing  
problems th a t the sm all businessman faces in the Sudan. K ilb y  (1986) 
stated th a t academics could develop action  research programmes, as 
w e ll as undertak ing  fu rth e r app lied and em p irica l research, to  
generate in fo rm a tio n  on the problems, needs and ro le , as w e ll as 
developm ent, o f sm all business. This em p irica l investiga tion  is 
d irected  to  close the sm all business concep tua liza tion  gap in the
Sudan. The pe rtin e n t question to  be raised and posed in th is  con text is 
: what is a sm all f irm ?  To th is  p o in t we tu rn  a tte n tio n  now.
1.3 WHAT IS A SMALL FIRM?
1.3.1 Small F irm  D e fin it io n  :
One o f the th e o re tica l problems w ith  regard to  research in to  
sm all firm s  is the d e fin it io n  o f sm all f irm , both among d iffe re n t 
coun tries and among d iffe re n t industries. The lack o f
encompassing d e fin it io n  o f sm all firm s  is due to  the fa c t tha t
many c r ite r ia  are employed in the d e fin it io n . H ertz (1979) 
argued tha t "the small business is one o f those phenomena
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which, though ex is ting  everywhere and freq uen tly  in the pub lic
eye, mean d iffe re n t th ings to  d iffe re n t people in  d iffe re n t places".
Ray and Hutchinson (1983) added tha t "a sm all en te rp rise  is easier
to recognise than to de fine". Osoze (1981) contended tha t
"The only thread o f com m ona lity  in in te r ­
na tiona l d e fin it io n  o f sm all business is a 
noticeab le  absence o f agreem ent in the 
lite ra tu re  as to what co n s ititu te s  a sm all 
business."
The B o lton  C om m ittee (1971) lend and extend fu rth e r support to 
the argum ent th a t there is no single d e fin it io n  o f sm all business, 
by s ta tin g  th a t : " i t  becomes c lear th a t a sm all f irm  could not be 
adequate ly defined in term s o f em ploym ent or assets turnover, 
ou tpu t or any o ther a rb itra ry  single q u a n tity , nor would the same 
d e fin it io n  be appropria te  throughout the economy".
In d e fin in g  sm all businesses, researchers and w rite rs  have 
em ployed many c r ite r ia . These c r ite r ia  could be c lass ified  in to  
q u a n tita tiv e  and q u a lita tive  ones. The q u a lita tiv e  c r ite r ia  are 
those which describe the characteris tics , the functions, and/or the 
a ttr ib u te s  which the defined possesses or lacks, regardless o f its  
q u a n tita tiv e  determ inants (Hertz, 1979). On the o the r hand, those 
which i t  is possible to  quan tify  in  a sim ple and p rac tica l manner 
are re fe rre d  to  as qua n tita tive  c r ite r ia .
Q u a lita tiv e  c r ite r ia  were considered by scholars (Hertz, 1979; 
W hite, 1977; Nappi and Vora, 1980) more profound, because of the 
notion th a t the in a b ility  to  q u a n tify  them ind ica tes more in tr in s ic  
and wholesome characteris tics. H ertz (1979) added th a t : "This 
b e lie f con tribu tes  to  the s ta b il ity  o f the q u a lita tiv e  c r ite r ia  which 
tend to  stay w ith  the defined fo r longer period o f tim e  than
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the q u a n tita tive  c r ite r ia . As a resu lt, they are also considered 
more re lia b le  and more accurate in th e ir  descrip tion o f the 
defined".
The f ir s t  q u a lita tiv e  d e fin it io n  o f smalls f irm  adopted in the 
U.S. was the d e fin it io n  embodied in  the Act 1953 which reads as 
fo llow s :
"A sm all business concern shall be deemed 
to  be one which is independently  owned 
and operated and which is not dom inant 
in its  f ie ld  o f ope ra tion".
The essentia l q u a lita tiv e  e lem ents o f th is  d e fin it io n  are three:
(1) independent ownership, (2) independent management and
(3) a sm all share o f the m arket. The Bolton C om m ittee  d e fin it io n
of sm all f irm s  (1971) was based on the 1953 A c t elements standing
as a f ir s t  q u a lita tiv e  d e fin it io n  o f sm all f irm s  in the U.K.
"F irs t ly , in  economic term s, a sm all f irm  
is one th a t has a re la tiv e ly  sm all share 
o f the m arke t. Secondly, an essential 
c h a rac te ris tic  o f a sm all f irm  is th a t i t  
is managed by its  owners or pa rt owners 
in a personalised way, and not through 
the medium o f a fo rm alised management 
s truc tu re . T h ird ly , i t  is also independent 
in the sense th a t i t  does not form  part 
o f a la rge r en terprise  so th a t the owner- 
managers should be free  from  outside 
con tro l in  tak ing  th e ir  p rinc ipa l decisions."
The Bo lton d e fin it io n  o f sm all f irm s  in troduces new elem ents to
the c r ite r ia  adopted in the U.S. d e fin it io n  by con ta in ing  the
fo llo w in g  elem ents in the prescribed order :
1. sm all m arket share
2. p riva te  ownership
3. ow ner/part-ow ner management
4. personalised management
5. not a subsidiary.
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G a lb ra ith  (1975) defined sm all firm s  from  a m anageria l po in t o f 
v iew  by s ta tin g  th a t : " I t  is useful to  describe the sm all firm s in 
q u a lita tiv e  term s as one in which the ope ra tiona l and adm in is tra ­
t iv e  m anagement lie  in the hands o f one or two people who are 
responsible fo r the firm 's  major decisions".
The German (West) d e fin it io n  o f sm all f irm s  (1978) adds and 
in troduces new elem ents and c r ite r ia  in d e fin in g  sm all businesses.
"By ............  sm all and medium enterprises are meant enterprises
which do not as a ru le  borrow on the c a p ita l m arke t and which are 
run independently  by persons working on th e ir  own account, who 
are themselves d ire c tly  involved in the work o f the f irm  and bear 
a ll the risks."
Regarding q u a n tita tive  c r ite r ia , a research work conducted by 
G eorgia In s titu te  o f Technology (U.S.), (1975) about sm all business 
d e fin it io n  in 75 countries discovered th a t none had an exclusive 
q u a lita t iv e  d e fin it io n , but th a t a ll had a q u a n tita tiv e  one; out o f 
these 75 coun tries only six used a q u a lita tiv e  d e fin it io n  in 
a d d itio n  to  the q u a n tita tive  one. I t  had been suggested th a t the 
choice o f the q u a n tita tive  c r ite r ia  is based on the b e lie f th a t the 
q u a n tita tiv e  c r ite r ia  are more appropria te  in de fin ing  a small 
business. The advantages o f q u a n tita tive  c r ite r ia  in de fin ing  small 
businesses have been c le a rly  expressed in th e ir  num erica l 
sp e c ifica tio n . On the con tra ry , the q u a n tita tive  c r ite r ia  su ffe r 
from  a rb itra riness  and environm enta l lim ita tio n s  (Ray and 
Hutchinson, 1983).
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W ith in  the con text o f q u a n tita tive  and q u a lita tiv e  c r ite r ia  adopted 
by researcher and p rac titione rs  in de fin ing  sm all business in developed 
and developing economies, the  c r ite r ia  could be summarised and 
classifed as fo llows:
Table 1.1
C r ite r ia  o f sm all f irm  d e fin it io n  :




1. to ta l asset size X
2. number o f employees X
3. sales volume X
4. p ro f it  level X
3. re levan t position o f the 
company w ith in  the 
industry
X
6. m arket share X
7. p riva te  ownership X
8. ow ner/part-ow ner manager X
9. personalised management X
10. re s tr ic tiv e  access to 
the cap ita l m arket X





Review o f the lite ra tu re  on sm all business d e fin it io n  
ind ica tes th a t sm all f irm  d e fin it io n  is connected by programme 
and scheme or po licy , the re fo re  the c r ite r ia  fo r small f irm  
d e fin it io n  vary according to the con tex t. The existence o f sm all 
f irm  d e fin it io n  im p lies the conceptua lisa tion  o f sm all business, 
regardless o f the macro ob jective  behind the po licy . The v ita l 
p o in t is : what is the position  o f sm all business in developing 
economies at th is leve l o f de te rm ina tion  and d e fin it io n  o f the 
sector?
D e fin it io n  o f sm all industries in some 
o f the Developing Countries :
The d e fin it io n  o f sm all industries in the developing countries 
varies from  country to coun try . N orm a lly  they are based on one or 
more fac to rs  inc lud ing  investm ents, em ploym ent and turnover. In 
d e fin in g  the sm all f irm  in N igeria , Osaze (1981) states th a t : "A 
sm all business is one which is owned, managed and co n tro lle d  by 
one or tw o  persons, is fa m ily  in fluenced in con tro l and decision­
m aking, has an u n d iffe re n tia te d  organ isation s tructure , has a 
re la t iv e ly  sm all share o f the m arke t and employs less than 100 
people". Based on Bolton and G a lb ra ith 's  approach, Osaze adds 
another dimension - fa m ily  - to  the d e fin it io n  o f sm all f irm  in 
deve lop ing countries. Chata and L iedho lm  (1982) quote the 
d e fin it io n  o f sm all-scale industry provided in the S ie r ra . Leone 
"Sm all Scale Industries Act, 1981", "sm all scale en terprise  is an 
indus try  or en terprise  whose fixe d  assets and annual ou tpu t is not 
in excess of U.S.$118,000 and U.S.$236,000 respective ly  and 
em ploym ent is not less than 15 persons and not more than 50 
persons". These q u a n tita tive  c r ite r ia  have been used in Kenya,
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Ghana and Zambia in de fin ing  sm all business.
In Tanzania, the fo rm a l d e fin it io n  o f sm all business was 
based on the con text and the geographica l lo ca tion . For the 
purpose o f financing , the sm all industry  is defined as : "any 
in dus tria l un it having a to ta l investm ent in land, bu ild ing , 
m achinery, equipment and o ther fixe d  assets not exceeding 
T.Shs.3 m illions ; i f  the un it is located in urban area but outside 
any 'SIDO' in d u s tria l estate, and T.Shs.3 m illio ns  i f  i t  is located 
inside 'SIDO' estate where a shed is provided or in a ru ra l area, 
beyond any Regional Headquarters (UNIDO, 1983).
The w orking pa rty  on sm all-sca le industries o f the Economic 
Commission fo r Asia and the Far East (1932) defined sm all 
business on qua n tita tive  and q u a lita tiv e  basis, as "one which is 
operated m ain ly w ith  hired labour, usually not exceeding 30 
workers in any establishm ent or u n it not using any m otive power 
in any opera tion , or 20 workers in an establishm ent or u n it using 
such power not exceeding 30 horse power". In Indonesia, sm all 
f irm  d e fin it io n  re fle c ts  the e ffe c t o f the con tex t and the  de fin ing  
agency on the se lection o f c r ite r ia  and d e fin it io n  param eters. The 
C en tra l Bureau o f S ta tis tics  c lass ifies sm all scale enterprises from  
the po in t o f view o f ru ra l en te rp rise  -  the Tanzanian approach - as 
a un it em ploying 3-9 workers. The Bank o f Indonesia as a 
fin a n c ia l body defines a sm all en terprise  in fin a n c ia l term s. The 
M in is try  o f Industry as a po licy-m aker defines a sm all enterprise  
in term s of investm ent and ownership. That sort o f va ria tio n  in 
de fin ing  th is  sector re flec ts  the lack o f in teg ra ted  po licy  and 
programmes between the in te res ted  and concerned agencies to
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prom ote and help sm all-scale industries in Indonesia. That which 
is said about Indonesia could be app licab le  to  many developing 
coun tries in  the Asian and the A frican  continents.
These varia tions in s ta tis tic a l, q u a n tita tive  and q u a lita tiv e  
c r ite r ia  used in  defn ing the sm all f irm , make i t  ex tre m e ly  d i f f ic u lt  
to  make va lid  comparisons o f the im portance and s ign ificance o f 
sm all f irm s  in various countries. A lthough the 'SBA' is considered 
the agency fo r U.S. sm all business in terests, its  d e fin it io n  is not 
u n ifo rm a lly  accepted by s ta te  and fede ra l agencies. This is 
because the c r ite r ia  used and adopted in de fin ing  the sm all f irm  
are based on the stage o f developm ent o f the economy, and the 
p a rtic u la r environm ent in which the d e fin it io n  is being used. The 
p e rtin e n t question to be raised is to what ex ten t is the sm all 
business sector determ ined and conceptualised in the Sudan.
In the Sudan there is no single fo rm a l d e fin it io n  fo r sm all 
industries. W ith in  the Developm ent and Encouragement o f 
Indus tria l Investment Act 1974, the Government refers to  sm all 
in d u s tr ia l projects as 'c ra ft ' which i t  defines as : "Any industry 
ca rried  out by any person or persons whose work basica lly  depends 
upon various p rim ary and in te rm ed ia ry  m ate ria ls  and in which 
some sim ple equipment, too ls and machinery are used or manual 
p roduction  o f some fin a l or in te rm ed ia ry  com m odities lia b le  fo r 
d ire c t c irc u la tio n  or consumption or any in dus tria l work decided 
by the M in is te r". The In s titu te  o f Industria l Research and 
Consultancy defines sm all-scale industries on the basis o f to ta l 
c a p ita l em ployed and em ploym ent.
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"Sm all scale industry is one which has a 
to ta l c a p ita l investm ent o f L.S.40,000 - 
L.S.200,00 and em ploying 10-50 workers."
The Sudan Association o f H and icra fts  (SAH) has its  own d e fin it io n
fo r sm all enterprises. "A ll persons who have a c e r t if ie d  licence
from  the au tho ritie s  and who em ploy one or more persons and who
work on a c ra ft which is being done in an in d u s tria l area." This
d e fin it io n  has been used by Faisal Islam ic Bank in establish ing its
specialised branch.
The Management Developm ent Centre defines sm all-scale
industry as one em ploying less than 50 workers. In the Industria l
Survey (1981/82), sm all f irm  has been defined as an enterprise
em ploying less than 25 persons. In studying sm all industries sector
in the Sudan, the U n ited Nations Indus tria l Development
O rganisation (UNIDO) has defined small industry  as :
"... a local undertaking em ploying  less than 
50 workers and having a to ta l investm ent in 
land, bu ild ings, m achinery, equipm ent and 
o ther fixe d  assets not exceeding L.S.350,000."
Despite the  declared in te n tio n  o f the Sudanese Industria l 
Bank (S.I.B.) to prom ote and develop sm all industry , the bank has 
not c la r if ie d  precise ly what i t  means by sm all-sca le industry. A 
po licy  paper on sm all-scale industries in the Sudan (1978) has been 
prepared by a bank o ff ic ia l which does not represent the o f f ic ia l 
bank view. W ith in  the subject paper, a d e fin it io n  o f sm all-scale 
industry  was stated : "sm all industries organised on re la tiv e ly  
modern lines producing consumer goods and o ffe r in g  advantages 
such as im port substitu tion  may have an in it ia l investm ent ranging 
from  L.S.50,000 and L .S .l00,000 and em ploying a labour force 
from  20 to 100 persons; i t  would mean an investm ent per worker
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of L.S.1,000." The Sudan Development C o rpora tion  as a finan c ia l 
body defines sm all scale industries and sm all projects as having 
investm ent up to  U.S.$25,000 w ith in  a spec ific  pro ject.
However, these de fin itions  or c lass ifica tions do not have 
much s ign ificance as none of the above carries any special 
programme or gives any special preference fo r the development o f 
sm all industries. These could be regarded as d e fin itio n s  fo r 
s ta tis tica l purposes.
The Research W orking D e fin it io n :
Bates (1971) argued tha t : " I t  probably does not m a tte r much 
in practice  which measure is chosen provided th a t i t  is reasonably 
accurate ly ca lcu la ted , has some relevance to  the problem under 
discussion and is used consistently during an inves tiga tion ." Based 
on the argum ents o f scholars in the f ie ld  o f sm all business (the 
Bolton C om m ittee , 1971; G albra ith , 1975; U.S. Small Business Act, 
1953; H ertz, 1979; Osoze, 1981), the w ork ing  d e fin it io n  o f sm all 
m anufacturing firm s  in a developing economy - Sudan -  w il l  be 
based on the fo llo w in g  dimensions :
1. The f irs t  dimension is em ploym ent. The em ploym ent has 
been adopted by various w rite rs  and p rac tition e rs  in drawing 
a dem arcation line  between sm all and large enterprise  in 
developed economies. Hertz (1979) went fu rth e r by con­
sidering the em ploym ent c r ite r ia  as the most re lia b le  and 
profound q u a lita tive  c r ite r ia , provid ing an answer to  the 
critic ism s which based on the degree o f arb itra riness em­
bodied in the number o f employees as a c r ite r io n  fo r small 
f irm  d e fin it io n .
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2. The second c r ite r io n  selected fo r de fin ing  sm all business in
th is study is ownership. Researchers assert th a t ownership is
the most re lia b le  and accurate q u a lita tiv e  c r ite r io n . However, 
the use o f ownership alone as a measure cannot re a lly  be
adopted as a c r ite r io n  fo r  de fin ing  sm all business.
3. Based on G a lb ra ith 's  approach, owner or part-ow ner manage­
ment and con tro l has been selected as a q u a lita tiv e  c r ite r io n  
fo r de fin ing  sm all business in th is  study.
4. The fou rth  and last dimension is based on the psychological
aspect, ta k in g  independence in ownership, management and 
con tro l and decision m aking as a c r ite r io n  fo r  de fin ing  small 
business.
These q u a n tita tive  and q u a lita tiv e  c r ite r ia  have been selected
so as to  sa tis fy  the research problem  under investiga tion , the
nature o f the research, which is em p irica l and the m ethodology
adopted. Therefore, the w ork ing  d e fin it io n  adopted is a
com bination  o f q u a lita tive  and q u a n tita tive  c r ite r ia . For the
purpose o f the research work a sm all f irm  is defined as :
"One which is independently  owned, managed 
and con tro lled  by ow ner/part-ow ner making 
a ll decisions over the com ple te  range of 
a c tiv itie s  and em ploying less than 50 persons."
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Figure No. 1-1

















1.3.2 D e fin it io n  o f stages o f sm all Enterprise Developm ent?
To define the stages o f sm all en terprise  development, 
accurate, re lia b le  and re levan t c r ite r ia  w i l l  be selected, provided 
th a t they meet the research problem , and the environm ent in 
which the d e fin it io n  is being used. To s ta te  a w ork ing  d e fin it io n  
fo r a sm all f irm  at incep tion , the tim e scale and life t im e  o f the 
en te rp rise  has been used as a c r ite r ia . For the purpose o f th is 
research work, sm all f irm  at inception is defined as one which
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established and commenced its  business opera tion  in (1980-1985). 
The tim e -sca ling  has been used as a c r ite r io n , on the grounds tha t 
i t  matches the research problem and the m ethodology d irec ted  to  
tes t e m p ir ic a lly  the tra d it io n a l theory.
In genera l, an increase in size is regarded as grow th, although 
N oe ll and Hydebrand (1971) contended th a t : "G rowth is not 
m ere ly  an increase in size, but of o ther facto rs  as w e ll."  They 
suggested th a t growth has both q u a lita tiv e  and qua n tita tive  
dimensions. Starbuck (1965), however, re fe rs  to  changes in the 
q u a lita t iv e  dimensions as development and to  changes in the 
q u a n tita tiv e  dimensions as growth. Consistent w ith  the d is tin c tion  
made by Starbuck, changes in the q u a n tita tive  dimensions have 
been considered as growth by Ford (1980). In his review  o f size 
li te ra tu re  K im b e rly  (1976) indicates th a t grow th may be viewed as 
an increase in physical capacity, number o f people, inputs or 
outputs, or d iscre tionary  resources.
Based on q u a n tita tive  dimension, Tam ari and his group (1971) 
de fined a fas t grow ing firm  as one in which sales grow by 15% a 
year in  m anufacturing  or by 10% a year in  non-m anufacturing . On 
the o the r hand a slow growing firm  was defined by the Bolton 
C om m ittee  (1971) as one in which the sales rem ained s ta tio n a ry  or 
rem ained constant, or declined. Ray, P iper and Hutchinson (1975) 
added another dimension by tak ing  an increase in the asset size as 
a c r ite r io n  fo r d e fin ing  small, growing firm s. In de fin ing  a sm all 
grow ing f irm  in a developing economy - N ige ria  - Osaze (1981) 
contended th a t : "an enterprise which had experienced rapid 
grow th over a re la tiv e ly  short period of tim e  .....  in th is  case,
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at least doubled its  turnover or asset size."
Based on qua n tita tive  c r ite r ia , a sm all grow ing f irm  is defined 
in th is  study as one which experienced change in assets, sales and 
asset turnover. To match the em p irica l research nature, a 
percentage change is used to  augment the qua n tita tive  c r ite r ia . 
Taking in to  consideration the nature o f the research se tting  - 
m anufacturing industry - and o ther econom ic ind ica to rs  -  in fla tio n  
and p ric ing  - a 100% increase in sales and asset size is used as a 
precise q u a n tita tive  c r ite r io n  fo r de fin ing  sm all, grow ing firm s  in 
the developing economy - Sudan.
W ith respect to  declin ing  and fa ilu re , Dun and Bradstreet, Inc. 
defines fa ilu re  as : "Those businesses th a t cease operations 
fo llo w in g  assignment or bankruptcy; ceased w ith  loss to  cred ito rs  
a fte r such actions as execution, foreclosure, or a ttachm ent, 
v o lu n ta r ily  w ithdraw  leaving unpaid ob liga tions; were involved in 
court actions such as receivership, re -o rgan isa tion , or arrangem ent 
v o lu n ta r ily  compromised w ith  c red ito rs ." Beaver (1966) defined 
fa ilu re  as a firm  declaring bankruptcy, overdraw ing its  bank 
account or d e fau lting  on in te res t payments on its  debts. Deakin 
(1972) defined fa ilu re  as those firm s  which experienced bank­
ruptcy, insolvency, or otherw ise liqu ida ted  fo r  the b e n e fit o f the 
cred ito rs . L ibby (1972) and Edm ister (1970) on addressing the 
problem  and p red ic tion  o f fa ilu re  in la rge and sm all enterprises 
respective ly  were concerned w ith  those firm s  who fa ile d  to  meet 
th e ir  loan ob liga tions. Gupta (1983) c r it ic is e d  the d e fin it io n  of 
fa ilu re  adopted by Beaver and o ther scholars, arguing tha t :
- 21 -
" .....  however, in  re a lity ,  bankruptcy is only
the cu lm ina tion . F a ilu re , in the true 
econom ic sense, m igh t in fa c t have occured 
several years p rio r to  bankruptcy proceedings."
In a developing economy - Ind ia  -  the fa ilu re  o f an enterprise 
usually cu lim ina tes  not in a bankruptcy p e tit io n , but in govern­
m ent take-over o f the fa ile d  en terprise  (Gupta, 1983).
From  th is  review  i t  is obvious th a t most researchers and 
w rite rs  on the fa ilu re  problem assert th a t the cessation of 
operations, fa ilu re  to meet f in a n c ia l ob liga tions, insolvency, 
d e fa u ltin g  on loan in te res t and re -o rgan isa tion  and bankruptcy can 
be considered as main elem ents in  de fin ing  fa ilu re  in developed 
and developing economies. For the purpose o f th is  research work, 
a dec lin ing  and fa ile d  firm  is defined as one which is deadly 
bankrupt, insolvent or under re -o rgan isa tion  regardless o f the 
nature o f re -o rgan isa tion  - v o lu n ta r ily  or by order.
Given th a t the stages o f sm all en terprise  developm ent are 
de fined , the next log ica l scholary step is to  decide what type of 
stage model is to  be used in sa tis fy ing  the research question. To 
th is  po in t we tu rn  now.
l.fr STAGES OF SMALL ENTERPRISES DEVELOPMENT
The po in t o f departure on the survey o f the lite ra tu re  on sm all 
business stage mode o f growth is one o f A lfre d  M arshall's best known 
analogies between the stocks o f the firm s  in an economy and trees in 
a fo res t. " A t a po in t in tim e, M arshall argued, there were large trees
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and sm all trees w ith  the two apparently  liv in g  s ide-by-side in harmony. 
However, some of the sm all trees are grow ing rap id ly , others are 
s tagna ting  and others declin ing. Some sm all trees would even tua lly  
grow so ra p id ly  as to replace the la rge r trees, w ith  the fo rest 
constan tly  evolving and changing, p a rtly  in response to  outside 
c ircum stances." (D. Story, 1983 - Entrepreneursh ip and the New F irm )
In th e ir  paper 'A  Typology o f Small Businesses Hypothesis and
P re lim in a ry  S tudy1 N. C hurch ill and V. Lewis (1983) show the
im portance o f c lass ifica tion  and ca tegorisa tion  o f sm all business in to
stage o f developm ent and growth fo r sharpening and understanding o f
the nature, characte ris tics  and problems o f sm all businesses.
"O ften  when you read about sm all businesses 
or lis ten  to  discussions o f sm all business 
problems, you may experience a ce rta in  
amount o f ba ttlem en t. W hile one person 
may be discussing the problems o f a 300- 
employee m anufacturing  company, another 
w ill be focusing on his neighborhood 
restaurant."
C h u rch ill and Lewis (1985) contended th a t unnoticed considerable 
d iffe rences between sm all businesses produces some pernicious e ffects :
-  A governm enta l po licy  passed w ith  one type o f sm all business in 
m ind may or may not be o f be n e fit to  the others.
-  Counsel given by the manager o f one business to  the manager o f 
another could be ill-adv ised .
- Tax and accounting regu la tions designed to  ben e fit one type o f 
business may be irre le va n t or even ha rm fu l to  others.
This is a research e ffo r t  w ith  an ob jective  to  exp lore  the area of 
financ ing  and fin a n c ia l con tro l of sm all m anufacturing  firm s  a t various 
stages o f developm ent, a ttem p ting  to develop a model fo r small
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ente rp rise  development in the Sudan. A c ruc ia l and a foca l po in t 
needing to  be raised is what stages are to be covered and on what 
dim ension w i l l  the stage be conceptualised. To de linea te  stages of 
sm all en te rp rise  developm ent, various models developed by researchers 
and theo ris ts  in the f ie ld  o f stage growth model at theory construction  
and e m p ir ic a l exam ination  leve l, have been exam ined c r it ic a l ly  in the 
fo llo w in g  discussion.
G re iner (1972) described organ isation as evolving through five  
stages o f developm ent, w ith  each stage characterised by an organis­
a tio n a l s truc tu re  and a management s ty le . The th ings th a t changed 
from  stage to  stage in G reiner's fo rm u la tio n  were the o rgan isa tiona l 
s truc tu re , the  degree o f m anageria l de lega tion , and the ex ten t and 
types o f fo rm a l contro ls. S te inm etz (1969) theorised th a t to  survive, 
sm all business must move through fou r stages o f growth :
1. D ire c t supervision
2. Supervised supervision
3. In d ire c t con tro l
4. D iv is iona l organ isation
S im ila r to  S teinm etz, Roland and Bruce developed a grow th model 
based on organ isa tiona l com p lex ities  and management s ty le . They 
fo rm u la te d  th ree  stages th a t a company moves through, as i t  grows in 
overa ll size, number o f products and m arket coverage.
1. One u n it management w ith  no specialised organ isation parts - 
'p ioneer'.
2. One un it management w ith  func tiona l parts - 'fu n c tio n a l'.
3. M u ltip le  opera ting  units, such as divisions.
The main c rit ic ism  which could be raised against the G reiner,
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Steinm etz and Roland and Bruce models is th a t a ll these models are 
one-d im ensional, in  the sense th a t they are based on organ isa tiona l 
co m p le x ity  and management s ty le .
In developing the tra d it io n a l view o f the fin a n c ia l life -c y c le  o f 
the firm , Weston and Brigham (1978) suggested six stages fo r 
en te rp rise  developm ent: inception , grow th (1), growth (2), growth (3), 
m a tu rity  and decline (see Table 1.2). The Weston and Brigham model 
was based on the  financ ing  as w e ll as management o f sm all firm s, in 
the sense tha t, w ith  each stage characterised by fin a n c ia l and 
m anageria l p ro file . I t  was a m u lti-d im ens iona l approach as compared 
to  the G riener and Steinm etz models.
The Weston and Brigham model was used by Ray and Hutchinson 
(1983) in addressing the issue o f financ ing  and fin a n c ia l co n tro l o f 
super-grow th firm s  in B rita in . In in ves tiga ting  the fin a n c ia l p ro file  o f 
rap id  and non-rapid growth sm all firm s  in N igeria , Osaze (1981) 
m od ified  the  Weston and Brigham model in to  c lass ifica tions o f grow th 
stages in to  ea rly , rap id  and developm ent growth.
The main weakness o f the Weston and Brigham model is based on 
the assumption th a t the company must grow and pass through a ll 
stages o f developm ent ending in decline and collapse, g iv ing  no 
consideration to  the fa c t th a t a f irm  may die in the  a tte m p t to  grow. 
E m p irica l research in to  small firm s  (K n igh t, 1984; Edm ister, 1970) 
provides evidence th a t the death ra te  o f sm all f irm s  is very high at 
in fancy stage o f development.
McGuire fo rm u la te d  a model th a t saw companies moving through
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Table 1.2
The tra d it io n a l view o f the finan c ia l 
l i fe  cycle o f the firm
Stage Source o f Finance




Inception Owners' resources Under­
ca p ita lisa tio n
Personal
management
G rowth (1) As above plus :
- Retained p ro fits
- Trade c red it
- Bank loans/overdrafts
- H ire purchase
- Leasing
"O vertrad ing"
liq u id ity
cris is
G rowth (2) As above plus :
- Long term  finance 
from  fin a n c ia l 





Growth (3) As above plus : 
-  New issue m arket
Loss o f 
con tro l
11
M a tu rity A ll sources ava ilab le M aint.
(R O l)
D ecline W ithdrawal o f finance :
- F irm  taken over
- Share repurchase
- L iqu ida tion
Fa lling
(R O l)
In su ffic ie n t
management
fo res igh t
X Weston and Brigham (1978) 
X Ray and Hutchinson (1983)
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f ive  stages o f econom ic development : (1) tra d it io n a l sm all company, 
(2) p lanning fo r grow th, (3) ta k e -o ff or departure from  ex is ting  
cond itions, (4) drive  to professional management and (5) mass 
production . The McGuire model was a c lear exp lana tion  to  the 
s ta tem ent o f M arshall on the pos ition  o f firm s  in the economy.
In exam in ing  sm all enterprise  developm ent, C hu rch ill and Lewis 
(1983) have developed a model la b e llin g  five  stages fo r small 
en te rp rise  developm ent (see F igure 1.2) : (1) existence, (2) survival, (3) 
success, (4) ta k e -o ff and (3) resource m a tu rity  - 'b ig  company'. In 
deve lop ing th is  model the authors c r it ic ise d  previous attem pts at 
devising models o f the sm all business growth on three counts. F irs tly , 
they assume a business must grow and pass through a ll the postulated 
stages. Secondly, the models fa i l  to  capture  the ea rly  stages o f the 
process and, th ird ly ,  most concentrate on size, measured by annual 
sales or number o f employees, bu t ignore o ther fac to rs  such as value 
added or co m p le x ity  o f product line .
Weston and Brigham (1978) and C h u rch ill and Lewis (1983), in 
fo rm u la tin g  th e ir  models, agreed on most stages and the dimensions; 
the m ain d iffe re n ce  between the subject models is th a t Weston and 
Brigham  considered decline and collapse as a separate stage, w h ile  
C h u rch ill and Lewis based th e ir  model on the p ro b a b ility  th a t a 
business may fa i l  com p le te ly  and drop from  sight a t any stage o f 
en terprise  developm ent.
In his review  artic le  'Int. Small B.' (J. W inter, 1984), Curran 
criticised the Churchill and Lewis model on the ground that :
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Figure No.1.2
C h urch ill and Lewis Model










" I t  is fa ir ly  typ ica l of its  kind a lb e it 
developing some aspects o f the theory in 
more de ta il than is usual but i t  does not 
re a lly  escape from  the cen tra l weaknesses 
o f th is approach. The main c rit ic ism  
against th is model is th a t i t  was based on 
a non-testable hypothesis which is no help 
fo r developing a proper theory ."
The stages theories have been c ritic ise d  by Stanworth and Curran
(1976) as, in p rinc ip le , inappropria te  fo r the study o f small f irm
grow th, on the grounds th a t the owner-managed enterprise  sim ply does
not fu n c tio n  in the linea r, casually linked pa tte rn  basica lly required by
the stage theories. Stanworth and Curran (1976) added tha t :
"The small f irm  here is seen as passing 
through a sequence of grow th stages though 
there is l i t t le  discussion on whether th is  is 
a necessary progression or whether, under 
ce rta in  conditions, one or more stages may 
be missed out or va ria tio n  in the sequence 
occur."
Based on the models developed by Weston and Brigham (1978) and 
C h u rch ill and Lewis (1983), the study w ill exp lore  financ ing  and 
fin a n c ia l con tro l p ro file  of small firm s at th ree  stages of sm all 
en te rp rise  developm ent - inception, growing and dec lin ing , tak ing  in to  
considera tion  the p ro b a b ility  o f fa ilu re  and success at a ll stages of 
deve lopm ent. The selection of Weston and Brigham model and 
C h u rch ill and Lewis model was based on the fa c t th a t both models 
were m u lti-d im en s iona l and suit the theme o f the research work, 
focusing on the id e n tif ic a tio n  and establishm ent o f the fin a n c ia l and 
m anageria l p ro file  o f small firm s at s ta rt-up , grow ing and declin ing  
stages o f developm ent - (see part 1.3 fo r d e fin it io n  and ope ra tiona l­
isa tion  o f stages o f sm all enterprise development).
Figure No.1.3
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The research stage model was used by the researcher in 
developing research case studies as a m ethodology fo r em pirica l 
exam ination  o f the ana ly tica l fram ework and generation and 
developm ent o f testab le  research hypotheses (see Vo l.II). In the 
process o f em p irica l test o f the research hypotheses, the model was 
used as a fram ew ork to  co llec t data and to categorise and classify  
sm all f irm  research sample accordingly.
The lim ita tio n  o f th is research model, which in d ire c tly  re flec ts  
the lim ita t io n  of the research work is tha t the fram ew ork has been
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tested on re trospective  data or observation at a single po in t in tim e  
instead o f ta k in g  a long itud ina l approach (Stanworth and Curran, 
1976). The second lim ita tio n  of th is  study embodies the fa c t th a t the 
research addresses the stages o f development ra ther than the 
tra n s it io n  process.
The analysis o f the survey results (chapters 5-10), stood as an 
em p irica l tes t o f the research stage model, along the way, to establish 
the finan c ing  characteris tics, financ ia l and m anageria l p ro file  o f sm all 
businesses at various stages of development (incep tion  and growing).
1.5 and 1.6 GENERAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION
1.5 SMALL BUSINESS IN DEVELOPED 
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
1.5.1 Sm all Business in Developed Countries :
The review  of lite ra tu re  shows th a t developed countries a ttach  a 
h igher degree o f im portance to sm all businesses as a basis fo r  th e ir  
econom ic developm ent. In the U n ited States (U.S.A.), the general 
c lim a te  towards sm all businesses is favourable. The im portance o f 
sm all firm s  in U.S. economy could be see through the observation o f 
R e illy  in Duns Review (1980) :
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"D uring the Afghan and Iran ian cris is 
President C a rte r cance lled a ll speaking 
engagements except th a t to 2,000 en tre ­
preneurs a ttend ing  a W hite House con fe r­
ence on sm all businesses. This is an 
ind ica tion  o f the esteem in which the 
sm all f irm  and its  owner is now held 
by the W hite House."
The id e n tif ic a tio n  o f small business as a separate e n tity  in the 
U.S. began w ith  the establishm ent o f the 'SBA' in 1953. Leyden (1983) 
added tha t : "By alm ost any count, i t  is c lear th a t U.S. business 
consists p redom inantly  o f small firm s". B irth  (1979) showed, from  a 
study o f 82 percent o f a ll m anufacturing and p riva te  sector service 
establishm ents in the U.S., tha t two th irds  o f net new jobs were created 
in f irm s  em ploying less than 20 people. S torey (1983 ).added th a t : 
"The independence and asp ira tion o f the entrepreneur has always been 
part o f the na tiona l cu ltu re  in the United States."
Regarding sm all business po licy and the fin a n c ia l fa c ilit ie s  
ava ilab le  to  sm all business, a growing pub lic  awareness o f the  special 
problem s faced by sm all business in the United States is dem onstrated 
not on ly  by congressional hearings and a w ide ly-pub lished W hite House 
conference devoted to  sm all business, but also - and more ta ng ib ly  - by 
the a c tiv itie s  o f the 'SBA' provid ing finance and advice to  small 
business (Leyden, 1983). These sort o f fa c il it ie s  under U.S. 
Government support and encouragement ind ica tes the degree of 
im portance attached to  small business in U.S. economy.
The issue of sm all business in the U.K. has a h is to ry  going back to 
the M acm illan  R eport in 1931. Regarding the economic sign ificance 
o f sm all business, Bannock (1976) shows th a t in the m anufacturing 
sector sm all enterprises represent 94 percent o f the to ta l firm s in 1968
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Cross (1983) classifed the Government measures to assist sm all firm s 
in the U.K. in to  finan c ia l, po licy, taxa tion , in fo rm a tion , education, 
em ploym ent and export awards. As a response to  the e x p lic it  
Government po licy towards sm all businesses in the U.K., Bolton Report, 
1971; Wilson Report (1979); the universities, fin a n c ia l in s titu tio n s  and 
research organisations have taken special in te res t in the ac tiv itie s , 
survival and growth o f sm all firm s.
Broadly, the  EEC looks at a ll measures concerned w ith  p o lit ic a l 
action , le g is la tion  on business com petition  and concentra tion . A rtic le  
26(1) of the Rome Convention between the European C om m unity and 
The A frican-C aribbean P acific  states (ACP) gives power fo r  the EEC to 
support the sm all and medium-sized businesses o f the 'ACP' countries.
In Japan, as a text-book example of a developed and indus­
tr ia lis e d  oountry in the fa r east, the sm all f irm  is exceedingly 
im portan t in almost a ll sectors of Japanese industry and commerce. 
Anthony (1983) added tha t : "Sm all business is part o f the social as
w e ll as economic fab ric  o f Japan  The Japanese governm ent has
in s titu te d  a range of measures to provide positive assistance to  sm all 
business.
It  is apparent tha t the main point emphasised by a ll developed 
coun tries , is th a t small businesses should be encouraged to p lay an 
im po rtan t ro le  in the process o f indus tria lisa tion . This ro le  is 
especia lly app licab le  to the developing countries. An in te res ting  
question needing to be raised in th is  con text is to what ex ten t has 
sm all business in developing countries received support and encourage­
ment as compared to developed countries.
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1.3.2 Small Business in Developing C ountries :
In developing countries, sm all businesses exist on un-structured 
fin a n c ia l systems, la rge -o rien ted  environm ent and they tend to  survive 
in sp ite  o f shortages and s t i l l  provide a service (F itzp a tric k , 1976). 
W ith respect to the developm ent of small firm s  in developing 
coun tries, Neck (1983) expla ined th a t the im m edia te  and m edium -term  
prospects fo r  prom oting sm all enterprise  in A fr ica  are no t encouraging. 
Few, i f  any, countries in the region possess a c lea r, workab le stra tegy 
fo r  o rde rly  development o f the sm all business sector. U n til d e fin ite  
po licy  issues are developed, the sector w ill continue to  shudder along, 
as i t  has in the past, ope ra ting  m ain ly in an ad hoc opportun is tic  
manner (S torey, 1983). Those supporting the sm all business sector as 
an econom ic development vehic le , believe th a t its  growth in 
deve lop ing economies has been hampered by the unreasonable 
re luctance o f government o ff ic ia ls  to deal w ith  th is  sector in a low 
demand by government fo r its  services. It has been fu rth e r argued by 
developm ent economists th a t governments have pos itive ly  d iscrim ­
ina ted  in favour o f firm s  in the fo rm a l sector by o ffe r in g  access to 
c re d it, fo re ign  exchange concessions, etc.
As fa r  as the A frican  region is concerned, w rite rs  (Neck, 1981;
S torey, 1983) c lass ified  the region in to  four categories, in  re la tio n  to
sm all en te rp rise  development po licy , as fo llow s :
1. South A fr ica
"sm all firm s  in the segments o f the Republic o f South 
A frica  can be said to  match those found in several 
industria lised  countries in terms o f e ffic ie n cy  and 
qua lity ." (K ilb y , 1986)
2. "sm all firm s in Egypt, Ethopia and N igeria  could w e ll 
be placed at a m iddle under level o f rank ing  on any 
w orld  scale." (Storey, 1983)
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3. "The f irs t  steps in the o rde rly  development o f the 
sm all enterprise sector have been taken in Cameroon, 
Zambia, Tanzania
4. "P o lit ic a l in s ta b ility  or governm ent by m ilita ry  ru le
has hampered the sector's progress in such countries 
as Uganda, Chad, ................  and Sudan."
The forego ing discussion (1.5.1 and 1.5.2) shows th a t developed 
and indus tria lised  countries give more consideration to  the prom otion 
and development o f sm all business sector than developing countries 
and p a rtic u la r ly  the A frican  region. This con trad ic ts  the fac t th a t a 
developing country w ith  scarce resources and a high ra te  o f popula tion 
grow th, needs sm all business as a p a rtia l so lu tion  fo r poverty and as a 
veh ic le  fo r economic development. The foca l po in t needing to be 
raised is what the socio-econom ic im portance o f the sm all f irm  sector, 
how sm aller firm s  f i t  in to  the m anufacturing p ic tu re  o f the Sudan and 
the position o f the sm all business sector in the government 
developm ent po licy . To th is  po in t, we d irec t a tte n tio n  now.
1.6 MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES AND THE 
SMALL BUSINESS SECTOR IN THE SUDAN
1.6.1 Sudan Economy :
The Sudan provides a textbook exam ple o f a developing coun try. 
It is estim ated tha t 80 percent o f the country 's  popu la tion  is engaged 
in a g ricu ltu re  and/or livestock ac tiv itie s . According to U.N. 
te rm in o lo gy  the Sudan is one o f the tw e n ty -fiv e  least developed 
coun tries in the w orld . The Sudan shares a number o f economic 
cha rac te ris tics  w ith  these countries, i.e. low per cap ita  income, GDP,
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share o f m anufacturing sector in GDP and il l i te ra c y  o f 75 percent or 
more (UNISCO, 1978).
According to the M in is try  of Finance - Sudan - report on
econom ic perform ance (1984), the na tiona l economy o f Sudan showed a 
progressive trend during the years 1978/79 to 1981/82 reg is te rin g  a 
grow th ra te  o f 4% per annum in GDP. But from  1982/83 onwards, its  
perform ance has not been so sa tis factory  and the positive  ra te  of 
grow th was reversed in 1982/83, reg is te ring  a negative ra te  o f (-) 2.7%. 
The negative ra te  o f growth has been a ttr ib u te d  to  the  dismal 
perform ance of the a g ricu ltu ra l sector, which has always played the 
prim e ro le , w ith  an e ffe c t on the perform ance of the o the r sectors, 
(Economic Performance Review, 1984/85).
The economic perform ance of the Sudan has been heavily
in fluenced  by the pub lic  sector investm ent since 1970, the date of
n a tio na lisa tion  and confisca tion o f most fo re ign  and loca l enterprises
w orking in  the m arket. The pub lic investm ent is m a in ly  in la rge
schemes based on ca p ita l in tensive form ulae. Sin (1986) a ttr ib u te d  the
negative ra te  of growth o f the Sudanese economy to  the fa ilu re  of
most pub lic  development schemes, which are la rge  and c a p ita l
in tensive ones. This observation provides co n firm a tio n  o f the
con ten tion  and a lleg a tion  o f Schumacher (1972) th a t :
"The fa ilu re  o f aid to  accelerate growth in 
many less developed coun tries (LDCs) is 
pa rtly  a ttr ib u ta b le  to  its  being tie d  to 
inappropria te  technology. Too frequen tly  
large plants have been established on the 
basis of fo re ign  aid in  the (LDCs) to  produce 
output in an in e ff ic ie n t manner."
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1.6.2 Industry in the Sudan :
Indus tria lisa tion , by v irtue  o f its  im pact on economic grow th, has 
been advocated as an im portan t vehic le  fo r achieving in teg ra ted  
econom ic developm ent, (N im eri and Shaelddin, 1975). The im portance 
o f in d u s tria l developm ent in the Sudan as a developing coun try  stems 
from  the need to broaden and d ive rs ify  the na tiona l economy , and so 
reduce the heavy re liance on the production and expo rta tion  o f 
a g r ic u ltu ra l products, whose yie lds and prices flu c tu a te  substan tia lly  
from  year to year. Indus tria lisa tion  is also needed to ease the chronic 
balance o f payments problems (N im eri o.p.ct, 1975).
Modern m anufacturing industry in the Sudan is o f recent o rig in , 
da ting  back to  1955/56, the year o f p o lit ic a l independence. A fte r  
independence the government declared its  po licy , which was to 
prom ote industry and a t the same tim e  to  expand ag ricu ltu re , a ll 
w ith in  the fram ew ork o f a balanced and in teg ra ted  economic and 
social developm ent plan.
The in dus tria l sector is sm all when compared w ith  the dom inant 
a g r ic u ltu ra l sector, accounting fo r less than 8% o f gross domestic 
product and em ploying about 6-7% o f the w ork ing popula tion.
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Table No.1.3
C on trib u tion  o f Economic Sectors in the GDP :
A ctua l/(% )
Economic Sectors: 78/79 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83
1. A g ricu ltu re 37.6% 35% 35.6% 36.0% 34.4%
2. Commerce 19.5% 21% 22.0% 21.5% 22.0%
3. M anufacturing <5c 7.0% 7.6% 7.6% 7.5% 7.9%
M ining
4. Transport 11.7% 9.6% 9.8% 10.3% 9.5%
5. Construction 4.0% 4.3% 4.3% 4.5% 4.9%
6. E le c tr ic ity 1.5% 2% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0%
7. Governm 't services 9.8% 11.4% 10.3% 9.7% 10.0%
8. O ther services 8.9% 9.1% 8.4% 8.5% 9.3%
9. GDP 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source : C a lcu la ted from  d iffe re n t pub lica tions :
C en tra l A d m in is tra tion  fo r Economic Research, 
M in is try  o f Finance and Economic Planning - Sudan.
From the s ta rt i t  was the Government's in te n tio n  to  encourage 
the p riva te  sector to  undertake new in d u s tria l ventures. In 1961 the 
Government d iverted from  th is  po licy  because i t  fe lt  th a t the  p riva te  
sector would not have e ith e r the in te res t or resources to  develop 
ce rta in  industries tha t were considered v ita l to  the economy (Eco. 
Report, 1977/78). The Industria l Developm ent C orpora tion , 'ID C ', was 
established in 1965 to manage the Government investm ent's in the 
industry. This is not to  say the p riva te  sector does not p lay a ro le  in 
the development o f in d u s tria lisa tio n  pa tte rn  in the Sudan.
According to the in dus tria l survey conducted by the  M in is try  of 
Industry in 1982/84, the to ta l number o f reg istered in dus tria l 
establishm ents in the Sudan was 7,003 firm s.
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Table No. 1,4




D is tr ib u tion  
Nos. %
Em ploym ent 
D is tr ib u tio n  
Nos. %
C.D.
D is tr ib u tio n  
Nos. %
Less than 25 6656 95 39,721 27.4 527,827 34.3
25 - 50 131 1.9 4,679 3.2 66,060 4.3
50 or less 6787 96.9 44,400 30.6 593,887 38.6
51 -  100 79 1.1 5432 3.8 82,748 5.4
101 6c above 137 2.0 95057 65.6 862,189 56.0
51 6c above 216 3.1 100,489 69.4 944,937 61.4
T o ta l 
1+2+4+5 7003 100 144,889 100 1,538,824 100
Source : Survey o f Industries, M in is try  o f Industries, 1984.
I t  is evident from  the tab le  th a t the sm all m anufacturing  firm s  
are dom inant representing 97% of the to ta l in d u s tria l establishm ent 
according to  the research working d e fin it io n . From the Table (1.3) i t  
becomes evident tha t the co n tribu tion  o f the m anufacturing sector 
towards em ploym ent has not been substantia l nor has the gross ou tpu t 
enough share in the GDP. A lthough the large enterprises are few er in 
number, they con tribu te  more to  em ploym ent and GDP than the sm all, 
as revealed by Table 1.3. This p ic tu re  could be a ttr ib u te d  p a r t ia l ly  to 
the weakness o f the in dus tria l survey which covered only reg istered 
enterprises. Thus, the a c tiv itie s  ca rried  out by the  in fo rm a l sector, i.e. 
hand icra fts , v illa g e  and ru ra l industries, which are not required to 
reg is te r themselves w ith  the prov inc ia l and reg iona l a u tho ritie s , are 
excluded.
The e ffic ie n cy , p rodu c tiv ity  and s truc tu ra l weaknesses o f the 
whole m anufacturing sector became evident from  the tab le  (1.4) 
worked out from  the survey data.
/
Table No. 1.5
A v e r a g e  Investment and O utput Ratios 





































1 : 5 
1 : 0.95
1 : 1.40 
1 : 0.48
Source : M in is try  o f Industry, Survey o f Industries (1981-82)
The tab le  shows tha t big industries appear to  be heavily  c a p ita l-  
o rien ted , and are also grossly unproductive. The ou tpu t ra tio  is very 
low in la rge industries, as compared w ith  sm all establishm ents. This 
ta b le  in connection w ith  o ther observations, provides evidence tha t 
sm all enterprise  is the most su itab le  vehicle o f econom ic developm ent 
o f a poor coun try like  Sudan.
1.6.3 Small Enterprise and Government Developm ent Po licy :
The Government indus tria l po licy  started w ith  the approval o f the 
Enterprise Concession Act in 1956 w ith  the ob jective  o f encouraging 
loca l and fo re ign  cap ita l investm ent in industry . In 1967 the 
Prom otion Investment Act w ith  more concession fo r p riva te  big 
investm ent was passed. In 1972, another act was passed : 'The 
Developm ent and Prom otion o f Industria l Investm ent Act, 1972', 
g iv ing  even more favourable cond itions fo r p riva te  investm ent.
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The change in economic developm ent po licy  a t le g is la tio n  level 
came in to  existence by passing the 'Encouragement and Investment 
Act, 1980', which repealed and superseded the previous sectoral 
developm ent. In o ther words, a single act is made app licab le  to  a ll 
sectors o f the economy. The objects o f th is  Act are, in general, to 
encourage investm ent projects a im ing towards the achievem ent o f the 
objects o f the development plan. The Act established a u n ified  bureau, 
known as the  Secretary General o f Investm ent. The 1980 Act was 
c r it ic is e d  by various com m entators and pa rtic ipan ts  o f 'March, 1986, 
Econom ic N ationa l Conference - K hartoum '. On the eva luation o f the 
Act (Economic Conference, 1985), Osman a rtic u la te d  tha t : "N ot only 
does the  A ct not d istinguish in-betw een the d iffe re n t sectors o f the 
economy, i t  also fa ils  to  ind ica te  p r io r it ie s  w ith in  the  sub-sectors. Any 
judgem ent, w ith in  the previews o f the Act would tend to  be subjective 
and d is to rt the very function  o f resources m ob ilisa tion  and selective 
investm ent in a developing economy."
The review o f the Government socio-econom ic development and 
p lann ing  polic ies, s ta rtin g  w ith  the Ten-years plan (1961-1970), New 
Developm ent plan (1970-1975), In te rim  A ction  plan (1972-1978), S ix- 
years Developm ent plan (1977/78-1982/83) and the  Three-year Public 
Investm ent and Development programme (1983/84-1985/86), shows tha t 
there  is no spec ific  dec lara tion o f po licy  fo r  sm all enterprise 
developm ent. There are many expressed wishes and in ten tions  
re fle c te d  in Governmental documents. The main po in t, which provides 




Act 1980/81 (6 - D)
" .......... to  encourage investm ent in projects
which the production o f which depends on 
local raw m ate ria ls  or the establishm ent o f 
which is encouraged fo r production o f such 
m ate ria ls ."
W ith the powers vested under the provisions o f the 1980 Act, the 
m in is te r ia l com m ittee  has prepared a lis t  o f industries, which are a ll 
sm all in  size and operations, and has delegated the power o f the 
licenc ing  to  the p rov inc ia l and reg iona l a u tho ritie s  concerned. 
However, the reg iona l au th o ritie s  have not been given the power to 
g ran t concessions except the a llo ca tio n  o f land a t concessional prices. 
Accord ing to  the Act, the sm all industries are e lig ib le  fo r one 
concession, i.e . the exem ption from  customs duty fo r p lan t and 
m achinery. The log ic  and assumption behind th is  is th a t the sm all 
industries are supposed to  work on ly w ith  loca l raw m ateria ls . A part 
from  the 29 industries selected, any pro ject w ith  ca p ita l investm ent of 
L.S.250,000 and under is also re fe rred  to  the reg iona l a u tho ritie s  fo r 
g ran ting  licence. This is an in d ica tion  and re fle c tio n  o f sm all business 
d isc rim in a tio n  in the Government developm ent po licy  and le g is la tion  
as w e ll as encouragem ent programme.
From th is  review  o f sm all business in the Sudan, in term s of 
s ta tis tic a l s ign ificance in the economy (97%) and the po licy  leve l, 
com pared w ith  the experience o f o ther countries in developed and 
developing economies (1-5), a conclusion can be drawn th a t there is a 
sm all business po licy  gap in the Sudan. This m acro-observation is an 
urgent need fo r more a tte n tio n  to  be paid to  the prom otion o f the 
sm all business sector in the Sudan. It is the  in te n t o f th is  research to 
bridge the gap in sm all business knowledge in the Sudan through an
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em p irica l investiga tion  of the problems encountered by th is  dom inant 
sector in the Sudan economy.
1.7 O rganisation o f the Thesis:
Based on the them e of fhe study, the thesis is structured in a 
manner so as to exp la in  the phenomena and the research questions. 
The ope ra tiona l c lass ifica tion  o f the study can be de ta iled  as fo llow s:
1. S tatem ent o f the research problem .
2. C r it ic a l review  o f re la ted body o f knowledge.
3. P ilo t study and analysis.
4. Research m ethodology.
3. Analysis o f the survey results.
6. Theatica l and po licy  im p lica tions  o f the research find ings.
The scholarly process o f inves tiga tion  has been presented in 
F igure 1.4 in re la tio n  to  c lass ifica tion  o f the chapters, theme o f the 
chapter and the hypothesis in question.
I
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FIGURE 1.4





























CHAPTER 11 CHAPTER 12
POLICY IMPLICATIONSFINDINGS AND THEORETICAL 
IMPLICATIONS
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CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE OF SMALL BUSINESS 
FINANCING AND FINANCIAL CONTROL
A c r it ic a l review  of the body o f knowledge on sm all business, 
shows tha t a considerable amount o f research w ork based on em pirica l 
investiga tion  and desk and lib ra ry  research has been done on small 
business in developed countries (U.S., U.K., Japan, France), but qu ite  
l im ite d  research work has been done on sm all business in developing 
countries and the A frican  con tinen t in pa rticu la r.
The objective o f th is  chapter is to  review the ex is ting  lite ra tu re , 
by summarising the d iffe re n t points o f view on the issue o f sm all 
business financ ing  and finan c ia l con tro l characte ris tics , eva luating 
c r it ic a lly  these views by ind ica ting  the strengths and weaknesses o f 
the lite ra tu re  and to  establish the state o f the a rt o f the body o f 
knowledge. Thus, the main theme o f th is  chap ter is to  place the 
cu rren t study in perspective, and to  ju s tify  the im portance o f the 
cu rren t study.
2.1 Small Business and the Theory o f Finance :
2.1.1 Despite the volume of research which has been done on sm all 
business financing in developed countries, the con trovers ia l issue which 
s t i l l  has not been com ple te ly  aswered, and probably never w ill be in
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developing countries, given the dearth o f data and in fo rm a tio n , is the 
question o f small business financing . Most o f the w ritin gs  on small 
business financing a tte m p t to provide an answer to  the question o f how 
sm all businesses raise funds. P e tty  and W alker (1978) argued tha t 
most o f the w rit in g  on sm all business financ ing  is p ragm atic  in nature, 
lis tin g  and eva lua ting  the various perspective sources o f financ ing . 
They added tha t :
"However, l i t t le  e m p irica l work is presented. 
Analysis re lies  genera lly  on personal exper­
ience in financ ing  the sm all company."
In general, sm all business finance research in developed and
1
developing coun tries centres on spec ific  issues and problems 
encountered by sm all, growing firm s. (For exam ple, Bolton, 1971; Ray 
and Hutchinson, 1975; Osaze, 1981.) This could be a ttr ib u te d  to 
a v a ila b ility  and access ib ility  o f data, which is u n lik e ly  to  be sa tis fied  
by the sm all f irm  at inception  and dec lin ing  stage. A major weakness 
o f the lite ra tu re  on sm all business financ ing  as w e ll as o the r issues, is 
th a t a comparison is o fte n  made between sm all and large businesses 
w ith o u t looking in to  fundam enta l d iffe rences among firm s  w ith in  the 
sector, leading to  m isleading results and conclusions. The o ther 
weakness which h igh ligh ted  in the measurement issue, is th a t most of 
the w r it in g  and research on small business financ ing  has been based on 
one po in t o f view ra the r than look ing  from  the v ie w -po in t o f demand 
and supply side - m u lti-d im ens iona l approach. In contrast, th is  
em p irica l investiga tion  tr ie s  to provide a broader perspective o f sm all 
business financ ing  and finan c ia l co n tro l, in  the sense th a t study is 
based on comparison between sm all businesses c lass ified  in to  inception  
and growing, tak ing  la rge  enterprises as a con tro l group as w e ll as 
fin a n c ia l in s titu tio n s  as a m u lti-d im ens iona l approach. (See Research
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M ethodology, Chapter -C h .4)
According to the tra d it io n a l view o f the fin a n c ia l life -c y c le  of
the f irm , developed by Weston and Brigham (1978), sm all firm s  s ta rt by
re ly in g  upon the owners' resources and the s ta rt-up  stage is o ften  
accompanied by under-cap ita lisa tion . The subject theo ry  states tha t 
the ea rly  and in it ia l period o f growth is characterised by over-trad ing  
p ro file . According to  'Evans hypothesis', the l i fe  cycle  o f the  f irm  has 
an in fluence  on the pa tte rn  o f financ ing .
This theo ry  has been tested in developed economies (U.K.) by the
Bath Studies, carried  out between 1972 and 1979 on supergrowth firm s.
In view o f the  low response ra te  o f previous studies on sm all business
(fo r  exam ple Bolton Report, 1971), the Bath Studies were carried  out
a t two stages o f investiga tion ; in the f ir s t  stage case-study research
in to  six specific  companies was em ployed to  bu ild  up hypotheses. The
f in a l sample taken consisted o f s ix ty -s ix  firm s. In com m enting and
review ing the  Bath Studies, Davis (1984) a rtic u la te d  th a t :
"The ir approach incorporates a dynam ic
analysis, look ing  a t such firm s  over a
considerable period, and, w h ile  re ly in g  on
conventional analysis o f accounting data, 
supports th is  w ith  m a te ria l obta ined from  
in -f irm  in te rv iew s."
Based on Wilson Report (1979) approach, th a t the problems o f sm all
enterprises are not just a m atte r o f the a v a ila b il ity  o f finance, Ray
and Hutchinson (1983) found th a t there was no genera l lack o f funds or
f in a n c ia l advice. The uniqueness o f th is  research work was based on
the in te ra c tio n  between financ ing  and management, in the sense tha t
the authors have examined in depth the question o f how super-growth
firm s managed th e ir  overtrad ing (Peacock, 1983). The Bath Study is an
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in te re s tin g  and e m p irica lly  based exercise in tes ting  the tra d it io n a l 
finance theory. The only reservation against th is  work is th a t i t  has 
been based on a re la tiv e ly  sm all sample which m ight a ffe c t the 
genera lisa tions o f the emerged find ings and premises.
In addressing the issue o f financ ing  and fin a n c ia l con tro l p ro file
and rap id  and non-rapid growth firm s in developing economies -
N ige ria  - 'The Bolton Approach' Osaze (1981) made an em p irica l test
fo r the  tra d it io n a l view at growth leve l. Osaze' work is in te res tin g  in
poor data developing countries. W ith regard to  a p p lic a b ility  o f the
tra d it io n a l theory Osaze concluded tha t :
" ............. the results from  th is  study suggest
tha t the tra d it io n a l view o f the fin a n c ia l 
p ro file  o f the sm aller f irm  and the financ ing  
l i fe  cycle o f the sm all grow ing f irm  is only 
p a r t ia lly  true  in term s o f its  g e n e ra lisa b ility  
p a rtic u la r ly  in developing economies."
The foca l po in t in th is  regard is what is the v a lid ity  and
a p p lic a b ility  of the tra d it io n a l view  of the fin a n c ia l p ro file  a t the
incep tion  stage o f development, compared to  the p ro file  o f grow th in
developing economies. Lack o f in fo rm a tion  on incep tion  p ro file  is a
major weakness of the lite ra tu re  on sm all business financ ing . It  is the
in te n t o f th is  study to  test e m p ir ica lly  the a p p lic a b ility  o f the
tra d it io n a l theory to  sm all f irm  at inception  stage o f developm ent in a
developing economy - Sudan, as w e ll as grow ing firm s. Ray and
Hutchinson (1983) state th a t :
"This tra d it io n a l view o f the fin a n c ia l l i fe
cycle of the f irm  ................. , conveys a p ic tu re
which, w h ils t p lausib le, has not been subject 
to extensive em p irica l tes ting ."
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2.1.2 Small Business Financing Gap :
One view po in t expressed in the lite ra tu re  suggests th a t sm all 
companies u tilis e  more debt in the ca p ita l s tructu re  (E ll io t t ,  1972), 
because owners o f small businesses have a grea te r propensity to 
assume more risk and/or debt financ ing  is more necessary because o f a 
possible inaccess ib ility  to  the equ ity  m arke t. O ther scholars, inc lud ing  
Bates (1964), Wilson (1979), argue th a t given the g rea te r riskiness o f 
sm all businesses, lenders are hesitant to  extend debt unless a strong 
equ ity  position is provided by the f irm . On inves tiga tion  o f sm all 
business fin a n c ia l po licy  in Cameroon, Besong (1978) added th a t : 
"Among the many lim ita tio n s  o f business is the problem  o f access to 
ex te rn a l sources o f finance. Theore tica l and em p irica l studies o f the 
Cameroonian fin a n c ia l scene shows th a t many business firm s 
(p a rtic u la rly  sm all businesses) are hampered by lack o f finance a t the 
ou tse t." Bates (1964) stated tha t "sm all concerns, however, have 
ce rta in  special problems of th e ir  own, and many o f these are 
expressible in term s o f finance".
Review o f the lite ra tu re  on sm all business financ ing  in developed 
and developing economies, id e n tif ie s  d iffe re n t opinions, views and 
d ia m e tr ic a lly  opposite premises and in ferences as to  a sm all business 
financ ing  gap. This va ria tion  and d iffe rence  in views could be 
a ttr ib u te d  to  the measurement o f sm all business financ ing  gap 
dimensions, m ethodologica l approach and the fram ew ork o f analysis.
In response to  M acm illian  Gap (1931) a great deal has been done 
in  the U.K. towards f i l l in g  the gap, and increasing pub lic  a tte n tio n  has 
been d irec ted  towards the finan c ia l problem  o f sm all business (Bates, 
1972). In 1938 the Federal Reserve study in the U.S. concluded tha t
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there  was a M acm illian  gap. Evidence from  Gravin (1970) work on 
sm all business financ ing  has been c ited  to  support the conclusion tha t 
a financ ing  gap exists fo r small businesses in general, a t least fo r 
o ther than short-te rm  funds in U.S. economy.
The most im po rtan t conclusion o f the Bolton C om m ittee  (1971) in
the U.K., was tha t the 'M acm illian  Gap' had been f i l le d  up by the ICFC
and o ther in s titu tio n s . The other conclusion was th a t there  was no
de fic iency  in the a v a ila b ility  o f in s titu t io n a l finance and tha t
f in a n c ia l fa c il it ie s  were adequate. The C om m ittee  fe l t  th a t there was
an evidence o f in fo rm a tion  gap as regards 'sources o f finance ' and the
m ethod o f presenting a case to such sources. The c r it ic is m  th a t can be
made against the Bolton Report is th a t the id e n tif ic a tio n  o f the gap
was based on one po in t o f view, ra th e r than looking  to  the issue from
the demand and supply-side perspective. Groves and Harrison research
work (1974), based on secondary data and in te rp re ta tio n  o f finan c ia l
in fo rm a tio n  o f the random sample, - desk research -  provide positive
support to  Bolton 's find ing .
"The In s titu tio n  and Bolton c la im  th a t 
there  is no gap in  the supply o f finance 
and th e ir case looks very strong."
Greenhow (1982) challenged the Bolton fin d in g  and commented tha t
"th e  q u a lita t iv e  and qua n tita tive  con tro ls  which had been imposed on
bank lend ing since the war meant tha t, when i t  came to  a lloca ting
scarce resources, the la rge r established and the re fo re  proven and more
c re d itw o rth y  enterprises were given f ir s t  cons ideration fo r the
ava ilab le  funds and newer, sm aller and, alm ost by d e fin it io n  more
risky enterprises were na tu ra lly  a t the bottom  o f the p ile ".
One view po in t expressed and held by some scholars is tha t a
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sm all business financ ing  gap does not re a lly  ex is t. In his a r tic le  'The 
M acm illian  Gap T h irty  Years A fte r ' Bates (1961) concluded th a t " I t  is 
c lear th a t the M acm illian  Gap is p a rtly  economic, in the  sense tha t 
many firm s  are not c red itw o rthy  by norm al standards, and p a rtly  
in s titu t io n a l in tha t the range o f ex is ting  in s titu tio n s  is inadequate 
and the special in s titu tio n s  do not operate on a large enough scale
....................  In a good many cases the firm s are not c re d itw o rth y  by any
standard; loans to  them would m erely be th row ing good money a fte r  
bad." Lord P iercey (1962) c r itic ise d  Bates and commented th a t
" ........... Dr. Bates .......  seems to  be doing some vio lence to the
'M acm illian  Gap' ......... i t  can not be m ainta ined th a t the M acm illian
C om m ittee  was th in k in g  as Dr. Bates would have us be lieve o f ".
This debate on the financ ing  gap and the d iffe re n t opinions and 
views expressed as w e ll in the l i t t le  w rit in g  on sm all business financ ing  
in developing economies, and the A frican  con tinen t in pa rticu la r. Bosa 
(1977); Besong (1978) and Osaze (1981) had id e n tif ie d  the existence o f 
a long-te rm  financ ing  gap in Uganda, Cameroon and N igeria  
respective ly , challenged strong ly the fin d in g  o f Schatz (1965) and 
Harris (1966). The weaknesses o f the analysis and find ings o f these 
studies th a t are one-dim ensional in  term s o f scope and measurement 
o f the finance gap. What remains to  be added is to  provide a w e ll 
documented answer to  th is  controvers ia l issue, presenting fu rth e r 
evidence th a t w ill support or inva lida te  some o f these views and 
opinions.
W ith respect to the sm all business financ ing  gap, there  was a 
con ten tion  in the lite ra tu re  th a t financ ia l in s titu tio n s  were not m aking 
ava ilab le  to  small businesses su ffic ie n t funds to finance an appropria te
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le ve l o f investm ent. The Wilson C om m ittee  (1979) agreed tha t as 
compared to  large firm s, sm all firm s  are a t a considerable disadvan­
tage in the fin a n c ia l m arket, and recommended establishm ent o f a 
specialised body fo r financ ing  sm all business. G rafer's view (1968) is 
consistent w ith  Wilson's fin d in g . This view has also received the 
e m p irica l support o f B ird and Ju ttne r (197**) in exam in ing the 
adequacy o f the fin a n c ia l m arke t in prov id ing  finance to  sm all business 
in A u s tra lia , as w e ll as K n igh t (1983) em p irica l research in Canada. In 
developing economies, N igeria , Omoparida (1978) exam ined the 
f in a n c ia l m arket operations and its  a ffec ts  on industry financing . 
Omoparida provides support to  c r it ic is m  levied against banks w ith  
regard to  sm all business financ ing . The weaknesses o f Omoparida's 
research e f fo r t  is embodied in the fa c t th a t i t  was based on 
questionnaires which proved to  be unsu itab le m ethodology in studying 
sm all business and p a rtic u la r ly  in developing countries w ith  low 
lite ra c y  ra te  and people who are not research-oriented.
In view of these controversies and debate, a v ita l and pe rtinen t 
question needs to be raised : Is there a sm all business financ ing  gap 
and, i f  so, in what form ? This research e f fo r t  is to  exam ine the 
question whether sm all businesses are re la tiv e ly  d iscrim ina ted  against 
in the  ca p ita l m arket. In th is  study, the exam ination  o f the financ ing  
gap is based on m u lti-d im ens iona l approach in term s o f measurements 
and perspective (see Research M ethodology chapter - Ch.4).
2.1.3. F inancia l P ro file  :
A great amount o f em p irica l research e f fo r t  has been conducted 
in developed countries, m ain ly the U.S. and the U.K., on id e n tif ic a tio n  
and establishm ent o f the fin a n c ia l p ro file  o f sm all f irm . Some of the
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work is in te res ting  and m ethodo log ica lly  sound.
Review of the finan c ia l p ro file  lite ra tu re  shows th a t there are 
c o n flic tin g  points and views on sm all business fin a n c ia l p ro file . With 
regard to  p ro f ita b il ity  some scholars (Anderson, 1967; Bates, 1964; 
Gupta, 1969) found tha t sm all firm s tend to  be less p ro fita b le  than 
la rge  firm s . On the o ther hand, Bolton (1971), Wilson (1979), Tam ari
(1980) and W alker and P e tty (1978) found th a t sm all firm s  are more 
p ro fita b le  than large firm s. Davis and Yeomens (1974) found tha t 
p ro f ita b i l ity  o f sm all firm s  was more adversely a ffe c ted  by c red it 
squeeze than were the p ro fits  o f la rge firm s. In m aking a comparison 
between slow and fast growing firm s  in  the U.K., Bolton (1971) found 
th a t rap id  growth firm s  were more p ro fita b le  than slow grow th firm s. 
This f in d in g  is inconsistent w ith  E llio tt 's  (1972), Gupta's and Singh's 
and W h itting ton 's  (1968) inferences. Osaze (1981) in developing 
economies - N igeria  - found a re la tio nsh ip  between growth and 
p ro f ita b il ity .
The liq u id ity  position  o f sm all firm s  is a hot debatable issue in 
the lite ra tu re  o f finance. The low liq u id ity  o f sm all business, as 
compared to  large business, is a them e o f though t led by Bates (1971), 
W alker and P e tty  (1978) and Wilson (1979). The o ther school o f 
though t is supported by scholars, Chen and Balke (1979) and E llio t t  
(1972). The th ird  group (Bolton, 1971; M ered ith , 1982) found tha t 
there was no s ig n ifica n t d iffe rences between la rge  and sm all, as 
regards liq u id ity  p ro file . Bates and H a lly  (1982), Boswell (1970), 
Tam ari and his group (1971) and Osaze (1981) tended to  agree tha t 
rap id  grow th causes liq u id ity  problems fo r sm all firm s . They based 
th is  s ta tem ent on the argum ent th a t i l l iq u id ity  has stemmed from
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grea te r investm ent in fixed  assets and sales as w e ll as from  greater 
re liance  on short-te rm  fund.
On f in a n c ia l gearing, the lite ra tu re  shows d iffe re n t op in ions and 
views on th e  position  o f small business fin a n c ia l risk . According to 
Bolton (1971), E l l io t t  (1972), Tam ari (1980), sm all f irm s  are not very 
d iffe re n t from  large firm s. Bates (1971) found th a t la rge firm s  were 
more deb t-o rien ted  than small firm s. W alker and P e tty 's  (1978) 
f in d in g  based on U.S. data is inconsistent w ith  Bates' find ing . In 
m aking a comparison betwen slow and fast-g row ing sm all firm s, Bolton 
(1971), Ray and Hutchinson (1981) and Osaze (1981) found th a t the 
sm all rapid growth f irm  is more h igh ly  geared than the slow one.
These d iffe rences between the find ings o f scholars provide the 
academic ju s tif ic a tio n  o f th is  research e f fo r t  in a tte m p tin g  to  
establish the  fin a n c ia l p ro file  o f sm all f irm  a t incep tion  and sm all 
grow ing firm s  and to  bu ild  a d ichotom y between sm all and large firm s  
in a deve lop ing economy - Sudan. Moreover, th is  research e f fo r t  is 
addressing the weaknesses o f the lite ra tu re , by m aking an a tte m p t to  
draw the fin a n c ia l p ro file  of the  sm all f irm  at incep tion  stage o f 
developm ent. On the academic and p rac tica l le ve l, the cu rren t study 
is the  f ir s t  study to  consider the issue o f the f in a n c ia l p ro file  o f sm all 
f irm s  a t incep tion , sm all grow ing firm s  and la rge  p riva te  enterprises 
from  the Sudanese perspective c o n tr ib u tin g  to the sm all business body 
o f knowledge in developing economies. This, in tu rn  ind ica tes the 
s ign ificance and o r ig in a lity  of the cu rren t study.
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2.2 Sm all Business and the F inancia l C on tro l Theory :
An overview o f the lite ra tu re  genera lly  ind ica tes th a t most
research work on sm all business has centred in the exp lo ra tion  o f the 
finance gap, whereas the finan c ia l con tro l p ro file  o f sm all f irm  is a 
de lica te  area in the lite ra tu re . The l i t t le  w r it in g  on fin a n c ia l con tro l 
cha rac te ris tics  o f sm all firm s is rep le te  w ith  in fo rm a tio n  on growing
and super-grow th firm s, which re flec ts  the weaknesses o f the
lite ra tu re .
I t  was established in the body o f knowledge th a t the fin a n c ia l
co n tro l systems operated by the sm all f irm  in developed and
develop ing economies tends to  be inadequate and sometimes
non -func tiona l to  e ff ic ie n t operations (Love tt, 1980). In western
in dus tria lised  developed countries - U.K. - Bolton (1971) found th a t :
"Cost con tro l and costing date are o ften  
so poor th a t management frequen tly  learns 
o f an im pending cris is  on ly w ith  the 
appearance o f the annual accounts or 
fo llow ing  an urgent ca ll from  the bank 
manager."
Said and Hughey (1977) provided support to  the Bolton C om m ittee , 
argu ing th a t the main problem in record-keeping fac ing  many sm all 
f irm s  in the U.S. was a com plete lack o f an organised in fo rm a tio n  
system. "S t il l o ther firm s may have some form  o f f in a n c ia l records, 
but they lack the de ta ils  necessary fo r m anagerial decision making, 
and fo r  re p o rtin g  to the firm 's  liq u id ity  pos ition ." Boswell (1972) went 
fu rth e r, arguing th a t the a ttitu d e  to con tro l, poor accounting records 
and inadequate con tro l systems have o ften  been the reasons behind the 
decline o f sm all businesses. Ray and Hutchinson (1975) in the Bath 
Study went fu rth e r, by bu ild ing  a re la tionsh ip  between stage o f growth
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and the degree o f soph istica tion o f the fin a n c ia l con tro l system, 
p rov id ing  support to  the sta tem ent o f L ievegrd (1973) th a t the 
fin a n c ia l con tro l systems based on plans and budgets become essential 
i f  grow th is not to  be in h ib ited .
L i t t le  w rit in g  and lite ra tu re  on th is  area em anating from  
deve lop ing countries provides support to  the lite ra tu re  and find ings in 
developed economies. Ohioma (1979) found th a t in sm all firm s  there 
is a d is in c lin a tio n  to  u tilis e  records fo r the purpose o f con tro l. Osaze
(1981) concluded th a t : " .....  In terms o f accounting in fo rm a tion
accum m ulated by sm all firm s  in N igeria  is l i t t le  doubt th a t there  are
by and large rud im en ta ry ." To co n tribu te  to  th is  in fancy body o f 
know ledge and th is  d if f ic u lt  and de lica te  area in sm all business 
research, th is  study w il l  address e m p ir ica lly  the question o f what is the 
f in a n c ia l con tro l p ro f ile  o f small f irm  at incep tion , and a t the growing 
stage o f developm ent, and to what ex ten t is in te rac ted  w ith  financ ing .
2.3 F am ily  in Small Business L ite ra tu re  :
A fa m ily  as an in f lu e n tia l fa c to r in business management has 
been re ce n tly  considered by scholars in developed and developing 
coun tries (Leyder, 1983; Galder, 1973; Beckhard, 1982; Bo lton, 1971; 
Bosa, 1978; Osaze, 1981). The fa m ily  became im po rtan t and 
s ig n if ic a n t in the western lite ra tu re  (Am erican and B ritish ) as a resu lt 
o f the study conducted in the U.K. and U.S. showing th a t e igh ty  
percent o f small firm s in the U.K. and U.S. are fa m ily  owned and
managed (Bolton, 1971; Beckhard, 1982).
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In developing countries, fa m ily  co n tr ib u tio n  is a con trovers ia l 
issue between development economists and o ther w rite rs . One view 
po in ts out th a t the prevalence of fa m ily  firm s  is freq uen tly  an 
in h ib it in g  fa c to r on grow th; others have po in ted out th a t fa m ily  is a 
main source o f finance and management cadre and trusted  personnel. 
The lite ra tu re  so fa r suggests tha t w hile  sm all f irm s ' entrepreneurs 
depend ra th e r heavily on the extended fa m ily  fo r seed c a p ita l, they 
ra re ly  receive funds from  the fa m ily  fo r expansion purposes. Osaze
(1981) in N ige ria  placed emphasis on fa m ily  in fluence  in  the growth o f 
sm all businesses as a supp lier o f funds and on how much p ro f it  was 
re ta ined  fo r  business growth and how much w ithdraw n fo r  fa m ily  
reasons. Bosa (1978) had studied the fa m ily  as a social and cu ltu ra l 
fa c to r in c rea ting  businesses in Uganda.
The lite ra tu re  in th is  area had focused on strengths and
weaknesses o f fa m ily  business at the growing stage o f developm ent,
the fa m ily  involvem ent in ownership and management as w e ll as
financ ing . The l i t t le  w rit in g  in th is  area is h igh ly  descrip tive  and not
based on rigorous analysis. Bannock (1984) id e n tif ie d  a lite ra tu re  gap
in th is  area by s ta ting  th a t :
"Most books and a rtic le s  w r itte n  on fa m ily  
in fluence in sm all business management are 
non-academic and the re fo re  non-techn ica l."
The rem a in ing  un-answered question in sm all business body of 
know ledge which w ill be addressed e m p ir ica lly  in th is  study is the 
degree o f fa m ily  in fluence at inception stage in  term s o f m o tiva tion  to 
set up the business, c o n tin u ity  and growth, and its  degree o f in fluence 
on finan c ing  and management o f the business at various stages o f 
developm ent (inception and growing).
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2A Entrepreneursh ip :
K ilb y  (1971) w rites th a t "the  search fo r the source o f dynam ic
en trep reneu ria l perform ance has much in common w ith  hunting the
he ffa lu m p ". An entrpreneur is a controvers ia l issue in  economic and
m anagement lite ra tu re . One paradigm  suggests tha t en trepreneu ria l
fo rm a tio n  resu lts  from  the in te ra c tio n  o f social and c u ltu ra l forces,
whereas M cC le lland 's  theory was based on an econom ic approach. In
deve lop ing economies, there is keen debate between development
econom ists on the question o f whether there  is a ca p ita l gap or
e n tre p re n e u ria l defic iencies in these economies. In developed
countries, a number o f researches have been conducted (Stepanek,
1967; Boswell, 1972; Bolton Report, 1971) to  exp la in  the re la tionsh ip
between finan c ing  and en trep reneu ria l gap. Research in developed
economies has id e n tif ie d  the existence o f en trep reneu ria l defic iencies.
The Bolton R eport (1971) in the U.K. found th a t :
"The overa ll standard o f management in 
sm all firm s  is low because the rou tine  
adm in is tra tion  side o f management which 
consumes so much of the sm all business­
man's tim e  is not p roperly  systematised 
and de legated."
On en trepreneursh ip  research, V ickery (1986) a rticu la te d  th a t : " I f  
management is the poor 're la tiv e ' o f academic research, i t  is no 
exaggera tion  to  say th a t entrepreneurship is the poor re la tive  o f
management research ............. entrepreneurship has also been neglected
because the study o f management has tended to  be lim ite d  to  the 
study o f la rge  com panies." Timmons (1978) states th a t more research 
in th is  young f ie ld  o f entrepreneurship should y ie ld  fu rth e r ins igh t in to  
our grow ing body o f knowledge. In exp la in ing  and in d e n tify in g  the
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knowledge gap in entrepreneurship, Timmons (1978) adds th a t "w h ile  
numerous studies have y ie lded im po rtan t ins igh t in to  entrepreneurship, 
i t  is im p o rtan t to  recognise th a t the ava ilab le  knowledge represents 
the t ip  o f the iceberg, w ith  areas o f agreem ent as w e ll as continu ing  
debate".
The weaknesses o f the lite ra tu re  on entrepreneurship is th a t most 
o f the w r it in g  and em pirica l inves tiga tion  has focused on successful 
entrepreneurs, owning and managing grow ing and supergrowth firm s 
(fo r exam ple, Bolton, 1971; Ahmed, 1980; Osaze, 1981). The main 
weakness o f the lite ra tu re  is th a t i t  is rep le te  w ith  data and 
in fo rm a tio n  on entrepreneurship in developed economies. In 
deve lop ing countries very l i t t le  em p irica l research has been done on 
entrepreneursh ip  (F.O.E.R., 1981). Gazze (1982) argues th a t the 
lite ra tu re  on entrepreneurship is descrip tive  and fragm ented.
Review o f the lite ra tu re  on entrepreneurship and sta te  of 
know ledge, four streams o f entrepreneur research could be id e n tif ie d  
(Paulin , C o lley  and Spaulding, 1982) :
(1) The entrepreneur as an ind iv idua l,
(2) the processes or mechanics o f entrepreneurship,
(3) the functions o f entrepreneurship in society, and
(4) the supporting topics.
Research studies focusing on the en trepreneur as ind iv idua l 
(M cC le lland  and C o llins , Moore, and Unwalla) have developed a va rie ty  
o f e n tre p re n e u ria l models and approaches to  study o f en trep reneu ria l 
cha rac te ris tics , persona lity  and behaviour. Some w rite rs  in th is  area 
(K n igh t, 1983) have drawn the in ference th a t the ob jective  and
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m otiva tion  in se tting  up the business as w e ll as personal t ra its  could 
be taken  as a d iffe re n ta tio n  device between successful and unsuccess­
fu l firm s . This type o f investiga tion  is based on p red ic tive  ra th e r than 
descrip tive  approach o f analysis o f entrepreneurship.
E n treprenenuria l m otiva tion  is a con trovers ia l issue in the 
lite ra tu re . According to  one school o f though t, the  socio log ica l event 
is the major m o tiva tin g  fac to r in the  c rea tion  o f a new venture. Those 
who support th is  approach emphasise s itu a tio n a l cond itions (Shapero, 
1975). On the  opposite side are those who argue the physchological 
fac to rs  are the key to understanding the e n tire  en trep reune ria l 
process. This school o f thought is led by M cC le lland , in troduc ing  in to  
the body o f knowledge the need fo r achievem ent theory. The 
M cC le lland  approach has been c ritic ise d  by scholars on the ground tha t 
i t  re s tr ic ts  the d rive  to  achieve to  econom ic a c t iv ity  alone. W ith in 
these schools o f thought a va rie ty  o f research work has been conducted 
(Aboud, 1978; Horandy, White and Welsh, 1982), com ing out w ith  
d iffe re n t views and opinions. Gazze (1982) a ttr ib u te d  the lack of 
consenus on m o tiva tio n  to  the in te rp re ta tio n  and measurement o f data. 
This research e f fo r t  w il l  address th is  con trovers ia l and debatable issue 
in an a tte m p t to  provide ins igh t in to  understanding o f th is  elusive 
phenomenom in developing countries.
A number o f studies in developed economies have a ttem pted  to  
de term ine the co rre la tio n  between en trep reneu ria l characte ris tics  and 
en trep reneu ria l a c tiv itie s  and perform ance. Age and education have 
frequen tly  received a tte n tio n . The years between 25 and 40 have 
freq uen tly  been m entioned as the age when the en trepreneuria l 
decision is most l ik e ly  to  be made in developed economies (Shapero,
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1971; Mayer and G oldste in, 1961; Cooper, 1973; Howell, 1972). The 
rev iew  o f the lite ra tu re  in th is  area ind icates tha t there is no 
consensus on the age a t which the entrepreneurs debut th e ir  
businesses. W ith respect to  deveJoping economies, the lite ra tu re  and 
s ta te  o f the a r t shows th a t there is a knowledge gap. Regarding 
education, the re  are d iffe re n t views and opinions on the level o f 
education o f entrepreneurship in developed and developing economies. 
Most o f the research in th is  area co rre la ted  leve l o f education to  size 
and grow th o f the f irm . I t  was established th a t the  leve l o f education 
is p o s itive ly  co rre la ted  w ith  growth and size o f the firm . The main 
question to  be addressed in th is  research is to exam ine the 
e n tre p re n e u ria l leve l o f education in re la tio n  to  inception , growing, 
dec lin ing  sm all f irm s  and large enterprises in developing economies.
There are  very few  studies in the lite ra tu re  on en trepreneuria l as 
an in d iv id u a l dea ling  sp e c ifica lly  w ith  the re la tionsh ip  between the 
en trep reneu r's  past experience and his m o tiva tion  as w e ll as 
perform ance. C a rro ll (1965) pointed out th a t the experience gained in 
previous ventures had probably been one o f the most im po rtan t factors 
in the u lt im a te  success o f m anufacturing entrepreneurs in the 
P h illip p ine s . An Am erican study by Mayer and G oldstein (1961) has 
shown th a t previous business experience ra the r than fo rm a l schooling, 
provided the most s ig n ifica n t tra in in g  fo r business ownership. S im ila r 
find ings have been reported by Lom ont (1972) and by Cooper (1970). 
This study w i l l  address th is re la tionsh ip , w ith  emphasis on the 
in fluence  o f previous experience on the m otiva tion , ownership and 
m anagement o f m anufacturing entrepreneurs in developing economies 
Sudan.
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2,5 The State o f the A rt :
As the general theory o f finance stands today, most o f the 
cu rren t issues tend to re la te  to  the la rge r companies in developed 
coun tries ra the r than the la rge r and sm alle r firm s  in developing 
coun tries. In the U.K. Curran and Stanworth (1982) argue tha t
" ......... Big was s t i l l  seen as b e a u tifu l and grow th was seen as the key to
the treasures of increased economies o f scale."
Most o f the w r it in g  on sm all business in developed economies 
represents a body o f descrip tive  know ledge and is p r im a r ily  concerned 
w ith  the  o ld question in the theory o f finance, in the sense th a t i t  is 
preoccupied w ith  the ra is ing o f funds ra the r than op tim isa tion  of 
funds. Ray and Hutchinson (1983) argue th a t "R a is ing finance is no 
longer a problem  in its e lf.  The problem s become those concerned w ith  
the o p tim isa tion  o f the finance fu n c tio n ." Very l i t t le  research work 
has addressed the question o f o p tim isa tio n  in  sm all business financ ing .
There are several de fic ienc ies in lite ra tu re  focussing upon the
fin a n c ia l con tro l characte ris tics  o f the sm all f irm . The overwhelm ing
m a jo rity  o f th is  lite ra tu re  is descrip tive , anecdotal and based upon the
authors' general experience, usually w ith  la rge  firm s. L im ite d
research work has been undertaken focussing on the fin a n c ia l con tro l
o f sm all business. On en trep reneu ria l research su ffice  i t  to  sta te  the
comments of Gazze (1982) :
"The lite ra tu re  on the en trepreneur as an 
ind iv idua l is o fte n  e xp lo ra to ry  and not w e ll 
in teg ra ted ."
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Recent reviews of the sm all business sector by the World Bank
(IBRD) in d ica te  tha t there is re la tiv e ly  l i t t le  in fo rm a tio n  on th is
m a tte r fo r developing countries in genera l, and a paucity  o f data on
A fr ic a  in p a rtic u la r. This is an in d ica tion  o f the gap o f knowledge of
sm all businesses in developing countries (Storey, 1983). Review o f the
lite ra tu re  shows th a t not very much is known in developing countries
about the  fin a n c ia l s tructure  and f in a n c ia l p ro file  o f sm all firm s , and
what are the specific  d iff ic u lt ie s , and there is no em p irica l answer,
even fo r  the  o ld question in the theory o f finance. The s ta te  o f the
a rt o f the body o f knowledge in  th is  area is very general and most o f
the l i t t le  w r it in g  on sm all business is m ain ly  descrip tive , others are
p rescrip tive , lack hard facts and do not provide a comprehensive or
in te g ra te d  analysis o f the o rgan isa tiona l, fin a n c ia l and ownership
s truc tu re  o f sm all firm s (Besong, 1978). Green (1977) added th a t :
" There are as ye t no s ig n ifica n t or 
em p irica l (such as the Bolton C om m ittee  
Report in the U.K.) on sm all businesses 
in developing coun tries."
The ob jective  o f th is  study is to p a rtic ip a te  in closing and f i l l in g  
the sm a ll business conceptua lisa tion  gap, and to  con tribu te  e ffe c tiv e ly  
to  sm all business body o f knowledge and p a rt ic u la r ly  in developing 
economies. The theme o f the research work and its  scope ind ica tes the 
o r ig in a lity  and sign ificance o f th is  em p irica l in ves tiga tio n . The 
academ ic ju s tif ic a tio n  can be seen c le a rly  from  the fa c t tha t no 
e m p irica l study has been undertaken to  exam ine the tra d it io n a l view 
o f fin a n c in g  theory fo r sm all f irm s  a t inception  and grow ing stage o f 
developm ent from  the demand and supply-side perspective - m u lt i­
d im ensional approach.
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Having id e n tif ie d  the research question, its  accom m odation in the 
body o f knowledge and its  academic and p rac tica l ju s tif ic a tio n , the 
main and foca l po in t in th is  scholarly process now to  be raised is what 
is the academ ic approach to be fo llow ed, and what is a su itab le  
fram ew ork in which to  address the research question, To th is  po in t we 
d irec t a tte n tio n  now.
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CHAPTER 3
ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES 
AN ALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND GENERATION '
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
3.1 CASE STUDY APPROACH :
In th e ir  a r tic le  "The case o f Q u a lita tiv e  Research", 'ABR, w in te r,
(1979)' Morgan and Sm ireich stated th a t :
"The choice and adequacy o f a method 
embodies a v a rie ty  o f assumptions regarding 
the nature o f knowledge and the method 
through which th a t knowledge can be obtained, 
as w e ll as a set o f roo t assumptions about the 
na ture  o f the  phenomena to  be investiga ted ."
Downey and Ire land (1979) added th a t : "The most re levant o f the
presuppositions tha t determ ine one's research perspective is tha t
m ethodo log ica l issues must always be answered w ith in  the con tex t o f a
p a rtic u la r research se tting . That i t  to  say, m ethodologies are ne ither
app rop ria te  nor inappropria te  u n til they are app lied to  a specific
research prob lem ".
Due to  the nature and scope o f the research work, focusing on 
finan c ing  and fin a n c ia l con tro l issues o f sm all firm s  a t various stages 
o f deve lopm ent and the nature o f phenomena need to  be investigated, 
co n tro lle d  and predicted, the research process has been broken down 
in to  tw o stages :
1. The developm ent o f the research hypotheses.
2. The em pirica l test of the research hypotheses.
(See Figure 3.1
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Based on th is c lass ifica tion  o f the research work, the in it ia l f ie ld  
work was a p ilo t study, exp lo ring  the research se tting , tes ting  
e m p ir ic a lly  the conceptual fram ew ork and developing a testab le  
research hypotheses.
In developing and fo rm u la tin g  the research hypotheses, a case
study approach has been used as a m ethodology. In his a r tic le  "The
use o f case studies in the In teg ra tion  o f Research and Teaching in
Management Education", 'Management Decision, 1975' Ray stated
th a t : "U n fo rtu n a te ly  'case research', 'case developm ent' and case
'w r it in g ' are used in terchangeab ly .......... I t  is necessary to d istinguish
between a 'teach ing  case' and a 'research case'." The Harvard
d e fin it io n  o f a teaching case is "a record o f a business issue which
a c tu a lly  has been faced by a business executive, together w ith  the
surrounding facts, opinions and prejudices upon which executive
decisions had to  depend". Ray (1975) defined a research case as :
"The 'research case' ........  has two parts.
The f irs t  is descrip tive o f the to ta l observed 
s itua tion  and the add ition  o f the second 
part, the diagnosis o f the s itua tio n , makes 
a perm anently useful research document."
These d e fin it io n s  o f 'teach ing ' and 'research' case study were used by a
number o f scholars inc lud ing  Bennis (1960) and Hagg and Hedlund
(1979).
The v ita l question th a t could be raised in th is  con tex t is why case 
study approach has been selected as a m ethodology fo r  the generation 
and deve lopm ent o f research hypotheses and not fo r tes ting  them? 
The m ain reason behind the se lection o f th is  approach a t th is  stage of 
the research process is to  reduce the scale o f the research by focusing 
on a sm a lle r number o f units than would otherw ise be involved, as
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w e ll as increasing the range o f d iffe re n t un its  w ith in  the study (Moore,
1967). M oreover, the se lection is based on the argum ent th a t the case
study approach is appropria te  fo r genera ting  hypotheses, but not fo r
tes ting  them . Locke added th a t :
"Case studies can be very va luab le  as a source
of hypotheses about the psycho-dynamics .....
Such hypothesis m ight never emerge from  
a questionnaire study because the re levant 
questions would not have been asked."
Ray (1976) added tha t : "The research case, p roperly  conceived and
used can be e ffe c tive  means o f :
accura te ly  observing th ings and events
prov id ing  in tim a te  and hab itua l fa m ilia r ity  w ith  things
prov id ing  diagnosis o f s itua tions which lead to  concept and
genera lisa tion ."
This approach has been used in the Bath Study (1975-1979).
Davis (1984) commented th a t : " ......  th is , however, is o f lesser
consequence than the va luable ins igh ts fo r fu rth e r research which th e ir  
approach developes."
This approach o f d iv id ing  the research process in to  two stages has 
been c rit ic is e d  by some w rite rs  and researchers. Hagg and Helund 
(1979) argued th a t :
"A lthough we acknowledge the com parative 
advantage o f case studies in hypothesis and 
theory genera tion , we do not th in k  th a t the 
m aking o f such a sharp d is tin c tio n  between the 
two stages o f the research process or the 
re leg a tion  o f case studies to  the fo rm er stage 
alone co n s titu te  a f r u i t fu l  approach to  research 
and enquiry."
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The main arguments th a t could be raised against the s ta tem en t o f 
Hagg and Hedlund (1979), is th a t the risk o f hasty conclusions is great 
in using case study fo r genera lisa tion . The second po in t is how to  free
the research from  bias in se lecting  a case study, because reasons fo r
g e ttin g  involved w ith  th is  or th a t company can o ften  be vague and 
choice beyond the con tro l o f the researcher.
The case study approach is not fo o lp ro o f, in the  sense th a t i t  does 
not fre e  from  problems and d iff ic u lt ie s . Hagg and Hedlund (1979), 
enum erated some d if f ic u lt ie s  in s c ie n tific  co n tro l over the process of 
the use o f case study approach as fo llow s :
The methods o f genera ting  in fo rm a tio n  in a case study.
The mode o f p resentation o f the in fo rm a tio n .
The procedures fo r reasoning about the data.
The rules fo r judging the v a lid ity  and re lia b i l i ty  o f the 
observations.
I t  is im p o rtan t in a ll case studies, as w e ll as in a ll kinds o f 
research, to  re la te  observation to  some general fram ew ork. Therefore 
the research case studies (see Vo l.II) have been d irec ted  to  focus 
in -dep th  on the conceptual fram ew ork o f the study (see F igure 3.3).
The case studies focusing on sm all firm s  a t various stages o f 
developm ent (see stage model, F igure 1.3) have been augmented by 
conducting in te rv iew s w ith  bank managements and bankers. A pub lic 
sem inar organised by the author and the supervisors on sm all firm s  in 
the Sudan so as to  raise the issue before in te rested  parties, and as a 
m ethodology fo r access to the research universe. This process 
fa c il ita te d  conducting the second stage o f the research process.
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3.2 ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES:
The purpose o f the case studies is to  exam ine the financ ing  
characte ris tics  and fin a n c ia l con tro l p ro file  o f the sm all f irm  at 
various stages o f developm ent in the Sudan. The analysis o f the cases 
was b u ilt  as w e ll round the opera tiona l fram ew ork, a tte m p tin g  to 
exp la in  the sta te  o f the a rt, and to  establish a founda tion  o f analogy 
between the Sudan experience and the body o f knowledge.
F igure  3.2
Sudan experience
Body o f knowledge
G eneration and 
developm ent of 
R. hypotheses
O pera tiona l 
fram ew ork 
of the study
3.2.1 Financing C haracte ris tics and F inancia l P ro f ile :
The de ta iled  analysis o f the sources o f finance o f the sm all f irm  
at incep tion  shows th a t sm all firm s  s ta rt by re ly in g  on owners' and 
fa m ily  resources as a main source o f in it ia l ca p ita l. Sm all firm s  did 
not issue equ ity  ca p ita l in Sudan. The main reason why sm all firm s  a t 
inception  depend la rge ly  on p riva te  sources is th a t they do not have 
accom m odation from  short and long -te rm  c re d it in s titu tio n s . In the 
Sudan, loans tend to be provided w ith  high security  and c o lla te r ia l 
requirem ents, conditions which are u n lik e ly  to be sa tis fied  by a typ ica l 
sm all f irm  at fo rm a tion  stage, b u ilt  round the personal savings o f the 
owners and fa m ily  resources.
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The common problem fo r a ll small firm s  and p a rt ic u la r ly  the 
sm all f irm  a t inception , is tha t no pub lic com m ercia l bank is allowed 
to  make long -te rm  loans o f more than 5% o f its  c re d it ce ilin g . 
Accord ing to  the C entra l Bank's c red it po licy, the jo in t venture and 
p riva te  banks have to a lloca te  25% o f th e ir  loanable funds to 
lo ng -te rm  investm ent. In th is  regard, Awad (1984) stated th a t Islam ic 
and p riva te  banks in the Sudan are reaping vast p ro fits  through short­
te rm  trade  financ ing , ra the r than developing the economy through 
long -te rm  lending to  development projects. The founder o f the Kissra- 
m aking fa c to ry  (case study No.6) confirm ed the sta tem ent o f Awad, by 
adding th a t :
"W ith my meagre fin a n c ia l resources ........  ,
I managed to develop my machines to  the 
stage where I ac tua lly  pu t i t  to  the test of 
fu ll-sca le  production. The results were very 
g ra tify in g  and I started look ing  round fo r 
buyers, partners and financ ie rs . But the 
response was d isappointing, and I had to  go 
i t  alone."
In responding to  the question on the bank financ ing  the s ta rt-up  
ca p ita l needs o f the sm all f irm , the d irec to r o f one o f the Islam ic 
banks (T.I.B .) argued th a t there is a c o n flic t o f in te res t between 
entrepreneurs and banks. "Entrepreneurs are p ro f it  - and social - 
status seekers which con flic ts  w ith  the bank's measures to  con tro l its  
resources under Musharaka financ ing ."
The p a tte rn  o f financ ing  o f sm all firm s at inception has an 
im p lic a tio n  on the fin a n c ia l p ro file . The re liance  o f sm all firm s  on 
personal savings in a country w ith  a low saving m argin (U.N.,1978) 
results in  in s u ffic ie n t fin a n c ia l resources to establish a business. The 
in s u ff ic ie n t s ta rt-up  ca p ita l is a good measure o f the under­
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c a p ita lisa tio n  p ro file  o f sm all f irm s  at inception  stage (Mao, 1978). 
The tw o research case studies, taken as an exam ple o f the sm all f irm  
a t inception , displayed liq u id ity , low p ro f ita b i l i ty  and low  gearing. 
L iq u id ity  could be a ttr ib u te d  to  the fa c t th a t sm all f irm s  a t inception 
were forced to  provide th e ir  own in te rn a l finance. L iq u id ity  was 
measured by dep ic ting  a re la tionsh ip  between cu rren t assets and 
cu rren t lia b ili t ie s  (curren t ra tio ) and w ork ing  ca p ita l ra tio  (see case 
studies). The low gearing p ro file  m ain ta ined by sm all firm s at 
incep tion , is not on ly a ttr ib u ta b le  to  lack o f in s titu t io n a l sources, but 
also to  the typo logy and p ro file  o f the entrepreneur.
Given the above facts, i t  is possible to  see a s ta rt-up  cap ita l 
c re d it gap to sm all business from  in s titu t io n a l finance. This 
observation provided co n firm a tion  o f Weston and Brigham (1978) 
tra d it io n a l view theory, w ith  a m o d ifica tio n  o f the fa m ily  as a main 
source o f finance at s ta rt-up .
The in -dep th  analysis o f the sources o f finance ava ilab le  to  the 
sm all, grow ing firm s, shows th a t sm all f irm s  a t grow ing stage re ly  on 
p riva te  sources, re ta ined earnings, and in s titu t io n a l finance o f a 
sho rt-te rm  nature. The use o f re ta ined  p ro f it  in financ ing  business 
opera tion  is a good ind ica tion  o f p ro f ita b i l ity ,  degree o f p ro fit  
re te n tio n  and im p lic it ly  could exp la in  the lack o f in s titu t io n a l 
long -te rm  finance. Trade c re d it could be considered as a main and 
cheapest source o f w ork ing ca p ita l finance , representing 70-80% o f the 
to ta l debt o f sm all firm s sample.
Regarding the working c a p ita l finance, sm all firm s, a t various 
stages o f development, experienced a pers is ten t problem  in ra ising
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sa tis fac to ry  finance from  the ca p ita l m arket. The in te rn a l resources 
augm ented w ith  in s ig n ifica n t in s titu t io n a l finance, could be considered 
as a m ain source o f finance o f w ork ing  ca p ita l needs o f sm all firm s  at 
in cep tion . The grow ing firm  is in a b e tte r position , in ob ta in ing  
w o rk ing  cap ita l finance from  exte rna l sources. This could be 
exp la ined by the fa c t th a t businesses th a t have been in  existence fo r a 
long tim e  easily go t in s titu t io n a l finance. This f in d in g  re fle c ts  the 
in fluence  o f age, size and security  as facto rs  in fluenc ing  use of 
ex te rna l sources o f finance, and explains the d iffe re n ce  in the 
finan c ing  pa tte rn  o f the sm all firm s at inception  and grow ing stage o f 
developm ent.
As fa r as expansion and development finance is concerned, sm all
firm s  a t inception  and growing stage o f developm ent re ly  on
ca p ita lis a tio n  o f earnings and o ther fa m ily  and owners resources in
m eeting expansion as w e ll as in fla tio n a ry  needs. The lack o f
in s titu t io n a l long te rm  finance could be considered as a main reason
behind the  slow grow ing ra te  o f sm all firm s. In the 'U .N .I.D .O .' Report
(1984), an observation was made th a t the pa tte rn  o f grow th and the
f ie ld  o f a c t iv ity  o f the sm all enterprises in the Sudan has remained
more or less the same over the years. There has been a big rise in the
to ta l number, but the pa tte rn  o f growth has been ho rizo n ta l. The
founder o f a sm all grow ing company (Case Study No.4) added th a t :
"Due to  n o n -a v a ila b ility  o f long -te rm  finance, 
as w e ll as a very sho rt-te rm  finance nature, 
we could not expand the opera tion  o f the 
company."
The re liance o f sm all grow ing firm s  on short-te rm  financing  has 
an im p lic a tio n  on the liq u id ity  scene and p ro file  o f sm all growing
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firm s  in the Sudan. The low and il l iq u id ity  p ro file  m ain ta ined by small 
grow ing firm  is consistent w ith  the body o f knowledge find ing . This 
low liq u id ity  p ro file  brings about a high fin a n c ia l gearing expressed as 
a re la tionsh ip  between debt and equ ity, and compensated to  some 
ex ten t by a ce rta in  degree o f p ro f ita b il ity .  The sm all grow ing firm  
shows th a t the re ta ined  p ro f it  in re la tio n  to  to ta l assets is low (10%), 
which questioned the degree o f adequacy o f re ta ined earnings to  meet 
developm ent needs, in the absence and lack o f in s titu t io n a l long-te rm  
finance. The low re ta ined earnings are not a ttr ib u ta b le  to  dividend 
po licy , ra the r th a t to  p ro f it  generated by sm all f irm s  under the pric ing 
po licy  determ ined by the Government, and h igh ly  in fluenced by the  big 
producers. The lega l p ro f it  m argin based on cost and m ark-up was 
13%, decided and con tro lled  by the Government.
There is a w ide or even universal agreem ent between scholars 
(Abdel Sammed, 1978; K n igh t, 1983; Boswell, 1972) th a t lack of 
finance is one o f the  prim e causes o f fa ilu re  o f the sm all f irm . The 
in it ia l f ie ld  work con firm ed th is  s ta tem en t in the Sudan, since finance 
and its  shortage is a common problem  in a ll developing countries, and 
the Sudan is no exception. The research case studies on the declin ing 
stage added another dimension to  causes o f fa ilu re , i.e. m isa lloca tion  
o f fin a n c ia l resources and the a ttitu d e  o f the entrepreneur or vision 
(mechanz model). The S.P.C. (Case Study No.7) was financed heavily 
by the com m ercia l banks (L.S.3-8 m illio n ), but the m ajor problem  was 
poor fin a n c ia l management. The analysis o f sources o f finance 
ava ilab le  to sm all firm s  at dec lin ing  stage shows th a t these firm s 
obta ined finance on sho rt-te rm  basis, and sh ifted  in to  long -te rm  use in 
and outside the business which put the firm 's  survival in jeopardy. The 
fin a n c ia l behaviour o f the sm all f irm  at the dec lin ing  stage has
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im p lica tio ns  fo r the fin a n c ia l p ro file  tha t could be read as i l l iq u id ity /  
insolvency, accelerated losses and high fin a n c ia l gearing. Due to  the 
c r ite r ia  used by banks in provid ing funds to  c lien ts , based on facto rs 
o the r than the cred itw orth iness, the dec lin ing  firm s  succeeded in 
ob ta in ing  in s titu tio n a l finance under re-o rgan isa tion stage or a t the 
process o f change from  one line  to  the o ther.
Table 3.1
Source o f Funds:
Sources of funds Inception Growing D eclin ing
1. Personal savings X X X
2. Owner's fa m ily X X 'exp ' X R.E.
3. Owner's bro ther <5c sister X
4. Trade c red it X
5. R eta ined p ro fit X
6. Comm, banks' loans X (i) X X
7. Dev. B. loans X ( ii)
8. Long-te rm  loans N/A N /A N/A
( i)  in s ign ifican t w.c. finance
( ii)  s ta rt-up  ca p ita l finance
R.E. R e-organisation -  R e-financing
Regarding the degree o f d if f ic u lt ie s  sm all f irm s  experienced in 
ra is ing in s titu t io n a l finance, a ll firm s  in question (7 case studies) 
reported  th a t the cost o f borrow ing is too high and p ro h ib itive . The 
cost o f finance w ith in  the banking system ranged between 18-24 
percent or more. According to  the C en tra l Bank c re d it po licy , w ith  the 
ob jective  o f constra in ing the growth o f money supply in the  ca p ita l 
m arket (1983), the m inimum  in te res t ra te  decided by 1983/84 po licy  
was 17%. The higher cost o f finance is a major problem  to  small
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businesses and sm all firm s at inception , in p a rtic u la r because la rge  and 
w e ll established firm s  are prepared to  borrow at any ra te , because of 
the quick tu rnover o f th e ir  businesses and th e ir  h igher degree of 
in fluence  on the p ric ing  o f products a t approval a t governm ental level 
and in the m arket. The use o f barga in ing as a method o f financ ing - 
cost de te rm ina tio n  under Islam ic banking system puts sm all firm s w ith  
inexperienced and poorly  educated owners a t a disadvantage.
The entrepreneurs o f firm s in the case studies reported th a t the 
o ther b iggest problem in finance was the provision o f acceptable 
security  and c o lla te ra l required by the fin a n c ia l in s titu tio n s . The 
types o f security  needed by banks to  provide short and long-te rm  
finance as reported  by entrepreneurs are : (1) m ortgage, (2) stock in 
trade  and (3) guarantees. The guarantees and guarantors are the 
major requirem ents fo r most business loans not exceeding L.S.30,000. 
Under Is lam ic financ ing  instrum ent - 'M urabaha', post-dated cheques 
are used as a security .
Banks and Sm all Business F inancing: The re la tionsh ip  between
the banks and sm all firm s  was c rit ic is e d  by research in terviewees from  
the demand and supply-side, on the grounds th a t no bank has a defined 
po licy  fo r sm all firm s . There is no d e fin it io n  fo r  what constitu tes 
sm all business in any fin a n c ia l in s titu tio n s  ope ra ting  in  the Sudan, 
in c lud ing  the  pub lic  development bank (S.I.B.). A foca l po in t and v ita l 
questions were raised on th is  issue by in dus tria lis ts  : Is the banking 
system in the  Sudan capable o f handling sm all firm s  problems? Is the 
banking system ready fo r th is  new approach o f Is lam isa tion? Do the 
banking systems have the a b ili ty  and q u a lifie d  s ta ff  to deal w ith  these 
new approaches to financ ing  and to what ex ten t can they be accommo­
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dated in the sm all f irm  environm ent? There was a concensus and
agreem ent th a t the banking system and bankers in the Sudan are not
q u a lifie d  to  run th e ir  own tra d it io n a l s im ple banking system, and
th e re fo re  not able to  assess business operations.
"Bankers are tra ined  in banks which are 
s ize -o rien ta ted  and are tra d it io n a l. We 
need new tra ined  bankers to  sa tis fy  sm all 
firm s."
This con ten tion  and a llega tion  received the support o f some bank 
managements (F.I.B.). "The banking system has to  be changed so as to 
fu rn ish  room fo r sm all firm s." Thus, the re  was a recogn ition  in the 
professional and sm all f irm  circus th a t the sm all f irm  is a t a 
disadvantage in  ob ta in ing  in s titu t io n a l finance. The lack o f a po licy 
fo r sm all f irm s  in the banking system, and a t the leve l o f the C entra l 
Bank, is an ind ica tion  o f fin a n c ia l po licy  gap on sm all business in the 
Sudan. Sm all businesses experienced not on ly the d if f ic u lt ie s  of 
ra is ing  finance from  banks, but also neg lect and ignorance in the 
banking circus.
Raising o f Funds Approach: Most o f the entrepreneurs and
m anagement o f sm all firm s in question reported  th a t the financ ing  is
approached through personal channels, in  the sense th a t they
ca p ita lised  on th e ir  contacts and re la tio nsh ip  w ith  banks' management,
senior bankers and governm ent o ff ic ia ls  and p o lit ic a l power (s.p.c. case
study No.7). The founder o f a s ta rt-up  company stated th a t :
"We did not present any f in a n c ia l docu­
m entation to  the bank fo r financ ing . The 
banks provided funds on the basis o f the 
persona lity  o f app lican t and the v ia b il ity  
o f the pro ject."
The founder o f the K issra-m aking fa c to ry  (case study No.6) confirm ed 
th is  con ten tion  by adding tha t :
- 77 -
"What may be accepted as excep tiona l, 
however, is not the kinds o f problems 
I encountered but the excep tiona lly  
fo rtuna te  position in which I found m y­
se lf. The m a jo rity  o f the top people 
in Government; banks; or o ther in s titu ­
tions were my contem poraries from  
school days or else knew me through 
other contacts."
We can conclude from  these statem ents th a t contacts and
personal channels are very im po rtan t media in ra is ing in s titu t io n a l
finance  in the Sudan. This view has received support from  the
supply-side, under Is lam ic financ ing  instrum ents.
"Due to the problem of delay in debt re ­
payment which curbed under in terest-based 
system by compound in te res t, the Is lam ic 
banks must be ca re fu l as to  whom they 
lend th e ir money. The persona lity  and 
p ro file  o f the c lie n t is our focus."
(F.I.B. 1982, 'Salama')
In his paper on the eva luation o f Is lam ic banks p ractice  in  the Sudan, 
Awad (1984) added another dimension to  the c r ite r ia  used by banks in 
p rov id ing  funds to  c lie n ts  under Is lam ic banking mechanism. He stated 
th a t : "The charge o f favouritism  is hard to  prove or disprove. A lm ost 
every bank has some favoured c lien ts  and 'F IB ' can not be an 
excep tion , and in th is  case an ideo log ica l bond between the bank and 
many o f its  shareholders and c lie n ts  strengthens the charge."
Regarding docum entation and the  level needed to  provide funds, 
most o f the entrepreneurs supported tha t docum entation is im po rtan t 
as a back-up o f the case in troduced through personal channels.
From th is  review o f the sm all firm s ' pa tte rn  o f financ ing , 
a v a ila b il ity  o f long -te rm  finance, cost o f bank borrow ing and the 
d if f ic u lt ie s  experienced in ra ising finance, the conclusion can be drawn 
th a t the re  is a sm all f irm  finance gap in the Sudan.
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3.2.2. E n trepreneuria l C haracte ris tics  and P ro file :
In addressing the issue o f an entrepreneur as an in d iv idua l in th is  
study, an en trepreneur has been defined as an "owner and manager of 
sm all enterprises". This w ork ing d e fin it io n  is accommodated w ith in  
the Schumprian school o f thought, which is fo llow ed la rge ly  by the 
present-day w rite rs  and theoris ts  in the f ie ld  o f entrepreneurship (see 
C hapter 4).
Entrepreneurs o f the sm all m anufacturing firm s in question 
(research case studies) could be c lass ified  in to  two types :
1. Those o r ig in a tin g  from  tra d in g  and fa m ily  businesses, and
2. Ex-governm ent and priva te  companies' o ff ic ia ls  and employees. 
These d iffe re n t types o f entrepreneurs vary considerably in back­
ground, education leve l, experience, vision, in the way the company is 
financed and managed, and in the management s ty le  adopted.
The c rea tion  and fo rm a tion  o f the sm all f irm  in the Sudan is 
p a r t ia lly  in fluenced  by th a t sort o f c la ss ifica tio n . In se tting  up a 
business, ex-governm ent employees were in fluenced by the dissatis- 
ca tion  w ith  the government job, previous experience in the lin e  o f 
industry , se lf-a c tu a lisa tio n  and the desire to m a in ta in  independence 
and to  be a 'boss'.
"I entered the f ie ld  o f business to  stand 
on my own; to  bu ild  my im age and 
repu ta tion  out o f my business. Moreover, 
the government job was too  narrow to 
embody my am bitious and innovative  a b ility ."
(Case study No.6)
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On the other hand, entrepreneurs who o rig ina ted  from  trad ing
and fa m ily  business put more emphasis on fa m ily  dimension, finan c ia l
gain and the e a r ly - l ife  tim e  work as main m o tiva ting  facto rs  fo r
se tting  up th e ir  own businesses, w ith in  the fa m ily  or supported by the
fa m ily  a t various stages o f development.
"I was encouraged by my fa th e r to  bu ild  
my own image and name, fo llo w in g  the 
way of our g rand fa ther. The fa c to ry  was 
financed by the fa m ily  business as a 
reward fo r 12 years o f lo y a lty  to  the 
fa m ily  and to give a chance fo r my 
brothers to  take an active  ro le  in the 
fa m ily  business ra ther than segregation of 
the fa m ily  w ealth ." (Case study No.2)
In th is  group we noticed tha t the fa m ily  tra d it io n  in financ ing  and
management o f the business was very strong and the entrepreneur was
surrounded by his fa m ily  members.
This sort o f c lass ifica tion  o f entrepreneurs in to  ex-governm ent 
employees w ith  a high level o f education, techn ica l knowledge and 
desire fo r independence, as compared w ith  o ther group, does not mean 
th a t the  f ir s t  type is not in fluenced by fa m ily  and fin a n c ia l gain and
vice versa. But the v ita l issue is the degree o f w e igh t o f the
m o tiva ting  fa c to r. Based on the seven case studies, the p ro f ile  o f an 
entrepreneur as an ind iv idua l in the Sudan could be set w ith in  the 
psychological, socio log ica l and s itu a tio n a l school o f thoughts in to  
three categories :
a) Points o f d irec t convergence:
- F a m ily -o rie n ta te d
- Independent o rien ta ted
- In fluence o f past and previous experience
- Image and se lf-ac tua lisa tion
- F inanc ia l gain
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b) Points o f in -d ire c t convergence:
- Growth o rien ta ted
- Ex-governm ent employees were h igh ly  educated whereas o ther
types were less or lower educated.
c) Points lack ing  convergence:
- Innovative  a b ili ty
- E a r ly - l ife  tim e  work
- Management tra in in g  and education.
The a ttitu d e  and p ro file  of an en trepreneur towards financ ing  has 
been seen by the  bankers as an in h ib it in g  fa c to r (Musharaka finance). 
One o f the entrepreneurs commented th a t "I have no objection on the 
bank invo lvem en t in a ll ope ra tiona l decisions, but there should be a
ce rta in  l im i t  to  the bank's invo lvem ent.............  bank's representative
behaves as bank em ployee, regardless o f the repu ta tion  of the 
business, im age and the name of the owner". Some entrepreneurs did 
not approach in s titu t io n a l finance on the grounds th a t i t  was usuary 
(Haram) and against th e ir  b e lie f and independancy. Thus, the 
en trepreneu r's  a ttitu d e , b e lie f, understanding and the desire fo r 
independence, shaped the fin a n c ia l s truc tu re  o f the f irm . The 
c la s s ific a tio n  o f entrepreneurs in re la tio n  to  ra is ing  o f in s titu tio n a l 
finance could be seen c le a rly  through the s ta tem en t o f one of the 
bankers (N.B.) :
"Some entrepreneurs are not able to  id e n tify  
and quan tify  the amount o f a d d ition a l finance 
they need, and have no idea o f the cost of 
th e ir  projects."
These types o f entrepreneurs, w ith  d iffe re n t cha racte ris tics  and 
background, could be expla ined fu rth e r so as to  see th e ir  im p lica tio n
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fo r the management o f the business. The ex-governm ent employees, in
managing th e ir  businesses, were in fluenced  by th e ir  past experience in
w e ll-fo rm a lise d  enterprises w h ils t those o r ig in a tin g  from  tra d it io n a l
tra d in g  and fa m ily  business were h igh ly  in fluenced by the way the
fa m ily  and trad ing  business is managed. The in i t ia l  f ie ld  w ork shows
none hard surpris ing resu lt th a t the leve l o f soph istica tion  o f the
fin a n c ia l con tro l m ain ta ined by the sm all f irm  is h igh ly  in fluenced by
the entrepreneur characte ris tics  and p ro file . The a ttitu d e  of
entrepreneurs w ith  a low leve l o f education and lack o f knowledge of
management theory and technique could be in te rp re te d  through the
sta tem en t o f one o f the entrepreneurs :
"The accounts section exists m ain ly to  
provide in fo rm a tio n  on tax and excise duties. 
F inancia l in fo rm a tio n  re la ted  to  banks and 
o ther decisions are kep t in my d ia ry ."
(Case study No.7)
This s ta tem en t could be compared w ith  the s ta tem en t o f the owner o f 
a sm all f irm  (case study N o .l)  who was an ex-governm ent employee 
and received a fo rm a l education and management tra in in g  : "The 
f in a n c ia l con tro l system stood as one o f the weaknesses o f manage­
ment, i t  is incom ple te , h is to rica l and o f no use in  re fle c tin g  the  actual 
pos ition . The outcome in fo rm a tio n  is not h e lp fu l in decision making. 
This is the area th a t needs more a tte n tio n  and consideration ."
These statem ents are not quoted to  show th a t the finan c ia l 
con tro l systems, m ain ta ined by sm all firm s  managed by entrepreneurs 
from  group two (ex-governm ent) is more adequate than the o ther, but 
s im ply to  show the e ffe c t o f background, o rig in  o f entrepreneurs on 
th e ir  a tt itu d e  towards fin a n c ia l con tro l. This observation, which 
provides support to Boswell's (1972) f in d in g  in the U.K., has been 
con firm ed  a by professional accountant who was involved in one o f the
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case study companies (case study No.3) :
"The problems o f accounting, and the 
fin a n c ia l con tro l in th is  sort o f company, 
are a function  o f the m e n ta lity , manage­
ment and business knowledge o f the 
entrepreneur. To in troduce an adequate 
system, you need f ir s t  to  change the 
perception, m e n ta lity  and a ttitu d e  o f owners."
The observation in th is  area is th a t the en trepreneur in the Sudan
lacks m anageria l sk ills . This lack o f m anageria l s k il l can be separated
in to  m isconception, m isunderstanding o f proper management, and the
proper and best way to organise th e ir  businesses. Thus, the in it ia l
f ie ld  work has id e n tif ie d  en trep reneu ria l de fic iency  in the Sudan. The
foca l po in t needing to  be raised in th is  con tex t is what kind o f
in s titu t io n  should be set up in the Sudan, so as to  raise the standard of
sm all business management practice .
Taking the Sudan experience, in conclusion, we could resta te  the 
s ta tem en t o f Cooper (1983), by contend ing th a t the m otive o f an 
en trepreneur fo r  going in to  business as w e ll as his cha racte ris tics  and 
p ro f ile  de term ines the financing , management and the expecta tion  o f 
the f irm .
3.2.3 F am ily  In fluence :
The in -dep th  analysis o f the research case studies ind ica tes tha t 
the fa m ily  stands as a main source o f finance a t various stages o f 
developm ent w ith  ce rta in  varia tions. The fa m ily  stand as a main 
source o f long -te rm  financing  to sm all business a t zero cost. The 
fa m ily  financ ing  o f the working ca p ita l needs o f sm all f irm s  at 
incep tion  was so s ig n ifica n t, co n s titu tin g  80% o f the to ta l debt 
finance. In the growing stage o f developm ent, we noticed th a t the ro le
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o f fa m ily  in business financ ing  confined to  re ta ined  p ro f it  (fo rego ing  
o f d ividends). The in it ia l f ie ld  work shows th a t the  ro le  o f the fa m ily  
in business financ ing  goes inversely to  the expansion and development. 
This could be a ttr ib u te d  to the success o f the grow ing f irm  in find ing  
access to an ex te rna l source o f finance.
The involvem ent o f the fa m ily  in the  business has been
considered by most interviewees (five  out o f seven) as a key success
fa c to r. The arguments o f entrepreneurs were based on lo y a lty  and
com m itm ent o f fa m ily  members, as w e ll as the secrecy o f the business.
"I have the b e lie f th a t the main fac to r
behind the success o f any business is the 
com m itm ent and lo y a lty  o f its  employees.
To secure th is  success fa c to r, I have b u ilt  
a great lin k  and connection between the 
business and the fa m ily ."  (Case study No.5)
Another entrepreneur added on o ther dimensions, s ta ting  th a t :
"Industry is based on secrecy and I have 
the conviction th a t the r ig h t people fo r 
th is  sort o f secrecy are the fa m ily  members. 
Moreover, by Quren and H yd ith , we are 
asked to th in k  in term s o f fa m ily ."
I t  was observed th a t the a ccou n ta b ility , defined lines o f
respons ib ilitie s  and ce rta in  degree o f fo rm a lity  were sacrificed  by the
fa m ily  business. This symptom c le a rly  could be observed a t inception
stage - pioneer enterprise . In the grow ing firm s , the accou n ta b ility ,
fo rm a lity  and fa m ily  involvem ent re la tionsh ip  was m ain ta ined w ith  a
ce rta in  degree o f va ria tio n . This f in d in g  im p lies  the d iffe rence
between s ta rting -up  and sm all, growing firm s  a t m anageria l level.
"A lthough DPP was owned, co n tro lle d  and 
managed by the fa m ily , we tre a te d  the 
company as a separate e n t ity  in the sense 
th a t i t  was reg istered as a lim ite d  company 
so as to s trike  a balance between the 
business objective and fa m ily  a ffa irs ."
(Case study No.5. S.G.F.)
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We observed tha t the involvem ent o f fa m ily  in financ ing  and
management of the business throughout its  stage o f developm ent, was
fo llow ed  by human and o rgan isa tiona l problems. In the fa m ily
business, there is a confusion o f the ro le  o f finan c ie r, investor and
manager as w e ll as fa m ily  members. This confusion o f roles in
connection w ith  fo rm a lity  and in fo rm a l involvem ent o f fa m ily
members, was considered by the co-founder of one o f the dec lin ing
firm s  (case study No.7) as one o f the main reasons behind the collapse
of the company. One aspect o f fa m ily  management which o ften  causes
problem s w ith  regards to  succession and its  e ffe c t on business, is the
fa m ily  insistence o f having one o f its  members serve as a ch ie f
execu tive  on the grounds tha t he is an e lder son. The researcher
observed th a t the management succession plan im p ic it ly  and e x p lic it ly
was b u ilt  round the h ierarchy o f the fa m ily . The d ire c to r o f the pub lic
bank (S.I.B.), which was h ighly involved in financ ing  one o f the
dec lin ing  firm s (case study No.7) added :
"The in troduc tion  o f fa m ily  members in to
..............  (usually a t higher echelons in the
hierarchy) acted as a fru s tra tin g  and 
a liena ting  fa c to r, as fa r as o ther personnel 
(professional) and th e ir  career were con­
cerned."
From th is  review, we may conclude tha t fa m ily  is an in flu e n tia l 
fa c to r on financing and management o f sm all firm s  in the Sudan, as a 
socio-econom ic phenomenon, deriv ing  its  power from  the extended 
fa m ily  concept, which is its e lf  a c u ltu ra l fa c to r. The main fin d in g  o f 
th is  review  is tha t the ro le o f the fa m ily  in financ ing  business 
opera tions corre lates inversely w ith  grow th, whereas its  degree o f 
invo lvem ent in management corre la tes pos itive ly  w ith  expansion and 
developm ent.
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The f ir s t  part of the fin d in g  could be used to  m od ify  the 
tra d it io n a l view of the fin a n c ia l l i fe  cycle of the firm  (Weston and 
Brigham , 1978) by adding fa m ily  to  owners resources at s ta rt-up  stage.
This m o d ifica tion  stems from  the fact tha t the subject theory has 
been developed fo r developed countries, w ith  d iffe re n t economic, 
socia l and values. The second part o f the main fin d in g  is inconsistent 
w ith  scholars inferences (Peiser and Wooten; Mansen, 1969; Levington, 
1971) in the f ie ld  o f the sm all f irm  management, po in ting  out tha t 
grow th is o ften  accompanied by professional management. Due to  the 
socia l s truc tu re  o f the Sudan, and fa m ily  pride, the fa m ily  dom ination 
o f the f irm  has a special problem in a ttra c tin g  outsiders and 
professionals in pa rticu la r.
3.2.4 F inancia l C o n tro l:
The in -depth  analysis o f the research case studies revealed tha t 
the o rgan isa tiona l s tructure  o f the sm all f irm  is very simple 
(sometimes does not ex is t) and in most cases is b u ilt  round the 
s truc tu re  and the h ierarchy o f the fa m ily . The organ isationa l 
s truc tu re  in most enterprises is confined to  a u th o r ity  and d irec t 
con tro l, which could be a ttr ib u te d  to  the kind o f entrepreneurs and 
m anagement status. It is noticed th a t entrepreneurs are u nw illing  to 
d ilu te  th e ir  personal power and con tro l over th e ir  businesses, and th is 
creates some sort o f in - f ig h tin g  between entrepreneurs belonging to 
the o lder generation and the new generation w ith in  the um bre lla  of 
the fa m ily . The o rgan isa tiona l set-up of sm all business does not 
re fle c t the actual p ractice  o f the decision-m aking process, as could be 
found in  pub lic  and priva te  la rge  enterprises. The founder o f a super 
growth f irm  (case study No.5) to ld  tha t :
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"The decision-m aking process in the DPP 
is ta ilo re d  round the in te res t o f the company 
regardless o f the rou tine  and fo rm a l procedure. 
We have the b e lie f tha t adherence to  rules 
and regulations, and fo rm a l channels is the 
sort of bureaucracy which destroyed the 
fu tu re  o f public enterprises in the Sudan."
The body o f knowledge shows tha t there are two predom inant
s ty les o f management : a u tho rita tive  (classical) and p a rtic ip a tiv e  and
consu lta tive  approach (modern). The p ilo t study shows th a t the
management s ty le  o f the small f irm  w ith in  the con tex t o f these two
schools o f thought is a function  of the owner's percep tion, experience,
degree o f fa m ily  and bank's involvem ent and stage o f developm ent.
The case studies re fle c t tha t the declin ing companies are managed
la rg e ly  by the a u th o rita tiv e  sty le . "We fo llo w  an in s tru c tio n  s ty le  so
as to  recover from  collapse" (case study No.7). The founder o f the
other dec lin ing  f irm  (case study No.6) stated th a t :
"The way I managed the fa c to ry  has been 
conditioned by the nature o f inven tion , the 
uniqueness o f the fac to ry  and size. The 
a u th o rita tive  s ty le  is the most su itab le  
approach."
In the business h igh ly  bounded by fa m ily  members, we observed th a t 
the management s ty le  is in fo rm a l, pa rtic ip a tive , and consu lta tive  a t
the top level (dom inant by fa m ily  members) and a u th o r ita t iv e  a t the
lowest le ve l. This com bination of management s ty le  has received a 
ju s tif ic a tio n  from  a founder of the growing company (case study No.5), 
who to ld  th a t :
"We do believe in the p a rtic ip a tio n  in  the 
decision-m aking up to the leve l o f jun io r
workers, but on the other hand, we do
believe in d irec t supervision and a u th o r it­
a tive  s ty le ."
The Managing D irec to r o f one o f the growing companies (case study 
No.5), who received a h igher fo rm a l education and an adequate fo rm a l 
management education and tra in ing , re la ted  management philosophy
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to  grow th of the business, as a key fac to r, adding another dimension o f 
management philosophy of small business in the Sudan. "We thought 
th a t the way we handle and tre a t our employees is the main reason 
behind th e ir  lo y a lty , devotion and com m itm ent. The m a te ria l evidence 
is th a t the company employees have no trade  union, which is e lig ib le  
and the  DPP is managed as one fa m ily  fo llo w in g  the ’Far East s ty le '."
The case studies reach the hard ly surpris ing conclusion tha t 
management o f sm all firm s in the Sudan are themselves unaware of 
th e ir  proper aims and objectives. In the lig h t o f lack o f objective 
recogn ition , the perform ance evaluation in most cases is b u ilt  round 
the m anufacturing equation, in the sense th a t the entrepreneur 
assesses the opera tion  o f the company, by com paring ou tput w ith  
inputs used (physical and m ate ria l). The v ita l question to  be raised is 
to what e x te n t the management s ty le , en trep reneu ria l a ttitu d e  and 
p ro file  shape the in te rn a l con tro l system m ainta ined by sm all firm s. 
(The Bath - Investiga tive  approach.)
A common symptom in sm all f irm  p ractice  a t a ll stages o f 
developm ent, as revealed by the research case studies, is tha t the 
con tro l o f cash was given high p r io r ity . Moreover, the  owners were in 
charge o f de ta iled  work on cash con tro l, debt c o lle c tio n , stock con tro l 
and c red ito rs  and banks' arrangem ent. This observation ind ica tes the 
im portance o f cash flo w  to  small business as w e ll as the perception o f 
entrepreneurs towards cash management.
Based on L iv ingstone (1970) c lass ifica tio n  and ca tegorisa tion  o f 
the accounting system in to  techniques, manpower and outpu t, the 
accounting system m ainta ined by sm all firm s w ill be evaluated. The
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researcher observed th a t the accounting records m ain ta ined by small 
dec lin ing  firm s  (6 <5c 7) are very crude and confined to  a co lle c tio n  of 
rece ip ts and cash vouchers kept by the owner, who is in charge o f a ll 
de ta ils . The accounting records dea lt only w ith  what was produced in 
physical term s and there are no annual fin a n c ia l reports. The data  is 
sca tte red  in d iffe re n t o ffices, except cash and bank books which are 
under the con tro l o f the owner. This state o f the a rt posed the 
question w hether the accounting system m ainta ined by these firm s is a 
d ire c t resu lt o f the dec lin ing  s itua tion , or whether i t  is responsible fo r 
the collapse and decline o f the small firm s in question.
The sm all f irm  at s ta rt-up  stage tends to  keep h is to rica l records, 
based on the re g is tra tio n  o f transactions w ith  the cash and bank books 
under the con tro l o f the owner or a member o f his fa m ily . The p ilo t 
study shows the 're la tiv e ' leve l o f soph istica tion m ain ta ined by the 
sm all, grow ing firm . This could be expla ined by stage o f developm ent, 
financ ing  and growth and size needs. Regarding the accounts 
personnel, the research case studies revealed th a t most o f the 
bookkeepers o f sm all firm s  a t inception  are p a rt-tim e rs , and, in most 
cases, em ployees in governm enta l departm ents. In the growing firm , 
the le ve l o f adequacy can be seen in the level o f accountants and th e ir  
status, which is re la tiv e ly  higher. The p ilo t study shows the  banks' 
in fluence  on the fin a n c ia l con tro l practice o f the financed firm s  as 
w e ll as the volume o f finance needed by the sm all f irm . This 
observation provides an evidence o f in te rac tion  between financ ing  and 
fin a n c ia l con tro l.
W ith respect to  p lanning, the research case studies provide 
support to  the lite ra tu re , which alleges tha t there  is no p lanning in
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sm all firm s  and the basic tendency o f small businesses is to  shy away 
from  plann ing. The p ilo t study shows tha t there  is no fo rm a l p lanning 
in sm all businesses, but th is  does not mean th a t there is no system atic 
th in k in g  p ractice  in sm all business, based on the grounds tha t 
everybody plans, but the d iffe rence  is in how he plans fo rm a lly  or 
in fo rm a lly .
From th is  review, we may conclude th a t the fin a n c ia l con tro l 
system m ain ta ined by the sm all f irm  in the Sudan is e ith e r in e ff ic ie n t 
or m isleading, and in both cases does not re fle c t the true  p ic tu re  of 
the business. A p rinc ipa l in ference can be drawn from  th is  p ilo t study 
th a t the sm all, grow ing firm  tends to m a in ta in  b e tte r accounting 
systems, as compared to  sm all firm s  a t inception . The crudeness and 
rud im en ta ry  nature o f the fin a n c ia l con tro l system is a d is tin c tive  
fe a tu re  o f the dec lin ing  sm all f irm .
3.2.5 F indings from  Analysis o f Case Studies:
The d e ta ile d  analysis o f the research case studies shows th a t the 
financ ing  characte ris tics  and p ro file  o f small f irm s  a t incep tion  stage 
o f deve lopm ent tend to  be s im ila r in some instances, despite the 
d iffe re n ce  in  ownership, o rig in  and im pact o f the socio-econom ic and 
m onetary environm ents. The cases show tha t sm all firm s  at inception 
stage o f developm ent tend to  resort to  owners’ and fa m ily  resources as 
a main source o f finance, whereas sm all grow ing firm s  re la tiv e ly  
received a c re d it accom m odation and access to  the short-te rm  
in s titu t io n a l finance and trade c re d it.
The main fin d in g  th a t can be derived from  in -depth  analysis o f 
the cases, is th a t sm all firm s  in the Sudan experience a persistent
- 90 -
problem  in ra is ing in s titu t io n a l finance fo r s ta rt-up  ca p ita l, working 
ca p ita l and expansion and developm ent needs. These d iff ic u lt ie s  can 
be expla ined through the lending regu la tions and securities required 
by banks in p rov id ing  funds, which are u n like ly  to  be sa tis fied  by small 
c lien ts , and the cost of finance, as w e ll as n o n -a v a ila b ility  of 
in s titu t io n a l long-te rm  debt.
This study based on observation also shows th a t there are other 
lim ita tio n s  apart from  the bo ttleneck in lending created by banks, 
expressed in to  lack o f governm ental fin a n c ia l po licy  fo r sm all scale 
industry sector and lack o f sm all f irm  conceptua lisa tion  in the Sudan. 
This in s titu t io n a l gap, among o ther facto rs, is responsible fo r small 
firm s finance gap in the Sudan.
On en trepreneu ria l level, the p ilo t  study had id e n tif ie d  the 
existence o f en trep reneu ria l de fic iency and gap in the Sudan. The 
research case studies show the in fluence  o f en trepreneur behaviour and 
a ttitu d e  on the fin a n c ia l s tructu re  o f the firm s as w e ll as management 
and fin a n c ia l con tro l practice .
The research case studies provide conclusive evidence th a t there 
is an in te ra c tio n  between financ ing  and fin a n c ia l con tro l. This 
in te rac tio n  is determ ined by volume and type  o f finance as w e ll as the 
financ ing  instrum ent used. The p ilo t  study provides the hardly 
surpris ing resu lt th a t the fin a n c ia l con tro l systems em ployed by small 
firm s are crude and rud im en ta ry, b u ilt  round the a b il i ty  o f the 
entrepreneurs. The system usually develops g radua lly , w ith  growth. 
The inadequacy o f the system is a d is tin c t fea tu re  o f the declin ing 
firm .
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On fa m ily , the main fin d in g , is th a t the ro le  o f fa m ily  in 
financ ing  business operations corre la tes  inverse ly w ith  grow th, whereas 
its  degree o f involvem ent in management co rre la tes  p os itive ly  w ith  
growth.
The research case studies provide an em p irica l ju s tif ic a tio n  fo r 
the development o f an in teg ra ted  po licy , based on financing , 
entrepreneur development, in s titu t io n a l im provem ent, management 
and a fu rn ish ing  o f supportive environm ent to  prom ote and develop 
sm all business sector. This its e lf  stands as an em p irica l exam ination  
o f the conceptual fram ew ork b u ilt  round the contingency theory, 
looking  fo r six elements as corner-stone fac to rs  fo r the developm ent 
o f the sm all firm s in the Sudan.
3.3 OPERATIONAL FRAMEW ORK:
3.3.1 System Approach:
A major goal o f any academ ic pursu it is the developm ent o f an 
overa ll theory which can serve as a conceptual fram ew ork fo r 
understanding, research and app lica tion  (Dubin, 1969), and every study 
must recognise the contingent nature  o f o rgan isa tiona l variab les. The 
conceptual and a n a ly tica l fram ew ork stands as a basis fo r the 
investiga tion  and exam ination  o f the phenomena under review . The 
choice o f the fram ew ork should be based on the  main c r ite r ia  o f 
relevance to  the inves tiga tion  and i t  should enable the researcher to  
examine and to exp la in  the in fluence  o f o ther re la ted  variab les. The 
system fram ew ork based on the prem ise th a t there  is an in te ra c tio n  
between a number o f variab les, provides a method fo r  inves tiga ting  
and fo r fo rm u la tin g  exp lanations fo r the re la tio nsh ip  between the
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re levan t variab les (W arm ington, L ip tio n  and Gribbon, 1977).
Luthons and Stewart (1977) stated th a t : "The system approach 
has emerged as an im portan t conceptual fram ew ork which a ttem pts  to 
in te g ra te  and red irec t some d ivergent th e o re tica l management 
constructs." Dublin  (1969) r ig h t ly  commented th a t the system and 
contingency approach based on the premises o f variab les in te ra c tio n  
provides a pragm atic  basis fo r analysing and in te rp re tin g  the ex is ting  
body o f management knowledge and em p irica l research, thereby 
fa c il ita t in g  understanding, pred ic tion  and con tro l o f the phenomena in 
question. Thus, contingency theory and system approach is a stra tegy 
or m eta theory, suggesting ways in  which phenomena ought to  be 
conceptualised and to  be expla ined (B ird and Schoonhoven, 1981).
The system and contingency approach was c r it ic is e d  by a number
o f scholars (B ird and Schoonhoven, 1981; C a rte r, 1975; Namboodin,
B la lock, 1975). B la lock argued th a t : "when contingency theoris ts
assert th a t there  is a re la tionsh ip  between two variab les which predicts
a th ird  va riab le , they are s ta ting  th a t an in te ra c tio n  exists between
the f ir s t  two variab les". Bird (1981) added th a t the problem  w ith
contigency approach is th a t lack o f c la r ity  by contingency theoris ts
blurs the  fa c t th a t an em p irica l in te rac tio n  is being pred icted.
Luthons and Stewart (1977) provide an answer to  the  c r it ic is m  levied
by some scholars s ta ting  tha t :
"In spite o f the s ig n ifica n t p rac tica l problems 
to be resolved, GCT o ffe rs  the theo ris t, 
researcher and p ra c tit io n e r a rea l and 
p o ten tia l fram ew ork fo r in te g ra tin g  ex is ting  
contingency approaches and fo r  o rchestra ting  
fu tu re  management research and developm ent."
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I t  is w ith in  the systems approach, th a t the ope ra tiona l fram ework 
fo r th is  study has been developed in an a tte m p t to  exp la in , con tro l and 
p re d ic t the phenomena o f sm all en terprise  developm ent. The selection 
o f the  system approach is based on the grounds th a t i t  is the most 
su itab le  fram ew ork to address the issue o f sm all business based on 
various variab les.
3.2.2 Review of Small Enterprise Developm ent Models:
The an a ly tica l fram ew ork which we seek to  establish should 
enable us to  exp la in  and p red ic t the research phenomena, focusing on 
the fin a n c ia l behaviour and m anageria l p ro file  o f sm all firm s at 
various stages o f developm ent. To a rrive  a t a su itab le  fram ework 
based on th e o re tica l and em p irica l founda tion , ce rta in  models on sm all 
en te rp rise  development w ill be questioned c r it ic a l ly  in  the fo llow ing  
discussion.
Neck (1977) developed a conceptual approach provid ing a 
d iagnostic  fram ew ork in which to  analyse problem s fac ing sm all 
enterprises. The Neckian model was based on the id e n tif ic a t io n  o f the 
'host' taken to  be the rec ip ien t human elem ents; the 'agent', and the 
environm ent. Neck suggests th a t results or e ffe c ts  are developed by 
the in te ra c tio n  o f these three components. Besong (1978) argued tha t 
"the  Neckian study is, however, lim ite d  in its  analysis o f the 
environm ent, hosts and agents facto rs. His conclusions do not show the 
synerg is tic  re la tionsh ip  and e ffe c ts  o f any p a rtic u la r com bination o f 
fac to rs".
Pa te l (1977) developed a model fo r  sm all en te rp rise  development 
as "be ing a function  o f en trep reneu ria l tra its , pro ject ideas and
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opportun ities , m anagerial sk ills , projects p lanning and reports, finance 
and economic, in fras truc tu re  and social p o lit ic a l environm ent". This 
model could be depicted in the fo llow ing  fo rm  :
ED -  f  (ET, PIO, Mg.SK; PPR, F, ENV)
The Pate l model, based on seven variables, is not in  a fo rm  which 
provides q u a n tifica tio n  or a tra d e -o ff to be made fo r the subject 
variab les (Ray and Hutchinson, 1983). The Pate l model id e n tif ie s  the 
main fac to rs  de te rm in ing  the success of sm all enterprise . The 
uniqueness o f th is  model as compared w ith  the Neck model, the finance 
is e x p lic it ly  considered as one o f the variables o f sm all en terprise  
development.
W ith in  the con tex t and the boundaries o f the tra d it io n a l view of 
the fin a n c ia l life -c y c le  theory o f the f irm , Weston and Brigham  (1978) 
developed a sm all en terprise  developm ent model. The subject model is 
based on the premises tha t sm all enterprise is a func tion  of 
entrepreneur, environm ent, financ ing  and fin a n c ia l co n tro l. Thus, the 
tra d it io n a l view add the dimension o f the fin a n c ia l con tro l as one of 
the main facets o f sm all en terprise  development. C h u rch ill and Lewis 
developed a model based on the m anagerial emphasis. W ith in  the 
con tex t o f models developed by Neck (Neckian model), Patel and 
Weston and Brigham; Ray and Hutchinson, K n igh t and Osaze developed 
models fo r sm all en terprise  developm ent in the U.K., Canada and 
N igeria  respective ly. Osaze (1981) add a fa m ily  as a social phenomena 
in developing economies.
There is a s im ila r ity  between the development models, in the 
sense tha t most o f th e ir  variab les are e x p lic it ly  and im p lic it ly
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common. The s im ila r ity  stems from  the fa c t th a t most o f these models 
are based on the Neckian model, which is the p ioneer in th is  area.
Table 3.2
Summary o f variab les found to be 





















1. Host -  entrepreneur X X X X X
2. Agent - F in. Inst. X X X X
3. Environm ent X X X X X
4. M anageria l sk ills X X X X X X
5. P ro ject planning X
6. Finance X X X X
7. Economic In frast. X
8. O ppo rtu n itie s /
p ro ject ideas X
9. F inanc ia l con tro l X X X X
10. O rganisa tion s t/m g t. X
11. F am ily X
12. Owners involvem ent X
13. S tra teg ic  goals X
3.3.3 The Research A n a ly tica l Model :
Having reviewed the various models developed by various 
co n trib u to rs  and scholars in developed and developing countries (Table 
3.2), the research a n a ly tica l fram ew ork has been developed. A 
conceptual fram ew ork based on system approach was developed p rio r 
to  the conduction o f the p ilo t study as a fram ew ork to exam ine 
e m p ir ic a lly  the research question. O tley  (1980) states th a t :
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"there  are very few  em p irica l studies in 
the accounting area th a t have e x p lic it ly  
adopted a contingency approach p rio r to 
co lle c tin g  data."
The in te rp re ta tio n  o f O tley 's  s ta tem en t adds a dimension o f 
uniqueness and strength to the research m ethodology and scholarly 
approaches adopted to investiga te  the sm all business phenomena.
To sta te  sp e c ifica lly  what we in tend to study and what is the 
research question, the state o f knowledge was reviewed and examined 
(Chapters 1 & 2), tak ing  in to  considera tion  the Sudan experience, 
revealed by the selected research case studies. The need fo r  a basic 
model is governed by the in te n tio n  to adopt or develop a model tha t 
w il l  help us to  re la te  and compare the va r ie ty  o f fac to rs  aris ing from  
the case studies.
The em p irica l exam ination o f the conceptual fram ew ork made 
q u a lif ic a tio n  in  the variables considered by scholars in term s o f in te r ­
re la tionsh ip  and measurement. The em p irica l fo rm u la tio n  of the 
a n a ly tic a l fram ew ork help resolving the problems and d iff ic u lt ie s  
h igh ligh ted  by various scholars in p rov id ing  a fram ew ork fo r analysing 
sm all en terprise  development. Ray and Hutchinson (1983) r ig h tly  
argued th a t :
" I t  is ex tre m e ly  d i f f ic u lt  to  provide a 
fram ework fo r  ana lysing sm all enterprise 
development, because o f the large number 
o f variab les involved."
The study a n a ly tica l model is in tended to  be ac tion -o rien ta ted , 
b u ilt  round a system approach w ith  an emphasis on financ ing  and 
fin a n c ia l con tro l as main facets o f sm all en terprise  development in 
the Sudan. The in fluence of o ther variab les id e n tif ie d  in th is  study 
were considered as w e ll. The subject fram ew ork was designed to
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cap ita lise  the analysis o f in te rac tion  and cause and e ffe c ts  re la tio n ­
ship between the components.
F igure 3.3 presents the a n a ly tica l fram ew ork and demonstrates 
the in te r-re la tio n s h ip  between the id e n tif ie d  variab les as w e ll as the 
scope o f the research e ffo r t .  The a n a ly tica l fram ew ork variab les w ill 
be defined, opera tiona lised and measured in Chapter 4 on 'Research 
M ethodology'. The subsequent chapters on survey analysis (5 - 10) w ill 
discuss more fu lly  the six components w ith in  the s tructure  o f the 
an a ly tica l fram ew ork.
3A RESEARCH HYPOTHESES:
Based on in -depth  analysis o f the research case studies, b u ilt  
round the basic a n a ly tica l model, a testab le  research hypotheses were 
accord ingly developed. By v irtue  o f th e ir  o rig in  as an in te ra c tio n  
between the  body o f knowledge and the em p irica l experience (see 
Figure 3.2), the research hypotheses stood as a lin k  between theory 
and facts. Thus, the research hypotheses were set as a com bination 
between theory and em p irica l experience, derived lo g ic a lly  from  the 
Sudan experience.
The fo llo w in g  research hypotheses a ttem pted  to  exp la in  the  state 
o f the a rt o f the an a ly tica l fram ework variab les as w e ll as the 
in te r-re la tio n sh ip  between them.
1. Small firm s a t incep tion  stage o f developm ent in  the Sudan resort 
to  owners and fa m ily  resources, whereas at the growing stage, 
they re ly  on trade c re d it and short-te rm  finance in financ ing  
business operations.












2.a. The sm all f irm  at the inception  stage o f developm ent,
experiences unde r-cap ita lisa tion  and tends to  d isplay liq u id ity , 
low p ro f ita b il ity  and high equ ity  to  debt.
2.b. The sm all, growing firm  in the Sudan, tends to  m ain ta in  low 
liq u id ity , p ro f ita b il ity  and low equity to  debt.
3. Sm all firm s  a t various stages o f developm ent (incep tion  and 
grow ing) in the Sudan experience persisten t problems in ra is ing 
funds. This prim a fac ie  a finance gap.
4. The sm all business financ ing  gap is a ttr ib u ta b le  to  :
a) in s titu t io n a l gap, and
b) in fo rm a tion  and com m unication gap.
5.a. The con tro l o f cash is given a high p r io r ity  a t various stages o f 
development (incep tion  and growing), whereas debtor and 
c re d ito r con tro l are given p r io r ity  at the  grow ing stage o f 
developm ent; and are the sole respon s ib ility  o f the entrepreneur.
5.b. The adequacy/inadequacy o f the fin a n c ia l con tro l systems o f 
sm all firm s varies from  one stage o f developm ent to  another. 
That va ria tio n  is due to  :
i) Entrepreneur a ttitu d e  towards accounting
i i)  The involvem ent o f banks, and
i i i )  The dom ination o f fa m ily .
F igure 3A  presents the structu re  o f the research hypotheses, in 
re la tio n  to s ta te  of the a rt - what? - and cause and e ffe c t re la tionsh ip .
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Figure 3.5, on the o ther hand, expla ins how the research hypotheses f i t  
in to  the a n a ly tica l fram ework and the s truc tu re  o f the chapters on 
survey results.
The next chapter, (Chapter 4) in th is  scho larly  process w ill provide 
a th eo re tica l founda tion  fo r the measurement and ope ra tiona lisa tion  
o f these hypotheses as w e ll as the d e fin it io n  and exp lana tion  o f the 
te rm ino logy involved.
FIGURE 3.4 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES STRUCTURE "What and Why"
WHAT ? WHAT ?
FINANCINI 






BERS: 1 & 2
WHY ?
FINANCING & FINANCING CONTROL
HYPOTHESIS NUMBER 3 
HYPOTHESIS NUMBER 4 
HYPOTHESIS NUMBER 5
FINANCIAL CONTROL 
STATE OF THE ART
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HYPOTHESIS NUMBER 4
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FINANCING
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Having stated the research topic and developed the research 
analytical framework and hypotheses, the next logical step is to explain 
how we intend to handle the issue and investigate the problem.
The purpose of this chapter is to operationalise the key 
concepts and to define specific variables that have been considered 
in this study. Thus, the chapter outlines the research methodology 
adopted in this study. In operationalising the analytical framework 
variables, the previous research has been reviewed critically so as 
to relate the research work to the body of knowledge (Child, 1972).
Research design, research sampling, as well as method of data collection 
and associated problems, are discussed thoroughly in this chapter.
Most researchers a s s e r t  that the quality of research depends 
not only on the adequacy of the research design, but also on the fruit­
fulness of the measurement procedures employed. Blalack and Blalack 
(1968) added that:
"Basic to any meaningful measurements are an adequate 
formulation of the research question and clear definition 
of the concepts involved".
Lundberg (1939) contended that measurement is not a way of defining 
things but is a process which is carried out only after the ’thing* 
to be measured has been defined. Eddington (1933) and Bridgman (1938) 
pointed out that the proper definition of a concept is not in terms of
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properties possessed, but rather in terms of actual operations. In 
distinguishing between a logical and an empirical approach to the 
problem of validity of measurement, Johoda, Deutsch, and Cook (1959) 
pointed out that:
"From the logical and theoretical standpoint, a measurement 
is said to be valid to the degree that it measures 
what it is supposed to measure. But how do we decide 
whether or not it is really measuring what it is 
intended to measure ?".
Robyn (1972) pointed out and explained the essence of measurement, 
arguing that:
"Such specification of what is to be measured - that 
is, to the establishment of measurement procedures
  The measurement procedures constitute the
working definitions of the concepts being used".
4. 1_______ Financing Characteristics and Financial Profile
The financing characteristics will include the types of 
finance (Islamic and non-Islamic; internal and external; and short 
and long-term finance). It will also include the methods of raising 
finance, the criteria used by banks in providing funds to clients, 
and the attitude of small firm owners/managers to different types 
of finance.
4.1. 1 Financing Instruments and Types of Finance:
The Islamic financing instruments which were introduced 
in the money market in the Sudan, since the establishment of the 
Fiasal Islamic Bank (1978) are:-
-  105 -
1. Mudaraba, 2 . Musharaka and 3. Murabaha* Awad(l984) state that:
"These techniques were known in classic books on 
Islamic jurisprudence as Musharaka (co-financing), 
Murabaha (open-ended jobbing), and Mudaraba (full- 
fledged trust".
Mudaraba is defined by the Muslim Jurists, Scholars and 
practitioners "Beit A1 Mai Islami" as "the buying of shares in a 
specific project or business, on the basis of a loan to a partner 
who is a working partner. The shares could be a part of the business 
or could be the entire capital". In his paper "Islamic Techniques 
of Finance" Awad (1984) explains the philosophy and essence of Mudaraba, 
by contending that the bank may go into partnership with a person 
whose only assets is his good name or business ability. Under Mudaraba 
the bank will provide all the finance required for the project which 
such a person will manage on its behalf, for an agreed share of the 
profit. The initial field work shows the complete absence of this 
type of finance and it is restricted only to trading.
Musharaka is defined by scholars and practitioners as a 
partnership in any activity of business. Sidigi (1980) defined Musharaka 
as:
"... a participating capital agreement, based on 
profit sharing".
Musharaka finance shares the characteristics of equity finance, in 
the sense that the financier provides funds in return for a specified 
share of the company profit, and debt finance, in the sense that it 
is an external source of finance and self-liquidating transactions.
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For the purpose of this research, Musharaka has been treated as debt 
finance. Musharaka could be classified as short and long-term finance, 
in the sense that it could be liquidated in the current accounting 
period, or in the long-term, depending on the project financed, and 
the agreement between the bank and its client.
The most common form of financing projects, working capital 
and trading transactions used by Islamic banks, and all banks under 
the Islamic banking system in the Sudan, is Murabaha. Murabaha has 
been defined by Muslim Jurists and Scholars as "resale with specified 
gain or profit". Murabaha is very short-term finance, being a self- 
liquidating transation within the accounting period "usually within 
six months as a maximum".
Bank overdrafts as a short-term finance were defined by 
Bates and Hally (1982) as:-
"Bank overdrafts are intended to be self-liquidating 
loans within the natural cycle of the firm's activity 
(usually one year); even if the period is longer, 
such loans are still short-term because the bank 
could withdraw the loan facility at short-notice 
if it wished to do so.
Long-term finance could be provided by the shareholders 
or owners, or by outsiders. The long-term finance provided by the 
owners could be further sub-divided into two sub-categories:
a. Share Capital
b. Retained profit
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Share capital and retained profit represent the difference between 
the total assets of the business and what is owed to people outside 
the business. Retained profit, as a source of long-term finance, 
was defined by J. Bates (1965) as:
"There is a reasonably clear theoretical economic 
criterion of retained profit: any income transferred 
to resources over and above what is necessary for 
the maintenance intact of the net worth or earning 
capacity of an enterprise, is retained profit".
The treatment of owners’ loans and its categorisation as 
a source of finance in small firms, appears to be a controversial 
issue. M. Tamari (1978) agrees that:
"The use of owners’ loans as a form of equity has 
another distorting effect on the Company’s financial 
performance. Some or all of these loans earn interest 
which is in effect a return on capital, just as 
dividends are; yet such interest payments are reported 
as a cost to the firm".
Tamari (1978) argues further that, if interest is paid 
on these loans and deducted in the profit-and-loss account from the 
profit earned by the firm, then the owners’ loans are not part of 
equity. However, if these owners' loans do not all bear interest, 
then these loans have to be added to the equity. In this research, 
Tamari’s (1978) measurement of owners’ loans is used throughout.
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4.1.2_____ Pattern of Financing
In addressing the issue of the financing pattern of small 
and large enterprises in the U.K.; Bates (1965) tackled the issue 
from two angles - (1) Sources of finance classified into internal, 
external, short and long-term and, (2) The allocation of funds 
operationalised into budgeting. This approach was used by Bates and 
Hally, in their recent publications (1982). In investigating the 
major source of funds of small firms, Bird and Juttner (1975) made 
an attempt to provide some empirical evidence pertaining to the financing 
of small business in Australia. The financial behaviour of small 
firms was operationalised and measured by the authors into:
The value of assets
The distribution of profits
The initial finance and its source
The source of equity and debt finance and their 
classifications and
Methods of raising finance.
Groves and Harrison (1974) lend support to Bates’s (1965) and Bird 
and Juttner, stating that:
"Analysis of the sources of funds utilised by the 
Companies was an important aspect of the study of 
the financial profile".
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Weston and Brigham (1978) operationalised capitalisation 
as long-term financing.
"Financial structure is measured by the ratio of 
common shareholder equity to total capitalisation, 
represent long term financing".
Under capitalisation was defined by Mao (1978) as insufficient 
initial capital. This definition was used by Bolton (1971); Tamari, 
(1978) and Harris (1977). For the purpose of this research, insufficient 
and week seed capital will be used as a working definition of under­
capitalisation.
To establish the state of the art on financing and financial 
facilities available to small business at various stages of development 
the financing characteristics were measured into sources of finance 
classified into bank borrowing, trade credit, and long-term finance, 
whether internal or external. The questions 23-29 set out to examine 
the sources of finance at start-up stage. Questions 30-36 provide 
data on bank borrowing as experienced by the demand-side; 31-39 on 
trade credit, and questions 40-46 on long-term finance. The objective 
of this part of the inverview guideline (23-46) is to provide data 
on small business financing, as well as large firms from the demand- 
side, in an attempt to test empirically the first research hypothesis. 
This data was supported by the financial data collected from the research 
sample. Thus, in this part of the study, large private enterprises 
were taken as a control group, following the approach of Bates (1965) 
in Britain and Walker and Petty (1978) in the U.S. The main objective 
of this comparison is to examine to what extent small firms were 
discriminated against. Bates (1965) added that:-
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"The difference between small and big businesses 
has always interested economists and others, and 
the columns of the financial press are seldom completely 
free from remarks about the place of the small enter­
prise in society....
Research work based solely on either the demand or supply 
side point of view was criticised by Scholars (Knight, 1984) on the 
ground that it was based on data collected from one side only, which 
might affect the validity of the resultant conclusions. To cater 
for this point, this study will address the issue of small business 
financing from both the demand and supply-side. This approach increases 
the scope of the research, but provides a complete picture of the 
phenomena and furnishes a platform for strong and well-documented 
inference.
In considering the financial position of the small-firm 
sector in Britain, the Bolton Committee (1971) paid much attention 
to the working of the banking system, and in particular to the effect 
of the policies of the monetary authorities on the operations of the 
clearing banks, who were the main providers of finance to small firms. 
Harris (1977) attempted to examine the adequacy of Australian financial 
bodies in meeting the needs of small business. Regarding the measurement 
of adequacy, Harris states that:-
"We could expect small businessmen, sociologists, 
politicians, economists and financiers to have differing 
perceptions of the adequacy of small business finance, 
all more or less valid given their differing interests. 
Probably no one view could offer the whole picture".
The efficiency of the financial markets was measured by 
Harris, as to their contribution in providing initial finance, growing 
capital for new and growing firms and long-term finance. The efficiency
- Ill -
of the capital market in relation to small business finance, was measured 
in the U.K. (MacMillian, 1931) U.S. (Gravin, 1970; Reserve Board) 
and other developed and developing countries, by long-term debt and 
equity finance. In 1953 study by the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System (U.S.), the financing problem of small firms was measured 
by the period of credit contraction, the availability of Credit to 
small business, and the financial institutions’ policies towards the 
small businesses. Knight (1984) studied the role of Canadian charactered 
banks in serving the financing requirements of small business. The 
study involved an investigation of the loan application files in the 
charactered banks, and a questionnaire survey of small business across 
Canada. The adequacy of the bank facilities was measured by the writer 
on five dimensions
1. Loan rejection frequency
2. Amount of Loan granted versus requested.
3. Interest Rate
4. Collateral requirements, and
5. Term of the loan.
Henderson (1966) measured the banks' behaviour towards small firms 
by comparing the loans advanced to quoted public companies and other 
companies.
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In examining the financial institutions’ behaviour towards 
small business financing in the Sudan, data was collected from ten 
financial institutions, classified into public commercial, private 
foreign and Joint venture, public development banks, and private and 
joint venture development agencies. The bank policy, a criterion 
of financing, financing behaviour, financial ability and conditions 
of financing were used in this study as a surrogate to measure the
banking policy and the attitude towards small business financing.
(See Appendix l.Bon Interview Guideline on banks Questions 1-24).
To collect data, bank managers , investment section and credit department 
personnel were interviewed by the researcher. The secondary data 
of the subject banks, as also Central Bank data, and the Ministry 
of Finance data, were used both to establish the financial ability 
of banks (See Chapter 8).
4.1.3 Measurement of Finance Gap:
In the U.K. the debate concerning the finance gap has a 
history going back to the McMillian Report (1931), which concluded 
that there was a shortage in the flow of funds to small business.
The MacMillian gap was defined by reference to unavailability of long­
term loans. This definition was adopted by the Radcliffe Committee 
(1959), the Bolton Committee (1971); Wilson (1979); Stoll and Currely 
(1980). Grafer (1968) stated that:
"There may be various types of financing gap e.g. 
short-term, long-term and mortgage. However the 
financing gap that has been most prevalent for small 
business is an unsecured long-term debt and equity 
capital gap”.
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Gravin (1970) argues that:
"Among the reasons for wide differences of opinion 
as to a small business capital gap is that a rigorous 
definition of the gap virtually defies demonstration 
of its existence nr measurement of its dimensions".
Ray and Hutchinson (1983) added that:-
"A finance gap can exist in two ways: First of all,
a gap would exist if the marginal return on the investments 
available to small business exceeds their marginal 
cost of capital, due to discontinuities in the provision 
of finance, such that funds were not available for 
otherwise profitable investments. Secondly, a gap 
would exist if the cost of money to small concerns 
...... exceeded the cost of money to large concerns •
The cost of financing disparity was used by many writers and
scholars in the field of small business (Stoll and Corely, 1970; Wilson, 
I979; Bolton, 1971; Brigham and Smith (1970) as a surrogate for the
measurement of the small business financing gap.
For the purpose of this research, the finance gap was measured 
in four dimensions:
1. Institutional long-term debt
2. Cost of borrowing
3. Capital shortage (short and long-term funds)
A. Security and collateral requirements.
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This operationalisation was based on the nature and scope of the research 
effort addressing the issue of the financing experience of small firms 
at various stages of development (inception and growing) and large 
enterprises in a financial market, structured round the Islamic financing 
mechanism.
The identification of the finance gap in this study, was 
not based solely on the interpretation of financial data, but rather 
on the combination of the opinions of both demand and supply-side, 
as well as the financial data of small and large firms. This triangulation 
approach adds strength to the generalisations. This measurement was 
set out to test empirically the hypotheses derived from the pilot 
study (Hypotheses 3 and 4) explaining the finance gap and the reasons 
for its existence.
In addressing the issue of small firms in the U.K., the 
Radcliffe Committee (1959) proposed a modification in the existing 
financial institutions. The Bolton Report (1971) concluded that there 
was no gap in terms of information about sources of finance. The 
Wilson Committee (1979) confirmed the alleged existence of a communication 
gap between small business and financial institutions. Based on the 
operationalisation and measurement of MacMillian (1931); Radcliffe,
(1959); Bolton, 1971; the institutional gap will be measured by examining 
the financial policy of the Government, which was reflected in the 
Central Bank's credit policy, and the policies of the Commercial and 
development financial agencies. The existence or absence of a specialised 
body and consequently policies and programmes on small business, was 
used in this study as a surrogate to measure the institutional gap 
(Questions 1-5).
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The information gap was defined and operationalised by 
the Bolton Committee as:
"The lack of knowledge and understanding within the 
small firm sector of the financial services available 
and of the costs and conditions attached to them".
For the purpose of this research the communication and information 
gap was measured by examining the communications channels maintained 
by the banks for providing information and advice to clients, and 
their connection with the criterion used by banks in providing funds.
So as to present holistic picture, the process on the one hand of 
raising funds as perceived by small firms, examined in conjunction 
with the process on the other hand of channelling funds to the client 
from the supply-side. Questions 48-73 deal with the demand-side and 
questions 19-23 cover the supply side (See Appendix 1).
4.2 Financial Control:
Control is a term with more shades of meanings than almost 
any other in the English Language. (Ottley, 1980). Hofstede (1968), 
in defining control placed emphasis on the idea of regulation and 
the monitoring of activities. Webster’s dictionary defines control 
as:
"An application of policies and procedures for directing, 
regulating and co-ordinating production, administration 
and other business activities in a- way to achieve 
the objective of the enterprise."
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In the extensive literature on management planning and control systems, 
control has been defined as the process of ensuring that the organisation 
is adapted to its environment and is pursuing courses of actions that 
will enable it to achieve its objectives. Anthony and Dearden (1977) 
define management control as:
"The process by which managers assure that resources 
are obtained and used efficiently and effectively 
in the accomplishment of the organisational goals".
Most writer in the field of management control agree that 
a management control system consists of two elements (Anthony and 
Dearden, 1977; Ansari, 1977; Lowi, 1971; Ottley, 1980). The first 
element is an information network which prescribes the rules of the 
measurement, collection and processing as well as transmission of 
information. This network was regarded by Ansari (1977) as the structure 
of the control system. The other element highlighted by scholars 
is the set of social relationships through which such systems achieve 
their goals. It may be regarded as the control process. (Ansari,
1977).
Anthony and Dearden’s (1977) definition of management control 
will be used here as a working definition. This definition has been 
selected on the ground that it was based on the distinction between 
management control, operational control and strategic planning, which 
satisfies the theme ofthe research, focusing on financial control, 
planning behaviour and the management style of the small firm.
Financial control was defined by Anthony and Dearden (1977)
as:
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"that part of management control systems that collects, 
reports and uses accounting numbers".
Ray and Hutchinson (1983) defined financial control as:
"The process by which management assures that economic 
resources are being used efficiently and effectively 
in accomplishing the organisational goals".
Osazse.(1981) defined financial control as the formal written communication 
network of financial information.
In this part of the study, we shall attempt to examine 
the way the small firm is organised to carry out its functions, how 
it is managed, and the relationship between the financial profile 
and the financial control. The study intends to examine the degree 
of adequacy of the financial control system (Hypothesis 5). To explain 
and predict the phenomena, the state of development of the financial 
control system of the small firm will be examined in connection with 
the influence of other identified variables.
One of the empirical problems with regard to research into 
financial control is the lack of quantification in this area and the 
nonavailability of generally accepted means of describing, evaluating 
and classifying the financial control. To cater for this problem,
Ray and Hutchinson developed an investigative model, based on the 
concept of the contingency theory.
"The financial control systems are variables which 
are contingent or dependent on other factors, and 
are tailored to the particular goals and the particular 
strategies of the organisation".
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The Bath Investigative framework, consists of six variables:-
MIn the pursuit of objectives; working through an 
organisation structure; with a management style; 
a structure of internal accounting; provides historical 
and forecasted finanacial information; which monitors 
key variables”.
The key financial variables such as historical and forecast 
financial information, financial planning and budgetary control were 
used by various writers as a surrogate to measure the state of the 
art of the financial control profile. In addressing the failure syndrome 
of small firms in Canada, McKinlay (1979) operationalised management 
shortcomings in the absence of planning and control. Such absence 
was measured by the writer by the type of information produced in 
the Company e.g. balance sheet, cash flow statement, forecasting and 
reporting of actual results, credit control. Thus, the measurement 
of the state of development of the financial control used and adopted 
by McKinlay was based on the type and nature of the information produced 
in the Company. Said and Hughey (1979) adopted this approach in examining 
the financial control practice of small firms in the U.S. They add 
the quality and status of accountants in the organisation as surrogates.
In their research work ’’The Failure Syndrome" Larson and Clute used 
type and frequency as well as the quality of book-keepers as a surrogate 
for the measurement of the financial control practice of the small 
firm. They identified financial shortcomings as one of the reasons 
behind the failure of small business. Accounting practice and its 
degree of adequacy was divided by the authors (Larson and Clute) into 
Inventory control, non-existent or degree of completion of the accounting 
records, cash-flow analysis, cash control, working capital analysis, 
budgeting system and the quality of the accountants. This approach 
based on type and frequency of formal financial information produced 
was used by Ray, Piper and Hutchinson (1975), Bolton (1971; Osaze (1981).
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This approach was built around the judgement that what 
is produced is also used in practice. This assumption represents the 
weaknesses of this methodology. Osaze (1981) stated that:-
"The weakness of this methodology   is that
it is not able to determine how the financial control 
information is used in practice by these firms for 
controlling their operations”.
The second weakness of this methodology is that it was based on type 
and frequency of the formal information, whereas the owners/managers 
of small firms manage their business with varying degrees of formal 
and informal information system.
Based on the review of the relevant literature, the state 
of development of the financial control system has been measured in 
this study by the nature and type of information produced in the company, 
as well as its frequency. The questions (106-,136)weredesigned so as 
to provide information on the state of the art of the financial control 
maintained by small firms. The awareness of the sample firms with regard 
to the importance of the financial control was measured by what may 
be regarded as the key financial variables. (See interview Guideline).
To explain, predict and control the phenomena of the financial 
control profile of the small firm, the influence of the financial institutions 
as perceived by entrepreneurs will be examined. The degree of banks' 
involvement has been measured by type and frequency of information 
produced and its final destination, in connection with the financing 
instruments. The quality of book-keeper and the influence of the 
financier will be used as a surrogate as well. This measurement will 
will help explain the interaction between the financing and financial
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control profile. Question 95 in conjunction with the questions on level 
of documentation (Questions 48, 59-62) were designed to provide data 
on this issue. The data from the supply-side will be used to examine 
crossly the data collected from the demand-side - Questions 19-28.
The initial field work of the study (hypothesis 5-B) indicates 
that the financial control profile of small firms is influenced by 
the previous experience of the entrepreneur and his attitude towards 
accounting. Boswell (1972) argued that:
"The attitude to control has often among other things,
led to decline of the small firm".
The previous experience of the entrepreneur was measured in two ways. 
Firstly, the number of years the present owner/manager has worked 
with this firm. Secondly, the total number of years of managerial 
experience the manager had, in addition to his/her experience with 
this type of firm (Robinson, 1980).
In measuring the attitude of small businessmen towards 
accounting, Said and Hughey (1977) examined the status of accountants 
and their role in the decision-making process, as a surrogate for measuring 
their attitude. The status of accountants was operationalised into 
the position of the accountant in the Company (full or part-time, family 
of non^family member), requirement and the quality of accountants.
This approach was supported by McKinlay (1979). This methodology was 
based on the evaluation of the researcher of the selected dimensions 
and the degree of objectivity achieved in the measurement. The Sathe 
(1982) approach was based on opinions and views by asking the entrepreneurs 
and/or chief executives what they think is the desired role for the 
controller in the major decision areas, and their views on the importance
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of accounting in maintaining their organisations. The weakness of 
this approach is its reliance on the opinions, views and ideas of the 
management, as well as, expectations, which are highly subjective themselves.
The review of the literature revealed that there are two 
approaches for the measurement of attitude. Based on the combination 
of these two schools of thought, the attitude of the entrepreneurs 
towards accounting was measured in this study. The questions 97-101 
were designed to collect data on the status of the accountants, and 
questions 103-105 structured to examine the opinions of the entrepreneurs.
The initial field work revealed that the financial control 
profile and its state of development is influenced by the degree of 
family involvement and domination (Hypothesis 5-B). Allen and Parison 
(1982) stated that:
"Controlling families may be willing to sacrifice 
some degree of corporate profitability in order to 
retain some degree of direct family control over 
the corporation".
In addressing the issue of organisation development in the family business, 
Bary (1984) measured the family influence on management in an organisational 
context, arguing that:
"Unlike more formal concerns in the family business, 
authority and status tended to come from membership 
of the family rather than from having a post in the 
organisation".
Farmer and Rickman (1964) contended that the sociological and cultural 
environment have a considerable impact on the ways in which industrial 
enterprises and their personnel carry out their functions. Rikabi (1984)
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stated that:
"Managers in the Sudan, like most of the people in 
that country, are the products of highly-structured, 
traditional society, where all authority is derived 
from the family (or tribal) position and submission 
to authority is seen as the way to avoid the anxieties 
of living".
The degree of family involvement in the business has been 
operationalised quantitatively by the number of people in the organisation 
belonging to the family of the founder or the owners of the business.
The qualitative measurement of the family involvement has been operation­
alised by tracing the origin of the business and the influence of 
the family on the management measured in the organisational context.
The organisational context has been divided into examination of the 
organisation structure of the firm, level of manning by family members, 
the essence of delegation and its influence on the degree of formality 
and informality of thefinancial control practice. Sofer (1962) concluded 
from his research that:
"The problem of recruiting adequate middle management 
was inseperable from the practice of reserving Senior 
appointments and Directorship for family members".
The initial field work revealed that the control of cash 
and the major items of profit and loss and balance sheet were under 
the control of the owner, or members of his family (Hypothesis 5-A).
These factors will be used in this study as surrogates to measure the 
degree of family influence on the financial control profile.
The qualitative data has been accumulated by conducting 
personal interviews with the founders, owners and management of small 
business on dimensions and surrogates identified by the researcher.
- 123 -
The initial field work revealed that the financial control 
system of small firms is influenced by the style of managemnt adopted, 
lending support to Khandwalla, 1977; Colson, 1980; Ray, Piper and 
Hutchinson, 1975 and B. Osaze, 1981. It w as  established in the academic 
literature that the style of management of small businessmen is author­
itative and paternal. Ray and Hutchinson (1983) lend support to the 
normative statement of Bolton (1971); Lowin (1968), by adding that:
”We can infer that no evidence was produced for the 
existence of consultative and participative styles 
which are often noted in large companies. By deduction, 
the authoritative and paternal style can be inferred 
to predominant, and in this regard the small rapid 
growth firms are not different since these two personal 
styles predominate up to flotation and even for years 
after flotation”.
Management style consists of the set of beliefs and standard 
about management, under which the organisation’s key decision-makers 
operate (Colson, 1980). For the purpose of this study, the management 
style of small businessmen will be considered as falling within both 
the participative and authoritative school of thought; therefore the 
styles to be discussed are the authoritarian and participative dimensions.
The authoritarian style was operationalised by Sales (1977), 
by the relatively high degree of power wielded by the owner/manager 
over the subordinates. As contrasted with participative style, both 
power, and all decision-making functions are absolutely concentrated 
in the person of the authoritarian.
To examine the style of management, delegation will be 
operationalised into the assignment of responsibility and delegation 
of authority on the main functions and activity of the company (raising 
of finance, allocations of reserves, cash control etc). The 
entrepreneurs will be asked about their views, and ideas on the management
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style (Questions 141-143). To accumulate cross-checked data, the sub­
ordinates will be asked to v/ha extent the owners delegated to them, 
on what issues, and at what level, as well as degree, do they participate 
in the decision-making process.
Planning Behaviour
Golde (1972) defined planning as:
MThe process of systematically thinking about the 
future of an enterprise as an integrated whole".
Schollhammer and Kuriloff, focussing specifically on small business, 
offer a definition of strategic planning in small business:
"The major purpose of (small) business planning is 
to discover opportunities that would enhance the 
firm's success and to identify threats that cause 
its failure. To accomplish this purpose, business 
planning concentrates on detecting external opportunities 
and risks, and internal strength and weaknesses".
The writers and contributors in the field of planning of 
small business (Golde, 1979; Still, 1974; Gilmore, 1972; Robinson and 
Pearce, 1984) assert that the literature in this area suffers from 
a "little big business syndrome", and the operationalisation of planning 
in small business is no exception. Robinson (1980) added that:
"No empirical studies have been undertaken which 
attempt to operationalise planning based on specific, 
critical dimensions of planning, unique to the small 
firm situations that are being advanced in the 
literature".
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The strategic planning was operationalised by writers as 
a systematic thinking and formal long-range planning. (Newman, 1951). 
Gilmore (1971) criticised this approach based on formality and long- 
range policy stating that:
"What is needed for small firms is a simple and practical 
approach that is within the reach of smaller companies".
Gilmore contended that the strategy of large corporations is a matter 
of record, but many medium-sized and small companies operate internally 
with a loosely defined strategy. Churchill (1984) extends support 
to Gilmore (1972) by operationalising planning into short-term budgeting.
Thurston (1983) stated that there are two approaches to 
planning in small firms. First, the minimal approach to planning based 
on owners’ ideas. Second, the full-blown approach based on steps and 
budgets. Robinson and Pearce (1983) operationalised formality into:
"Formality has been operationalised according to 
the degree to which sophisticated written documentation 
emanated from the planning effort. Written documentation 
has been identified as a major dimension of the move 
towards formal planning in small firm".
The operationalisation of formal planning into written documentation
was used by Rice, 1970; Buchele, 1967; Gilmore, 1972; Still, 1974.
The informality in planning was operationalised -by Golde (1972) into
fuzzy and unwritten documentation and the use of word of mouth as a 
communication median. Robinson and Pearce (1984) lend support to Golde’s 
measurement of informal planning.
In this review, the planning practice and behaviour of 
small firms in the Sudan will be measured by examining the empirical
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presence or absence of planning as operationalised by Scholars (Golde, 
1972; Rice, 1980). This operationalisation has been used because of 
its applicability to small firms and the theme of the research effort, 
which attempts to confirm or disprove the normative statement made 
by the writers that there is "no planning in the small firm". To explain 
the formality and informality continum, Robinson and Pearce’s operational­
isation of formal and informal plan will be used. Questions 109-112 
were structured to collect data on budgeting practice and 144-150 on 
strategic planning practice.
4.3 Entrepreneurial Characteristics
Palmer (1971) states that:
"The word entrepreneur carries a deluge of definitional 
and operational ambiguity".
One of the earliest definitions of an entrepreneur is that 
of Contillon who described the entrepreneur as:
"a rational decision-maker who assumes the risk and 
provides management for the firm".
There was a school of thought, Mill, 1948, which attempted to build 
a demarcation line between entrepreneurs and small business owners.
This school of though considered risk as a distinguishing factor.
Schumpter (1934) and others have asserted and continue to assert that 
risk bearing, which is inherent in ownership is a prime factor in 
entrepreneurial characteristics and functions.
In addressing the issue of the entrepeneur as one of the 
elements of small enterprise development, an entrepreneur has been
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defined as an owner and manager of a small enterprise. This working 
definition has been accommodated within the Schumpterian school of 
thought, which is followed by present-day writers in the field of 
entrepreneurship (Timmons, Welsh and White). Moreover, this definition 
satisfies the definition of Knight (1921) who sees the entrepreneur 
as the ultimate decision-maker in the enterprise. To address this 
issue of entrepreneur as an individual, age, motivation, education, 
previous experience and managerial skills will be taken as surrogates 
(Questions 9-22).
4.4 Environmental Factors:
The environment was operationalised in small firm research 
by various scholars into legislation, infrastructure, market, education 
and training programmes and taxation and investment policy. (Beasley 
and Wilson, 1984; Meredith, 1985). In defining and operationalising 
environment in developing countries, Ray and Hutchinson (1983) 
claimed that the small enterprise development model should lay stress 
on institutions, infrastructure and educational system.
In attempting to establishvhether the Sudan Government 
devloped explicit policies towards small business and to examine the 
impact of presence or absence of public policy on small enterprises 
throughout their stages of development, the study will focus on two 
main indicators. On academic and empirical justification grounds this 
study will focus on (a) Governmental financial policy, and (b) institution­
alisation. On theoretical grounds, these two public policy indicators 
have been based on Beasley and Wilson (1984)’s measurement. Empirically, 
the consideration of these two indicators was then based on the issues
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and arguments pointed out by the policy makers in the relevant ministries 
and small businessmen. (Initial Field Work).
4.5________Research Design, Research Entities and Research Sampling
4.5.1______ Research Design
In their research work "Research Methods in Social Relations"
Sellitz and Deutsch (1966) stated that:-
"A research design is the arrangement of conditions 
for collection and analysis of data, in a manner 
that aims to combine relevance to the research purpose 
with economy in procedure. It follows that research 
design will differ depending on the research purpose".
The writers (Sellitz and Deutsch) went further, arguing that the question 
of design and analysis cannot easily be seperated. They contended 
that :
"in actual research, one’s design and data collection 
precede analysis. But knowledge and anticipation 
of analysis problems are absolute pre-requisites 
to a satisfactory design".
Mautz (1980) extends support to Sellitz and Deutsch, by adding that 
the research methodology used has to match the prevailing knowledge 
of the phenomena under investigation. Based on this argument, this 
research design has been guided by the fundamental questions, which 
the researcher intends to investigate.
Essentially, the study is an example of expost-facto 
(retrospective) reearch. It was not possible to assign firms based 
on random treatment to start-up, growing and declining small firms, 
as well as large private enterprises. Therefore, each firm will be
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attracted to the group to which it belongs, according to the criterion 
and the working definition of the small firm and its stage of development.
4.5.2 Research Entities:
The focus is on indigenous small manufacturing firms in 
a developing economy - Sudan, at various stages of development, identified 
by the author as inception, growing, and declining stage. Manufacturing 
was defined in the International Standard Classifications of All Economic 
Activities (ISIC), prepared by the statistical office of the United 
Nations (1970) as:
"The mechanical or Chemical transformation of inorganic 
or organic substances into new products, whether 
it is done in a factory, or in the worker’s home 
and whether the product is sold wholesale or retail".
In addressing the financial problems of manufacturing firms in Nigeria,
Olyompia (1978), added that the ISIC definition of manufacturing is
strictly only applicable to the industrialised developed economies,
since activities such as construction, repairing, mining, tailoring
and assembling, generally come under the umbrella of manufacturing
in many developing countries. Osaze (1981) in Nigeria, defines manufacturing
as:
"Those involved in the production of goods or services 
either by hand or machinery".
To determine the research entities and the research universe, 
the ISIC definition is used as a working definition, in conjunction 
with small and large firms working definition.
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The manufacturing sector was chosen as a research setting 
for a number of reasons
1. The availability and accessibility of data in the manufacturing 
sector, compared to trading and other economic sectors. According
to Government regulation and taxation procedures, all manufacturing 
firms have to prepare financial accounts. Moreover, there are other 
sources of information in this sector, such as the ’SIB’; the Sudanese 
Businessmen’s Association (SBA) and the relevant Government departments.
2. Most recent studies of small enterprise development in 
developed and developing economies concentrated on industry (Bolton,
1971; Neck, 1977; Bosa, 1978; Tamari, 1980). Therefore it has been
felt that comparison between the Sudan and other developed and developing 
countries would be made easier.
3. The trend of industrialisation in most developing countries, 
and the Sudan is no exception.
4.5.3_____ Research Sample:
It is widely recognised in social science research that 
the desired characteristics of the sample are:
1. A proper sample must give a precise picture of the population 
from which it is drawn.
2. The sample should be as small as precision considerations 
permit, as economical as possible, and gathered as swiftly as its various 
measurement techniques permit. Lazerwitz argues:
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"In the social sciences, sampling procedures and 
complications are thrusts upon the researcher by 
the very nature of his data-gathering conditions".
The majority of previous studies on small firms used in 
the pairing sampling techniques in which a certain group was matched 
according to certain criteria with the firms in the other group.
Typically, industry and size have been used as pairing criteria.
(Edminister, 1970; Bates, 1967; Boswell, 1973). The accounting year 
has been considered and used as a criterion for matching two sets of 
the firms. (Ray and Hutchinson, 1983; Blum, 1974). Marais added that:
"pairing in this manner ensures that interfirra differences 
in industry and size do not affect the magnitude 
of the independent descriminant variables ".
In this study, accounting years, as well as size and industry, in conjunction 
with other working definitions have been used as a pairing criterion.
In comparing small and large enterprises, the kind of industry, as 
well as the same accounting year, have been used as a sampling criterion. 
Based on these identified criteria, the sample industry has been drawn 
from economically important industries in which small firms play an 
active part.
The Sudanese Industrial Survey of 1981/82, carried out 
by the Ministry of Industry, revealed that the food industry constitutes 
77% of the total industry, and 80% of the food industry were small 
firms, defined by the Ministry of Industry as manufacturing firms 
employing 25 persons or less. The survey indicates that 30% of the 
total industry was concentrated in greater Khartoum.
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TABLE 4.1
Classification of Industry According to Size
Rank Industry No. of 
Est.
%
1 . Food Processing 5411 77
2 . Metal & Mechanical 953 13.5
3. Wood Products 245 3.5
4. Textile 154 2.2
5. Chemicals 107 1.5
6. Cement & Building 77 1
7. Printing 64 1
8 . Others 19 0.3
7036 100
Source: Ministry of Industry;
Industrial Survey - 1981/2.
The geographical distribution of the total industry according 
to 1981/82 Industrial survey was as follows:
TABLE 4.2
Geographical Distribution of Industry In the Sudan
’Provinces'




















Est. - 7036 2119 670 610 625 637 503 571 381 304 208 138 270
% 100 30 9.5 8.7 8.9 9.1 7.2 8.1 5.4 4.3 3 2 3.8
T
Figure : Rounded up.
Source : Ministry of Industry; Industrial survey (1981/82).
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According to this industrial survey, the total number 
of industries employing less than 50 workers was 6,787 manufacturing 
firms, and 249 firms employing more than 50 workers. The survey 
shows that 4,740 firms are engaged in bread-making and grain milling, 
essentially processing industries employing less than 5 workers 
and 700 establishments in the mechanical, wood and metal industries, 
employing less than 10 workers (Handicrafts). Therefore, the total 
number of small manufacturing firms employing 10-50 workers including 
owners and managers, is 1347 firms. This number could be further 
broken down in the following:
. employing less than 25 1216 firms 90%
. employing 25 - 50 131 firms 10%
The research sample (45 firms) of small manufacturing 
firms represents 3.34% of the total sample of small manufacturing 
firms in the Sudan, which compared favourably with the sample of 
the Bolton Report in the U.K. (2,115/1.25 million) representing
0.17% of the total small firms registered in Britain. This sort 
of variation, despite the difference in stage of economic development 
between the Sudan and Britain, could be attributed to the methodology 
adopted in collecting data. The large private enterprises represents 
6% of the total of large firms in the Sudan in both public and 
private sectors. Thus the total research sample (small and large) 
represents 3.8% of total industry in the Sudan.
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TABLE 4.3
Classification of the Sample by Range of Employment:
A. Small Firms
B. Large Firms
No. Range of Employment No. of Establishments %
1. 10 - 20 6 13.3
2. 21 - 30 15 33.3
3. 31 - 40 7 15.6
4. 41 - 50 14 31.1
5. Failed/ 3 6.7
45 100
1. 100 - 300 7 47
2. 301 - 500 3 20
3. 501 - 700 1 7
4. 701 - 1000 1 7
5. Over 1000 3 20
15 100
TABLE 4.4
The Nature of Industry and Geographical Location of The Research Sample






St.up Small Firm 50 25 10 5 5 5 - 100%
Small Growing Firm 55 15 - 5 20 - 5 100%
St. up + Growing Firm 52.5 20 5 5 12.5 2.5 2.5 100%
Declining S.F. 80 20 - - - - - 100%
Large 20 20 - 13.3 13.3 - 33.40 100%








St. Up Small Firm 70 5 20 5 5
Small Growing Firm 75 - 20 - 5
St. Up + Growing Firm 72.5 2.5 20 2.5 2.5
Declining S.F. 80 20 - - -
Large 80 13 - 7 -
20+20+5+15 Sample (60) 75% 2% 13% 4% 3%
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Table 4.4 shows that the research survey included many 
small businesses in the rural area - outside KH - besides those 
in the Greater Khartoum area.
The scope of the research has been designed to cover 
20 failed companies, so as to compare and contrast declining 
firms with small firms at the inception and growing stages of 
development. The researcher experienced great difficulty in 
collecting data on this type of firm, because there is no statistical 
office in the Sudan, such as Robert Morris Associates in the 
U.S. and no bank data on small business. The researcher, by 
personal contact and capitalising on previous experience in the 
Management Development Centre, succeeded in getting data on five 
firms. This is a problem of research into failure in developed 
and developing countries in particular and the Sudan is no exception. 
This sort of difficulty stems from the fact that man always prefers 
to speak about his success, rather than his failure. Moreover, 
small business, by the facts of life, is vulnerable, being based 
on market niche and opportunities, and the entrepreneur, in the 
business of making money, can easily shift from one line of business 
to another.
Regarding the sample of the financial institutions, 
banks have been classified according to type and nature i.e. 
public commercial banks, private joint venture banks, public 
development banks, and private and joint venture development 
agencies. In the survey, 11 banks including the Central Bank, 
have been included. The research banks sample can be further 
classified into 3 public banks, 2 private Islamic banks, 1 foreign
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commercial bank, 1 joint venture commercial bank, the Public 
Development Bank (S.I.B.), 2 Private and Joint Venture development 
agencies and the Central Bank, representing respectively 60%,
50%, 33%, 100%, 100%, 100% of the total number in their sector . The
banks sample included in the survey represents 61% of the total 
financial bodies operating in the Sudan. Regarding the financial data 
on banks, all banks (100%) have been included in this study.
4.5.4 Administration of the Survey:
The administration of the survey was affected by 
the researcher. The data to be collected was divided into two 
parts:
The first part pertained to the identification of 
businesses to be studied, in the sense of ascertaining whether 
the business could be legitimately included in the scope of the 
survey. The researcher has used personal contact and capitalised 
on the contacts made in the initial field work. The second part 
of the survey pertained to collection of data from the research 
sample.
The survey took place between the months of November 
1985 and April 1986. The selection of the dates when the survey 
took place, was decided by the research position and stage, as 
well as the Supervisors’ time schedule in supervising progress 
of the field work in the Sudan. For instance, a period between 
October and May is likely to influence the businessmen's response
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to research, because it is a busy time for all industries, whether 
seasonal or not.
4.6________ Method of Data Collection:
Because of the confidential nature of the information 
needed, focussing on patterns of financing and the financial 
behaviour of small firms in the Sudan, it was realised from the 
outset that the method used in obtaining this data would be crucial 
to its success and validity. Entrepreneurs all over the world, 
are tight-lipped when the subject involves financial data (Omopariola, 
1978).
Previous research into company finance, even in developing 
countries, where dependable records exist, have produced a low 
response rate. (Bolton, 1971) (0.17%). In view of the unsuitability 
of questionnaires in collecting data from small business in a 
country with a 75% illiteracy rate (UNISCO, 1978), and the low 
response rate of previous postal questionnaires (Bolton, 1971;
Federal Research Report, 1953), the personal interview was the 
preferred method of collecting data from the research sample.
4.6.1______ Interviewing:
Interviewing as a qualitative research technique 
was defined by Mosar and Kalton (1977) as:
"A conversation between interviewer and respondent 
with the purpose of eliciting certain information 
from the respondent".
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The importance of interviewing, as a qualitative research technique, 
arises from the necessity to come into contact with individuals 
so as to get access to the facts and opinions, and to receive 
them directly from the persons. Kaplan (1970) asserted that:
"Where the source is accessible to the investigator, 
the interview is the device to tap it, and 
if it is not easily reachable, the controlling 
factor in th success of the interview is the 
reaction of the personalities involved".
Theorists in the field of methodology (Maccoby &
Maccoby; Mosar and Kaplon etc), divided and classified interviewing 
into standardised and unstructured interviews. A structured 
or standardised interview was defined by Maccoby and Maccoby 
(1968) as:-
"An interview in which questions have been 
decided upon in advance of the interview, and 
are asked with the same wording and in the 
same order for all respondents".
On the other hand, an unstructured interview was defined as an 
interview in which, the interviewer's technique is completely 
flexible, and is varied from one respondent to another.
The most fundamental argument supporting the structured 
interview is that one should not use a rubber yardstick. Maccoby 
and Maccoby summarised the opinions of the opponents and proponents 
of structured and unstructured interviews.
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"In Favour of Standardised Interviews:
a. They incorporate a basic principle of measurement
b. They are more reliable
c. They minimise errors of questions wording
In favour of Unstructured Interviews:
a. They permit Standardisation of meanings rather 
than the more superficial aspects of the stimulus
situation -
b. They are more valid
c. They are more flexible”.
In practice, the choice is not between the completely 
structured and the completely unstructured, but between many possible 
degrees of informality. Merton and Kendall (1946), among many 
others, have advocated a semi-structured interview, which they 
call the "focussed interview”, and which employs an interview 
guide with a list of objectives and suggested questions, but 
gives the interviewer considerable latitude within the framework 
of the interview guide (Maccoby and Maccoby). This approach 
was adopted in this study for collecting data from both the demand 
and the supply side, as also from other related and relevant 
Government departments.
The interview, as a research tool, has certain advantages 
which become more important in developed and developing countries.
These advantages may be summarised as follows:
1. Being always direct, it is the only way by which
certain types of information can be obtained.
2. Being highly flexible.
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3. The greatest value is the depth and detail of information
that can be secured.
Interviewing as a research technique is not free 
from problems and difficulties. Gopal asserted that 
the limitations of an interview resolve themselves into two types. 
First, those associated with the respondent, reflected in his 
inability or unwillingness to provide certain types of data.
Secondly, those associated with the limitations and bias of the 
interviewer himself.
Evaluating interviewing as a qualitative research 
technique in the light of other alternatives - questionnaire and 
behavioural observation, interviewing is a recommended tool in 
studying small firms in developed and developing economies. 
Interviewing has proved its superiority over other methods in 
obtaining and collecting data in devleoping countries. Questionnaires 
could be utilised successfully in an educated community capable 
of understanding the questions and realising its own responsibilities 
to respond truly and fully. These conditions are unlikely to 
be met in under developed countries, and particularly from small 
businessmen.
There is a real difficulty in measuring good interviewing, 
and in deciding what interview characteristics are desirable.
The only way to assess and evaluate interviewing is to examine 
and test the quality and quantity of data the interviewer brings 
home (Moser and Kalton, 1981). To assess the data collected; 
the information collected according to the interview guideline 
was related to the hypotheses in the question. This process 
has been carried out at the data organisation stage, during and
- 143 -
after the field work. This approach helped to ensure the quality 
and quantity of data.
4.6.2______ Interview Guideline:
The research interview guideline was built around 
the operational framework of the study. It fell into four parts. 
First, certain straightforward facts were obtained about the 
establishment, size, economic life, activities, ownership and 
the degree of family involvement in management (Questions 1-8).
In the first part also general information on the entrepreneur 
was collected (Question 9 - Question 22).
In the second part of the interview guideline, important 
information was requested about the company financing, cost of 
finance, raising of funds approach, as well as problems faced 
by companies in raising institutional finance (Questions: 23 
73). This data represents the backbone of the research effort, 
as well as the most sensitive part of the work. This sensitivity 
stems from the fact that some small businessmen are hesistant 
and unwilling to provide financial data to outsiders other than 
family members.
The third part of the interview guideline deals with 
financial control characteristics of the Company. Questions 74 
- 134. The fourth part was centred on the general issues and 
outstanding problems as perceived by the entrepreneurs (Questions 
135 - 144).
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Pb  far as concerns the large private enterprises, 
the data was collected according to parts one and two of the interview 
guideline. (See Appendix - l.A).
The interview guideline for the financial institutions 
was structured into six parts. The first part focussed on general 
information regarding the bank policy in relation to small business 
definition, financing and development (Questions 1-4). In 
the second part important information was requested on financing 
criteria, determination of cost of finance, collateral requirements, 
and other related issues. The third part dealt with documentation, 
and its degree of importance in relation to financing instruments.
The fourth part was centred on the monitoring techniques employed by banks 
in following-up financed firms. The last part on" the supply-side interview 
guideline was designed to elicit information on banking advice and other 
related general issue's (See Appendix l.B and Figure 4.1)
The data thus collected from all sources, were supported 
and augmented by the collection of secondary data from the research 
sample, mainly financial statements and other related and relevant 
materials.
Based on the Boswell (1970) model in researching 
small firms "The Methodology of Researching the Small Firm", 
the shape of the interview conducted in this study can be represented 
diagrammatically as follows:
-  145 -
FIGURE 4.1 CLASSIFICATION OF INTERVIEW GUIDELINE 




































4.7________Problems of Data Collection:
Delineation of the problems and difficulties experienced 
by the researcher in conducting an empirical survey on small 
business financing and management in the Sudan, is not to say 
that small business is not beautiful, in opposition to the Schumacher 
School of thought, but rather to say that small business researching 
is an invaluable experience.
The first set of problems concerns knowing the exact 
number of small manufacturing firms in the Sudan, as well as 
the name and location of such companies. Attempts were made 
to obtain a list of manufacturing firms from the Registrar of 
Companies Office (RCO); but the data was inadequate and out of 
date. There was no classification of industry, since the relevant 
office kept records of companies only at the registration state.
There is no further obligation for companies to provide the *RCO’ 
with annual accounts. Personal contact was used intensively, 
and of great help in maintaining a reasonable rate of response 
(50%).
The second problem experienced by the researcher 
was the unwillingness of entrepreneurs to speak about finance 
or to provide information on financing and financial problems.
Out of 100 firms contacted personally only 50 firms agreed to 
provide the available data. The researcher experienced great 
difficulties in securing data suitable for financial analysis 
so as to satisfy the accounting period criterion and time-dimension. 
This is rather a common problem in small business research. Gr ves 
and Harrison contended that:
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"All empirical work suffers to some extent 
from data problems and Bolton (1971) relying 
quite heavily on questionnaire design, was 
no exception".
Due to non-existance of a central statistical office or any other 
bodies, where financial and accounting data of businesses 
collected and collated, all financial data for the whole research 
sample was collected personally by the researcher from the sample 
firms.
The third problem experienced by the researcher in 
conducting this small business survey in the Sudan, is best expressed 
in the statement of Stanworth and Curren (1973) on research into 
small business
"Research into small businesses may not be 
very attractive because of the great diversity, 
individualism and number of small businesses means 
that valid findings with wide application are 
not easily come by. The small business owner/ 
manager tends to be a highly self-sufficient 
person in many ways. He is unlikely to have 
had any formal management training, and thus 
does not speak the currently fashionable jargon 
of the social scientists. Researchers find 
it easier to communicate with executives in 
large business and the latter are more likely 




FINANCING CHARACTERISTICS OF 
THE SMALL FIRM IN A DEVELOPING 
ECONOMY - SUDAN
Starting a business regardless of size, whether in a 
developing or developed economy, requires a substantial 
amount of capital and financing for formation, take-off, 
survival and growth. Finance represents the life-blood of 
the business, therefore, a healthy business needs suitable 
blood, in terms of type, timing and cost. Bates and Hally 
(1982) stated that:
"There is no single ideal way of financing a firm.
Each business has individual circumstances which make its 
requirements unique: The industry and markets in which
it operates, its age and the stage of its life-cycle which 
it has reached."
Ray and Hutchinson (1983) added that:
"The elaboration of the traditional view of the 
financing of the small firm, that small firms start by
relying upon the owners' resources.....   If the firm
is growing or wishes to grow it is likely that it will 
consider other available sources."
The main focus of this part of the study it to examine 
the individual sources of finance available to the small 
firms at various stages of development (inception and growing) 
and to explore the financing pattern and financial behaviour 
of small firms. Thus, this chapter was designed to address 
theoretically the issue of 'the empirical test of the traditional 
view of the financial life cycle of the firm, developed by 
Weston and Brigham (1978).
To establish the Sudan experience, along the way to 
establishing the research hypothesis, its theoretical and
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relevant policy implications, the chapter is organised as 
follows:- Part I provides insight into financing character­
istics of small firms at various stages of development, based 
on comparison between small firms and large private enterprises 
sample. This part is re-classified into four sub-parts. 
Analysis of the pattern of financing is presented in depth 
in part II. The concluding section summarises the main 
investigations findings, and the theoretical and policy 
implications that emerge from this part of the study.
In establishing the research hypothesis (1), the analysis 
was based on historical financial and accounting data obtained 
from the research sample (quantitative) as well as opinions 
and views of entrepreneurs and management of the sample firm 
(qualitative). This approach of analysis (Traingulation) 
was made possible by the research methodology adopted in 
collecting data (See Chapter 4).
5.1: THE MAIN SOURCES OF FINANCE
In addition to the owners' interest and resources as an 
internal source of finance, there are four main alternative 
sources. Firstly, family loans and financial support, in terms 
of short-term or long-term finance at start-up stage and/or 
throughout the life cycle of the firm as a family business. 
Secondly, trade credit facilities. Thirdly, bank borrowing, 
in the form of either overdraft facilities and other Islamic 
financing instruments (Murabaha and Musharaka) or medium and 
long-term loans. The fourth category of funds, internal to 
the firm, and a prominent source of finance for expansion and 
development, is retained profit.
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Generally# these categories can be re-classified into 
internal and external source of finance# and short and long­
term financing. The survey provides evidence that# in each 
of these groups, small firms at inception and small# growing 
firms as well as large enterprises# differ.
5.1.1: Source of Start-up Capital
An individual, setting up in business for the first time# 
falls into one of three broad categories. First# these were 
those starting completely from scratch# with owner resources# 
and with the owner having no experience in, or connection with# 
existing enterprise. Secondly# these were those which belong 
to family businesses and develop family business or divert 
family resources into small family business# receiving the 
financial (complete) and psychological support of the family 
members. In this category# the family has a great influence 
on the prospect# management and expansion policy. Finally# 
these were those who received financial support from family 
members and family business# in establishing their own 
business. In this group# the degree of family influence was 
rather less powerful than in the second group.
Table (5.1) shows that most small firms in the sample 
(67r5%) fall into the second and third group# which illustrates 
the influence of family as a socio-economic phenomenon. Each 
of these groups# with its historical background# brought a 
different profile and a different source of start-up capital.
Regarding large private firms, two categories could be 
drawn out. Firstly# those started very small within the 
financial ability of entrepreneur and the wealth of his 
family, representing 47% of the sample. Secondly# these were
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No. F % No.F % No.F %
Current Starting-up 
Small Firms 6 30 10 50 4 20
Current Growing Small 
Firms 7 35 10 50 3 15
Small Firms Sample 13 32.5 20 50 7 17.5
Large Firms. /, started 
very small ' 1 7 4 27 2 13
Large Firms. / started 
very large 3 20 5 33 0 0
those which started very large, representing 53% of the sample. 
The table (5,1) shows that 40% of the large private manufact­
uring sample, started very small within the boundary of family 
and owner resources as a small family business.
The research sample shows that 25% of the research 
universe was based on owners' resources at inception stage,
44% started as a family business, and 16% relied on owners' 
and family resources, providing the total of 85% of the whole
i
research universe, established within the owner's and family 
resources.
Table (5.2) provides confirmation of the research 
hypothesis, showing that small firms at inception rely on 
personal savings and owners' resources in financing the initial 
capital needs. That sort of reliance on personal savings and 
family wealth is a good indication that small firms at 
inception, started with insufficient capital. Many developing 
countries appear in the last category according to the World 
Bank Calculation (1976). Sudan, in particular, belongs to the
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T a b le  5 . 2 :  S o u rce  o f  F in a n c e  o f  Seed C a p i t a l
1. Personal Savings of
O w n e rs
2. Family Business




5. Bank - long-term
loans






9. Loans from Friends
10. Owners 1 •''and Family 
Resources
fifth category, with less than US$200 income per head of 
population. These categories of per capital income levels are 
a reflection of the real differences in standards of living 
and in economic welfare. The low per capital income creates 
low or zero savings and investment for the large mass of 
population. In the Sudan, there was a variation in income and 
personal savings, and that variation was the financing niche 
which creates small business, built on personal savings, 
family fortune and wealth.
The survey shows that large enterprises which started 
very large obtained external sources of finance in financing 
start-up capital needs. On the other hand, the research 
sample shows that large firms, which started very small, share
CURRENT 
St.Up S.F s,cJ.F. LARGE
No.F % No .E % No.F %
10 50 17 85 4 27
10 50 11 55 5 33
12 60 11 55 6 40
- - 2 10 7 47
4 20 6 30 9 60
4 20 4 20 7 47
4 20 3 15 10 67
0 0 0 0 7 47
1 5 0 0 0 0
20 100 20 100 9 60
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the characteristics of small firms in financing start-up 
capital needs. This observation provides evidence that 
ownership and size are determinant factors of the 
financial structure of the firm.
The other financing variable, which discriminates 
between small firms and their large private enterprises 
counterparts at formation and inception stage of development, 
was the availability and use of the hire purchase system as 
medium-term loans from suppliers of machinery. The sample 
shows that 67% of large private enterprises had the privilege 
of using this type of financing, compared to 20% of small 
firms at inception (1980-8 5) and 15% of current small, growing 
firms at formation stage (1945-78). Small and large private 
enterprises had received hire purchase facilities under 
commercial bank guarantee and some large firms, as a strategic 
industry, received this kind of service under Government 
guarantee.
Starting with the question of the financial needs of an 
average start-up company, one has primarily to ask what is 
the amount of capital needed to start such an enterprise.
There is.no empirical work in the Sudan providing an answer 
to this question. This finding itself stands as empirical 
justification for this part of the study, providing material 
evidence of its originality and significance (See Chapter (1) 
(1.2)). To provide an answer to this question, all small 
manufacturing firms financed by the Sudanese Industrial Bank 
(S.I.B.) from 1962 to 1983 (22 years) and the research 
sample were used as a universe. The S.I.B. firms were selected 
as a universe for the determination of start-up capital needed
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by an average small manufacturing firm, because of their size 
and ownership, categorised as privately-owned small manufact­
uring firms employing less than 50 employees (See Chapter 1 
on S.F. definition). To provide a firm conclusion, the 
range of seed capital employed by the research sample was 
considered, in order to augment small firms financed by 
S.I.B. results. The analysis provides a most surprising 
result, that the finding based on the research sample was in 
agreement with the result derived from the S.I.B. sample.
That sort of agreement was an indication and reflection of 
the quality and degree of strength of the derived premise.
Table 5.3; Size of Investment of Small Manufacturing Firms 
Financed by S.I.B. 1962-1983
L.S. (000's) (000's)
YEAR TOTAL INVESTMENT - BANK AND OWNER
TOTAL NO. 




1962 131 5 26
1963 588 17 35
1964 503 16 31
1965 344 8 43
1966 1350 19 71
1967 268 17 16
1968 524 15 35
1969 6 1 6
AVERAGE
62-69 3714 98 38
(SIXTIES)
1970 526 6 88
1971 1066 19 56
1972 521 12 43
1973 3567 15 238
197 4 605 12 50
1975 2320 10 232
1976 3124 12 260
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L.S. (000* s) L.S. (000's)




1977 828 12 69
1978 14 93 17 88
1979 1114 20 56
SEVENTIES 15164 135 1121970-1979
L962-1979 18878 233 81
1980 3410 20 171
1981 2263 23 98
1982 3607 29 124
1983 3413 16 213
1980-1983 126 93 88 144
1962-1983 31571 321 98
SOURCE: SUDANESE INDUSTRIAL BANK ANNUAL REPORTS 1962-1983
* TOTAL INVESTMENT - total bank contribution and owners1
contribution at start-up
Table (5.3) indicates that the amount of capital needed 
to establish small manufacturing firms in the Sudan was 
about L.S.38,000 during the sixties and increased to 
L.S.112,000 during the seventies. The table provides 
evidence that the capital needed during the early eighties 
was on average L.S.144,000, equivalent to £22,000 converted 
according to the prevailing exchange rate. This increase 
in the capital needed to set-up small business could be 
attributed to macro-economic factors, mainly inflation, 
reflected in a continuous devaluation of the Sudanese currency 
(197 9-1986), under the direction and control of the International 
lenders (IMF and World Bank). In the Sudan as well as in 
other developing countries, the rate of inflation as an 
economic indicator is not known either at official or unofficial
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level. The table (5.3) shows that the capital needed to 
set-up a business during the period (1962-197 9) was about 
L.S.81,000. Thus, the capital needed to establish small 
manufacturing firms in Sudan before the first devaluation 
of the Sudanese currency was less than L.S.100,000.
The small growing firm research sample provides 
confirmation of S.I.B. results, that 60% of the sample 
(1945-1978), utilised start-up capital of less than 
L.S.100,000, and 100% of small dealing firms sample (1967- 
1975) started operations with less than L.S.100,000 as 
start-up capital.













RANGE OF SE£D 
CAPITAL:
L.S. (000's)
No. F % No.F % No.F % No.F % No.F %
Less than 100 5 25 12 60 5 loo 22 49 2 13
Less than 300 10 50 17 85 5 100 32 71 7 47
Over 300 10 50 3 15 0 0 13 29 8 53
US$ (000*s)
Less than 50 7 35 1 5 4 80 12 27 1 7
50-100 6 30 7 35 0 0 13 29 1 7
Less than 100 13 65 8 40 4 80 25 56 2 14
Less than 250 18 90 12 60 5 100 35 78 4 27
More than 250 2 10 8 40 0 0 10 22 11 73
The survey shows that the amount of capital needed to 
launch such small manufacturing companies, varies significantly 
among different lines of business. The industry depending on 
imported machinery needs more than small manufacturing firms, 
based on locally produced machinery. Start-up in the field 
of soap and edible oil processing takes place with an average 
amount of capital of about L.S.1,000,000 (one million or
- 157 -
£143/000), compared to start-up in confectionery which 
depends largely on locally produced machinery and requires 
an average amount of capital of about L.S.85,000 (£12/000).
From this review, the investigation provides an 
empirical finding of significance to policy makers and 
those interested to help and foster small business sector.
The financing of start-up capital has to be done with 
a long-term perspective. The survey has identified the 
equity gap and non-availability of external and institutional 
finance for start-up capital, which has a great effect on 
capitalisation of small firms in the Sudan. The survey 
further indicates that the majority of the small firm sample 
started with no debt capital at all. This observation is 
an indication of the financial difficulties the entrepreneur 
faces in successfully setting up his endeavour. (See 
Chapters 6 and 7). It would be shortsighted to restrict the 
analysis of the capital needed to run and launch a young 
company successfully to its mere start-up capital.
(Hunsdeik, 1986). Thus, the next sections are devoted to the 
discussion of the ongoing financial facilities available to 
small and large businesses.
5.1.2: Family Contribution in Financing the Small Firm
The examination of family contribution into small firms 
financing at inception and growing stages of development 
discusses the dimensions of seed capital, working capital and 
total capitalisation financial position.
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5 . 1 . 2 . 1 :  F a m ily  C o n t r ib u t io n  in t o  Seed C a p i t a l  F in a n c in g
A large number of businesses in the Sudan and other 
developing countries is associated with the family system. 
(Bosa, 1978). The closely-held family-type businesses 
that prevail are due to traditional and psychological 
factors, within the concept of the extended family as a 
socio-economic phenomena. The family plays a very important 
role in making all kinds of contribution and loans to the 
business, both initially and later. The family in the Sudan 
and other developing countries, not only provides finance, 
but also sets up individual in business, providing all kinds 
of support. B. Osaze (1981) in Nigeria, observed the 
existence of family financing and support as a customary 
mutual-aid interest in the extended family system. The 
most frequent example as observed during the empirical work, 
was that of positive family contribution in formation, 
financing and management of small and large private enter­
prises in the Sudan (See table 5.1) .
The sample shows that 43% of the small firm sample 
experienced 51 to 100% family contribution in the formation 
and financing of seed capital.
Table (5.5) shows that 55% of small firms at inception 
stage were medium and large users of family resources in 
financing the seed capital needs of the business. An 
interesting finding, which reflects a real indication of the 
significance of family in financing start-up capital and 
formation needs of small firms, was that 35% of small firms
t
experienced 91 to 100% family contribution. This result was 
augmented by the finding that 98% of small firm sample received
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SMALL F . 
SAMPLE
RANGE OF CONTRIBUTION: No.F % No.F % No.F %
Negative Family Contribution 7 35 8 40 15 37.5
Less than 10% 0 0 0 0 0 0
Between 10 - 20% 1 5 3 15 4 10
21 - 30% 1 5 0 0 1 2.5
31 - 40% 2 10 — — 2 5
41 - 50% 0 0 1 5 1 2.5
51 - 60% 1 5 — — 1 2.5
61 - 70% 1 5 — — 1 2.5
71 - 80% — — 1 5 1 2.5
81 - 90% 0 0 0 0 0 0
91 - 100% 7 35 7 35 14 35
Medium Contribution
20 - 49% 3 15 1 5 4 10
Large Contribution
50% and over 9 45 9 45 18 45
Medium and Large 
Contribution
20 - 100% 12 60 10 50 22 55
100% Family Contribution
in Seed Capital 7 35 7 35 14 35
100% Owners' Resources in
Seed Capital 7 35 8 40 15 37.5
100% Owners' and Family
Resources 14 70 15 75 29 73
Seed Capital From Family
and External Source 5 25 0 0 5 13
Seed Capital From Owners
and External Source 0 0 1 5 1 2.5
Firms Received Family 
Financial Support in
Seed Capital Formation 20 100 19 95 39 98
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f a m i ly  f i n a n c i a l  s u p p o rt  a t  in c e p t io n .
The survey provides empirical evidence offering positive 
support to the research hypothesis, that the family is the 
main source of start-up capital/ substantiating the personal 
savings of owners (73%). The effect of the life cycle of the 
firms divided into stages of enterprise development (figure 1.3), 
in relation to family finance, was examined by building a 
relationship between family financing of working capital 
needs and total assets of the sample firm (current). To 
this point we turn now.
5.1.2.2: Family Contribution in Working Capital Finance
The family contribution to working capital finance of 
the current starting-up small firms and current small, growing 
firms was measured on historical accounting data basis, 
building a relationship between family loans as shown in 
the balance sheet, and the current liabilities of the companies 
in question.
The sample firms show that 60% of starting-up small firms, 
showed family loans as a part of current liabilities, as 
compared to 30% of small growing firms. This observation is 
an indication that the family is an important source of working 
capital finance at inception. The effect of the life-cycle 
of the firms could be seen clearly, by comparing the situation 
of current small growing firms with 95% of the sample 
receiving family finance for seed capital and formation needs.
The main limitation of this analogy is embodied in the 
constraints and limitations of financial statements based 
on historical and conventional accounting records, asserted
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by scholars. (Bates, 1967, Adminster, 1970). Based on 
aggregate (mean), the family contribution into financing 
working capital needs of small firms at inception was 22% 
compared to 13% of small growing firms.
Table 5.6: FAMILY CONTRIBUTION INTO WORKING CAPITAL
FINANCE OF S.F. SAMPLE (Balance Sheet Data)
RANGE . OF FAMILY FINANCE AND LOANS CURRENT CURRENT
AS A % OF CURRENT LIABILITIES St. £>.F. G.S.F •
No.F % No.F %
Firms showing Family Loans as a part
of C.L. 12 60 6 30
Less than 10% 2 10 1 5
Between 10 - 20% 1 5 1 5
21 - 30% 3 15 1 5
31 - 40% 1 5 1 5
41 - 50% 0 0 1 5
51 - 60% 1 5 0 0
61 - 70% 1 5 0 0
71 - 80% 0 0 0 0
8l - 90% 2 10 1 5
91 - 100% 1 5 0 0
21 - 100% 9 45 4 20
51 - 100% 5 25 1 5
USE OF FAMILY LOANS AND FINANCE
Firms with no Family Loans on
Balance Sheet 8 40 14 70
Small User Less than 10% 2 10 1 5
Medium User 10 - 40% 5 25 3 15
Large User 41 - 100% 5 25 2 10
Medium and Large User
(W.C. Finance) 10 50 5 25
Family Finance and Loans as a % of C.L. 22 13
Family Finance as a % of T.A. 9 6
Table (5.6) shows that 50% of small firms at inception
were large and medium users of family loans and resources in 
financing working capital needs, compared to 25% of current 
small growing firms sample. The proportion of small firms
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at inception stage of development/ compared to the proportion 
of small group firms sample/ provides positive support to 
the research hypothesis that small firms, at inception, 
resort to internal and non-institutional finance. The 
subject observation provides an empirical examination, 
confirmation and modification to the traditional view of 
the Financial Life Cycle of the firms theory.
Based on aggregate historical accounting data, the survey 
provides more evidence of the negative correlation between 
family finance and growth, based on analogy and comparison 
between small firms and inception and small growing firms 
profile. This profile can be explained by the ability of 
small growing firms to obtain external sources of finance, 
measured in terms of loan security, contacts and growth 
pressures and needs.
The examination of total family contribution in 
financing total capitalisation of small firms, as presented 
in detail in table (5.7), provides an interesting result 
showing that the family contribution to the average 
small firms at inception was 38% of the total assets employed 
with 6 5% of the sample of small firms at inception, 
categorised as a medium or large user of family resources in 
financing business operations.
From this review of family contribution in small firm 
financing (3 measurement surrogates), a conclusion can be 
drawn that the family was a most important source of finance 
at inception stage of development. The empirical investig­
ation provides support to the research finding at the initial 
stage (case study approach) that the role of family financing
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T a b le  5 . 7 :  FAMILY CONTRIBUTION IN  CA PITALISATION OF
SMALL FIRMS
CURRENT
*RANGE OF FAMILY CONTRIBUTION ST. UP CURRENT
IN FINANCING TOTAL ASSETS: SMALL F. G.S.F
No.F % No.F %
Less than 10% 2 10 0 0
Between 10 - 30% 1 5 3 15
31 - 50% 2 10 1 5
51 - 70% 6 30 3 15
71 - 100% 4 20 3 15
51 - 100% 10 50 6 30
♦Firms with no family connection
at present 5 25 10 50
USE OF FAMILY IN FINANCING TOTAL A
Small User Less than 10% 2 10 0 0
Medium User 10 - 30% 1 5 3 15
Large User 31 - 50% 2 10 1 5
Very Large User 51 - 100% 10 50 6 30
♦Medium and Large and Very Large
User 13 65 10 50
♦Large and Very Large User 12 60 7 35
♦Total Family Finance as a % of
T.A. (MEAN) 38% 24%
in business correlates inversely with growth, which provides 
an elaboration and confirmation of the effect of the life­
cycle of the firm on financing characteristics. The empirical 
observation, as well as the prevailing social system of the 
Sudan, built round the concept of family, with deep roots 
in the extended family (Hammied, 1974), provides confirmation 
of the observation of DuSaulay (1968) in a similar environment - 
West Africa.
"In West Africa, the family makes it impossible for 
a man to become a millionaire, but it also prevents him from 
starving."
The limitation of this analysis of family contribution 
is that it was not based on longitudinal research work, but
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it does possess strength, being based <on qualitative'and 
quantitative data.
5.1.3: TRADE CREDIT
In this part of the chapter, trade credit, as 
external short-term financing, will be examined, so as 
to identify its contribution in financing small firms and 
large private enterprises in a developing economy - 
The Sudan. The examination of this source of finance and 
its degree of significance will centre in the following 
points: First, the proportion of firms receiving trade
credit, and the correlation between trade credit and trade 
debt, its contribution to working capital and total 
investment finance, augmented by the opinion of entrepreneurs 
and management. Second, the examination of the real 
contribution of trade credit in financing of the firms based 
on the net-trade concept (NTC) (Bates 1964).
The investigation provides interesting results, challeng­
ing the finding of the literature, showing that trade credit 
facilities, as a source of seed capital, were very meagre, 
if not negative, for small firms, but represent one of the 
main sources of initial working capital for large private 
enterprises which started very large (47%). The research 
sample shows that 55% of small firms at start-up stage did 
not receive trade credit facilities, compared to 90% of 
small, growing firms receiving trade credit facilities as 
external short term finance.
The period of trade credit facilities obtained by 
small firms usually varies from one to six months. Trade 
credit facilities, from the Government, (30% of the sample)
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and overseas suppliers, are usually provided under 100% 
Commercial bank guarantee. The lack of bank guarantee and 
unwillingness of banks to provide bank guarantees to small 
firms, because of loan security, explains the insignificant 
use of trade credit facilities by starting-up small firms.
The overseas suppliers provide credit facilities to small 
and large enterprises under The Cash Against Document (C.A.D.) 
system, which means that payment has to be made on arrival 
of goods. The 'C.A.D.' system was introduced in 1981, as 
a result of the Bank of Sudan's failure to meet its 
obligations towards suppliers of raw materials. The survey 
shows that the owners' financial position and ability to 
maintain accounts abroad is the only way to receive trade 
credit facilities from overseas suppliers, conditions 
unlikely to be satisfied by the typical indigenous entre­
preneur .
"We have an account in a clearing bank abroad (England), 
which qualifies the business to get trade credit facilities 
from overseas suppliers, by providing payment securities and 
guarantees to suppliers, and avoids the Bank of Sudan rules 
and regulations."
Most of the entrepreneurs in the sample reported that 
the nature of industry, the financial climate, and policy 
pursued by Central Bank and Governmental rules and regulations 
have an effect on the availability of trade credit facilities 
from overseas markets and the Government. The manager of one 
of the small, growing firms, operating in what the Government 
categorised as the strategic industry and commodity sector 
said:
"We usually receive regular 35 day trade credit facility 
from Government as a sole owner of wheat. The flour wheat 
under this famine situation is regarded as a strategic 
commodity, under tight Government control and supervision, 
and on this account the facility is granted."
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Regarding trade credit facilities from the local market, 
the entrepreneurs put more emphasis on personal relations 
with the suppliers, as well as their previous experience in 
purchasing raw materials, as a main reason for their success 
in obtaining trade credit facilities. This observation 
gives an indication of the influence of the entrepreneur as 
an individual.
Those owners' of small firms, which did not receive 
trade credit facilities, enumerated a number of reasons 
illustrating the difficulty in using trade credit facilities. 
The reasons may be summarised as follows:
.There are no trade credit facilities in the local 
market, and thus all business dealings are built round cash 
transactions.
.Trade credit facilities from overseas suppliers of raw 
materials and spare parts are usually affected by the 
confidence of suppliers in the financial ability of The Central 
Bank, as well as The Commercial banks' guarantees.
.Banks are not willing to provide guarantees to small 
business, because of poor loan security.
Regarding the correlation between trade credit and 
trade debt, the small firms at inception sample shows 
that 40% provide and receive trade credit facilities, 10% 
provide trade credit facility only, 5% receive trade credit 
facility, and 45% neither receive, nor provide any sort of 
trade credit facilities to their customers. The small growing 
firm sample shows rather different profile with 80% of the 
sample providing and receiving trade credit facilities. The 
large private enterprises sample provides evidence that
- 167 -
large companies were larger users of trade credit than 
small companies with 100% of the sample receiving trade 
credit facilities, compared to 60% of small firms sample 
(Table 5.8)
Table 5.8; Correlation Between Trade Credit and Trade Debt












No.F % No.F % No.F % No.F %
Inception - S.F. 8 40 2 10 1 5 9 45
Growing - S.F . 16 80 2 10 1 5 1 5
Large 15 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
To examine the real contribution of trade credit as a 
source of finance, the net trade credit concept is used as 
a measurement device. Net trade credit is defined as the 
excess of trade credit received by the company over trade 
debt.

















No.F % No.F % No.F % No.F %
S.F. at Inception 6 30 5 25 9 45 14 70
Small Growing 
Firms 16 80 3 15 1 5 4 20
Large Firms 13 87 2 13 0 0 2 13
Table (5.9) shows that 70% of small firms at inception 
sample either maintained negative trade credit (25%) or zero
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(45%), a good indication that trade credit was not an 
important source of finance for starting up small firms. The 
table shows the significance of trade credit as a source of 
finance for small, growing firms and large private enter­
prises sample.
The survey results based on aggregate accounting data, 
add additional support to previous investigation findings.
The sample firms.show that the trade credit contribution to 
working capital finance, measured by depicting a relationship 
between trade credit and current liabilities of the firm 
was higher in small growing firms than small firms at inception 
with 23% and 21% respectively. (See Table 5.10). The result 
is replicated in measuring the contribution of trade credit 
in total assets and a percentage of total debt finance.
The sample firms show that trade credit contribution to 
working capital finance, was higher in large firms showing 
24%, than small firms. This finding has been contradicted 
by measuring the trade credit contribution on a relationship 
between trade credit and total debt finance received by the 
company. (See Table 5.10), The explanation of this contra­
diction is the fact that small firm financing was very short, 
confined to trade credit, bank borrowing and family loans, in 
the sense that the current liabilities of small firms equate 
in most cases to its total debt finance.
The foregoing discussion on trade credit contribution 
in small and large firms financing has theoretical implications. 
With respect to the small firms sample, the findings and 
premises from this investigation, provide positive support to 
the research hypothesis. Regarding small firms at inception
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T a b le  (5 .1 0 )  -  T ra d e  C r e d i t  -  Summary
L.S. (0001s)
Volume of Trade Credit 
(Agg. Average)
Trade Credit Facilities 
(Average/Firm)
Trade Debt (Average P. Firm
Net Trade Credit Average
Trade credit as % of C. lia
Trade credit as % of D. Fin
Trade credit as % of T.
Assets
Companies receiving Trade 
Credit Facilities
Co's, receiving and 
providing Trade C.F.
Co's, receiving TCF only
Co's, providing TCF only
Co's neither receiving nor 
providing TCF
Co's Receiving TCF from Govt
Co's receiving from oversea 
market
Co's, receiving from local 
market/business
Co's, receiving from bus & 
Govt. (Local)
Co's, receiving Govt. Dept.
& overseas
Co's with +ve NT Credit
Co's with -ve NT Credit
Co's with zero NT Credit













No.F % No.F % No.F %
9 45 18 90 15 100
8 40 16 80 15 100
1 5 2 10 0 0
2 10 1 5 0 0
9 45 1 5 0 0
:. 2 10
3 15 8 40 14 93
3 15 6 30 15 100
1 5 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 5 33
6 30 16 80 13 87
5 25 3 15 2 13
9 45 1 5 0 0
14 70 4 20 2 13
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RANGE OF TRADE CREDIT AS A * OF CURRENT LIABILITIES
RANGE OF TRADE CREDIT AS 





No.F % No.F * No.F *
Negative 11 55 2 10 0 0
Less than 10* 2 10 4 20 1 7
10 - 20% — _ 4 20 4 27
21 - 40% 4 20 3 15 3 20
41 - 60% 1 5 3 15 3 20
61 - 80% 2 10 2 10 2 13
81 - 100% 0 0 2 10 2 13

















sample, the finding challenged the full applicability of the 
traditional theory, on the ground that trade credit has been 
relatively less important at inception. The small, growing 
firm sample provides confirmation of the theory, showing 
the effect of the life-cycle on pattern of financing and 
financial behaviour. The provision of trade credit facilities 
under commercial bank guarantee put small firms at a 
disadvantage (inception), compared to large firms.
It is argued in financing literature that there is an 
association and analogy between trade credit and bank credit 
as external sources of finance. The focal point to be raised 
in this context, is to what extent this proposition holds 
true in the developing economies, such as The Sudan. To 
this point we turn attention now.
5.1.4: BANK FINANCING AND SMALL FIRM. - "Demand side perspective1
Banks were criticised in both developed and developing 
countries for their lack of response to ideas, to new projects,
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and to the financing of both start-up and working capital and 
expansion needs of small firms. The empirical investigation 
provides evidence that the majority of small and large firms 
sample experienced bank borrowing, with variations in volume 
and type of finance and contribution of bank borrowings in 
financing business operation. This observation did not 
alleviate the fact that small firms at inception resort 
to owners' and family resources.
Based on aggregate historical financial and accounting 
data of the research sample, the survey provides strong 
support to the research hypothesis that small growing firms 
had better access to external sources of finance, than small 
firms at inception. The research sample shows that bank 
borrowing represents 30* of the total funds employed by the 
average small firm at inception, compared to 37% tended to 
be maintained by small growing firms. The large private enter­
prises sample provides an interesting finding that bank 
borrowing was a most important source of finance for fixed- 
assets needs and working capital finance.
With regard to availability of long-term bank loans, the 
sample shows that small firms at inception received an 
average of 5% of its total funds, compared to 10% maintained 
by an average small, growing firm. The small firms sample 
result, compared to the proportion of long term loans received 
by an average large firm (49%), was a good indication of 
small business long-term finance gap (See Chapter 7).
The empirical investigation shows that the long term 
loans reflected in the large firms' financial data, initially 
provided as working capital finance under overdraft facilities
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in most cases. This observation was an indication that 
there was a switch in the use of overdraft to one of a 
much longer-term role than is usually associated with this 
type of finance by larger firms under interest-based 
systems and after Islamisation in 1984,
Table 5.11; Bank Borrowing Contribution in Financing The





Short T.F. as a % of total Bank 
Finance
Long T.F, as a % of total Bank 
Finance
Total Funds
Bank Finance as a % of Debt 
Finance
Bank Finance as a % of Total 
Finance
Bank Sh. T. Loans as % of T. Fin. 
Bank L. T. Loans as % of T. Fin.
5.1.4.1: Type, Volume and Form of Bank Borrowing
The discussion of type and volume of finance received 
by small firms and their large private enterprises counter­
parts was based on the analysis of '154' loans received by 
the research sample from commercial and development financial 
bodies in the last five years (1980-1985), classified into 
53 loans received by small firms at inception, 56 by small, 















5% 10% 4 9%
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Figure (5.1) indicates that small firms, regardless of
stage of development, received a low volume of finance and 
of short duration, as compared to large private enterprises. 
This low volume of loan is an implicit indication that small 
firms received institutional finance at a high cost rate, 
measured as bank fixed charges on the administration of loans 
(Brigham and Smith). This is, however, a separate issue, 
and will be tackled in depth in Chapter 7 on the finance 
gap.
The low volume of loans provided by banks to small busi­
nesses and particularly to small firms at inception, can 
be attributed to the level of security provided by 
small clients to lenders. It is the primary concern of any 
bank or development financial institution to safeguard
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its resources, and especially the funds loaned to its 
customers. The security provision of most banks in the 
Sudan, under both Islamic and interest based systems, are 
clearly laid down in their policy regulations and are 
generally determined by the particular circumstances of an 
applicant (See Chapter 8).
Table (5.12) shows that Islamic financing instruments 
(Murabaha and Musharaka) as short-term financing, made up 
a significant portion (51%) of term of finance provided by 
commercial banks to starting-up small firms sample. This 
could be explained by the fact that most small firms at 
inception sample (1980) either established or started 
operation after the Islamisation of the banking system in 
the Sudan. Table (5.12) shows an interesting point, that the 
volume of Musharaka loan was high, in relation to the total 
number of loans. This finding supports the contention of 
bankers that Musharaka financing provides a large volume 
of finance, and by its virtue assumes continuity of finance. 
The table (5.12) shows that over-draft facilities constituted 
a significant portion of finance received by small, growing 
firms before Islamisation and large private enterprises 
under both the Islamic and interest-based system.
Under the Islamic financing mechanism, most of small 
firms sample was financed by Islamic financing instruments - 
Murabaha-, which usually was very short and associated closely 
with specific goods and transactions. Large enterprises as 
old customers, were financed under overdraft facilities, 
permitted by the Central Bank under high level of security, 
conditions unlikely to be satisfied by small firms. The 
use of open credit facilities, with specific ceilings, built
TABLE NO 5 . 1 2
CLASSIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF (15 4) LOANS REC. BY RESEARCH SAMPLE (1980-1985)
CURRENT ST. S.F. CURRENT S.G.F. CURRENT LARGE
L.S. (OOO's) 
Volume
No. of Loans L.S. (OOO's) 
Volume
No. of Loans L.S. (OOO's) 
Volume
No. of Loans
AMT. % No. % AMT. % No. % AMT. % No. %
BANK OVERDRAFT 149 14 17 32 639 34 23 42 4758 50 18 40
MURABAHA 336 32 22 42 316 17 17 30 2177 23 14 31
MUSHARAKA 445 43 5 9 780 42 7 13 0 0 0 0
LONG-TERM LOANS 66 6 4 8 102 5 5 9 2587 27 11 25
BANK GUARANTEE (St.T) 9 1 1 1.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER SH.T. 
FIN/BANK 37 4 1 1.5 28 2 6 20 20 _ .2 4
LOANS FROM FRIEND/S 2 - 3 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL OF 3 (LOANS) 1044 100% 53 100% 1865 100% 56 100% 9541 100 45 100
TABLE 5 . 1 2  -  c o n t in u e d
ALLOCATION OF LOANS






WORKING CAPITAL FIN. 930 89 1753 95 7555 79
FIXED ASSETS FIN. 114 11 112 6 1986 21
TOTAL 1044 100 1865 100 9541 100
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round the overdraft facilities by large enterprises, creates 
a degree of flexibility in the allocation of funds and 
provides an assurance of continuity of financing.
Concerning the classification of the subject loans into 
short and long term loans, the table (5.12) provides evidence 
that although banks prefer short term credit, they do in 
fact supply all long term loans borrowed by large private 
enterprises. Thus, this is evidence that a company which 
has shown some evidence of security, can obtain long term 
loans from banks.
Based on the opinions of respondent entrepreneurs and 
management of small and large enterprises in the sample, the 
empirical investigation provides evidence that there was a 
mutual interest in the use of Murabaha finance between banks 
and their clients. For the lender, Murabaha is a very short, 
self-liquidating transaction, easy to control and administer, 
compared to Musharaka. Regarding the demand side opinion, 
one of the entrepreneurs related that:
"Murabaha is similar to overdraft? it is very short term 
but there is no bank involvement in the management of the 
business."
The survey shows that 50% of the sample attributed the 
use of Murabaha finance to its similarity to overdraft 
facilities, and it represents the preference of the financial 
institutions. Very few entrepreneurs advocated Musharaka 
finance, arguing that Musharaka entailed the sharing of risks 
as well as ensuring continuous finance, the bank being an 
active partner in the project.
The use of Murabaha finance rather than Musharaka finance 
by entrepreneurs can be attributed to the main objective
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behind the establishment of an enterprise, centering in 
desire for independence and family involvement, singling out 
the effect of attitude, behaviour and typology on the choice 
of finance.
"We do prefer Murabaha to Musharaka, because financing 
under Musharaka is followed by bank rules, regulations and 
interference in the management of the business."
Regarding the suitability of these Islamic financing 
techniques to industry, most of the entrepreneurs contented 
that Islamic financing instruments were very short- lived, 
inflexible and did not take into account the need for 
continuity and timing of finance. The use of Murabaha - as 
prominant type of finance which is linked to certain 
transactions, forces small firms to seek other sources to 
tide them over until the application for another Murabaha is 
approved. That sort of conditions creates difficulties for 
small firms to secure their working capital finance.
Table 5.13: Forms of Bank Borrowing as Reported by
Entrepreneurs







No.F % NO.F % No.F % No.F %
Murabaha 15 75 15 75 30 75 13 87
Musharaka 5 25 5 25 10 25 2 13
Musharaka TRF 
into Murabaha 1 5 3 15 4 10 3 20
Overdraft Credit 
Facilities 9 45 16 80 25 63 14 93
Long-term Loans 5 25 7 35 12 30 9 60
Equity Finance 2 10 1 5 3 7 0 0
Bank Guarantee 1 5 0 0 1 3 12 80
Continuous Credit 
Facilities - 
Ceiling 0 0 6 30 6 15 14 93
Loans from Govt. 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7
Madaraba 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table (5.13) sets a platform for the identification of 
a small business institutional finance gap based on 
non-availability of long-term financial facilities. The 
table shows that 60% of the large firms sample obtained 
long-term financial facilities from banks and 93% of the 
sample succeeded in obtaining a continuous credit facilities. 
(See Chapter 7 for more details on finance gap).
Regarding the use of bank borrowing in financing business 
operations, most entrepreneurs of the sample firms (87%) 
contended that the borrowing from commercial banks was the 
only external source of finance both available and easily 
accessible. As to the degree of importance of bank borrowing, 
the large private enterprises sample adds another dimension, 
with 67% of the sample having the opinion that the volume of 
investment was very large and the industry would not survive 
without the banks' financing and support.
"The saving margin and capacity of the individual 
to save is very low in The Sudan, in relation to meeting 
the needs of industry. Moreover, the shortage and 
fluctuation in the supply of hard currency compelled us to 
rely on bank borrowing".
As far as the cost of bank borrowing was concerned, most 
small and large firms in the sample reported that the cost 
of bank borrowing was too high for very short-term finance.
The entrepreneurs and management of the research sample 
enumerated a number of problems associated with bank borrowing. 
The major problems reported were, the credit squeeze system, 
the lack of hard currency in the banking system, the criteria 
used by banks in providing funds to clients, timing of finance 
and The Central Bank regulations, rules and financial policy. 
The credit squeeze systems, based on the philosphy of
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reduction in the money supply in the financial market for 
macro-economic reasons, put small firms at a disadvantage 
with their low level of security and high degree of risk 
as compared to large firms. (See Chapter 8 for details).
The empirical investigations findings, based on the 
opinions of an entrepreneur (qualitative), revealed that 
the Sudanese Industrial Bank's financing of small industry 
was insignificant, whereas the financing of Islamic banks, 
as new bodies introduced into the Sudanese financial 
market, was very short-term and confined to assisting purchase 
of raw material.
Table 5.14: Proportion of Firms Raised Funds from the
Sudanese Industrial Bank




















1. F irms 
attempting to 
obtain funds 20% 25% 23% 0 13% 0
2. Did not 
make an attempt 80% 75% 77% 100% 87% 100%
3. Attempted 
and succeeded 20% 20% 20% 0 7% 0
4. Attempted 
and failed 0 5% 3% 0 7% 0
Table (5.14) illustrates that the proportion of firms 
applying for the 'S.I.B.' loans was very low with 23 and 13% 
of small firms and large firms respectively. The table shows 
that all firms applied and obtained finance from the S.I.B. 
at start-up stage. This was explicable by the Act and bye-laws 
of the bank. The explanation of the scene that a large 
proportion of the research sample (80%), made no attempt to
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raise funds from the 'S.I.B.' can be seen clearly in table 
(5.15) here below, by reference to factors and reasons 
reported by entrepreneurs.
Table 5.15: Reasons Reported by Entrepreneurs who did not
make an Attempt to Raise Funds From The S.I.B.






1. S.I.B. does not finance working 
Capital 44% 47% 40%
2. Business started very small and 
there was no need for add. F. 
Assets 25% 13% 0
3. Too bureacratic as a public Bank 25% 13% 13%
4. S.I.B. was known as a bank with 
very little capital and low 
financial ability 63% 73% 60%
5. Unknown to subject 25% 25% 0
6. Cost of borrowing is too high 25% 0 0
7. S.I.B. financing is closely 
associated with the availability 
of foriegn loans, directed to 
specific industry by lenders. 0 20% 0
8. Project over the capacity of 
the S.I.B. 0 0 27%
The research sample shows that 25% of small firms 
reported that the S.I.B., as a financier was unknown to them. 
This finding was an indication of the existence of a 'Bolton 
Gap', defined as a lack of information on available financial 
facilities (See Chapter 7 and8). Others reported that (18%) 
that the S.I.B. as a development public bank was too 
bureaucratic and highly under the influence of Government
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policies and directives. This point gives some hints on 
the public development banks and Government relationship 
(See Chapter 8 for more details). The banks' financing 
operations/ being restricted to fixed assets finance/ were 
criticised by industrialists.
With respect to Islamic banks, the research sample 
shows that 75% of the small business universe made an 
attempt and succeeded, in raising very short-term finance for 
raw material purchase, under Murabaha instrument.
The opinion of entrepreneurs, who made no attempt or 
attempted and failed, to raise funds from Islamic banks, 
ranged a round the practice of Islamic banks, not to 
provide finance for newly established businesses, or the 
banks were unknown to them. One opinion of an entrepreneur 
on Islamic banking finance introduced the concept of political 
commitment and ideology as a critical factor for raising 
finance from Islamic banks. The charge of favouritism is 
hard to prove or disprove. Almost every bank has some 
favoured clients and Islamic banks are no exception. (Awad, 1985) 
The hardly surprising result based on the opinion of the demand- 
side, positing an ideological bond between Islamic banks and 
many of their shareholders and clients, strengthens the charge.
Jurists and practioners found a justification for this 
practice on the ground that Islamic bank is not allowed to 
charge interest or penalty on delay payment according to sharia 
code and Islamic principles and that is why Islamic banks must 
be careful as to whom they lend their money.
Others argued that Islamic banks were profit-oriented, 
providing very short-term finance for profitable transactions
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against a higher level of security. It is not the intention 
of this study to prove or disprove this argument, which may 
have some validity. That Islamic banks have been making 
large profits is neither deniable nor objectionable. After 
all, banks are profit making institutions. The survey has 
identified that the contribution of Islamic banks in financing 
long-term needs of small firms sample was insignificant, if 
not non-existent.
5.1.4.2: Bank, Trade Credit and Family Finance, The Degree 
of Use and Their Correlation
With regard to the significance and intensive use of 
trade and bank credit, as an external source of finance and 
family loans in financing small firms and their large private 
enterprise counterparts, a relationship was depicted between 
these three sources of finance, in relation to current 
liabilities. The main objective of this exercise was to 
examine the correlation - if any - between these sources of 
finance. Family finance here is confined to items and amounts 
presented as a part of current liabilities, as an external 
source of finance.
A multiple scale of measurement based upon three grades 
(A, B and C) with different combinations and weight for what 
constitues a small, medium and large user was constructed.
This approach -multiple - has been used so as to create a 
platform for highly documented inferences and findings.
Based on measurement (A), table (5.17) shows a number 
of interesting points of which three are of particular 
importance. The first, the size of financing received by 
small growing firms and large private enterprises with a
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certain degree of variation provided by external bodies, 
namely banks and general trade creditos. The second point 
was the use by small firms at inception of short-term 
finance, in terms of bank financing, rather than trade credit 
finance. This finding questions critically the contention 
that small firms use trade credit facilities as lower security 
and collateral requirement finance. The third point, table 
(5.21) shows that small growing firms and large private 
enterprises were large users of trade and bank credit in 
financing their operations. This correlation lends support 
to an unconfirmed hypothesis of Bates (1964):
"Small firms receiving large trade credit tend to be 
more likely to receive large bank credit as well."
The empirical investigation provides that Bates (1964)
hypothesis was applicable to small, growing firms and large
firms, but it was not applicable to the small firms at
inception. This finding leads to a proposition that the large
receiver of family finance is likely to be the small firm at
inception.
The three points reflected by the table (5.17) extend 
positive support to the research hypothesis and in turn., 
provides confirmation of the life cycle theory of the firms. 
Table (5.18) based on scale (B) and table (5.19) on the 
unified scale (C) provide confirmation to the correlation 
finding, which stood as an indication of the validity of the 
derived results.
The explanation of this correlation finding is the 
fact that trade credit facilities from overseas markets as 
well as from the Government, were usually provided under 
Commercial bank guarantees. Moreover, under Islamic
TABLE NO. 5 . 1 6 SCALES OF MEASUREMENT






SMALL MEDIUM LARGE SMALL MEDIUM LARGE SMALL MEDIUM LARGE
LESS THAN RANGE OVER LESS THAN RANGE OVER LESS THAN RANGE OVER
BANK CREDIT 40% 40-50% 50% 30% 30-39% 40% 20% 20-2 9% 30%
TRADE CREDIT 15% 15-20% 20% 20% 20-29% 30% 20% 20-2 9% 30%
FAMILY FINANCE 20% 20-30% 30% 20% 20-29% 30% 20% 20-29% 30%
T a b le  5 . 1 7  R e c e ip t  o f  B ank, T ra d e  C r e d i t  and F a m ily  F in a n c e





























LARGE 9 45 9 45 6 40 7 35 10 50 10 67 7 35 4 20 1 7
MEDIUM 2 10 1 5 2 13 0 0 2 10 2 13 2 10 - - 1 7
LARGE & MEDIUM 11 55 10 50 8 53 7 35 12 60 12 80 9 45 4 20 2 13
SMALL 9 45 10 50 7 47 13 65 8 40 3 20 11 55 16 80 13 87
TOTAL 20 100 20 100 15 100 20 100 20 100 15 100 20 100 20 100 15 100
T a b le  5 . 1 8  R e c e ip t  o f  B ank, T ra d e  C r e d i t  and F a m ily  F in a n c e





























LARGE 11 55 10 50 8 53 4 20 9 45 8 53 7 35 2 10 1 7
MEDIUM 3 15 3 15 3 20 3 15 1 5 2 13 2 10 1 5 1 7
LARGE & MEDIUM 14 70 13 65 11 73 7 35 10 50 10 66 9 45 3 15 2 14
SMALL 6 30 7 35 4 27 13 65 10 50 5 34 11 55 17 85 13 86
TOTAL 20 100 20 100 15 100 20 100 20 100 15 100 20 100 20 100 15 100
T a b le  5 .1 9  R e c e ip t  o f  B ank, T ra d e  C r e d i t  and F a m ily  F in a n c e





























LARGE 14 70 13 65 11 73 4 20 9 45 8 53 7 35 2 10 1 7
MEDIUM 0 0 2 10 1 7 3 15 1 5 2 13 2 10 1 5 1 7
LARGE & MEDIUM 14 70 15 75 12 80 7 35 10 50 10 67 9 45 3 15 2 13
SMALL 6 30 5 25 3 20 13 65 10 50 5 33 11 55 17 85 13 87
TOTAL 20 100 20 100 15 IOC 20 100 20 100 15 100 20 100 20 100 15 100
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financing mechanism - Murabaha and Musharaka transferred to 
Murabaha, the most common financing instruments used by banks 
in financing industry,,banks usually imported raw materials 
on behalf of the clients, according to sharica code, which 
prohibits dealing in money.
5.2 PATTERN OF FINANCING AND FINANCIAL BEHAVIOUR
The pattern of financing of small firms in the Sudan 
presents interesting facts and contrasts, and provides 
empirical evidence of the effect of the life cycle of the 
firms, as well as its size on financial structure.
Based on aggregate accounting information of the research 
sample, table (5.20) provides a summary of the financing 
pattern of small and large firms. Tables (5.20) and (5.21) 
show that the small firm at inception stage of development, 
relies more on internal resources (58%) than the small, growing 
firm (40%). The table (5.20) indicates that 48% of the 
financial needs of the average small growing firms was 
financed from external funds.
The research sample shows the use of retained profit 
and directors' loans by small, growing firms, in financing 
their long-term assets needs. The directors' loans were very 
small (1%), but they were frequently of great strategic 
significance to the firms. The significance and importance 
of directors' loans and retained profit could be seen clearly 
in the light of unavailability of institutional long-term 
financial facilities.
The large private enterprises sample reflects a hardly 












% AMT L.S 
(000's)
% AMT L.S 
(OOO.Vs.).
%
Bank 0/D & short
T. Loans 352 25 528 27 3543 15
Bank Long-term 
Loans 72 5 189 10 11387 49
Trade Credit 118 8 205 10 1883 8
Other C. Liab. 13 1 25 1 1969 9
Paid up Cap.
1 Own. Res.1 679 48 680 35 3197 14
Directors 1 Loans - — — 26 1 32 —
Reserves 8 1 70 4 735 .3
Retained Profits 32 2 133 7 75 —
Family Loans 133 10 113 5 185 2
1407 lOO 1969 100 23006 100
Owners' and Family
Resources 812 58% 793 40% 3382 15%
Other Equity 40 3% 229 12% 842 3%
Int. Fin. - Equity
Fin. 852 61% 1022 52% 4224 18%
External Source 
of Finance 555 3 9% 947 48% 18782 82%
Bank Borrowing 424 30% 717 37% 14930 49%
LONG TERM FINANCING
Bank Long term loans 72 8% 189 16% 11387 73%
Owners Resources 679 73% 680 56% 3197 20%
Family Resources 133 14% 113 9% 185 1%
Retained Profits 32 3% 133 11% 75 .5%
Reserve 8 2% 70 6% 735 5%
Directors' Loans - - 26 2% 32 .5%
TOTAL 924 100% 1211 100% 15611 100%
CAPITAL STRUCTURE
Equity Fin. (inc. Fam) 852 61% 1022 52% 4224 18%
Long Term Debt 72 5% 189 10% 11387 49%
Short Term Debt 483 34% 758 38% 7395 32%
1407 100% 1969 100% 23006 100%
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(OOO's) L.S. CURRENT 





AMT . % AMT X AMT %
Fixed Assets 881 63 1193 60 16639 12
Debtors 71 5 138 7 763 3
Stocks and WIP 399 28 483 25 4107 18
Cash and Bank Balances 40 3 101 5 110 1
Other Current Assets 16 1 54 3 1387 6,
Liquid Assets 526 37 116 40 6367 28
TABLE 5.21













INTERNAL SOURCE OF FINANCE 61 1 52 1 18 2
DEBT FINANCE 39 2 48 2 82 1
100 100 100
Bank short-term loans 25 27 15
Bank Long-term Loans 5 10 49
Trade Credit 8 10 8
Other Liabilities-
Accrued 1 1 9
Family Reserves 48 35 14
Other Equity 10 5 1
Retained Profits 2 6 0
Directors' Loans 0 1 0
Bank and Trade Credit 38% 47% 72%
Family and Owners'
Resources 58% 40% 15%
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employed by an average firm, as a large user of trade and 
bank credit, was derived from external sources. The 
empirical investigation shows that the very smallest companies 
at inception stage of development tend to finance a large 
part of its financial needs from internal resources, and the 
very largest companies tend, to rely on external sources of 
finance. This observation is inconsistent with Bates (1964) 
observations in Britain.
"The very largest and the very smallest companies 
tend to finance a large part of their capital expenditure 
from their own savings."
The empirical investigation provides evidence that the 
issue of shares and capital was neither a source of finance 
for small firms nor for large private enterprises in the 
Sudan. This situation may be attributed to technical, social 
and psychological factors. On the technical level, there 
was no stock exchange of market for selling and buying 
shares in The Sudan. The social and psychological factors 
are embodied in the fact that most small firms were built 
round the family structure and inter^t, which stood as a 
barrier to the introduction of new members outside the 
family boundary. This factor introduced the behavioural 
aspect in the choice of finance and financing strategy, 
providing support to behavioural economists.
Regarding the classification of financing into short 
and long-term financing, the survey shows that small growing 
firms were more frequent users of short term finance than 
small firms at inception and large firms. This profile 
has an implication on the liquidity profile (See Chapter 6). 
Despite the low level of institutional long-term loans in 
small business financing, the long term financial facilities
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marked slightly the difference between small firms at 
inception and small, growing firms, with 8 and 16% respect­
ively (table 5.20)
5.3: CONCLUSIONS
The empirical investigation of this part of the study 
have theoretical and policy implications. Some of the 
implications that emerge are of special significance for 
bankers, banks, policy makers and other specialised bodies 
willing and attempting to help the small business sector in 
The Sudan.
Essentially, the empirical study provides confirmation 
of the first research hypothesis, based on the concept of the 
life-cycle of the firms and its influence on mode and pattern 
of financing. The empirical investigation singled out the 
financial differences and dis-similarities between small 
firms at inception, small growing firms and large firms in 
developing economies like The Sudan. The major financial 
differences between these three groups may be summed up as 
follows:
-The small firm at inception stage of development tends 
to rely on the personal savings of the owners and family 
sources. This finding has a theoretical implication by 
providing documented modification to the traditional theory. 
The study shows that the role of family financing in 
business correlates negatively with growth. With respect 
to external sources of finance, the survey shows that small 
firms at inception were larger users of bank credit than 
trade credit in financing working capital needs. This 
result questions critically the established contention in the
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literature, and challenged the full applicability of the 
traditional theory to developing economies like The Sudan.
The small growing firms was a large user of trade and 
bank credit in financing business operations. This 
observation provides confirmation of the traditional theory 
at this stage of development, and extends support to 
Bates (1964) on the trade and bank credit correlation.
The empirical study shows that the very smallest companies 
at inception tend to finance a large part of their financial 
needs from internal resources (58%) and the very largest 
companies tend to rely on external sources of finance (82%).
This finding questions Prais (1959) and Bates (1967) 
statement. The comparison between small and large firms 
extends support to Donaldsons' (196 9) concept of financial 
mobility. Bates (1967) stated that:
"Small firms can frequently exist on the fringes or 
in the interstices of the economy, whilst big companies have 
a big say in the creation of their own environment."
With respect to trade credit, the large enterprises sample
result, extends support to Davis and Yeomens (1974) observations:
"Large firms initiated an increase, not in credit 
given, but in credit taken at the expense of smaller firms."
The measurement of bank borrowing contribution in financing
small firms at inception, small, growing firms and large
enterprises, lends support to the proposition that banks
provide finance under higher level security, and collateral
requirements which were more generally stringent.
The issue of shares was a source of finance neither for 
the small, nor for the large firms. The empirical survey 
shows that the majority of small firms in the sample (98%) 
have no equity capital other than that of the owner and his/
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her family. This is attributable to social, psychological 
and technical factors. At the policy implication level, this 
is not an invitation to set up a stock exchange market in 
the Sudan, as a step to promote small business. The 
contradiction between banks' rules and regulations and 
entrepreneurs' attitude, questions the practicality of 
'Musharaka' instruments in financing entrepreneurial 
activities.
Due to non-availability of long-term financial 
facilities, small, growing firms tend to use short-term 
finance for long-term investment, so as to maintain growth. 
This practice is no longer possible for a firm financed 
under Islamic financing mechanism, which in most cases, as 
specified by Sharia code, is linked to specific items and 
transactions.
At the policy implication level, this part of the 
study provides an empirical answer to the still unanswered 
question in The Sudan, that is, what is the amount of 
capital needed to set up a small manufacturing firm in 
The Sudan? This piece of information based on the research 
sample and the Sudanese Industrial Bank (S.I.B.) financing 
operations (1962-1983), can be used as a platform for 
policy initiation and development of a financial scheme for 
the promotion of the small business sector. (See Chapter 12).
Given the methodology of analysis and the resultant 
findings, the next step in this scholarly process of 
investigation is to consider the implications on liquidity, 
financial risk, profitability and profit retention of the 
small firms in a developing economy _ The Sudan. To this 




LIQUIDITYf FINANCIAL GEARING, PROFITABILITY AND DEGREE OF SELF-FINANCE 
OF THE SMALL FIRM AT INCEPTION AND THE GROWING STAGE
In this Chapter, an attempt is made to establish the financial 
profile of small firms at inception and small growing firms, as 
well as their large private enterprise counterparts in a developing 
economy, the Sudan. Given the small amount of empirical work done 
in developing countries, and the non-existence of any empirical 
research in this area in the Sudan, the findings were analysed in 
relation to empirical research done in developed and developing 
countries. The criteria for inclusion were that the previous studies 
should involve substantial empirical work, including partial or 
comprehensive analysis of financial profiles.
The analysis of the accounting data was cross-sectional, 
consisting of ’snapshots1 of all sample firms at a particular point 
in time, rather than looking at individual firms over - time. The 
finanacial data for the period 1982-1984 was aggregated, and accounting 
ratios were derived. To provide a firm conclusion, the analysis 
was based on aggregates of the whole period (1982-1984) and annual 
aggregate balance sheets derived from the years 1982, 1983 and 1984, 
so as to reflect the trend of the financial profile of the research 
sample.
Due to non-availability of accounting data suitable for 
analysis and poor accounting information maintained by the research 
sample, the analysis of the financial profile was based on a very
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short-term series (3 years), similar to the Oxford survey (1964) 
in the U.K., as a pioneer and exploratory work in the Sudan.
To establish the hypothesis under investigation, and 
the theoretical and policy implications that might emerge from the 
subsequent discussion, the chapter is organised as follows:
Part I focuses o n  the specification of the financial dimensions, 
the main areas of interest and measurement of the relevant financial 
variables. Analysis and establishment of liquidity, financial 
gearing, profitability and degree of self-financing profile is 
presented in depth in part II, III IV and V respectively. The concluding 
section summarises the main investigation findings.
6. 1 Specification and Measurement of Financial Dimensions:
6.1. 1_____ Specification of the Financial Dimensions:
For the purpose of this research, the financial profile 
will confine itself to the determination of liquidity, profitability, 
financial gearing and the degree of self-financing. This operational­
isation was based on the previous research work which measured the 
financial profile of these four dimensions. (Beaver, 1966; Altman,
1968; Bolton, 1971; Bates and Hally, 1982) .
Altman (1968) added that:
"Ratios measuring profitability, liquidity and solvency 
prevailed as the most significant indicators".
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Liquidity was defined by Tabari (1978) as:
"... a firm’s ability to meet its short-term financial 
obligations without having to liquidate its long-term 
assets, or cease operations”.
The second phase of the analysis of the financial profile was to 
examine the earning capacity of the firm. Gupta (1983) commented 
that:
"profitability ratios are, in general by their very 
nature, sensitive to operational health".
Financial gearing was defined by scholars (Walker and Petty, 1978; 
Altman, 1968) as a relationship between debt and equity, taken as 
a measurement of the financial risk of the firm. The degree of 
self-financing was used by Bates (1964) as a surrogate for delineating 
financial differences between small and large enterprises in the 
U.K.
Ratios based on, and derived from, historied accounting 
data and financial information are often considered as yardsticks 
for evaluating the financial performance of the firm. The limitation 
of the financial ratios was highlighted by various theorists and 
writers in the area of finance. Beaver (1966) argues that:
"The emphasis upon financial ratios does not imply 
that ratios are the only predictors of failure.
The primary concern is not predictors of failure 
per se, but rather with financial ratios as predictors 
of important events ....".
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Beever (1966) went further stating the distinction between the power 
of ratios to predict and the ability of the researcher to use ratios 
for prediction. Gupta argues that:
"Despite the voluminous literature which has been 
built up upon financial ratio analysis, the principles 
of such analysis have lacked scientific character.
They have been based more on subjective feeling, 
convention, and belief about the importance of particular 
ratios, than on clear empirical evidence".
In selecting the ratios for analysis, the objective was 
to arrive at the minimum number of ratios which provided coverage 
of the areas of interest, and which,yielded the maximum useful comparison 
with other studies. (Ray and Hutchinson, 1983) Tamari (1978) added 
that:
"The exact choice of ratios will clearly depend 
on the object in view and the information available".
Lev (1984) used the "Principal Factor" analysis approach for the 
selection of ratios. This approach was criticised by Morrais (1979) 
who argued that:
"However, any attempt at ratio identification should 
be supported by some sort of conceptual framework, 
and not based merely on mechanistic methods such 
as factor analysis or stepwise regression".
The selection of the financial ratios in this study, was based on 
the criteria advocated by scholars, which could be summarised as 
follows:
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1. The popularity in the Literature;
2. The usefulness in the related previous research;
3. The availability of information; and
4. Their potential relevance to the study.
6.1.2_____Measurement of Financial Dimensions:
A.________ Liquidity
Liquidity ratios have traditionally been given considerable 
importance, an indication of which is the fame and popularity enjoyed 
by current ratio. Bankers inevitably place great stress on liquidity 
analysis, believing it to be the foundation of a firm’s financial 
soundness. Tamari stated that:-
"the capacity of a firm to pay its expenses and 
debts as they mature is generally measured by the 
current ratio”.
The current ratio shows to what extent the firm is able to meet 
its current liabilities out of the cash value of its current assets, 
without having to dispose of its long-term investments ( Tamari,
1980).
A more fundamental criticism cited against the current 
ratio was that the notion of liquity is based on a false analogy 
of the role of current assets and current liabilities within the
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firm. Fadel and Parkinson (1976) added that the current ratio ignores 
the dynamic nature of the problem.
A recognition of the dynamic nature of the problem of 
evaluating liquidity, lad Beaver (1966) to introduce the cash-flow 
model. The cash flow ratios used in Beaver’s study were considered 
to be the strongest indicators. Lev (1984) added that:
"These recent approaches, Beaver, 1966; Watter,
1957? Fadel and Parkinson, 1978; treat liquidity 
as a functions of flows of funds rather than stocks 
of funds".
Morrais (1979) added that:-
"The observation had already been made that small 
firms seem to have heavier overdraft commitments 
relative to their size, and the cash flow to current 
liabilities ratio seems to measure the ability of 
the firm to cover its short-term obligations".
Potrone and Du Bois (1981) lend support to the usefulness of cash 
flow ratios in measuring liquidity, arguing that survival ,is a primary 
requirement of the small business.
"Liquidity and cash flow ratios are often key indicators 
of the firm’s ability to survive".
Beaver (1966) defined the concept of cash flow as net profit 
plus depreciation. This was analogous to Walter’s (1957) definition 
of cash flow.
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The working capital to total assets ratio was used by 
Altman (1968) as a measure of the net liquid assets of the firm, 
relative to total capitalisaiton. This ratio is frequently found 
in studies of corporate problems as a measure of liquidity. Horrigan 
(1968) stated that:
"A sophisticated study in the 1940s concluded that 
the best ratios for predicting business failure 
were net capital to total assets, net worth to debt, 
and the current ratio".
The empirical work provides evidence that small growing 
firms deployed short-term financing into long-term assets. This 
sort of financing has an adverse effect on liquidity, and on 
ability of firms to pay their obligations. This finding necessitates
the use of the long-term financing to long-term assets ratio as
a liquidity indicator.
Having identified the logic behind the selection, the 
measures of liquidity employed in this exercise include:
1. Current ratio
2. Cash flow ratio
3. Working capital ratio
4. Current liabilities to total debt ratios, and
5. Long-term finance to long-term assets ratio.
- 205 -
B.________ Financial Gearing:
In measuring the financial gearing of the firm, Tamari, 
(1978), built a relationship between equity and long-term debt.
Walker and Petty (1978) used debt to total assets ratios, current 
liabilities to total debt ratio, and fixed charges coverage as measure­
ment devices. Altman (1968) used the market value of equity to 
book value of debt ratio as a measurement device. Altman adds the 
dimension of market value, which other studies had not considered.
Altman’s measurement was criticised by various writers, 
on the ground that it requires market information on equity value, 
which is not available for un-quoted and small companies in developed 
countries, and not available for any company in the developing country 
- Sudan. The empirical work provides evidence that it was difficult, 
if not impossible to compute the market value of equity in the Sudan, 
because of the prevailing market imperfections, and the economic 
and market indicators were not known in the Sudan. Thus, book-value 
of equity to book value of debt was used in this study in measuring 
the financial gearirg. The financial gearing indicators used ini this 
study may be stated as follows:
1. Book value of the equity as a percentage of the book
value of total debt.
2. Book value of the equity as a percentage of the book
value of long-term debt.
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3. Book value of the equity as a percentage of the book
value of long-term finance.
C.________ Profitability:
It is rare to find two economists who would agree entirely
about the measure of profit or return to be employed. It is even 
more unusual to find a measure of agreement about the definition 
to be used in any ratio (Bates, 1967). Bates*s arguement was positively 
supported by Tamari (1978), who added that:
"The term profitability may reflect different things
to different users, no one indicator is ......
a sole ratio of profitability .
Ray and Hutchinson (1983) looked at profitability in three different 
ways. They measured in terms of return on investments, assets turn­
over, and retained earnings as a percentage of total assets.
The use of retained earnings ratio was advocated by Altman 
(1968) on the ground that it is a measure of cumulative profitability 
over/time, and the age of the firm is implicitly considered in the 
ratio. Ray and Hutchinson (1983) added that:
"This ratio is important for small firms as it reflects 
the fact that small growing firms are vulnerable 
because of lack of equity reserve, which reduces 
their ability to raise finance".
Sales to total assets ratios, is a standard financial 
ratio illustrating the sales generating ability of the firm’s assets,
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was advocated by writers as a sound measure of profitability (Beaver, 
1966; Edmister, 1972; Horrigan, 1966). Altman (1968) added that:
"It is one measure of management capability in dealing 
with competitive conditions".
Reviewing this literature revealed that earnings before interest 
and tax, to total assets ratio, was used by scholars (Stevens, 1973; 
Elam, 1975; Bosa, 1978; Gupta, 1983) as an indicator of profitability 
profile. Thus, the profitability indicators used in this study 
are:
1. Sales to total assets ratio
2. Retained earnings to total assets ratio
3. Profit 'BIT* to total assets ratio
4. Profit margin.
D.________ Degree of Self-Financing:
The degree of self-financing was measured by Bates (1965) 
in two possible ratios:
1. A ratio of gross company savings to material investment
in fixed assets and stocks: and
2. A ratio of gross company savings to expenditure on operating
assets.
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Gross Company savings were defined by Bates as retained 
profit plus depreciation and prior year's adjustment. The empirical 
work provides evidence that there was no dividend policy in small 
businesses, because of the type of ownership. The distribution 
of profits, as one way to avoid taxes, could be traced in Directors! 
remuneration and salaries. These items could be considered as a 
sorce of finance. The gross company savings in this study were 
defined as net profit before distribution of Directors' remunerations 
and salaries, plus depreciation.
From this review, the analysis of the identified financial 
dimensions was based on a theoretical foundation.
The selected, ratios are presented in Table (6.1).
TABLE 6.1
VARIABLES INCLUDED IN THE MEASUREMENT OF THE FINANCIAL DIMENSIONS OF THE FIRM:
RATIOS/VARIABLES
LIQUIDITY PROFITABILITY FIN. GEARING DEGREE OF 
SELF-FINANCING
1. Current ratio X
2 . Cash Flow Ratio X
3. Working Capital Ratio X
4. L.T.F. to L.T.A ratio X
5. C. Liability to total debt ratio X
6 . E. B.I.T. to T.A. ratio X
7. Retained E. to T.A. ratio X
8 . Sales to Total A. ratio X
9. The Gross Margin ratio X
10. Equity as % of T.D. X
11. Equity as % of L.T.D. X
12. Equity as % of L.T. Fin. X
13. Gross Company saving to F.A. & Stock ratios X






It was established in accounting and finance literature that 
a high degree of liquidity is a positive sign of strong capacity 
of the firm to honour commitments. The other side of the liquidity 
profile is embodied in the negative implications of keeping idle 
cash and resources, with reduced or negative earnings. The latter 
point has had significant implications in the Sudan and other developing 
countries, with a high rate of inflation. (Estimated to be 40% 
in 1985). The traditional view of financing suggests that the small, 
growing firms experience liquidity problems.
6 .2.A_____Current Ratio:
The survey indicates that the small firm at the inception 
stage of development was more liquid than the small growing firm, 
as reflected by the current ratio. 75% of sample small firms at 
inception maintained a liquidity profile, with current ratio of 
more than one, compared to 35% of small growing firms. This finding 
is consistent with Walker and Petty’s (1978) and Gupta’s (1983) 
study that current ratio, as a liquidity indicator, was seen to 
fall with the firm’s growth. Based on current ratio, the survey 
shows that there was no significant different between the liquidity 
profile of the small growing firm and the large private company.
This finding provides positive support to the Bolton Committee’s
(1971) and the U.S. Small Business Administration’s findings (1984).
The finding on small growing profile provides a positive support 
to Osaze (1981) inference in Nigeria. (See Tables 6.2 and 6.3).
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6.2.B Cash-Flow Ratio:
In terms of cash flow ratio, the indication was that
the small, growing firm was less liquid than the small firm at inception
stage. The survey shows that 55% of small, growing firms maintained 
1 to 20% cash flow as a percentage of current liabilities, compared 
to 65% of small firms at inception, which maintained over 20% (see 
table 6.3). Regarding large private enterprises, the cash flow 
ratio result is consistent with the finding based on current ratio.
The liquidity profile of small firms at inception was an indication 
of reliance on internal finance and low portion of institutional 
















1. Current Ratio 1.84 .46 .89 1.22 .91 .79 1.20 .91 .86
2 . CF. to C.Liab Ratio 117% 31% <19>% 36% 34% <15>% 21% 28% <37>%
3. Working Capital Ratio 6% <25>% 5% 5% <3>% <5>% 7% <4>% <5>%
4. C,Liab To T.D. Ratio 25% 77% 45% 55% 77% 38% 75% 86% 36%
. 5. L.T.F. to F,A.Ratio 107% 68% 91% 106% 95% 94% 111% 79% 95%
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TABLE 6 .3
LIQUIDITY MEASUREMENT BASED ON AGG,ACCOUNTING DATA
LIQUIDITY INDICATORS: START-UP GROWING LARGE
(5).
RANGE OF RATIOS: NO.F % NO.F %
NO.F %
1. Current Ratio: 
. less than 1 5 25% 13 65% 8 53%
. Between 1-1.49 9 45% 3 15% 7 47%
. Between 1.50-1.99 2 10% 1 6% 0 0
. 2 or more 4 20% 3 15% 0 0
20 100% 20 100% 15 100%
C.R. less than 1 - illiquid 5 25% 13 65% 8 58%
C.R. more than 1 liquid 15 75% 7 35% 7 47%
2. Cash Flow Ratio: 
C.F. to C.L. Ratio
. NEGATIVE RATIO (-ve C.F.) 1 5% - - 5 33%
RANGE:
1 - 20% 7 35% 11 55% 8 53%
21 - 40% 5 25% 5 25% - -
41 - 60% - - 1 5% 2 13%
61 - 80% - - - - - -
81 - 99% 1 5% 1 5% - -
100 - 200% 1 5% - - - -
over 200% 5 25% 2 10% - -
100% and over 6 30% 2 10% - -
61% and over 7 35% 3 15%
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Curr St. up 
S.F
Growing Large
NO.F % NO.F % NO.F %
3. WORKING CAPITAL RATIOS:
. co’s with -ve w. cap. 5 25 13 65 8 53
. co's with +ve w, cap. 
N.W. Cap. To T.A. Ratio:
15 75 7 35 7 47
. NEGATIVE - 5 25% 13 65% 8 53%
. Less than 10% 7 35% 1 5% 5 33%
. 10 - 20% 4 20% 2 10% 1 7%
. 21 - 40% 4 20% 2 10% 1 7%
. 41 - 60% - - - — — **
. 61 r 80% - - 1 5% —
—
.‘81 - 100% - - - — 1 7%
. 10% or more
4. CURRENT LIABILITIES TO 
TOTAL DEBT RATIO:
8 40% 6 30% 2 13%
. Less than 20% 0 0 0 0 1 7%
. 20 - 40% 1 5% 0 0 0 0
. 41 - 60% 0 0 0 5% 4 27%
. 61 - 80% 2 10% 2 10% 2 13%
. 81 - 99% 2 10% 1 5% 2 13
. 100%
5. LONG TERM FINANCE TO LONG 
TERM ASSETS RATIO:
15 75% 16 80% 6 40
. Less than 50% 0 0 2 10% 1 7%
. 50 - 99% 2 10% 8 40% 6 40%
. 100 - 149% 12 60% 2 10% 6 40%
. 150 - 200% 2 10% 5 25% 1 7%
. More than 200% 4 20% 3 15% 1 7%
. 100 % or more 18 90% 10 50% 8 53%






Fig 6—2: Current liability to to ta l 
debt ratio
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6.2.C______ Working Capital Ratio:
Liquidity, as measured by the working capital ratio, 
provides support to findings based on current ratio and cash flow 
ratio. The sample firms show that 25% of starting up firms maintained 
negative networking capital, compared to 65% of small growing firms. 
Regarding the relationship between net working capital and total 
assets employed by the firm, the small firm at inception maintained 
6% in 1982 and 7% in 1984, compared to small growing firms which 
maintained <25>% in 1982 and <4^% in 1984. This indication of cor­
relation between growth and illiquidity profile.
The empirical work provides evidence that there was 
a severe shortage in working capital for both small and large private 
enterprises, as reflected by the working capital ratio. Regarding 
international comparison with the U.K. and Nigeria, a conclusion 
could be drawn that small firms, as well as large firms in the Sudan, 
experience greater shortage in working capital
TABLE 6.4
Working Capital Ratio:
SUDAN 'RESEARCH SAMPLE1 








Ray & Hi 
.1983
itchinson




The working capital shortage has an implication for earning 
capacity as well as the degree of capacity utilisation of assets.
16.2.D_____ Current Liabilities to Total Debt Ratio:
As a consequence of limited access to the capital market, 
the small firm at inception relies on internal resources. Table 
6.5 indicates that small growing firms have relied much more on 
short-term financing, with fixed asset showing increase. The reliance 
on short-term financing was reflected in a steady increase in current 
liabilites with a steady decrease in long-term financial facilities.
TABLE 6.5
Change in Sources and Uses of Funds:
Small Growing f Large Firm
Firm
1983 1984 1983 1984
Change in Sales + 61% + 27% + 49% + 3%
Change in Current Liabilities + 17% + 70% <r21>% + 10%
Change in Long Term Loans + 22% + 62% + 18%
Change in Long Term Finance + 73% + 7% +215% -<16>%
Change in Fixed Asset + 29% + 10% + 20% <r17>%
Change in Current Assets +133% + 1% + 7% + 20%
The liquidity profile, as measured by current liabilities to 
total debt ratio, shows that small growing firms maintained a high level 
of current debt to total debt. The low level of liquidity of small 
growing firms increased steadily from 77% in 1982 to 86% in 1984.
The sample of small firms at inception with a degree of liquidity
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profile,provides evidence that the ratio of current liabilities 
to total debt rises with the growth rate and age of the firm, with 
25% in 1982, 55% in 1983, and 75% in 1984. The availability of 
long-term financial facilities to large firms, meant that large 
private enterprises tended to be more liquid than small firms.
TABLE 6.6
Current Liabilities to Total Debt Ratio:
RESEARCH SAMPLE
St. up >.F. c>.G.F. LARGE Walker & Petty 1078
82 . 83 84 Av. 82 83 84 Av. 82 83 84 Av. Small Large
25% 55% 75% 52% 77% 77% 86% 80% 45% 38% 36% 40% 83.7% 62.99%
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The sample shows that small firms were slightly more liquid 
than small firms included in Walker and Petty’s (1978) research effort 
in the U.S. The low liquidity profile of small firms, as measured 
by this ratio, could be explained by unavailability of long-term financial 
facilities, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7., addressing 
the issue of the small business financing gap in the Sudan. This 
finding provides positive support to Bates (1971), Gupta (1969) and 
Wilson (1979). The finding that 80% of small growing firms sample 
with 100% current liabilities to total debt ratio, was an elaboration 
of the traditional view of the financing of the firm, and suggests 
that small firm experience a liquidity problem and maintained an over 
trading profile.
6.2.E______ Long Term Finance to Long Term Assets Ratio:
The empirical work provides evidence that there was a switch 
in the use of short-term finance in financing and funding long-term 
assets by small growing firms and large private enterprises (See 5.3 
-Ch. 5) this observation was established in the literature by Tamari
(1972), Wilson (1979), Bird and juttner (1974). Peacock, 1974 states 
that:
"... small firms depend substantially *on overdraft 
for medium and long-term purposes".
The sample shows that 50% of small growing firms maintained 
less than 100% of long-term finance to long-term assets, compared 
to 10% and 47% maintained by small firms at inception and large private 
enterprises respectively (See table 6.4)
Fig 6—3: Long term finance to 
long-te rm  assets ratio
120-1





Fig6—4: Cash flow to 
current liabilities ratio
120-1
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6 .2.F______ Overall View:
From this review, a conclusion could be drawn that small 
firms at inception stage of development tended to maintain more liquidity 
than small, growing firms. This profile stems from the fact that 
small firms at inception tended to rely largely (58%) on internal 
resources, as a result of lack of access to the capital market, and 
the lending regulations and quality of entrepreneurs, whereas small, 
growing firms tended to rely more on short-term financing and borrowing 
to finance their working capital needs, as well as their long-term 
asset needs. (See Chapter 5; 5.3). This finding provides an elaboration 
of the traditional theory and confirmation of the fact that the life 
cycle of the firm, has an effect on the liquidity profile of small 
firm.
The research reveals an interesting point, that large 
private enterprises tend to maintain lower liquidity than small firms 
at inception, and a certain degree of similarity with insignificant 
differences with small, growing firms. This finding provides an answer 
to the controversial issue, that small firms have been found to be 
more illiquid than large firms (Bates, 1971; Gupta (1969); Walker 
and Petty, (1978) and Wilson (1979) conflicting with the findings 
of Chen and Balke (1979) and Elliott (1972) found that small firms 
tend to be more liquid than large firms.
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6.3________Financial Gearing:
The extensive use of external sources of finance by large 
and small, growing firms with some degree of variation, has an implication 
on the financial gearing of the firm, explaining the dissimiliarities 
between small firms at inception and small growing firms. Generally 
speaking, the empirical investigation provides conclusive evidence 
that the small firm, regardless of stage of development relies more 
on equity and internal sources of finance, than do large firms.
TABLE 6.7
Degree of Capitalisation
Equity as a Percentage of Total Assets Ratio
1 2 3 = 1 + 2 4
RANGE OF THE RATIO: St.up. S.F. S.G.F S. Firms Samp Large
NO.F % NO.F % NO.F % NO.F %
Less than 20% 2 10 1 5 3 8 5 33
Between 20 - 29% 3 15 4 20 7 18 4 27
30 - 39% 1 5 2 10 3 8 3 20
AO - 49% 1 5 5 25 6 15 1 7
50 - 59% 3 15 2 10 5 12 1 7
60 - 69% 4 20 2 10 5 15 1 7
70 - 79% 2 10 2 10 4 10 1 7
80 - 89% 2 10 0 0 2 5 0 0
90 - 99% 2 10 1 5 3 8 0 0
100% 0 10 1 5 1 3 0 0
X less than 50% 7 35 12 60 19 47 13 87
X 50% and over 13 65 8 40 21 53 2 13
X 60% and over 10 50 6 30 16 40 1 7
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Table (6.7) illustrates the reliance of small firms at inception 
on equity: 65% of the sample made extensive use of equity in financing 
assets, compare to small growing firms with only 40%. The table 
provides evidence that large firms were more debt-oriented than 
small firms, regardless of the stage of development. This finding 
challenged the contention that the capital structure of the small 
firm is more debt-oriented. Based on the relationship betwen equity 
and total assets, indicating the degree of capitalisation, table 
(6.7) provides an elaboration of the life cycle theory of the firm.
The higher the ratio, the lower capitalisation rate in a country, 
where personal savings are very low as a macro-economic factor.
This finding extends support to the premise that small firm at inception 
experienced, and tended to maintain, an under-capitalisation profile.
TABLE 6.8
Equity as a Percentage of Total Funds 
International Comparison
NO COUNTRY ST. UP. 
S.F.
GROWING AVERAGE LARGE WHOLE
AVERAGE
1. U.S.A. 57% 57% 57% 57%
2. U.K. 56% 56% 52% 54%
3. JAPAN 22% 22% 22% 22%
4. FRANCE 34% 34% 38% 36%
5. ISRAEL 45% 45% 36% 41%
6 . NIGERIA 42% 42% 0 0
7. SUDAN 61% 51% 56% 18% 43%
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TABLE 6.9
Equity As a Percentage of Long Term Finance
COUNTRY
ST.UP. 
S.F. S.G.F. AVERAGE LARGE
WHOLE
AVERAGE
U.S. 85% 85% 74% 80%
U.K. 92% 92% 76% 84%
JAPAN 52% 52% 45% 49%
FRANCE 56% 56% 56% 56%
ISRAEL 75% 75% 56% 66%
NIGERIA - - - -
SUDAN 92% 84% 88% 27% 68%
Based on an international comparison of the financial structure 
and profile of small and large firms in developed economies (U.S.,
U.K., Japan, France) and a semi-industrial country (Israel), conducted 
by Tamari (1980), the research sample extends support to Tamari*s 
findings that the equity level was higher for small than large private 
enterprises. The emprical work adds another dimension to Tamari*s 
survey, showing that the equity level is higher for the small firm 
at inception than for both small growing firms and large private enter­
prises. The high level of equity in small business financing in the 
Sudan, was not a reflection of availability of equity finance, but 
rather an indication of nojia/ailability of external sources of finance.
A further analysis of the relationship between equity and 
total capitalisation, provides an interesting point that equity was 
predominant at inception, and its role in financing decreased with 
growth and age of the enterprise in operation. The retention of profit
by small growing firms, as an internal source of finance, increased 
slightly the contibution of equity in financing business operations. 
(See table 6.10 here below).
TABLE 6.10 










1982 1983 1984 Av. 1982 1983 1984 Av. 1982 1983 1984 Av.
Equity As % of T.A. 70 57 54 60 40 51 49 47 <2> 36 18 18
C.L. As % of T.A. 7 23 34 21 47 37 49 44 45 24 22 33
R. Profit as % of T. A. .76 1 1 1 10 11 14 12 12 .05 .33 44
227
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Taking book value of equity to total debt ratio as 
measuring financial gearing, the indication was that the small 
firm at inception stage of development had higher equity to total 
debt ratio of 1.64 than did small growing firms with a ratio 
of 0.82. With respect to large private enterprises, the indication 
was that small growing firms tended to maintain a higher equity 
to debt ratio than large corporations with an average of 0.25.
This finding challenged the conclusion of Tamari (1980) that small 
corporations have a higher debt to equity ratio than do large 
corporations. The possible explanation of this profile was the 
fact that large private firms were more frequent users of long­
term loans than small firms.
With respect to the comparison between small firms 
at inception and small growing firms, the research finding lends 
support to Elliott's (1972) observation that growth was found 
to affect the firm's debt position, with both debt-equity ratios.
As far as large private enterprises are concerned, table 6.11 
shows that the large firm has a higher debt to equity ratio than 
both the small firm at inception, and the small growing firm.
A vital question to be raised in this context is why large firms, 
with a liquidity profile similar to small growing firms, have 
a higher debt to equity ratio than small growing firms. The 
study answers this question by providing empirical evidence that 
small growing firms rely more on current liabilities (38%) than 
do large enterprises (32%). On the other hand, large enterprises 
used more long-term liabilities financing (49%) than small growing 
firms (10%. Consequently, small, growing firms maintained a 
higher level of current debt to total debt ratio and lower debt
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to equity ratio, as compared to large private enterprises, 




INDICATORS STARTING UP. S.Ir. Small Growing Firms Large
1982 1983 1984 Av. 1982 1983 1984 Av. 1982 1983 1984 Av.
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2. Equity to L.T.F Ratio



































-  231 -
TABLE 6.12




RANGES N0.F % N0.F % N0.F %
Less than 20% 2 10 0 0 4 27
20 - 40% 2 10 5 25 5 33
41 - 60% 2 10 2 10 3 20
61 - 80% 1 5 3 15 0 0
81 - 99% 0 0 2 10 1 7
Less than 100% 7 35 12 60 13 87
100% and over 13 65 8 40 2 13
The last two rows of table 6.12 provide firm evidence that 
the small firm at inception was low geared, as compared to the small 
growing firm. This finding provides positive support to the foregoing 
analysis of data, which form strong and documented support to the 
research hypothesis under investigation.
Based on Bolton’s (1971) and Ray and Hutchinson’s (1983) 
classification of what constitutes high and low level of financial 
gearing, a conclusion could be drawn that small growing firms were 
highly geared, with figures in line with Bolton (1971); Ray and 
Hutchinson (1983) in the U.K. and B. Osaze (1981) in Nigeria. Regarding 
large private enterprises, the empirical survey shows that financial 
gearing was very high. The difference between small growing firms 
and large private enterprises is embodied in the degree of financial
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gearing. The research work provides evidence that the level of 
financial gearing of starting-up small firms, increased with an 
increase in short-term finance received by small firms. This was 
an indication that equity to debt ratio decreased with the age of 
the small firm. The possible explanation for this trend could be 
access of the small firm to the capital market, after its early 
stage of establishment, in the form of short-term bank borrowing. 
This finding was an elaboration of the effect of the life cycle 
of the firm on pattern of financing and financial behaviour.
Fig 6—5: Equity to total Fig 6—6: Equity to long-term
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Fig 6—8: Sales to total assets ratio
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The research findings, based on the relationship between 
equity and long-term finance and long term assets, confirm the analysis 
of the financial gearing profile, based on debt/equity ratio, that 
the level of equity is higher for small firms than for large firms, 
and the debt level of small firms is very different. This observation 
in turn, questioned critically Bolton’s (1971); Elliott's (1972);
Chen's and Balke's (1978) and Tamari's (1980) findings, and lends 
positive support to Bates's (1971) finding that debt level tends 
to be lower for small firms.
The nonavailability of long-term debt to small business 
at inception, could be seen clearly in the similarity in equity 
level as measured as a percentage of long-term finance or long-term 
loans. (See table 6.13). This is rather a seperate issue, and 
will be discussed in depth in Chapter seven of this study on identification 
of the small firm's finance gap in the Sudan.
TABLE 6.13
Equity to Long Term Finance Ratio 
Range of -
Start Up S.F 
*
S.G.F LARGE
N0.F % N0.F % N0.F %
Less than 20% 0 0 0 0 2 13
20 - 40% 1 5 0 0 3 20
41 - 60% 4 20 3 15 3 20
61 - 80% 3 15 3 15 1 7
81 - 99% 3 15 3 15 0 0
100% 9 45* 11 55* 6 40*
* Family Finance, reduce the rate
- 236 -





N0.F % N0.F % N0.F %
* Comps rec.L.T. 5 25 4 20 9 60
* Comps not Rec L.T. Loans 15 75 16 80 6 40
RANGE OF THE RATIO:
1 - 19% 0 0 0 0 2 13
20 - 40% 0 0 0 0 1 7
41 - 60% 0 0 0 0 2 13
61 - 80% 0 0 0 0 0 0
81 - 99% 0 0 1 5 1 7
100% and over 5 25 3 15 3 20
20 100 20 100 15 100
Regarding the comparison between small firms at inception 
and small growing firms, the measurement of financial gearing, 
based on a relation between equity to long term finance ratio, 
and equity to long term debt ratio (table 6.13), shows that small 
growing firms tend to maintain a higher equity level than small 
firms at inception, which contradicts the result reached under 
debt/equity ratio. The explanation of this contradiction is embodied 
in the reliance of small firms at inception on family finance, 
categorised as long-term finance, and reliance of small growing 
firms on institutional short-term finance, as a direct result of 
lack of long term loans. This explanation implicitly and explicitly 
confirms the finding that small growing firms were greater users 
of external source of finance and highly geared, as compared to 
small firms at inception.
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An Overview:
The foregoing discussion suggests that the small firm 
at inception tends to maintain high equity to debt, as compared 
to the small growing firms, which exhibit a high gearing ratio.
Due to nonavailability of equity finance, small growing firms not 
only substitute short-term debt for long term debt, but also substitute 
short debt for unavailable equity finance. The empirical investigation 
provides firm evidence that large private enterprises have higher 
financial gearing than small firms.
The pattern of financing and financial behaviour, and
their effect on the liquidity and financial gearing of the firm 
questioned the earning capacity of the firm as a critical factor 
for the existence, survival and growth of small firms in a hostile 
environment in a developing economy - the Sudan - . To this point 
we turn our attention now.
6.4 Profitability:
The initial field work (pilot study) (see Chapter 3),
posited that the small growing firm was more profitable than the
small firm at inception stage of development in the Sudan. In 
the U.K. Ray and Hutchinson (1983) stated that:
"In order to grow to reach a stock market flotation 
a small firm must be profitable".
This proposition, which emerged from the analysis of the initial 
field work (Research Case Studies), has been taken further, so
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as to establish the profitability profile and performance of small 
businesses in the Sudan.
6 .A.A_____Sales to Total Assets Ratio:
In terms of sales to total assets ratio, the sample 
firms provide evidence that the small growing firm was more efficient 
in the utilisation of its assets either than the small firm at 
inception, or than large private enterprises. The asset turnover 
of the small growing firm rose from 110% in 1982 to 117% in 1984 
with an average of 115.7%, compared to the small firm at inception, 
with an average of 59% and large private enterprises with an average 
of 28%. The low profitability of the small firm at inception is 
confirmation of the finding of Anderson (1967), that small, relatively 
new firms were less profitable. The degree of capacity utilisation 
of the small firm at inception, as measured by Sales to total assets 
ratio, increased steadily from 28% in 1982 to 83% in 1984. That 
was an indication and reflection of use of more working capital 
finance from external sources, which was an elaboration to the 
effect of age and life-cycle of th firm on pattern of financing.
TABLE 6.14
Sales to Total Assets Ratio:
St. Up Growing Large
1982 28% 110% 35%
1983 96% 120% 23%
1984 83% 117% 28%
Av. 69% 115.70% 28%
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The higher degree of asset utilisation (Table 6.16) 
showed by the small growing firm, in comparison with the small 
firm at inception, could possibly be explained by the accessibility 
of the small growing firm to the capital market. Moreover, the 
higher sales to total assets ratio maintained by the small growing 
firm was an indication of little or no excess capacity among small 
growing firms, which stood as a proof of the institutional long- 
term debt finance gap (see Chapter 7). The asset turnover of small 
growing firms in the Sudan was lower than that found by Bolton 
in the U.K., and Osaze in Nigeria. This in turn reflects the lack 
of working capital finance in the Sudanese financial market (See 
6 .2).
TABLE 6.15
Sales to Total Assets Ratio:
St. Up. S.F. S.(3.F LARGE
RANGE OF THE RATIO: N0.F % N0.F % N0.F %
Less than 50% 8 40 2 10 6 40
50 - 99% 4 20 5 25 5 33
Less than 100% 12 60 7 35 11 73
Between 100 - 149% 3 15 6 30 2 13
150 - 200% 1 5 3 15 0 0
Over 100% 8 46 13 65 4 27
Over 200% 4 20 4 20 2 13
As far as the comparison between small and large enterprises 
is concerned, the study provides empirical confirmation of the established 
contention in accounting and finance literature, that small firms 
were more efficient in utilising assets and in generating high earnings
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than larger firms (Bolton, 1971; Wilson, 1979; Tamari , 1980 and 
Walker and Petty, 1978. (See Table 6.14)
There are several macro-economic explanations to this 
observation which challenges the large scale economies theory. The 
research states that large enterprises were capital intensive projects, 
built and established round partial or full processing of imported 
raw materials and technology, whereas the small firm is constrained 
by low level of capitalisation and dealt with relatively local and 
simple technology, and local raw materials. Therefore the larger 
firm was more subject to macro-economic indicators. The shortage 
of hard currency or foreign exchange is the key constraint to obtaining 
adequate imported inputs. Some managers of large firms report delays 
of up to a year in obtaining foreign exchange through commercial banks 
at the official rate. Others have entirely given up trying to get 
foreign exchange through official channels, and now deal exclusively 
on the free market.
The heavy over-investment measured as an imbalance between 
production capacity and inputs, was cited as a main factor behind 
under-capitalisation of production capacity as negative economic 
indicators ( Economic Conference KH, 1986).
A comprehensive reported conducted by the World Bank Mission 
on Sudan economy (1985) - M A World Bank Country Study, Sudan Pricing 
Policies and Structural Balances" shows that the operating cost of 
industrial establishments in the Sudan is higher, affecting the degree 
of profitability. The mission found that labour is rather expensive 
in the Sudan as a consequence of its scarcity in certain areas, and
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alternative job opportunities abroad:-
’’Such that average wages for textile workers in the 
Sudan were U.S.$ 0.65/hr compared to $0.40 in Egypt 
and $0.32 in Pakistan”.
The mission went further, attributing the under-capacity utilisation 
of industrial establishment to the shortage of professional managers.
The economic costs of under-utilised capacity exhibited 
by large private firms are two-fold: First, the waste and uneconomic
utilisation of resources in a country with very meagre financial 
resources. Second, under utilised capacity means foregone production. 
This empirical Investigation provides support to the World Bank Report 
(1985) stating that:
"The firms that on average have the greatest potential 
for economically efficient production were those 
based on domestic raw materials, rather than imported 
inputs”.
The research findings give an empirical justification for a development 
policy based on the philosophy of positive encouragement for small 
business, and the avoidance of investment in industries already suffering 
from excess capacity. (See Chapter 12).
6.4.B_____ Retained Earning to Total Assets Ratio:
The relationship between total assets and retained profit 
is an indication of the degree of profitability, profit retention, 
as well as the degree of importance of retained profit in financing 
the firm. This ratio shows that small growing firms were more profitable
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than either small firms at inception or large private enterprises. This 
is an indication that the small growing firm retained a proportion 
of its profit so as to finance growth and expansion. The research 
sample shows that the retained earnings of small growing firms rose 
steadily from 10% in 1982, to 14% in 1984 with an average of 12%, 
compared to 1% of small firms at inception. This finding lends positive 
support to Bates (1967), that small firms rely more than large on 
their own savings for expansion.
A further analysis of the historical financial data shows 
that 50% of small growing firms maintained 10% and over of retained 
profit to total assets ratio, compared with 20% of small firms at 
inception and 7% of large firms. (See Table 6.17).
TABLE 6.16







1982 .76 10 < >
1983 2 11 .05
1984 .96 14 .33
Average 1.24 12 .13
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TABLE 6.17
Range of R.E. to T.A. Ratio:
ST. UP S.F. S.G.F LARGE
N0.F % N0.F % N0.F %
Negative - No R.E. 6 30 2 10 6 40
Less than 10% 10 50 8 40 8 53
10 - 20% 3 15 7 35 1 7
21 - 30% 0 0 2 10 0 0
31 - 40% 1 5 1 5 0 0
However, the earnings retention of the small, growing firm 
in the Sudan is low by comparison with the small growing firm in Nigeria, 
with 23.47% for fast growing firms, and 24.25% for slow growing firms, 
as well as Bolton (1971) (20-28%) and Bath Supergrowth firms (21-27%).
This could be explained by the low level of capacity utilisation maintained
by the small, growing firm in the Sudan, as compared to the U.K. and
Nigeria, as a result of shortage and lack of satisfactory working 
capital finance. The low level of profit retention maintained by 
large firms was not due to profit distribution but rather to accumulated 
losses. This sort of profile was explained by respondent management
of large enterprises as being the result of shortage of working capital
finance and other inputs, reflected in the fact that most large firms 
were working at less than 30% capacity.
6.4.C Profit Before Interest and Tax To Total Assets Ratio:
This measure provides confirmation of the previous findings 
that the small growing firm was more profitable than other firms,
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with an average of 7%. To figure out this ratio, the profit was adjusted 
by adding directors’ remunerations to the reported profit.
TABLE 6.18
Net Profit BIT to Total Assets Ratio:
%
YEAR St.Up S.G.F LARGE
1982 2% 8% <13>%
1983 3% 6% -9>%
1984 2% 8% <16>%
Av. 2.3% 7.33% <12.67>%
6.4.D Profit Margin:
This indicator provides the interesting point that there 
was no significant differences between small firms at inception and 
small growing firms in generating operating profits, with an average 
of 4.3% and 6.3% respectively. A further analysis, of aggregate accounting 
data provides the surprising result that the small firm at inception 
was doing better than the small growing firm in generating income.
The research sample shows that 60% of starting up small firms maintained 
10 to 49% profit margin ratio, compared with 35% of small growing 
firms sampled.
This contradictory result could possibly be explained by 
the fact that most small firms at inception were built round local 
raw materials, whereas most of growing firms depend partially, or 
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process. This causation introduced macro-economic factor.
The other explanation vas that small firms usually started very small, 
and operations expenses were low, compared to small growing firms.
The empirical work provides evidence that the capital needed to finance 
assets in the early eighties was more than that needed in the seventies 
and sixties (5.1). This observation was an explanation of high operating 
profit of small firms at inception, low retained earnings to total 
assets and low level of asset utilisation, compared to small growing 
firms. (See table 6.20).
TABLE 6.19
N.P. + Directors' Remuneration as a % of Sales:
St.Up S.F. S.(5.F. LARGE
N0.F % N0.F % N0.F %
Negative 0 0 0 0 8 53
Less than 10% 8 40 13 65 7 47
10 - 19% 5 25 7 35 0 0
20 - 29% 3 15 0 0 0 0
30 - 39% 2 10 0 0 0 0
40 - 49% 2 10 0 0 0 0
An Overview:
The foregoing discussion, based on the selected profitability 
indicators, indicates that the small growing firm was more efficient 
and profitable than either the small firm at inception or large private 
enterprises. The higher profitability of the small growing firm was 
a vehicle to overcome its illiquidity profile, and to survive even
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with its high level of financial gearing and risk. Based on asset 
utilisation and the degree of capacity utilisation, the empirical 
investigation questioned the traditional economic theory with its 
emphasis on large scale economies.
6.5 Degree of Self-Financing:
The survey posited that small firms face formidable difficulties 
in raising institutional finance, and particularly long-term financial 
facilities. (See chapter 5; 5.1.4 and Chapter 7). It was in the field 
of profit retention and use of retained profit as an internal source 
of finance, that the greatest differences were observed between small 
firms at inception, small growing firms and large private enterprises.
In measuring the degree of self-financing, Bates1(1964) 
measurement, based on the concept of cash-flow model was used (See 
part 6.1.2.D). Based on cash-flow to material investment in gross 
fixed assets plus stocks ratio; (Ratio No. 1). The sample shows that 
the degree of self-financing in small growing firms was higher than 
in small firms at inception and large firms averaging 22%, 8 .5% and 
8% respectively (Table 6.20).
A further analysis of the financial data shows that 65% 
of small firms at inception exhibited less than 10% and 80% of large 
firms, compared to 85% of small growing firms maintained 10% and over 
(Ratio NO. 1). This observation indicates that small growing firms 
rely on retained profit for expansion and development to a greater 
extent than their large enterprise counterparts. This profile questioned 
the degree of adequacy of retained profit to meet growth demand.
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TABLE 6.20
Degree Of Self-Financing Based on the Concept of Cash Flow;
1. Cash Flow to Material 
Inv in G.F.A. +
Stocks Ratio
2. Cash Flow to Material 
Inv in G.F.A. +
Stocks + N.T.C Ratio
Cash Flow = Retained Profit and Depreciation
N.T.C. = T.D. - T.C. and Depreciation use of Funch)
RATIO NO. 1
CashFlow to G.F.A. + Stocks 
Ratio:
Range of the Ratio:
. Less than 10%
. 10 - 19%
. 20 - 29%
. 30 - 39%
. 40 - 49%
. 50 - 59%
. 60 - 69%
. 70 - 79%
. 80 - 89%
. 90 - 99%
100% and over
St. Up S.F. Growing Large
N0.F % N0.F % N0.F %
13 65 3 15 12 80
3 15 8 40 3 20
2 10 3 15 - -
1 5 4 20 - -




20 100 20 100 15 100
St. Up Growing Large Firm




RATIO NC . 2
w to Material Inv in
St. Up. S.F. G.R.JS.F. LARGE
uasn r10
N0.F % N0.F % N0.F %
G.F.A + Stocks + N.T.C.
Range of the Ratio: 
Less than 10% 13 65 2 10 11 73
io 19% 2 10 9 45 3 20
. 20 - 29% 3 15 2 10 -
. 30 - 39% 1 5 4 20 - —
io• 49% 1 5 2 10 - —
. 50 - 59% - - - - 1 7
. 60 - 69% - - - — —
. 70 - 79% - - 1 5 — —
. 80 - 89% - - - — —
. 90 - 99% - - - — —
. 100% and over — - —
20 100 20 100 15 100
RATIO NO. 3





Range Of The Ratio;
Start Up Growing Large
NO F % NO.F % NO.F %
Less than 10% 4 20 0 0 11 73
10 - 19% 9 45 6 30 3 20
20 - 29% 2 10 5 25
30 - 39% 4 20 1 5
40 - 49% - - 2 10
50 - 59% 1 5 2 10 0 0
60 - 69% 0 0 2 10 0 0
70 - 79% 0 0 1 5 0 0
80 - 89% 0 0 0 0 0 0
90 - 99% 0 0 0 0 0 0
100% and over 0 0 0 0 0 0
The research has proved the inadequacy of this type of internal source 
of finance (see Chapter 5; 5.21). The lower degree of self-financing 
exhibited by larger firms was compensated by bank borrowing on both 
short and long-term nature (See Chapter 5).
The second criterion (Ratio 2) for the degree of self- 
financing provides confirmation of the result under Ratio 1. (See 
table 6.20). Based on the concept that cash flow, or gross company
i
savings, equate to net profit plus depreciation, the sample provides 
evidence that the degree of self-financing was higher in small firms 
(11, 12%), (12%), (13%) than in large private enterprises, exhibiting 
a negative ratio (^11^%).
The higher degree of self-financing maintained by small 
growing firms in comparison with other firms, questioned the degree 
of growth.
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Bates (1964) argues that:
"...It is possible that a high degree of self-financing 
indicates a cautious and slowly developing enterprise".
The relatively higher degree of profit retention maintained 
by the small growing firm was an indication of the success of the 
management of small firms, in striking a balance between and reconciling 
the demand of the family and business needs. This sort of financial 
and investment behaviour in the light of capital shortage posited 
that the growth question is not confined only to the availability 
of finance, but rather to both finance and management. The latter 
factor will be discussed as a seperate issue in Chapter 10.
Bates (1964) observed that:
"Small firm expansion must be much more closely 
determined by the availability of internal funds".
6.6 Conclusions
The empirical findings of this investigation have been 
stated at various points throughout the preceding parts of this Chapter 
(6.2 - 6.5). It may now be possible to combine and summarise the 
main conclusions of this part of the study. The empirical findings 
have theoretical and policy implications, which are of especial significance 
to banks and other bodies willing to provide finance to small business, 
and potential investors in small business. This exercise, based on 
ratio analysis, provides confirmation of the second research hypothesis.
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The main conclusions and their theoretical and policy 
implications, may be summarised as follows:
1. As a measure of the degree of capitalisation, the small
firm at inceptions shows a high ratio of equity to total assets.
This high ratio, coupled with lack of equity finance, is an indication 
of the under-capitalisation of the small firm at the inception stage 
of development. While debt is a viable source, under-capitalisation 
results in a low volume of borrowing against security, unfavourable 
loan terms, and a high cost of borrowing. This study provides evidence 
that under-capitalisation is one of the financial characteristics 
of small firms at inception, a financial pitfall, which might lead 
small businesses to failure and death. This finding elaborates the 
traditional theory and suggests its applicability to the financial 
profile scene in developing economies like the Sudan.
2. In terms of working capital management, starting-up small
firms tend to exhibit more liquidity than small, growing firms. The 
study supports the contention that growth causes a liquidity problem. 
Large private enterprises, on the other hand, appear to have less 
liquidity than small firms at inception and exhibit liquidity similar 
to small growing firms. This finding provides an answer to some 
controversial issues in finance and accounting literature.
3. As regards to the financial risk, the survey shows that
the small firm at inception tends to be low-geared, whereas the small 
but growing firm is highly-geared. The empirical investigation provides 
firm evidence that large private enterprises have higher financial 
gearing than small firms.
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4. As far as profitability is concerned, small growing firms
are more efficient in utilisation of their assets than small firms
at inception. The empirical investigation challenges the large-scale 
economics theory, providing evidence that small firms are more efficient 
in utilising their capacity, and in generating earnings, than large 
private enterprises. This finding lends support to Bates's (1967);
Walker and Petty's (1978) and Wilson's (1979) inferences in developed 
economies. At the policy implication level, this observation offers 
a strong documented case for the adoption of a national economic develop­
ment policy, based on the philosophy that the small firm is the best 
and most appropriate vehicle for industrial development in a poor 
country, with a depressed economy, based on donations and heavy borrowing. 
As a national issue, this strategy could restore the economic independence 
of the country (See Chapter 12).
5. The degree of self-financing based on cash flow model,
is higher is higher in small growing firms than in small firms at 
inception. With respect to a comparison between small and large firms, 
this study provides evidence that the degree of self-financing is 
higher in small firms than in their large private enterprise counterparts.
A concluding point for this section is that the financial 
profile exercise provides confirmation of the effect of the life-cycle, 
growth and size of financial behaviour, and financial structure of 
the firm. Thus, there appears to be a marked dissimilarity between 
the financial profile of small firms at inception, small growing firms 
and large private enterprises in developing economies.
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It is worth mentioning that care should be taken in the 
interpretation of these results, being based on poor accounting information, 
a distinctive feature of developing countries (Parker, 1984), particularly, 
applicable to small businesses. The main limitation of this study 
analysis, is its basis on a very short-time series (3 years) and in 
aggregated accounting records. Wilson (1979) argues that:
"There is very great diversity in the financing patterns 
and financial performance of small companies. The 
degree of variation in the usual financial ratios 
is much greater for small companies than for large. 
Consequently average figures for small companies 
as a whole can sometimes be very misleading and must 
be treated with caution".
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE SMALL BUSINESS 
FINANCING GAP
The preceding parts of this study (chapters 5 and 6) have described 
the sources of finance available to small business, and their relative 
importance. The in-depth analysis of financial facilities available 
to small business at inception, to small, growing firms and to large 
private enterprises, identified the symptoms of the financial differences 
and dissimilarities.
The financing of small companies has always been a problem. (Peacock, 
1977). Adam Smith in 1922 complained that:-
"The banks (the traders and undertakers seem to have thought) could 
extend their credits to whatever sum might be wanted, without 
incurring any other expense besides that of a few reams of paper.
They complained of the contracted views and dastardly spirit of the 
directors of these banks, which did not, they said, extend their 
credit in proportion to the extension of that trade of the country."
The shortage of finance has persistently proved a formidable constraint 
in the establishment and promotion of small business, in developed 
countries and developing economies alike. The debate concerning the 
finance gap has a history going back to the 'Macmillian Report' of (1931) 
in the U.K. In the U.S., a nationwide survey conducted by the Department 
of Commerce in 1934 disclosed that long term funds could not be 
obtained from any source by almost half of all small manufacturers 
needing such credit. Bird and Juttner (1974), Peacock (1974) and Os&ze 
(1981) had proved the existence of the finance gap in Australia and 
Nigeria respectively (see chapter 2: 2.1.2)
There was belief amongst academics and professionals in the Sudan, 
that there was a shortage of finance, (National Economic Summit, March 
1986), but there was no empirical work done on the identification and
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measurement of the financial difficulties and problems. The purpose 
of this chapter is to give a better understanding of some of the 
financing problems that small businessmen face, and to provide an 
empirical answer to the question whether: the small business is at a 
disadvantage in obtaining adequate financing, or in other words, does 
a "small business financing gap" exist and, if so, in what form. 
(Hypothesis - 3, see chapter 3).
To identify the finance gap symptom^ the analysis was based on multi- 
dimentional measurements (see chapter 4 - Research Methodology). To 
examine the finance gap from the demand side perspecive, the analysis 
was based on both accounting and non-accounting data. Thus, the 
uniqueness of this approach of analysis is embodied in the fact that 
findings were not merely an interpretation of historical accounting data, 
but also were based on qualitative data.
Based on the identified dimensions, along the way to establish the 
relevant hypothesis, and the emerge theoretical and policy implications, 
the chapter is organised as follows: Part I identifies the long term 
debt finance gap. Parts II and III examines the finance gap based on 
capital shortage and cost of borrowing respectively. Analysis of the 
process of raising funds as perceived by entrepreneurs is presented in- 
depth in Part VI. The concluding section summarises the main 
investigation findings, and the theoretical and policy implications that 
emerge from this part of the study.
7.1. LONG TERM DEBT FINANCING GAP
Ironically, the Macmillian Report is probably remembered best for
one short paragraph in which it pointed to the existence of what has
come to be known as The Macmillian Gap: "It has been represented to
us that great difficulty is experienced by the smaller and medium­
sized businesses in raising the capital which they from time to 
time require ........" (Bates, 1964).
Long term debt finance as a viable source provides an opportunity to
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to small business to avoid under-capitalisation at the inception stage
of development and for expansion and growth. Grafer (1968) articulated
that: "The type of financing most often unavailable on reasonable
terms to small business is the type normally required for significant, 
permanent expans ion."
The empirical investigations provides conclusive evidence that small
firms, regardless of stage of development are at a considerable
disadvantage in obtaining long term finance from banks and other
financial bodies, as compared to large private enterprises. The sample
firms show that large firms were large users of institutional long
term loans, either as initial long term loans or overdraft facilities
converted into long term loans (49%), in financing business operations,
than small firms at inception (5%) and small growing firms (10%)
(see chapter 5 for more analysis - 5.2 and chapter 6). The survey shows
that the long term debt incurred by an average large firm equates to
73% of long term financing, compared to 8% and 16%, maintained by small
firms at inception, and small growing firms respectively.
Table No 7.1







No F • % No F % No F %
Companies obtained long 
term loans
6 30 8 40 9 60
Companies did not obtain L.T.D. 13 65 12 60 6 40
Companies did not apply for 5 25 3 15 3 20
Table 7.1 based on the proportion of firms receiving long term loans
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gives an indication that small business is at a disadvantage in receiving 
long term loans (65%) , compared to their large private counterparts, 
who enjoyed 60% institutional long term financial facilities.
The empirical investigation states the fact that the Sudanese 
Industrial Bank (SIB) was the main supplier of long term loans for small 
business at inception stage (20%), whereas public and private commercial 
banks were the main providers of institutional long term financing to 
large enterprises (see Chaper 5, 5.26.T.) This finding challenged 
the contention that the commercial banks, as a traditional source of 
finance, were not considered a prime source of long term funds, since 
their raison d'etre was to supply short term financing. (Grafer op.ci.)
This observation provides evidence of small business discrimination in 
the capital market. The possible explanation of commercial banks' 
behaviour, was the security required by banks against long term debt, 
unlikely to be satisfied by typical small business. (See Chaper 8 for 
more discussion).
The unavailability of institutional long term financial facilities 
had an adverse effect on growth and expansion policy of small businesses, 
as reported by entrepreneurs and managements of small businesses. 55 percent 
of small businesses at inception, reported that they had not had any 
policy for expansion, as a result of lack of institutional long term 
debt finance. The small growing firm sample shows that 60% relied 
heavily on retained profits in financing long term assets, compared 
with 60% of large firms, who received a great volume of finance from 
commercial banks on a long term basis.
The survey shows that 53% of large firms received fixed assets finance 
and 87% received working capital finance on a continuous basis in the 
expansion process. On the other hand, the low level of retained
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earnings (12%) maintained by an average small growing firm, was an 
indication of the degree of inadequacy of retained earnings in meeting 
growth and expansion needs. That inadequacy, in connection with 
unavailability of institutional long term financial facilities, is an 
indication of the financial difficulties small business experienced 
in meeting start-up capital needs, and maintaining and sustaining growth.
As far as the reasons for unavailability of institutional long term 
debt for small business is concerned, 58% of small growing firms sample 
reported that banks in the public and private sectors did not finance 
fixed assets needs for the establishment or expansion of small 
business. Others argue that the banking policy was to finance at 
short term against stringent security and high guarantees. Most 
entrepreneurs of small firms (85%) reported that the banking system, 
based on Islamic financing mechanism, and the credit squeeze system, 
in conjunction with banks' management and bankers' attitudes towards 
small business financing were the main reason for the lack of long term 
financial facilities. Thus, the demand side attributed the existence 
of a Macmillian gap to the capital market mechanism and bankers' 
attitudes. This finding will be cross-examined in chapter (8) focusing 
on the supply side of financing.
The empirical investigation provides an interesting point that the 
use of long term debt was influenced by the attitude, perception and 
belief of the entrepreneur. The survey shows that 25% of small firms 
at inception had the convinction that bank financing should be 
confined to working capital finance, so as to avoid problems of 
ownership which might arise from financing under Musharaka Instrument.
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This observation is consistent with the finding of Bates (1964) in U.K. 
and Beckhard/(1975Xn U.S., and provides support to behavioural 
economists views on the relationship between the choice of finance, 
ownership, and control of firms (Davis and Pointon, 1984).
The foregoing discussion, based on an analogy between small and 
large private enterprises with respect to availability of institutional 
long term finance, provides an empirical proof of the existence of 
Macmillian Gap in the Sudan.
7.2
IDENTIFICATION OF FINANCE GAP 
BASED ON CAPITAL SHORTAGE DIMENSION
Gravin (1970) argues that the finance gap would exist if the 
marginal return on investment available to small businesses exceeded 
their marginal cost of capital. The empirical investigation shows 
that small, growing firms were more efficient in the utilisation of 
assets than starting-up firms with an average of 115 - 70% and 60% 
respectively. As has been noted earlier in this study, (chapter 6, 6.4) 
the low degree of capacity - utilisation maintained by small firms at 
inception stage of development is an indication of lack of working- 
capital finance, provided that small firms at inception were more 
efficient in generating income measured by profit-margin ratio (see 
Chapter 6 6.4). Thisprofile is a good indication of difficulties 




DEGREE OF CAPACITY UTILISATION
AND LONG TERM LOANS - SMALL GROWING FIRM AND LARGE
Small Growing Firms Large Firms
1982 1983 1984 AV 1982 1983 1984 AV
Capacity utilisation 110 120 117 116 35 23 26 28
Long term loans 171 209 190 8546 13830 16293
Increase in L.T.L. 22% (9%) 62% 18%
% of Ext Debt Finance 23% 23% 14% 20% 55% 62% 64% 60%
Table (7.2) shows that the degree of capacity utilisation was high 
in small growing firms, with very low institutional long term financial 
facilities, as compared to large private enterprises, with low degree 
of capacity utilisation and a high percentage of long term financial 
facilities portions. This finding was an indication of relative non­
excess capacity and shortage of long term facilities experienced by 
small growing firms, which, in turn gives empirical evidence of a 
small business financing gap. Harris (1967) argues that:-
"If no significant economies exist, or all firms are operating 
optimally, a finance gap would be reflected by a relative high 
degree of asset utilisation, and high profitability of existing 
assets. "
Based on the measurement and identification of small business 
financing gap on availability/unavailability of funds - short and long 
term - the research sample provides evidence that the small firm relies 
on internal sources of finance, whereas large private enterprise were more 
debt orientated (see table 5-20 and 5-21 Chapter 5).
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Table 7.3
AVAILABILITY OF EXTERNAL FINANCE
BASED ON OPINION OF ENTREPRENEURS AND MANAGEMENT OF THE RESEARCH SAMPLES
St. Up S.F. S.G.F. S.F.
Sample
Large F.
No F % ' No .F % No.F '% No.F %
Companies lacked external 
finance
19 95 15 75 34 85 14 93
Companies did not lack 
external finance
1 5 5 25 6 15 1 7
Fund needed to Finance, 
but were not Available
Fixed Assets 12 60 12 60 24 60 4 27
Working capital 18 90 13 65 31 78 14 93
Fixed assets and W.C. 11 55 10 50 21 53 4 27
Promotional purposes 3 15 4 20 7 18 3 20
Type of Finance Needed 
But not Available
Short term finance 16 80 13 65 29 73 14 93
Long term finance 12 60 12 60 24 60 4 27
Equity finance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Continuous working 
capital finance 15 75
f
13 65 28 70 14 93
Table (7.3) shows that there was a similarity between small and 
large firms, with regard to unavailability of working capital finance, 
in relation to the production capacity. Most of the respondent 
entrepreneurs and managers (82%) complained of unavailability of 
sufficient working capital finance. According to the World Bank Report (1985) 
the used production capacity of industrial establishment in the Sudan 
ranges between 26-30%. It is in the field of long term loans and fixed 
assets financing that a clear difference is observed between small and
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large private enterprises. The table, based wholly on the opinion of 
entrepreneurs, provides evidence that small firms are at a considerable 
disadvantage in obtaining institutional finance. The identified small 
business financing difficulties were seen as having two consequences; 
a shortage of initial capital for a new start-up, and a deficiency in the 
provision of development capital to finance growth and expansion of 
the established enterprise.
Table (7.3) presents an interesting point that entrepreneurs' 
sample did not complain about non-existence of equity finance. This 
profile and financial behaviour, as has been stated before, (Chapter 6), 
is attributable to social and psychological factors. Bates (1967) in U.K. 
observed that:-
"Since most private companies are also family firms, they do 
not find it particularly easy to raise long term funds outside 
their immediate field of influence. Another important factor 
is the fear that the introduction of outside capital might 
dilute or threaten the existing owners' control of the business."
The empirical investigation provides evidence that the small firm 
equity gap in the Sudan is divisible into technical aspects measured 
by the non-existence of a formalised stock market, and social and 
psychological factors (see Chapter 6, 6-3).
The preceding parts of the chapter (7.1 and 7.2) provide material
and empirical evidence that there was a small business financing gap
in the Sudan expressed as small business concerns difficulties in 
obtaining the volume of long term loan and working capital finance for 
start-up and adequate growth. The vital question to be raised in this 
context is whether where such capital is available to small businesses, 
is it at a disadvantage because it must pay a higher interest rate?
To this point we direct attention now:-
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7 . 3 .
IDENTIFICATION OF SMALL BUSINESS FINANCING GAP 
BASED ON COST OF BORROWING CONCEPT
The cost disparity between small and large businesses was used
by scholars as a surrogate for the identification of the finance gap.
(See Chapter 4, 4.I.B.) Brigham and Smith (1970) argue that:
"Material differences in financial costs exist between small 
and large corporations in that small firms pay a higher cost 
for debt financing than do large firms."
Table 7.4.




Table 7.4 shows that there was a general agreement between small
businesses and large firms that the cost of borrowing was too high for
very short term finance, under the interest based system and more so
under the Islamic financing mechanism. The owner of one small firm said that
"The cost of finance was very high, and Islamic financing 
instruments with a minimum of 24% per annum discourage industry.
Under these circumstances, no industry, whatever the size, could 
be established and sustained from bank borrowing. The best
strategy for a healthy company is to depend on, and to be established 
from owners' resources and to resort to banks for costly working 
capital finance."
Based on interest rate, or "Hamish El Murabaha^under Islamic 
financing, as a measurement of the cost of borrowing, the survey shows 
that there was no cost disparity between small businesses and large ones, 
with regard to minimum rate decided by the Central Bank, and the minimum 
charge decided by the management of /
continued next page
St s .F. S.G. F. S.F. S. Large
No.F % No.F % No.F % No.F %
17 85 15 75 32 80 14 93
3 15 5 25 8 20 1 7




the commercial bank in question. This unification was created by the 
fact that there was no formal or informal definition of what constitutes 
small and large enterprises in the banking system, and the financial policy­
making level (Central Bank). The cost of bank borrowing under Islamic 
financing instruments (Murabaha and Musharaka), above the minimum rate 
decided by bank management was based on bargaining. The Central Bank 
has no influence on the determination of the maximum cost of borrowing. 
Thus, the determination of the cost of bank borrowing depends partially 
on the bank's opinion, the profitability of the transaction, the 
security provided by the clients, as well as the ability of the 
applicant to present and to defend his case before bank officials.
Regarding the latter factor, Bolton (1971) observed in the U.K. that small
firms tend to be unskilled in presenting a financial case.
The negotiation skill of the applicant as well as security formula 
as determinant factors of the cost of bank borrowing (above minimum), 
put small firms and particularly starting-up small firms, with in­
experienced entrepreneurs, at a considerable disadvantage in obtaining 
the needed volume of finance on reasonable terms. This observation 
introduces the concept of an entrepreneur as an individual, measured 
into negotiation ability and capability to present and defend his case 
before financiers and potential investors. The director of The 
Investment Section - Tadamon Islamic Bank commented that:;
"The cost of lending above the minimum charge is based entirely 
on bargaining and negotiation between the bank and the client, 
under Marabaha as well as Musharaka."
Avad,H (1985) argues that the financing decision as well as the cost of
finance under Islamic banking system is based on personal basis and
bargaining, because of the issue of delay and prohibition of delay
penalty under Islamic principle and Sharia code.
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In their article "Cost of Capital to the Small Firm" Eugne F Brigham
and Keith V Smith (1970) state that:
"Loans to small firms are typically smaller than loans to larger 
firms, and since there are fixed costs to making and servicing 
any loan, smaller firms must necessarily pay higher rates to 
cover such fixed costs."
Based on 154 loans received by the research sample from commercial
and development financial institutions in the last five years (1980 -
1985) (See Chapter 5, 5.1.4.3, figure No 5.2), the analysis shows that
the volume of loan received by a small firm at inception and a small
growing firm, was very low, compared to the average received by large
enterprises. This observation extends support to Brigham and Smith,
and provides evidence of the cost disparity between small and large
firms, measured as fixed cost charge.
Table 7.5
COMMERCIAL BANKS' INTEREST RATE 'SUDAN'
1978 1981 1983 1985
Discounts of Bills of Exchange 
Advances against Bill of Exchange 
Advances to Industrial borrowers 














Minimum rate 1983 - onward (Islamisation)
Source: World Bank Report, Sudan, Ministry of Finance
In order to reduce the rate of credit expansion, and to control
the growth of money supply in the financial market, the Central Bank,
implemented a set of monetary and credit measures in the years 1983-1986.
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Within these measures, the minimum lending rate on banking facilities was 
18% for industry and export, and 21% for trading. Under the credit squeeze 
system, commercial banks raised the minimum rate from (18-21%) to 2'.’% per month 
for Murabaha finance and 30% per annum under Musharaka finance.
Table (7.5) shows that the cost of bank borrowing in the Sudan was 
too high, with a steady increase in 1978, from 14.5% to 24% in 1985, a 66% 
jump. The higher cost of bank borrowing could be seen in comparison with 
other developing countries; Nigeria 6%, Ghana 9%, and Sierra Leone 8%
I
and some developed countries, U.S. 7%, U.K. 15.3% and Canada 9% (1978).
The low level of money supply, under the credit squeeze system,
accompanied by higher cost of borrowing, put small firms with low
security and high risk at disadvantage in obtaining institutional funds,
compared to large ones. Galbraith (1957) stated that:
"Monetary policy discriminates against the smaller, less 
monopolistic firms."
Singth and Whittington (1968) argue that in the period of 'squeeze1,
the un-quoted sector might bear the brunt of the monetary restraint.
the effect of ceiling and credit squeeze on financing, is a separate
issue and will be discussed in depth in Chapter (8) on examination of
the financial abilities of banks in the Sudan.
7.4
OVERALL VIEW
The foregoing discussion (7.1-7.3) provides empirical evidence 
that small businesses experience formidable difficulties in raising 
institutional short and long term finance as compared to their large 
private enterprise counterparts. Thus, there is, 'a Sudanese Macmillion 
gap'. This finding provides positive support to the research hypothesis, 
and is consistent with the finding of Bosa (1978) in Yougonda, Besong(1978)
-268-
in Cameroun and Osaze (1981) in Nigeria, adding the dimension of 
identifying the finance gap on multi-dimensional measurement approach.
To idendify the finance gap from the demand-side perspective, a 
vital question is to be raised as to why the financing gap exists, 
and how small businessmen perceived the reasons and causes of this 
existence. To this point, we turn attention now.
7.5 WHY FINANCING GAP EXISTS
Prudent investors, and financiers, being risk avertors and 
security concious, generally try to avoid situations where there is 
little probability of a large gain and a large probability of a loss, 
with payment default and failure. This is the main reason why 
financial institutions and investors, are reluctant to finance and 
invest in small businesses. Grafer (1968) added that:-
”....a gap is created by normal operation of the capital 
market, in which allocations are guided by expected rate of 
return appropriately discounted for risk. The additional 
risk of financing small business is caused by some of its 
common characteristics.”
Tables (7.6) and (7.7) illustrate that the banking institutions 
satisfy borrower demands neither for long term financial facilities, 
nor for short term loans. The financial problems reported by 
respondent entrepreneurs give substantial evidence of a small business 
financing gap.
The empirical investigation shows that small business financing 
is adversely affected by the Central Bank financial and priority policy. 
The majority of small businesses (80%) reported that the financial 
policy of the Central Bank, as well as the credit squeeze system, were 
the main reasons given by financial institutions for refusing to 
extend credit. Small growing firms put more emphasis on shortage of 
hard currency for financing raw materials and other working capital items.
- 269-
The owners and managers of small businesses provide confirmation 
of the existence of a Radcliff gap in the Sudan, attributing the 
finance gap to banking policy, banks' management, and bankers' attitude 
towards small business financing. 93% of small businesses reported
t
that bankers were not sympathetic towards small business (table 7.8).
On institutional basis, the respondent entrepreneurs attributed the 
financial difficulties of small business to an institutional gap, in 
the sense that there was no body in charge of providing finance to 
small business in the Sudan. This led to the implementation of 
Radcliff (1959) statement on small business financing in ULK.-
"We think that there is room for some further improvements", 
along the way, to eliminate or close the identified small business 
financing gap.
Table 7.6
RANKING OF REASONS GIVEN BY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
FOR REFUSING TO EXTEND CREDIT AS REPORTED BY ENTREPRENEURS SAMPLE
St S. F. S G.F. S.F. Sampl I Ta Large Firm
-
No F % No F % No F % No F %
Credit squeeze system 16 80 19 95 35 88 13 87
2* Priority policy of the 
Central Bank 12 60 13 65 25 63 7 47
3  ^ Shortage of Hard currency 7 35 13 65 20 50 15 100
4. Banks do not finance F.A. 
as policy
6 30 4 20 10 25 3 20
5. Banks do not provide L.T.L. 6 30 4 20 10 25 1 7
6. Bank of Sudan Financial 
decis ion
0 0 7 35 7 18 6 40
7. Government regulation on 
f inancing
0 0 2 10 2 5 3 20
8. Security and guarantee 
unsatisfactory
8 40 0 0 8 20 0 0
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Table 7.7 FINANCIAL PROBLEMS AS REPORTED BY SMALL BUSINESS SAMPLE
ST UP S.F S.G.F. S.F.'Av'




Unavailability of long-term loans 12 60 15 75 27 68
2. Unavailability of short-term loans 14 70 11 55 25 63
3. Lack of'fin. for expansion - FA - - 13 65 13 33
4. Lack of fin. for expansion - WC - - 9 45 9 23
5. Terms of Financing 5 25 3 15 8 20
6. Timing of Finance 10 50 5 25 15 38
7. Cost of Finance was very high 17 85 14 70 31 78
8. Banks want too much collateral 12 60 8 40 20 50
9. Insufficient information about financ« 
alternatives
6 30 8 40 14 35
10. Too low credit limits - - 6 30 6 15
11. Approval process of financing 12 60 8 40 20 50
12. Discontinuity of financing 8 40 3 15 11 28
13. Credit squeeze system 16 80 15 75 31 78
14. Shortage of hard currency 4 20 12 60 16 40
15. Bank of Sudan policy 12 60 9 45 21 53
16. Lack of trust in Bank of Sudan - - 6 30 6 15
17. Banks' mgr and bankers under­
standing to industry problems
- - 6 30 6 15
18. Lack of source of initial capital 8 40 - - 8 20
19. Financial power of Branch managers 2 10 4 20 6 15
20. Islamic finance is very short 13 65 12 60 25 63
21. Islamic financing is unsuitable 
for industry
- - 7 35 7 18
22. Political implications in 
financing decision
12 60 8 40 20 50
23. Islamic financing is inflexible - - 9 45 9 23
24. Banks give priority to large firms 10 50 8 40 18 45
25. Banks provide finance only under 
higher security
13 65 8 40 21 53
26.
t
Banks are profit orientated 7 35 5 25 12 30
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Table (7-8)
ATTITUDE OF BANKERS AND BANKS TOWARDS 
SMALL BUSINESS FINANCING AS REPORTED 
BY ENTREPRENEURS
Mgrs were sympathetic 
Mgrs were not sympathetic 
Have no opinion
Banks fin against security
Banks object to financing small 
business
Banks financing directed to large 
business and bigprojects
The negative attitude of bankers 
derived from lack of policy
Financing is based on personal 
channel and relation
Banks look for profit in trading
Small businesses face ignorance 
in banking
Financing is based on names
Banks do not wish to finance 
small businesses because of security
Banks are trading orientated
Start up SF S Fii:m Av
No F % No F % No F %
0 0 0 0 0
r
0
20 100 17 85 37 93
0 0 3 15 3 7
20 100 20 100 A0 100
12 60 15 75 27 68
10 50 A 20 1A 35
11 55 7 35 18 A5
A 20 - - A 10
5 25 6 30 11 28
6 30 8 A0 1A 35
A 20 7 35 11 28
6 30 A 20 10 25
5
1 1
25 2 10 7 18
- 272-
The foregoing discussion, based on entrepreneurs opinion (tables
7.6 - 7.8) suggests that the finance gap is created by the capital 
market. This view will be subject to cross-examination in the next 
chapter, focussing on the financial institutions' behaviour towards 
small business - supply" - side-perspective. The next logical and 
pertinent question to be raised is to what extent the identified 
finance gap could be attributed to entrepreneur and small business 
practice in the fund-raising process. To this point we turn now.
7.6 PROCESS OF RAISING FUNDS
It was established in the financing of small business literature,
that financing affects and is affected by the financial control systems
maintained by small business. Radcliff (1959) pointed out that there
was a communication gap. Bolton (1971) went further, arguing that
there was an information gap, rather than a finance gap (see Chapter 2.)
Ray and Hutchinson (1983) argue that "..... before a firm can successfully
raise finance, it is necessary for it to identify the sources available 
and to present, where necessary, a case to potential lenders."
The objective of this part of the chapter is to examine the 
raising of funds approach from the demand-side perspective, by 
questioning the responsibility for financing within small firms, the 
level of documentation required by banks in providing funds, and the 
degree of importance as perceived by small businesses, and finally, 
to assess the entrepreneur's success in raising finance and obtaining 
financial advice.
Regarding the responsibility for the financing function the 
research sample shows that the founder, the entrepreneur and family 
members on formal and informal level, were predominant in small 
business at inception and growing stage of development.
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The survey shows that 98% of small firms had no financial 
specialists, compared to 67% of large private enterprises with 
financial specialists. Most entrepreneurs of small businesses (70%) 
argued that financing is a confidential issue, based on the secrecy 
of the business. Others argued that there was no need for a 
financial specialist, because of the size of operation.
Table 7.9 RESPONSIBILITY FOR FINANCING FUNCTION
St Up S.F. S.G.F • S Fir samplmse Large firms
No F % No F % No F % No F %
1. Entrepreneur/s 20 100 18 90 38 95 5 33
2. Owner/s and family members 7 35 5 25 12 30 2 13
3. Managing director and 
financial mgr (Non F) 0 0 1 5 1 3 10 67
4. Owner + finance mgr 0 0 5 25 5 13 5 '33
5. Managing director (Non F) 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 73
6. Accountant 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7. Chairman (BOD) (FM) 0 0 1 5 1 3 3 20
Table (7.9) shows that the financing decision in small business 
was built round the ability of the entrepreneur and his attitude and 
understanding of alternative sources of finance. The entrepreneurs 
sole responsibility for financing in a country with nearly 70% 
illiteracy rate questioned the type and quality of financing decisions 
in a hostile environment with meagre financial resources. Walker 
and Petty (1978) argue that:-
”The basic nature of the entrepreneur could have a bearing 
upon the working capital decisions within the small 
corporations. If the managers of small firms are willing to 
assume greater risk, as experience would suggest, the attitude 
may well be reflected in the small firm’s liquidity position.”
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With respect to the level of documentation required by banks in 
providing funds as reported by small firms the last year's accounts 
were ranked as most important piece of information for raising all 
types of institutional finance under both Islamic and under interest- 
based system (table 7.11'). In response to the question how 
extensively did you document your case in attempting to obtain funds 
from outside sources - banks - 65% of small firms reported that they 
presented historical financial statements for overdraft finance 
and 80% for Murabaha finance. Table (7.1o) shows the degree of 
importance of documentation in raising finance, as perceived by 
entrepreneurs, demand-side. This observation questioned the 
quality of the financial control systems maintained by small firms 
and what was useful in raising finance. This is a focus of the 
financial control which forms the second part of this study (Chapter 10).
Table 7.Ip
DEGREE OF IMPORTANCE OF DOCUMENTATION IN RAISING FUNDS 
AS REPORTED BY SMALL FIRMS
St up S.F. S.G.F
S.F.
Sample Large Ent.
No F % No F % No F % No F %
Very important 16 80 12 60 28 70 14 93
Important 3 15 6 30 9 23 1 7
Very important/important 19 95 18 90 37 93 15 100
Not important in Islamic B 2 10 2 10 4 10 0 0
Not important in continuous 
finance 1
1 5 1 5 2 5 0 0
Starting up Small Firm Small Growing Firm Large Firm
0/d Mur Music LTL 0/d Mur Music LTL 0/d Mur Music LTL
Last year's account AO 65 10 N/A 70 85 A0 20 100 67 7 60
Cash budget 0 0 0 0 5 5 0 0 13 7 0 20
C.F. analysis 5 0 0 0 0 5 5 0 20 7 0 A0
Statement of uses 
of funds
10 75 0 0 0 55 10 0 13 A7 0 20
Current val. of Co. 10 10 5 0 0 0 0 15 7 0 0 27
Valuation by 
Bank Rep.
10 0 10 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C.A/C only 0 5 5 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Value of Security 25 A5 5 15 15 20 5 10 27 A7 23 53
Feasibility Study 5 5 5 15 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 A0
Approved licence 10 20 20 15 10 20 10 - 13 20 7 7
Report fromyour bank 20 10 10 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
None 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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The survey provides evidence that the degree of importance of
documentation was highly influenced by the volume of finance.
"It is difficult, if not impossible, to get finance from 
banks without documentation, mainly last year's balance sheet, 
regardless of the name of applicant. We know that some 
people get finance without presenting any sort of documentation, 
but that is mainly small amounts within the discretion of the 
bank manager, and is highly dependent on the personal 
relationship between the bank manager and the applicant." 
(Entrepreneur)
Under the credit squeeze system, .stated by the Central Bank (1983-86),
all loans exceeding L.S. 300,000 had to be approved by the Central
Bank, with all necessary documentation attached.
The research provides an interesting point that financing is
not only based on documentation. Entrepreneurs reported that
personal contact with banks management, ideology and attraction of
the firm were the main factors behind success in raising finance in
addition to documentation.
"Our experience in public and foreign banks, shows that 
documentation is important in raising finance, because 
finance is based on credit worthiness, whereas in Islamic 
banks, it is not important, because financing is very 
short term and is based on factors other than documentation, 
mainly personal relationship and ideology."
This opinion was justified by Awad (1985) stating that"unscrupulous
borrowers may take advantage of the Islamic banks' reluctance to
make them paymore if they do not pay on time, and evade repayment
of their loans. This is one reason why Islamic banks must be
careful as to whom they lend their money." Regarding the use of
personal relationship in raising institutional finance, it suffices
to state the opinion of an experienced entrepreneur:
"In my personal opinion, developed over time, from experience 
in trading and industry, the personal relationship with bank's 
management at different levels is very important in raising 
funds. It is important, because we are in the Sudanese
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community, where everything is based on personal relationship.
Moreover there is lack of information in the Sudan and access to 
information is based on personal efforts. This does not rule 
out other factors in raising finance such as credit worthiness.
A new factor in the financial market is ideology. The use of 
ideology, as a factor in providing finance by Islamic banks, 
is very natural if you trace how the management of these banks 
are appointed and how they have been put in the power position."
Others argue that the use of personal relationships in 
raising finance is very important under the credit squeeze system, 
where demand for funds is greater than supply (Demand and Supply 
formula), putting the absolute power of the financing decision 
in the hands of top banks' management. This observation indicates 
that small firm owners with no contact, and unknown by the fact of 
life as a very small project or investment is at disadvantage in 
raising funds, compared to owners and management of small growing 
and large firms. The use of the personal approach in raising finance 
has an adverse effect on the creation of small business and development 
of new ideas and projects.
Based on matrix analysis (table 7.12) of the critical factors 
behind the success of raising finance, documentation, good contacts 
with banks' management and bankers and business attraction, were 
ranked as most important factors.
With respect to information and advice on the financial 
facilities available and all financing matters, the small firm 
sample shows that there was a lack of information and advice.
88% of small firms reported they they did not seek or receive 
external financial advice from anybody. The Chairman of the 
Sudanese Businessmen Association commented that:
". there is a lack of information and advice in all 
aspects in the field of industry and particularly 
financing in the Sudan. The lack of advice on finance 
puts the small firm with an unenlightened owner at a 
disadvantage in obtaining finance."
Table 7.12 SUMMARY OF MOST IMPORTANT FACTORS IN RAISING FUNDS FROM BANK AS REPORTED BY SAMPLE FIRMS MATRIX ANALYSIS
Starting up Small growing firm Large
»
Total Score Total Score Total Score
So % Ranking No % Ranking No % Ranking
1. Well presented case 77 20 2 51 16 2 90 22 1
2. Name of applicant 34 8 4 22 7 6 20 5 8
3. Good contacts with B Mgt and bankers 95 24 1 84 26 1 78 19 2
4. Business attraction 34 8 5 38 12 3 21 5 7
5. Obviously growing firm - - X 27 8 5 53 13 3
6. Type of funds (SH. T) 51 13 3 35 11 4 18 4 9
7. Prompt settlement of debt - - X 3 1 14 - - X
8. Profitability-Bank 7 2 10 9 3 9 - - X
9. Banks understanding to industry - - X 3 1 15 - - X
10. Shareholder in the bank 3 2 11 15 5 7 9 2 11
11.
12.
Part of bank management 








13 36 9 10
13. Govt directives - - X 11 3 8 31 8 4
14. Nature of industry 13 3 9 6 2 12 37 9 5
15. Ability to present case 24 6 7 - - X - - X
16. Local financing 16 4 8 - - X - - X
17. Bank is a partner 7 2 12 - - X - - X
18. Ability of Bus.to create C.F. - - X 8 2 10 - - X
19. Enterprise has long history in - - X - - X 14 3 6
business
Total 394
100 323 100 407 100
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Table 7.15
REASONS FOR NOT SEEKING FINANCIAL ADVICE 
AS REPORTED BY SMALL FIRMS
Not in need of ext. advice 
operation very small
Did not trust outsiders
Sufficient expertise within co.
Had not heard of anybody being
available
Banks did not provide financial
advice
Cost of advice is very high 
Entrepreneur well experienced 
Size of business is very small 
Banks, as partners, provided advice 3
i
S t up .
CO S.G .F. S .F . Sample
No F % No F % No F %
9 45 7 35 16 40
5 25 5 25 10 25
1 5 3 15 4 10
10 50 12 60 22 55
8 40 6 30 14 35
1 5 0 0 1 3
0 0 3 15 3 8
0 0 3 15 3 8
15 0 0 3 8
Table 7*13 reflects the typology of entrepreneur and his 
characteristics of reluctance to consult outsiders. This is a 
separate issue and will be discussed thoroughly in Chapter (9) of 
this study. The majority of entrepreneurs sample (55%) reported that 
they had not heard of anybody providing advice being available. The 
opinion and views of small firms on financial advice and its 
availability and unavailability could be summarised as follows
1. There was nobody in The Sudan providing financial advice, neither 
in the banking system, nor in the Government.
2. Banks were not interested in or willing to finance industry; 
therefore they did not provide financial advice and information 
to industrialists. There was no formal system for advice and 
information in any type of banks operating in The Sudan.
3. Lack of financial advice affected adversely the creation and 
development of all small businesses with no informal access to banks,
-2 8 0 -
4. The cost of advice provided by private consultants was too high 
for small businesses.
5. Industry was initiated and based on the ability of entrepreneurs 
with experience in financing trading. Thus the advice gap is 
reflected in the lack of advice on the difference between trading 
and industry finance.
The foregoing discussion based on the opinion of entrepreneurs, 
suggests that there was an information and small business advisory 
gap in The Sudan. This gap measured into lank of information on 
financial facilities available to small businesses and non-existence 
of body for providing this advice to small business. This situation 
is aggravated by the management knowledge of entrepreneurs (see 
Chapter 9 on entreprenuership). Thus the empirical investigation 
based on the demand-side data identified the existence of Bolton Gap 
symptons in the Sudan. The identified gaps as symptoms will be 
examined from the supply-side perspective in the next chapter.
7. 7 CONCLUSIONS
The empirical findings of this part of the study have both 
theoretical and policy implications. Some of the implications 
that emerge from this study are of especial significance for policy 
makers , financial institutions, and other bodies willing to help 
the small business sector in The Sudan.
Based on rigorous analysis of accounting and non-accounting 
data of small firms, in comparison with their large private enterprise 
counterparts, the empirical investigation on multi-dimensional 
measurement has identified the existence of a small business financing 
gap in The Sudan. The existence of what may best be known as the 
"Sudanese Macmillian Gap" as a pioneer effort, is based on long term
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debt, cost of borrowing disparity and capital shortage. This 
finding gives confirmation of the research hypothesis and consistent 
with Osaze (1981) in Nigeria and Bosa. (1978) in Uganda, and 
challenging the finding and conclusion of Schatz (19^5) and 
Harris (1966). Many academicians and financial people argue that 
the small business financing gap does not really exist, because 
most of the small businesses, which are unable to obtain long term 
financial facilities are not worthy of these finds in the first place 
(Grafer, 1968) (See Chapter 2). This study and its identification 
of finance gap approach, provides an answer to this arguement.
Based on the entrepreneurs opinion, the research has attributed 
the finance gap to banking policy and institutional gap. This 
opinion and its degree of validity will be examined in the next 
chapter. The analysis of raising funds approach shows the 
importance of documentation and personal contacts in obtaining 
institutional finance. The empirical investigation has identified 
the existence of ’Bolton Gap1 in the Sudan in terms of lack of 
information on financial facilities available and lack of small 
business advisory services.
The reseach has only identified the symptoms of these gaps.
Much remains to be done on the causes of these gaps, the interaction 
between these gaps and to what extent the finance gap is attributable to 
information and institutional gap and the degree of influence. The 
present study should afford a point of departure for in-depth 
analysis of the individual issues.
The uniqueness of this approach of small business financing 
gap identification (see Chapter 4) provides a strong and well- 
documented premise as a foundation for relevant and practical
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policy and strategy for small business development in The Sudan.
At the policy implication level, a focal point needing to be 
raised at the outset, is which policies are likely to contribute 
to small business development and which programmes and initiatives 
can eliminate and/or close the identified gaps. The research 
findings provide policy makers with an answer to the question 
what is needed to close the gap, the form of the gap and its 
relationship to stage of small enterprise. The vital question to 
be answered first, is what financial philosophy is to be followed 
and how can it be implemented. This is rather a separate issue, 
and will be discussed in depth in Chapter 12.
The next logical step in this scholary process of investigation 
is to validate that the identified small business financing gap is 
created partially by the capital market operation and to what 
extent the financial control systems maintained by small firms is 
responsible for the gap. The first point will be discussed 
thoroughly in the next chapter (8). The second point is a part 
of the identification and establishment of the financial control 
characteristics of small business, which is the theme of chapter (10).
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CHAPTER EIGHT
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS1 BEHAVIOUR TOWARDS 
SMALL BUSINESS FINANCING IN THE SUDAN
The examination of the financial facilities available to 
small business in The Sudan (Chapter 5 - 7 )  led to the identification 
of two gaps in the provision of finance to the small business from 
the demand-side perspective. (Macmillian and Bolton Gap). The 
primary objective of this part of the study is to determine the 
role of the Sudanese and foreign commercial and development 
financial institutions in servicing the financial requirements 
of small businesses and to examine credit accommodation provided. 
Thus, an attempt is made to provide insight into financial ability, 
and willingness of the commercial and development financial 
bodies to provide finance to industry, and small manufacturing 
firms in particular. Thus, the ultimate objective of this chapter 
is to identify, or in other words to validate or invalidate that 
the identified small business financing gap is created partially 
by the capital market operation.
Due to the non-existence of a formal or informal definition 
of what constitutes small business in the existing financial 
institutions, the analysis was based on financial and non-financial 
data - opinions - (quantitative and qualitative).
8.1 FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SET-UP IN THE SUDAN
The existing structure of institutional finance in the Sudan 
for the flow of finance to industry and particularly small firms is
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composed of:-
1. Traditional financial institutions, such as public and private 
commercial banks, based on both Islamic and interest based 
system.
2. The public development financial institutions, which are 
financed largely by Government sources such as The Sudanese 
Industrial Bank (SIB) and The Sudan Development Corporation 
(SDC).
3. The private and joint venture development agencies, such as 
The Sudan Rural Development Finance Company (SRDFC) and The 
Sudan Islamic Investment Company (SIIC), see figure 8.1.
Usually, the objective of the monetary and fiscal 
policies is to adjust the money supply in the capital and 
financial markets in accordance with the desired flow of business 
investment (Meltzer 1960). The international lenders (IBRD and IMF) 
have an influence on the financial policy and supply of money, 
through the determination of interest rate and the value of 
currency of most developing countries, and The Sudan is no 
exception. (Salih, SISA Newspaper 1986-Sept.) It may be 
expected, a prori, that expansionary monetary and fiscal policy, 
if successful, will encourage the financing of small business, 
whereas a restrictive policy will have the opposite effect.
The financial system in The Sudan is entirely regulated 
and managed by The Government. The Central Bank exercises 
quantative monetary control, primarily by deciding the credit 
ceiling of the commercial banks, as well as a qualitative control 
of the allocation of banks' financial resources, and the 
minimum interest or profit margin. In addition, the Central
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FIGURE 8.1
■ ■ policy institutions
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Bank has the financing power to approve any loan or advance 
exceeding L.S. 300,000. In controlling the supply of money 
in the capital market, the Central Bank prescribes the 
liquidity ratios of commercial banks, and requires obligatory 
deposits with the commercial banks (12.3^ of total bank 
deposit). The state of the art provides confirmation of the 
study*s analytical framework (Chapter 3)f that institutional 
financing is highly influenced by environmental factors such 
as Government financial and credit policy and international 
lenders influence.
The empirical investigation provides evidence that 
there was neither a definition for what constitutes small 
business, nor a policy for small business in the banking system.
In response to the question have you maintained a policy regarding 
small business, 100 percent of the banks reported the non-existence 
of such a policy.
•’There is no clear-cut policy regarding small business. 
The issue is dealt with casually, while the bank is 
trying to conform to the directive of the Central 
Bank ... However, no classification as to the size 
of the business is considered in the process, because 
the decision on financing emerges from other factors.”
In comparison with international experience in developed (U.S.,
U.K., Japan, Canada) and developing countries (India, Nigeria,
Egypt) is an indication that there was a small business policy
gap in the banking system in The Sudan.
8.2 COMMERCIAL BANKS AND SMALL BUSINESS FINANCING:
8.2.1 Commercial Banks Financing
Commercial and conventional financial institutions 
were criticised by the demand-side (small firms) for their 
lack of response to small business financing (Chapters 5 7)»
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providing support to international allegations against commercial 
banks.
In examining the role of commercial banks in financing 
industrial development in The Sudan, consideration must be 
given to the ability of banks to provide financial facilities 
to small business. The criteria used by banks to determine 
lending capacity vary considerably, amongst other things, on 
the size of the bank, credit restrictions imposed by the 
Government and the nature of the bank. In this study, the 
advances to lending capacity ratio was used as a measure to 
determine whethere there was un-used lending capacity among 
commercial banks. The lending capacity of the bank was equated 
to deposit and equity, allowing a percentage for bank liquidity ( 1 0 % )  
and the obligatory deposits decided by The Central Bank, under the 
credit squeeze system (12.9%) (1986).
Table (8.1) and figure (8.2) show the size of un-utilised 
lending capacity with all commercial banks between 1970 and 1984 
(15 Years). The relevant table and figure show that the average 
un-utlised capacity per year was 1 1 % . Table (8.1) and figure (8.2), 
provide evidence that the degree of un-utilised capacity 
maintained by commercial banks in the public and private sectors, 
under Islamic and interest-based systems, was very large. The 
existence of small business financing gap (Chapter 7)> in 
conjunction with the large amount of un-used financial ability 
ranging from 16%  t o  55% was a good indication of the commercial 
banks attitude towards small business financing.
Table (8.2) based on 1984 financial data shows that the 
degree of un-utilised capacity was larger in private Islamic
TABLE 8.1 TABLE 8,1
N.B. Fixed assets represent less than 1% Lendable and used lendable _ „ %
of total assets; for all banks capacity of commercial banks * * 1311
except FIB, rep 2196 in 1984 1970-1985 (15 years) Lendable capacity























1970 57 6 63 1096 57 71 6 77 13596 (3596)
1971 61 6 67 - 10% 60 70 5 75 12596 (2996)
1972 86 6 92 - 10% 83 85 5 90 10896 ( 896)
1973 106 6 112 - 10% 101 99 5 104 10596 ( 396)
1974 141 6 147 - 10% 132 123 5 128 91% 396
1975 172 6 178 - 10% 160 186 5 191 11S96 (1596)
1976 224 10 234 - 10% 211 228 5 233 11096 (1096)
1977 327 16 343 - 10% 309 265 14 279 90% 1096
1978 428 19 447 - 10% 402 343 31 374 9396 796
1979 845 21 866 - 10% 779 461 31 492 6396 3796
1980 720 29 749 - 10% 674 593 31 624 99% 796
1981 943 45 988 - 10% 889 778 35 813 91% 996
1982 1339 94 1433 - 10% 1290 1143 35 1178 91% 596
1983 1782 247 2029 1096 10% 1623 1377 35 1412 8796 1396
1984 2063 326 2389
12.9% 10% 1831 1609 35 1644 8596 1196
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banks than in public and joint venture commercial banks. This 
could be attributable to the fact that Islamic banks were 
trading-orientated as a newly established experience (Awad, 1984), 
and trading finance was curtailed by The Central Bank as a part 
of the credit policy in an attempt to reduce the growth of 
money in the financial market, and to channel banks1 finances 
into productive sector (Bank of Sudan 1984/85).
Table 8.2
UN-UTILISED LENDING CAPACITY OF COMMERCIAL BANKS IN 1984
No Bank Un-used capacity
1. Faisal Islamic Bank 47%
2 . Tadamon Islamic Bank 3 1 %
5. Bank of Khartoum 3 %
4. El Nilien Bank 22%
5. Sudan Commercial Bank 16%
6* Sudan International Bank 15%
7. Sudanese Savings Bank 14%
The traditional problem of all banks and bankers all over 
the world is how to maintain a balance between deposits and 
advances and loans provided by the bank. Table (8.5), and 
figures 8.5 and 8.4 show the classification of deposits into 
demand, time (investment) and savings deposits with all 
commercial banks operating in The Sudan between 1975 1984
(10 years). The table and figures show that the demand deposit or 
current accounts represents 69% of the total deposit, whereas time
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T A B L E  8 . 5
L S  i n  t h o u s a n d s  A n a l y s i s  o f  D e p o s i t s  b y  T y p e  o f  A c c o u n t  a n d  1 9 7 5 - 1 9 8 4  -  1 0  y e a r s
a n a l y s i s  o f  a d v a n c e s  (C om m  B a n k s )
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% 72% % 10 0% 7096 6% 24% 100% 70% 7% 23% 100% 69% 8% 2 $ 100%
AD V A N C E S  ( m i l l i o n s )  1975 1 9 7 6  1 9 7 7 1 9 7 8
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I N  TH O U SAN DS
1979 1980 1981 1982
C /A . /C T  D e p S a v g T o t a l C / A / C T . D e p S a v g T o t a l C / A / C T  D e p S a v g T o t a l C / A / C T  D e p t ' S a v g T o t a l
G o v t 10207 5221 22 15450 12821 - 238 13059 19850 5235 149 25234 12215 - 16/ 12379
B o a r d s 213 - - 213 298 - - 298 489 - - 489 12948 - 6 12954
L o c a l  G o v t 5608 - - 3608 11622 - 210 11832 8221 107 - 8328 8122 - 1061 9138
P r i v a t e 388527 34468 106010 528805 528568 51046 115210 694824 644980 10979 15380 908500 875975 218129 210940 1305044
T o t a l 402355 39689 106032 548076 553309 51046 115658 720013 673540 115061 153930 942551 909260 218129 212171 1339560
% 73% 7% 20% 100% 77% 7% 16% 100% 71% 12% 17% 100% 68% 16% 16% 100%
1 9 7 9  1 9 3 0  1 9 3 1  1 9 3 2
Sh t  lo a n Long t  lo an T o ta l sh t .  lo an lo n g  t  1 T o ta l Sh.T. lo a n Long T .L T o ta l S h o rt T .L . Long T .L . T o ta l
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ANALYSIS OF DEPOSITS BY TYPE OF ACCOUNT AND 
ANALYSIS OF ADVANCES 1975-1984 10 YEARS
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and saving deposit represents 14% and 17% respectively. The 
size of demand deposit has an implication on mode of banks' 
advances.
Table 8.4 ANALYSIS OF DEPOSITS BY TYPE OF ACCOUNT (1980-1984)





Dep Savg Dep T + S Dep
% % %
1. Sudan Commercial Bank 75 6 19 25
2. Elnilien Bank 69 5 26 31
3. Bank of Khartoum 80 1 19 20
4. Sudanese International Bank 66 30 4 34
5. Faisal Islamic Bank 51 46 3 49
6. Tadoman Islamic Bank 70 6 24 30
Table (8.4) shows an interesting point that the structure of 
deposits varies between Islamic and non-Islamic banks in the 
sense that time deposits maintained by Islamic banks were more 
than those maintained by public and other private banks. This 
is attributable to the fact that Islamic banks are based on 
profit sharing and investment deposits. It is not the 
purpose of this study to examine variation in the banking 
system, but rather to show the implication of deposit structure 
and types of banks' financial resources on pattern of financing.
It was established in the literature that the bank has 
to maintain and strike a balance between safety and profitability. 
In other words, to achieve a balance that maximises short-term 
profitability, while not sacrificing long-term profitability.
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Table (8 .5) and figure (8 .5) show the classification of 
commercial banks advances for the period 1970-1984* The table 
and figure show that short-term loans were by far the most 
dominant sort of advances provided by the commercial banks (78%). 
This finding was a reflection of lack of long term financing in 
the banking system.
According to the credit policy issued by the Central 
Bank towards the end of 1985t private sector banks were 
directed to raise their share in medium and long term financing, 
from 10% to 29% of the total credit ceiling set for each bank. 
Public commercial banks, on the other hand were not allowed to 
provide long term loans to more than 9% of its total credit 
ceiling. The long term loans and advances provided by 
commercial banks ranged from 1% in Islamic banks, to 29% 
maintained by public commercial banks. The low level of long 
term advances provided by Islamic banks has been justified by 
pointing.out that they are still at the experimental stage, 
and had to avoid risky and prolonged loans.
"We are constrained in providing finance by the 
deposit portfolio within which demand deposits 
formed a high proportion."
The research banks sample reported that short term 
financing was more profitable to the bank under the credit 
squeeze system, by increasing the turnover of the bank 
financial resources.
The empirical work provides evidence that the commercial 
banks in The Sudan, under both Islamic and interest based 
system, were concerned mainly with the financing of trade, with
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TABLE 6.5
ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS' ADVANCES 
TO PRIVATE BORROWERS 1970-1984 (15 YEARS)
Quest; Availability of Long Term Loans

















1970 62 9 71 87 13 100
1971 60 10 70 86 14 100
1972 74 11 85 87 13 100
1973 92 7 99 93 7 100
1974 112 11 123 91 9 100
1975 175 11 186 94 6 100
1976 210 18 228 92 8 100
1977 223 42 265 84 16 100
1978 291 52 343 85 15 100
1979 365 96 461 79 21 100
1980 463 130 593 78 22 100
1981 611 167 778 79 21 100
1982 900 243 1143 79 21 100
1983 1002 375 1377 73 27 100
1984 1155 454 1609 72 28 100
5795 1636 7431 78% 22% 100%
Range of Bank long term loans 1970-1984 (15 years)
Less than 25% 87%
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an average of 69%, and 31% for short term industry financing. 
Table (8.6) and figures (8.6) and (8.7) show that most bank 
credit was allocated to import and exports as well as trading 
in the local market.
Regarding the classification of industry financing (31%) 
as to the size of industry, there was no formal definition, so as 
to determine quantitatively the contribution of commercial banks 
in financing small business. Bank managements and bankers 
enumerated a number of reasons for giving a high priority to 
large and growing firms rather than to small and newly 
established enterprises.
1. Under the credit squeeze system, the bank has to maximise
the use of its resources into profitable and well secured
investment.
2. Large enterprises provide guarantees and security to the bank.
3. ’’Banks are more concious about security and profit, rather
than the future prospect of the business. Bankers in 
traditional commercial banking systems are more conservative 
and trading-orientated.”
4. ’’Islamic financing under Marabaha encourage financing 
of trade, rather than industry, and financing of large 
rather than unknown small businesses, because it is very 
short and based on guarantee and security. Due to 
prohibition of charging penalty against delay in payment 
under the Sharia code, the security for settlement is
the most critical factor in providing'finance to client.”
These points reflect the conservative nature of banks 
and bankers as well as their security and profit orientation.
The credit squeeze system imposed by the Government is an 
answer to the question of the difficulties small business 
experienced in raising institutional finance. Under the ceiling
TABLE 8.6
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COMMERCIAL BANKS < ADVANCES TO PRIVATE BORROWERS
(l) Availability of long term loans 
(X) Finance of industry
DURING 1975-1984 10 Years 
LS millions
0 )
snort Term ^ .jy^ j e^s










Medium & /  
Long T loan/
Amt % Amt % Amt °/o Amt % Amt °/o Amt 7so Amt % Total Adv
1975 68
cr\ 15 9 59 34 21 12 12 7 175 94 11 6 186
1976 82 59 16 8 74 35 24 11 14 7 210 92 18 8 228
1977 85 58 23 10 75 34 27 12 13 6 223 84 41 16 264
1978 95 52 39 13 107 37 29 10 23 8 291 85 52 15 343
1979 111 50 48 13 135 37 38 10 33 9 365 79 96 21 461
1980 149 52 61 13 170 37 49 11 33 7 462 78 130 22 592
1981 162 27 125 20 227 37 63 10 34 6 611 79 166 21 777
1982 298 55 204 23 268 30 77 8 52 6 899 79 243 21 1142
1983 512 51 242 24 276 28 103 10 69 7 1002 73 375 27 1377
1984 558 51 298 26 286 25 128 11 85 7 1155 72 454 28 1609
Total 1718 52 1078 20 1677 31 559 10 368 7 5393 77 1586 23 6979
Average 
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system, banks tended to extend credit to small businesses only 
to the extent that funds were not required by big enterprises.
This was observed in developed and developing countries.
Kearney (1977) commented that: "small businessmen bear a large
part of the brunt of both the restrictive monetary policy ... 
and of the disintermedation caused by the peculiar systems of 
ceiling deposits."
8.2.2. Financing Decision Factors in Commercial Banks
In examining the financial institutions' behaviour 
towards small business financing in Britain; the Wilsom Committee 
(1979) concluded that small firms were at a considerable 
disadvantage in the financial market. Loans were more 
expensive, and security arrangements were also more stringent. 
Lending by commercial banks in The Sudan is undertaken against 
a security of one sort or another, varying from personal signature, 
post-dated cheque, guarantee by third parties, to more than full 
cover provided in the form of tangible assets provided by the 
borrowers.
"Regarding collatorial requirements, there is no 
difference between small and large enterprises.
The security required varies with the operation, 
type of industry and the historical profile of 
the customer (Judgment)."
Under-participating capital agreement - 'Musharaka*
collaterial arrangement reauired by banks could be detailed as
follows:-
a) All material financed by the bank should be under the direct 
custody of the bank - 'Direct pledge*.
b) The material financed by the bank to be under th£ direct 
custody of the client, provided that he/she presents periodical 
records - letter of trust.
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o) Deed of mortgage, which is used as a collaterial requirement 
for the trust receipt, 
d) Debenture.
Under Marabaha finance, personal guarantee or third 
parties guarantee was used by all banks except private foreign 
banks, as collaterial requirements and security for all loans 
and advances not exceeding L.S.300,000. The post-dated cheque, 
direct pledge, and mortgage deed, were used by commercial banks 
as security against Murabaha finance. The credit policy 
stated by The Central Bank was based on the philosophy of 
deflation and finance against security:
"Financing on overdraft basis should be provided 
for specific item and transaction and under 
satisfactory security."
"Bank of Sudan, Credit Policy 1985”
Based on loan-security equation small business seems 
less attractive to the commercial banks, and large enterprises 
were considered safe for investment. Thus, small businesses 
were discriminated against, as compared to large corporations. 
Besong (1977) justified the commercial banking behaviour 
arguing that:-
"  The security becomes necessary when the
relationship between banker and businessman lacks 
trust, and many small business borrowers are in 
the habit of trading on thin equity."
Table (8.7) (Overleaf) shows the higher value of 
security required by banks in providing long-term loans, which 
is unlikely to be satisfied by typical small business. This 
finding is consistent with result based on the opinion of small
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firms (see Chapter 5) • Groves and Harrison(1974) in the U.K. 
commented that: ’’Small companies, however, face a set of
difficulteis peculiar to their group which make it more difficult 
for them to obtain long term finance.”
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In examining the attitude of commercial banks towards
small business financing and particularly small manufacturing firms,
the bank managements were asked to rank ten factors in order
of importance to them in making loan decisions. Tables (8.8.A)
and (8.8.B) show that The Central Bank regulations, the
security, established loan policies of the bank and the profile
of the customer, were the four most important factors in
channelling funds to clients. The table shows an interesting
result, that the management of the businesses is a critical
factor in institutional finance.
"Under Musharaka finance, the participation and 
loan decision is highly based on the evaluation 
of the company assets, and how the company is 
managed in terms of system and cadre" (FIB).
The survey provides that small business was managed on a 
personal, rather than formal structure (Chapter 9)• This 
observation questioned critically to what extent banks were 
staffed with knowledgeable personnel, able to understand the 
difference between small and large businesses.
The commercial banks reported that the size of the 
business was one of the most important factors in making loan 
decision on the grounds that the size of the firm is a 
reflection of the value of security.
It was observed that the private commercial banks 
seem to give more weight to security provided, the name of 
applicant, and official rules embodied in The Central Bank 
directives, than to the economic development, potential of the 
company to the community. This sort of conflict between 
profitability and economic development experience by conventional
- 3 0 3 -  
TABLE 8.6.A.
MOST CRITICAL FACTORS IN LOAN DECISION AS REPORTED
BY COMMERCIAL BANKS SAMPLE AND THE CENTRAL BANK
















Nationality of the owner/s 7 9 8 9 9 7 9 5
The Bank's financial position 3 5 2 8 4 6 4 10
The firm's management 4 6 5 2 5 4 5 6
The firm1s financial position 8 3 6 3 2 3 3 7
The growth potential of the 
firm industry
5 8 4 1 7 5 7 9
The established loan policies 
of the bank
2 1 3 6 3 2 1 X
Central Bank requirements 1 2 1 5 1 1 2 1
Size of the firm 6 7 7 7 6 8 6 4
Name of applicant 9 11 9 10 8 9 8 X
Development potential of the 
company to the community
X 4 X X X X 10 2
Nature of industry X X X 11 X X X 3
Security provided 10 10 10 4 10 X 11 8
Ideological factors X X X X X X X X
Geographical location X X X X X X X X
Management (Bank) opinion X X X X X X X X
\ -
- 3 1 0 -  
TABLE 8.8.B 
MATRIX REPRESENTATION





Nationality of the owners X X X X 1 X 2 1 4 X 25 6 8
The Bank's financial position X 1 1 2 1 1 X 1 X 1 46 11 5
The firm's management X 1 X 2 3 2 X X X X 51 12 4
The firm’s financial position X 1 4 X X 1 1 1 X X 53 12 3
The growth potential of the 
firms industry
1 X X 1 2 X 2 1 1 X 42 10 6
T£e.gstahlished loan policies 
0 e "bank
2 2 2 X X 1 X X X X 59 13 2
Central Bank regulations 5 2 X X 1 X X X X X 74 17 1
The Size of the firm X X X 1 X 3 3 1 X X 36 8 7
Name of the applicant X X X X X X X 2 3 1 13 3 11
Devdopment potential of the 
company to the community
X 1 X 1 X X X X X 1 17 4 9
Nature of industry X X 1 X X X X X X X 8 2 12
Security provided X X X 1 X X X 1 X 4 14 3.2 10
Total 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 7 438 100
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banks was observed by Whittlesely (195^)» He argued that:
"It is the nature of bankers, including Central bankers, to 
be conservative rather than adventurous. But economic growth 
is essentially an adventurous concept."
The survey shows that Islamic banks give more 
consideration to the personality of applicant. This is 
attributable to Sharia code and principle, which governed the 
operation of Islamic banks under the direct supervision of 
"Fatawa Supervisory Board". This observation is consistent 
with the finding based on entrepreneurs* opinion (Chapter 5)•
In examining the willingness of commercial banks to 
extend credit and privide finance to small firms, bank manage­
ments were asked to rate banks on their eagerness to help finance 
industry. The opinions of bankers revealed that banks did not like 
to provide finance to manufacturing, and particularly not to 
small manufacturing firms.
The deficiency of the traditional and conventional 
financial institutions, stand as a practical justification for 
initiation or specialised financial body, so as to fill or 
eliminate the void created by commercial banks* practice.
Virata (1979) argued that: "Where there is a great need for
development financing, the existing financial systems are based towards 
short term maturities, especially in developing countries where 
there is a general lack of savings."
8.5 DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (DFIS)
Development banks were perceived by academics and 
professionals as instruments for attaining the objective of
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rapid industrialisation (Raj 1979)* The theoretical and 
practical justification for the establishment of development 
financial bodies in developing countries was described by 
Franklin Root (1977) as follows: "In developing countries,
productivity is low because income is low; investment is low 
because savings are insufficient; savings are insufficient 
because incomes are low; incomes are low because productivity 
is low." Giscard (1979) added that the principal problem for 
the developing countries is, therefore, to break the cycle 
described by Franklin.
The theoretical foundation, and the philosophy behind 
the establishment of fDFI! is to provide development and long- 
perspective finance at reasonable terms and cost to firms which 
are unable to obtain funds from commercial banks. The vital 
question in this context is, to what extent did the Sudanese 
development financial institutions in theory and practice, 
establish a system of finance for industry, and how did this 
differ from conventional bank practice.
8.5.1. The Sudanese Industrial Bank(SIB)
It was established in 1961 as a Govermental development 
financial institution with L.S.200,000 authorised and paid 
capital.
"The Sudan commercial bank* s loans to industry have 
been characterised by their short term nature.
Private Sudanese investors were sceptical towards 
investment in the relatively new field of industry. 
Given the low level of savings, scarcity of foreigh 
exchange, and investors reluctance to indulge in 
industry, the need for a specialised industrial 
financing institution seemed imperative."
(SIB Report 1980)
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, The *1961* legislation confined the bank to the financing of 
projects in the manufacturing sector only, regardless of the 
size of industry.
In spite of the positive direction towards small 
business financing, which was not stated in the bank policy, 
but rather emerged from the meagre financial resources held 
by the bank, there was no formal or informal stated definition of 
what constitutes small business in the bankfs policy. This was a 
true indication of a small business policy gap in The Sudan.
Table (8 .9) and figure (8.8) analyses bank operations 
since its inception in 1962, and reflects the effect of these 
operations on investment and financing of industry. During 
the period 1962-1983» the bank approved 241 loans to establish 
new projects, and 81 supplementary loans for existing projects. 
Total bank contribution in these projects was in the form of 
loans L.S.15 million (88^), L.S.0.575 million (3%) and 
guarantees L.S.1.60 million (990* Thus, the total bank 
contribution during this period (22 years) amounted to L.S.17.18 
million as part of the total investment of L.S.33 million ie the 
bank contribution represented 55% of the total investment created 
by the financial and assisted firms.
The table (8 .9) shows the industrial enterprises 
receiving loans and financial facilities from the SIB was 322.
This shows the low level of financial contribution of the SIB 
to the industry. According to the 1981/82 industrial survey, 
the number of manufacturing firms registered in The Sudan was 
7036 (Chapter 1). This indicates that 5% only of manufacturing 
firms succeeded in obtaining finance from the SIB.
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TABLE 8.9
ANALYSIS OF SIB FINANCE 1962-1985 (LSfOOO's)


















68 0 0 68 151 % %
1962 5 0 5 68 0 0 68 131 52 48 14
1963 14 3 17 398 0 0 398 588 68 32 23
1964 13 3 16 242 0 0 242 503 48 52 15
1965 8 0 8 136 0 0 136 840 16 84 17
1966 15 4 19 351 438 193 982 1350 73 27 52
1967 14 3 17 160 0 0 160 268 60 40 9
1968 11 4 15 234 0 53 287 524 55 45 19
1969 1 0 1 4 0 0 4 6 67 33 4
1970 3 3 6 72 0 270 342 526 65 35 57
1971 16 3 19 273 0 445 718 1066 67 33 38
1972 9 3 12 294 0 77 371 521 71 29 31
1973 11 4 15 1507 0 423 1930 4150 47 53 129
1974 7 5 12 316 0 88 404 670 60 40 34
1975 5 5 10 1271 0 0 1271 2520 55 45 127
1976 9 3 12 1747 138 0 1885 3124 60 40 157
1977 6 6 12 553 0 0 553 828 67 333 46
1978 16 1 17 818 0 0 818 1493 55 45 48
1979 14 6 20 715 0 0 715 1114 64 36 36
- 315-
ANALYSIS OF SIB FINANCE 
1962 - 1985

















1980 13 8 21 1734 0 0 1734 3685 47% 53P/0 83
1981 15 8 23 1172 0 0 1172 2265 52% 48% 51
1982 23 6 29 1524 0 0 1524 3607 42^ W o 53
1983 13 3 16 1795 0 0 1795 3413 5^0 47% 112
Total 241 81 522 15384 576 1549 17509 32990 5JA 47% 54
% % % %
88 3 9 100
Average Inv. per project = LS 102,000








62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83
Total
No %
Less than 10 1 5 7 2 4 5 2 0 1 5 4 5 1 0 4 3 11 9 4 8 12 5 98 3 0%
10 - 20 2 4 3 2 5 4 3 1 2 2 7 3 6 2 3 2 1 6 10 9 9 2 88 2 1 %
21 - 30 1 6 5 3 3 4 5 0- 3 8 0 1 0 1 2 1 3 2 0 2 6 5 61 19^
31 - 40 1 1 0 1 5 2 1 0 0 3 0 4 5 2 2 4 0 3 3 1 1 3 42 1396
0LT'*1 0 1 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 4 2 1 1 17 %
Over 50 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 0 0 1 0 2 0 3 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 16 %
010 4 12 9 6 14 10 11 1 5 13 8 8 11 7 7 8 4 11 17 14 17 11 208 (> ? %
T No Of Loans 5 17 16 8 19 17 15 1 6 19 12 15 12 10 12 12 17 20 21 23 29 16 322 100
Range: 10 - 50 65^
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To examine the role of the SIB in financing small 
business, table (8.10) shows that 95% of the firms received 
finance from the bank were employing less than 50 employees 
at the time of application. This was an indication that the 
SIB servicing small business sector without a preceded policy.
The main difference between the SIB and the 
traditional commercial banks consists of the fact that SIB 
does not seek deposits from individual or other bodies.
Instead, it relies mainly on aid from the Government in the 
form of equity, representing 58% of the total financial 
resources, and aids and loans from foreign agencies with an 
average of 42%. (see table 8.11 and figure 8 .9). The table and 
figure show that the financial resources were very meagre, and 
this calls in question of the degree of autonomy maintained by 
the bank so as to raise funds from abroad. The field work 
provides evidence that the bank was under the direct control of 
the Ministry of Finance, as absolute owner of the bank. This 
sort of link, between Government and development banks, was 
viewed and interpreted by some scholars (Park, 19799 Rayner 1980), 
as Government interference, which had an adverse effect on the 
operation of the bank. Ansopg (1980) discounted the fear of 
Government interference; arguing that:-
’!Whatever form development banks take, they can not 
operate in isolation, and they require Government 
support and encouragement to function effectively."
In determining the lending capacity of the SIB, as a 
means of examining the ability of the bank to provide finance 
to industry, a ratio of 90% of the equity and other foreign aids 







F i g  8 - 9 :  A n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  S u d a n e s e  I n d u s t r i a l  B a n k ' s  
F i n a n c i a l  R e s o u r c e s  i n  t h e  p e r i o d ,  1 9 6 4 — 1 9 8 3
U000-.
1 2 0 0 0 -










Table 8.11 and figure 8.10 show the size of un-utilised'
loan capacity maintained by the bank between 1964 1983 (20 years).
The table shows a surprising result, that there was a large sum
of un-utilised capacity with the SIB during the period 1964-1977*
averaging 1 7 % , Table 8.12 on the range of un-utilised capacity,
shows that it ranged between 1 0 %  and J > 0 %  during the period 1964-
1977* Tables 8.11 and 8.12 show that the degree of loan capacity
utilisation was very high during the periods 1978-1983* with
insignificant idle capacity (4%). This variation in the degree
of loan capacity utilisation could be explained by a marco-
economic factor, embodied in the continuous devaluation of
the Sudanese currency (June 1978 onwards) and its consequential
inflationary effect.
"The devaluation of the Sudanese pounds has led to a 
drastic increase in cost of imported machinery, and 
raw materials. Consequently the capital expenditure 
needed to establish an indistrial enterprise soared 
dramatically in terms of local currency, causing 
discouragement to investors. This has manifested 
itself quite clearly in the operations of the Bank 
which had concentrated more on small ventures 
using locally produced materials.(SIB Report 1982)
The existence of un-utilised loan capacity with the
i
development bank (SIB) is much more disturbing than the 
situation at the commercial banks, which are normally bound 
by the deposit portfolio. The existence of small business 
finance gap, in conjunction with the un-utilised capacity of 
the SIB, was an indication of small business policy gap.
Although the un-utilised capacity of the SIB was very low, in 
relation to industry demand nevertheless it was a good indication
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LS OOO'a TABLE 8.11
FINANCIAL ABILITY. LENDABLE AND USED 1964 - 1985 - 20 years
BALANCE SHEET BATA (HISTORICAL) LENBABLE CAPACITY OF SIB
Year Financial Res
L Cap 






Equity Loan Total 90% Loans
Eq.
Inv Guar Total % %.
1964 822 500 1322 1190 393 438 831 70 30
1965 986 500 1486 1337 585 438 - 1023 77 23
1966 1358 500 1858 1672 1132 438 - 1570 94 6
1967 1357 500 1857 1671 988 438 - 1426 85 15
1968 1753 70 1823 1641 1281 - - 1281 78 22
1969 1953 70 2023 1821 1455 - - 1455 80 20
1970 2059 66 2125 1913 1700 - - 1700 89 11
1971 2383 81 2464 2218 1394 445 - 1839 83 17
1972 2146 72 2218 1996 1460 445 - 1905 95 5
1973 2678 51 2729 2456 1372 445 - 1817 74 26
1974 2711 135 2846 2561 1594 445 - 2039 80 20
1975 3242 1139 4381 3943 2755 445 - 3200 81 19
1976 3280 1363 4643 4179 3425 445 - 3870 93 7
1977 3870 2077 5947 5352 4180 583 - 4763 89 11 I1
1978 3908 3988 7896 7106 6388 907 - 7295 103 (3 )
1979 3922 6058 9980 8982 8291 988 - 9279 103 (3 )
1980 3994 6321 10315 9284 7863 583 - 8446 91 9
1981 5263 6605 11868 10681 9095 583 - 9678 91 9
1982 6863 6599 13462 12116 10106 583 - 10689 88 12
1983 5448 6800 12248 11023 10447 583 - 11030 100 0
Total 59996 43495 103491 93142 75904 9232 - 85136 91% %
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TABLE 8.12 
RANGE OF UN-UTLISED CAPACITY (SIB)
Range of un-utilised capacity- %  per year
No.Y. %
1964 - 1983 (20 years)
More than 3C% - -
\
p&C\lIO 6 30
19 - 1096 6 30
Less than 1 CP/o 8 40
20 100
1964 - 1977 _ Before 1st 
14 Years Devaluation.
More than 3O /o - -
V
PSCM1O 6 43
19 " 1096 5 36
10% and more 11 79
Less than 10% 3 21
1978 - 1983 -  After 1st 
6_years Devaluation.
More than 30^ 6 - -
30 - 2096 - -
19 -  1096 1 17
1096 and over 1 17
Less than 10% 5 83
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of the bankfs attitude towards small business financing. The 
existence of un-utilised capacity with the development banks 
in Africa, was attributed to the fact that they are still 
relatively new kind of institutions. (Olycmpia 1978).
The credit squeeze system imposed by the Central Bank 
on commercial banks operations had an indirect effect on the 
operation and performance of the SIB. The credit squeeze 
system has affected the productivity of existing units, and 
eventually the level of collection of outstanding loans.
Table 8.13 shows the number of manufacturing firms 
applying for SIB finance was very low, averaging 2 2 % . This 
could be attributed to lack of information, (see chapter 5* 
table 5.15). Table 8.13 and figure 8.11 shows the degree of 
loan rejection for the periods 1962-19831 They indicate that 
the rate of loan rejection was very high with an average of 
8596. The Director of The Technical Section (SIB) said that:
"Applications were either cancelled or rejected, 
generally on account of inadequate information 
being submitted; because applicants were unable 
to raise the legal minimum capital contribution, 
because some projects were not viable, or because 
the bank was not prepared to expend its investment 
in a certain outlet."
According to its bye-law, the bank may not invest, by 
loans or guarantees, in any one private industrial enterprise, 
more than the following percentage of its subscribed and 
fully paid up share capital, of its reserves and of its loan 
capital:
a) 19%, if the private industrial enterprise is owned and
and operated by a co-operative society, or a limited company.
- 325-
b) 10$), if the private industrial enterprise is owned by a 
partnership.
c) 7% in all other cases.
This financing strategy is based on the assumption that the 
applicant is able to participate in start-up capital, and is 
thus contradictory to the state of the art, as explained in 
Chapter five ( 5 • 1 • 1 •) •
As to conditions of financing, the bank requires 
security for any loan or guarantee it issues. Thus, the 
factory building, fixed plants and machinery, are subject to 
a first mortgage for the period of the loan. It was stated 
in the bank policy that the total value of the mortgage item 
under both Islamic and interest-based system, should not be 
less than 120% of the approved loan, otherwise an extra 
mortgage was required. Moreover, the plant should be insured 
in favour of the bank throughout the period of the loan. This 
was an indication that the SIB is security-oriented, and 
questioned critically the demarcation line between the 
conventional commercial banks and development banks in providing 
developmert finance to small business.
The other factor, which challenges the philosophical 
foundation and theoretical justification of the development 
banking system is the cost of finance. The interest charged by 
the Bank under interest-based system (1962-1983) was on 
medium term loans (ie 2 to 6 years) and at the rate of 9i% on 
long term loans (ie 6 to 15 years) in 1970. The rate of 
interest was increased to 14% and 15^% in 1980 respectively.
In 1982, and according to The Central Bank directives, the cost 
of finance was increased to 17% and 21% respectively. In 
1984 (February), the Bank's Act and Bye-Laws were amended so
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TABLE 8,13
THE SUDANESE INDUSTRIAL BANK LOAN APPLICATION AMD REJECTION
62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 Total
No of applicat 35 67 76 53 115 96 74 65 62. 84 63 92 67 52 36 47 94 85 79 94 85 62 1583
Acceptance 5 14 13 8 15 15 12 2 3 16 15 11 13 8 12 9 16 14 13 15 23 13 244
Rejection 30 53 63 45 100 82 63 64 59 68 54 81 60 47 27 41 78 71 66 79 62 49 1342
Acc.Rate % 14 21 17 15 13 15 15 2 5 19 14 12 10 10 25 13 17 16 16 16 27 21 19#
Re j .Rate % 86 79 83 85 87 85 85 98 95 81 86 88 90 90 75 87 83 84 84 84 73 79 85#
Appl.New & Supp. Loan 35 70 79 53 119 99 78 65 65 87 66 96 72 57 39 53 95 91 87 102 91 65 1664
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as to conform with Islamic and Sharia code. The Bank 
started lending money on long term Murabaha and Musharaka terms 
based on a penalty in case of delay or default. The profit 
margin or 'Hamish1 charged by the bank is within the range 
of 17 and 2 1 %  under Murabaha finance and range of profit- 
sharing is between JQ P /o and 4 C %  under Musharaka finance. 
Moreover, commitment charges at the rate of if%  per annum were 
charged on the signature of loan agreement.
Although the cost of finance charged by the bank 
was slightly less than those charged by the commercial banks, 
it was very high compared to other countries (see Chapter 7)* 
The higher cost of finance accompanied by stringent security 
was a good confirmation of small business difficulties in 
raising institutional finance in The Sudan (Chapter 7 -Finance 
Gap).
8.5.2. The Sudan Rural Development Finance Company ( SRDFC)
The Sudan Rural Development Finance Company {SRDFC) 
was formed in 1981, as a subsidiary company of the Sudan 
Rural Development Company (SRDC) with an authorised capital 
of L.S.10 million. The company became operational in 1982, 
with an issued capital of L.S.5*20 million { 3 2 % ) in ordinary 
share capital. The L.S.3.20 million was subscribed 6 0 %  by 
European and 40^ by Sudanese parties. The objective of the 
company, as stated in the Articles of Association, is as 
follows
’•The aim of the company is to meet the needs of 
medium and long term capital finance, as well 
as technical assistance to commercially viable 
small and medium scale enterprises, principally 
in the private sector."
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The initiation of this scheme by conventional 
commercial banks operating in the Sudan and foreign overseas 
financial bodies, was a confirmation and recognition of the 
financial difficulties small firms face, in raising and 
securing institutional long term finance from conventional 
financial bodies. This sort of institution is similar in 
principle and theory to ICFC (U.K.) and SBA (U.S.). The main 
difference between SRDFC and ICFC and SBA, lies in the fact that 
the two last were built round a comprehensive research work and 
consequent detailed policy under Government’s sponsorship, 
whereas the former was established by foreign- and domestic 
owners with an objective of financing commercially viable 
projects. This difference implies the existence of a small 
business conceptualisation gap in The Sudan.
With regard to the definition of what constitutes 
small business, the company has not maintained a clear and 
precise definition. The definition used by the company was 
built round the volume of finance and geographical area.
The operations and financing of the ’SRDFC* are 
limited by geographical coverage, in the sense that company 
financing can be made in any rural area or town except Greater 
Khartoum (capital). This factor constitutes the uniqueness of 
the SRDFC. This policy was initiated as a development factor 
to equalise the distribution of resources such as Welsh and 
Scottish Development Agencies in the U.K. and Irish Development 
Authority (IDA) in Ireland.
The SRDFC extends finance in the form of equity 
participation, Murabaha or other forms and combinations
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thereof which conform to Sudanese law. In financing under 
Sharia code, the Murabaha loan agreement has been selected 
as financing instrument.
"In 1984, a form of Murabaha loan agreement had 
been selected, whilst, perhaps not ideal for long 
term development finance, allowed the company to 
proceed with lending ....
...... The Civil Transaction Act introduced in
February 1984» which initially gave the impression 
that the limited liability concept would cease to 
exist....
... .Management of RDC and RDFC agreed that caution 
must be exercised in consideration of equity 
investment in project."
( A.Report, 1984)
The SRDFC’s finance could be in foreign or local 
currency or a combination of both. The question here is of 
whether to lend in foreign currencies, where overseas equipment 
and machinery requires the use of such funds, or in the 
Sudanese pounds. The prevailing exchange rate (market rate) was 
used by the company in calculation of loans at the repayment 
time. This practice proved discrimination of small business, 
in favour of large businesses, which were successful in raising 
institutional long term finance from conventional institutions 
at official exchange rate (see Chapter 5) •
The following limits are observed as a guideline for 
the size of enterprise qualifying for SRDFC finance:
- SRDFC finances up to 5 o f  total project cost.
- SRDFC maximum investment, per project, is US$500,000.
However, investment by third parties - alongside SRDFC and 
the project sponsor himself - is encouraged by the management 
of the company. Within the maximum ceiling of financing, the 
financing power of the management of the SRDFC could be 
defined as follows:
- 331-
- up to $30,000 General Manager
- up to $100,000 Finance Committee
- up to $100,000 to „ t,- 4.
0500^000 Board of Dlrectors
The SRDFC !s financing strategy, being of a long term 
nature, is a good vehicle to eliminate or close the identified 
small business finance gap. The main limitation of this 
financing strategy, is that the company provides finance only 
to an entrepreneur who is able to raise 30%  of the total cost. 
Moreover the SRDFC is itself operating with meagre financial 
resources.
Table 8.14 shows that SRDFC finance mainly for small 
agricultural and industrial establishments, with an average of 
L.S.235»000 finance per project.: The survey shows that the
SRDFC finance mainly for newly established projects, and 
against fixed assets purchase and initial working capital to 
assisted companies. The table shows that the number of firms 
receiving finance from the SRDFC - small manufacting firms - 
was 7, representing 1%  of the total small manufacturing firms. 
The table shows also the degree of un-utilised capacity within 
the SRDFC in its first two years of operation ( 2 7 % )
( 3 0 %  of total resources) The degree of un-utilised capacity 
( 27% ) could be justified on the ground that the SRDFC was at 
an early stage of business operations, with a conservative 
attitude.
In determining the cost of financing in SRDFC,volume, 
type of finance, term of financing and the repayment period were 
used as yardsticks. The cost of finance was calculated on
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TABLE 8.14
ANALYSIS OF SRDFC FINANCING IN 1984/1985
Project Co.fin.1984 Pro j. Co. fin. 1985/ ( 8) Project app, for. fin.1986
S.Manf. S.Ag. Total S.Manf. Ag.small Total S, Manf, S.Ag. Total
No. P. Amt. No. P. Amt. No. P. Amt. No. P. Amt. No. P. Amt. No. P. Amt. No. P. Amt. No. P. Amt. No. P. Amt.
5 1292 1 214 6 1506 2 446 1 161 3 607 6 1308 - - 6 1308
LS 000*8 1984 1985 1986
SRDFC1s Financing 1506 607 2113
Capital of Co(Paid up) (FR) 
at disposal 3200 1374 3200
Lendable capacity (90%) 2880 1237 2880
Un used lendable (capacity) 1374 630 767
TJn used capacity (%) 48% 51% 27%
Used capacity (%) 52% 49% 73%
Total No of projects financed 9 projects (small)
Average = LS 255.000
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simple annual rate. The financing under Murabha instrument 
was based on predetermined cost, accompanied by the penalty 
charge over delay or default. This practice is a violation 
of Sharia code and principle. The cost of finance schedule 
stated in the policy of the company could be summed up as 
follows:-
Table 8.13
SRDFC - Cost of Financing Schedule
No Amount L.S./ $ § i m a ent
Fixed charge 
per annum
1. Less than LS 250,000 1-12 months 20 - 2%
2. Less than LS 250,000 15-25 months 26 - 3< % >
3. Less than LS 250,000 26-50 months 31 - 4(#
4. More than LS 250,000 Short period 20 - 2 %
5. More than $100,000 and the 
payment will be in US$, at 
exchange rate prevailing at 
due date, regardless of the 
repayment period. ie%
6. More than $100,000 and the 
payment will be made at the 
exchange rate prevailing at 
time of dispersment
_____
20 - 2 %
Regarding delay in payment or loan default, the company 
charged the client 25% as cost of finance for the first two 
months, 40% for delay period of two to six months and 50% for 
more than six months as a penalty, regardless of the financing 
mechanism used.
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Table 8.15 shows a most surprising result, that challenges* 
the theoretical foundation of SRDFC as a development agency, in 
the sense that the cost of financing charged by the company was 
higher than those charged by traditional and conventional 
commercial banks.
The loans and financing provided by SRDFC are usually 
secured by mortgage deeds and guarantees from third parties.
For small projects needing less than $30,000, post-dated 
cheques, followed by guarantee from a commercial bank or 
reputable third party are acceptable as security. For all 
loans exceeding $30,000, loans are provided against mortgage 
deeds exceeding 20C$> of the amounts of funds provided.
From this review, a principal inference can be drawn that, 
the operation and financing practice of SRDFC has inharmonious 
features, in the sense that the company was established with a 
positive bias towards small business financing, whereas its 
financing practice, in terms of cost of finance, conditions of 
financing, provide confirmation of the existence of small 
business finance gap in The Sudan.
8.3.5 Sudan Islamic Investment Company (SIIC)
The Sudan Islamic Investment Company was formed in 1982 as 
a private limited company, owned by Faisal Islamic Bank (Sudan) 
and *Dar A1 Mai A1 Islami1, with an authorised capital of 
US$10 million. The company became operational in late 1983 with 
an issued capital of $3 million (l»S7.5 million), subscribed by 
owners on equal ratio. The company was set up to:-




ANALYSIS OF S I I C FINANCING
lMudaraba Mudaraba Mudaraba Mudaraba
No 1 % No 2 % No 3 % No 4 % Total %
Small manf F. 421 35 520 16 1747 50 2747 69 5435 46
Large Manf F# 750 63 2526 79 1617 46 950 24 5843 49
Other sectors 26 2 140 5 137 4 303 7 606 5




1209 3193 3501 4000 11903
Un-used Suk. Res 12 7 - - 19
% of un-us ed j 1% 22% 16%





90% of Fin Resources
Un-used lend capital 1529
%  of un-used 11%
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2. To participate in economic development of the Sudan, and
3. To improve and enhance savings and investment behaviour
of the Muslim community (the Article of Association).
The company as a financier, operates its business as fMudaripf 
by issuing *Sukok A1 Mudaraba* to the public at large. Thus, the 
financing of the company was tailored round *Sukok A1 Mudaraba*.
It was stated in the company policy that Sukok A1 Mudaraba is for one 
year, which enables the company to make an investment within one 
year out of A1 Mudaraba resources.
The company provides finance under Musharaka, against 
re-evaluation of assets as a security for the company investment.
The cost of finance is embodied in the profit sharing agreement, 
which in most cases is distributed 45% for the company and 55% 
for the client for profit not exceeding LS400,000 and 25% 
and 73% respectively for profit more than LS400,000. Under 
Musharaka agreement losses are distributed accordingly to the 
share in the capital of operation.
Table 8.16 shows that the SIIC financing was mainly 
devoted to large enterprises (49%) rather than small manufacturing 
firms. This was attributable to the security provided by large 
firms to the company in a position of JSMudarip”. The table 
indicates that all company investments were within the financial 
resources generated from the issuing of Sukok, which means that 
the equity of the company remains as un-utilised funds, implying 
the conservativeness of the company.
8.4 PROCESS OF CHANNELLING FUNDS TO CLIENTS
Small and large firms sample (demand-side) reported that 
documentation relating to the previous year* s accounts was
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very important in raising institutional finance, apart from 
other factors (chapter 7)* The objective of this part of the 
chapter is to examine to what extent this contention holds 
true in the financial institution practice. Thus, the focus 
is on the process used by banks in providing funds to clients, 
as regards the level of documentation required, monitoring 
techniques employed and the quality of advice provided by 
banks to small business.
8.4*1 Level of Documentation
The commercial and development financial institutions as 
well as the Central Bank, reported that documentation is very 
important in providing funds to clients.
"A very good financial control system assists bankers 
to assess properly the financial position of the 
client, so the more adequate the financial control 
system, the more the chance for the client to get 
credit facilities. This applies even for credit 
facilities less than the Bank of Sudan Financing 
Approval'1. ( N. B.)
Table 8.17 shows that the historical financial statement 
for the previous year, documentation on guarantee, and value of 
security, were ranked as most important pieces of information 
in providing funds to clients, regardless of the size of the 
business. This finding is consistent with that derived from 
the opinion of small and large firms (Chapter 7» table 7*10). 
The table shows that all responding financial institutions, 
except the Central Bank, give more consideration to information 
on applicants - external information - as a part of the process 
of financing decisions. The table illustrates that Development 
Financial Institution (DFl), as provider of medium and long
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TAELE 8.17
LE VEL OF DOCUMENTATION NECESSARY FOR THE BARK 
TO PRO VIDE FIN AN C E
TVT-t 1 T5 0. Abu Int. Total
Level of Doc: Bank
E  »
Kh. SIB. Bank FIB. TIB. DB. Bank SRD. SIIC No %
P/L &  B/sheet last y c X X X X X X X X X
X 10 100
Proforma invoice X X - - X X X X - X 7
70
Type of operations X X - X X X X X -
X 8 80
Statement of affairs X X - - X X - X -
- 5 50
Approved licence - - X X - X - - X X 5
50
Doc. on guarantee X X X X X X X X X
X 10 100
Letter of guarantee X X - - X X - - X 5
50
Name of management - - X X - - X - X X 5
50
Shareholders - - X X X X X - X
X 7 70
Report from Banks - - - - X - X - X
X 4 40
Registration Cert. - - X - X - - - -
- 2 10
Production & sales p1 x - X X - X X - X
6 60
Feasibility study - - X X - X - - X
X 5 50
Inf on applicant X X X - X X X X X
X 9 90
Business C#Flow - X - - - X - X
X 4 40




X X X X X X
6 60
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term financial facilities, laid stress on future operation of 
the business, in terms of sales, production plan and cash­
flow analysis.
In response to the question on the degree of importance 
of documentation in providing funds to clients, all banks 
reported that documentation was very important in channelling 
all types of finance. The survey shows that the minimum 
level of documentation required by banks was a summary of 
of requirements in terms of proforma invoice, actual financial 
statements; whether statement of affairs or balance sheet, 
and information on applicant personally and through banking 
system enquiry.
Table 8.t8
Degree of Importance of Documentation in 



















Marabaha A A A A A B A A A A 10 100
Musharaka A A A A A A NA NA NA A 7 70
Mudaraba NA NA NA A A A ' NA NA NA NA 3 30
Overdraft A A NA A NA NA A A A NA 6 60
Long t. loans A A A A A A A A A A 10 100
Med. term loans A A A A A A A A A A 10 100
A Very important 
B Important 
C Not important 
NA Not applicable
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This observation questioned critically to what extent 
small business could satisfy the financier by providing
information, or in other words is the financial control
system responsible for the identified finance gap. However
this observation provides evidence of interaction between
financing and financial control.
8.4.2 Financing Follow-Up and Monitoring Techniques
It was established that the project monitoring and
financing follow-up of development banks goes way beyond
conventional follow-up in the sense that development banking
differs from traditional banking. (Gupta 1979)* Punja (1979)
stated that:- "Experience in development banking has reinforced
the belief that no development bank could be effective without
the machinery for effective follow-up of assisted projects."
On Islamic banking practice, Salama .(1984) stated that:-
"A vigilent monitoring of investment is a must for 
for .the success of profit-sharing systems; the 
supplier of funds under this system has a vital 
interest in the venture, as he will not have a 
stipulated interest at the end of the year.
For the successful operation of profit-sharing 
system, any finance supplied or any operation 
executed, should be brought to an end within the 
agreed period, any delinquecy or delay in the 
execution will involve a loss to the supplier of 
capital, it is in the interest of the supplier 
of capital to see to it that the project is 
executed as scheduled ...... ".
It was argued that the staff members in the bank responsible 
for project appraisal should not bear responsibility for 
following up these projects, because they might not be able 
to identify their own mistakes (Simba 1979)* It was observed 
that this sort of separation was adopted in development 
agencies and Islamic banks.
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TABLE 8.19













Monitoring Techniques MR MS 0/D LT MR MS o/d LT MR MS o/d LT MR MS o/d LT MR MS O/D LT MR MS O/D LT
Letter of Trust X X
Control of Goods (Pledge) X X X X X X X X
Control of Security X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Control of mortgage X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Post dated cheque X X X X X X
Continuous reporting on op. X X X X X X X X
Involvement in Management 








Design of acct. & report system X X
Snap shot visit X X X X X X X
Appointment of manager X
Continuous follow up X X X
Periodical Report X X X
Stand by security 
Promissory note X X X X X X X X X







Monitoring Techniques MR MS O/D LT MR MS O/D LT MR MS O/D LT
Letter of trust
Control of Goods (Pledge)
Control of Security X X X X X X X X X
Control of mortgage X X X X X X X X X
Post dated cheque
Continuous reporting on operation X X X X X
Involvement in management X X X X X X
a) Board of directors1 level X X X X X X
b) Accounting level X X X X
c) Operational level X X
Design of accounting & reporting system X X X X X X X
Snap shot visit X X X X X X X X
Continuous follow up X X X X X X
Periodical report X X X X X X X X
Appointment of management X X X X X X X
Stand by security X X X
Promissory notes
Penalty X X X
Legal contract X X X X X X X X X
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Table 8.19 shows that the control of the securities
pledged was used by all types of banks for all types of financing
instruments. Under Musharaka finance, banks play an active role
in the management of the business, starting from snapshot visit,
installation of accounting system, and appointment of bank
representatives to an appointment of the top management of the
business. The degree of involvement in the management of the
business under Musharaka, depends on volume of transactions,
and availability of management cadre;
The survey shows that Development Financial Institutions
(DFIS) laid great stress on the management of the business.
The Director of the SIB said that:-
”It is needless to stress that the quality of management 
is a crucial factor in the success of ventures financed 
by the Bank. ”Family” ownership and management is not 
an uncommon practice. Where competence of a management 
is seen to be doubtful, joint efforts should be exerted 
to recruit men of talent, experience and expertise.
IBS should work out the modalities of a suitable 
arrangement in this regard.”
The survey shows that DFIS not only exercised its control on 
financial and accounting systems, they went further in having an 
effect on the management of the financed firm.
8.4.5. Small Business Advice
The small business research sample, demand side, 
reported that there was lack of information and advice in the 
financial facilities available in the capital market. (See 
Chapter 7» part 7*6). On questioning what sort of communication 
channels are maintained by the bank and its clients, the survey 
provides evidence there was no specialised advice unit for 
providing information to clients.
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"It is the market of capital supplier, therefore 
there is no need to establish such unit in
the bank."
The lack of financial information and advice in the banking 
system could be seen clearly in the result that 92%  of the 
research sample - demand side - reported that they had no idea 
nor had they heard of the SRDFC or its financing activities.
The non-existence of the financial advice in the 
banking system problem can be compounded by the quality of 
entrepreneur and his inability to identify sources of 
information on alternative forms of financing, (see Chapter 9)•
8.5 SUMMARY ARP CONCLUSIONS
The analysis of the financial facilities provided by 
the commercial banks and their pattern of allocation, provides 
firm evidence that small manufacturing firms are at a 
disadvantage in terms of type of finance, volume of finance 
and conditions of financing. This finding provides a positive 
support to the third research hypothesis on the identification 
of the small firm finance gap from the supply side perspective.
Using a loan to deposit ratio, the survey proved that 
there existed large amounts of un-utilised loan capacity with 
the commercial banks in The Sudan. This finding was a good 
indication of the commercial banks behaviour towards small 
business financing. This could be explained by the fact that 
commercial banks were highly security concious and profit- 
oriented.
The empirical investigation provides evidence that 
the financing practice of development financial institutions violate
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the philosophical foundation and the theoretical justification 
of the establishment of development financial bodies by being 
both security oriented and profit concious. Thus, this study 
finding provides confirmation of Gravin (1970), Bird and Juttner 
(1974) and Knight (1985) observations that the small business 
financing gap is created partially by the capital market 
operation.
The examination of the financial institutions policies, 
proves that there was small business conceptualisation and a policy 
gap in the banking system. Regarding information and advice on 
financial facilities, the analysis of the supply side result is 
consistent with the inference derived from the opinion of the 
demand side, leading to a principal premise that there is a 
’'Bolton'1 gap in the Sudan. The information and advice gap was a 
direct consequence of the policy and small businesses 
institutional gap in the Sudan.
Regarding the relationship and interaction between 
financing and financial control, the research work based on 
supply side opinion extends support to Bolton (1971) and Ray and 
Hutchinson (1983) that there is an interaction between financing 
and financial control. Thus, it provides confirmation of the 
study analytical framework (Chapter 3) and positive support to 
the research hypothesis (Hypothesis 5)•
The point of strength in this study, apart from the 
methodological strength is embodied in the consistency of 
findings derived from the supply and demand side. How to close 
or to eliminate the identified gaps is a matter of policy, which 
will be discussed in Chapter 12.
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Given small business financial profiles and identified 
gaps, a focal point needs to be raised in this scholary process 
is what type of tycoon and entrepreneur guides and manages 
this profile. To this point we direct attention now.
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C H A P T E R  N I N E  
THE SUDANESE MANUFACTURING ENTREPRENEUR
There appears to be a growing awareness among both economists and policy 
makers that entrepreneurship is a critically scarce resource in many parts of 
the world, and that its appearance cannot be attributed entirely to the presence 
of economic opportunities. (Arthur, Cole, 1940). Baumol (1968) articulated 
that: ”encouragement of the entrepreneur is the key to the stimulation of
growth ... the policy maker thus is interested primarily in what determines the 
supply of entrepreneurship and in the means that can be used to expand it".
Carroll, J.J. (1965) added that the entrepreneur in a developing economy 
is a powerful agent of change, not only of economic change but also of the 
social change which almost inevitably accompanies it. Most of the writers on 
economic development of underdeveloped countries, assert that underdeveloped 
countries suffer from a deficiency in dynamic entrepreneurs and the 
entrepreneural class pointed out by McClleland and Hagen is almost non-existent 
in most of the poor countries (Awad, 1979)* Broehl (1983) added that the 
entrepreneual process in the less developed world is impeded by the conflicts of 
old and new.
Another advanced case for modern small scale enterprises in developed and 
developing countries runs in terms of their contribution to the development of 
entrepreneurship (P. Neck, 1977; V. Patel, 1977; Churchill and Lewis, 1983; and 
Knight 1984). Timmons, J.A. (1984) rightly argued that:
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“Central to nearly all models of venture creation 
is the individual entrepreneur as a catalyst, 
energizer, project champion, innovator, creater 
and team leader".
Policy makers wishing to foster entrepreneurship seek to identify the 
entrepreneur. Financiers recognise that they are essentiallyy financing 
people, but what characteristics of entrepreneurs? Management development 
institutes desire to develop an entrepreneur, but what are they? and what 
are their training needs? This part of the study is attempting to provide 
understanding of the Sudanese entreneurs (elusive heffalump), as one of the 
facets of a small enterprise development model.
It was established in the body of knowledge that the motive of an 
entrepreneur for going into business often determines how he finances and 
runs the business. It was also asserted that age, level of education, 
occupational origin, industrial experience and social factor interm of family 
are an important determinant factors of entrepreneur performance in managing 
and developing the business (Broehl, 1984; Kuriloff, 1979)*
To find out the Sudanese experience the Chapter is organised as follows: 
Part I provides outlines on the Sudanese entrepreneurship and motivation for 
setting up the business and its relationship to occupational origin and 
previous experience. Analysis of the profile of entrepreneur including age, 
level of education, experience, occupational origins and family as a social 
factor is presented in Part II. Part III gives an outline of entrepreneurial 
management attitude, and the concluding section summarises the results and 
discusses implications of the major findings.
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9.1 ENTREPRENEURIAL MOTIVATION
McClleland (1961) and Atkinson (1964) have developed a theory of 
psychological motivation that has been widely used in the study and practice 
of management and entrepreneurship (Timmons, Smollen and Dingee, 1977)* The 
theory of psychological motivation suggests that people are motivated by 
three principal needs:
(a) the need for achievement (n Ach),
(b) the need for power (n pow), and
(c) the need for affiliation (n Aft).
(Timmons, 1985). In addressing the issue of small enterprise development in
the U.K., Bolton (1971) argues that:
"The desire for independence appears to be overriding 
and indeed may on occasions even operate against their 
own interest ... many businessmen in small firms 
recognise that money is not their prime motivation”.
Dunkelberg and Cooper (1984) and other writers provide confirmation to 
Bolton finding, showing that entrepreneurs are independence oriented in 
forming their businesses. A number of writers including Atkinson (1964), 
Timmons (1973) and Welsh and White (1983) on the other extreme asserted that 
money has a very special meaning to the successful entrepreneurs. Timmons 
(1978) articulated that:
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"The entrepreneur is involved in a continous process of 
making money, going out and investing out in another 
company, and then starting all over again. The cycle 
never seems to end and the money is a way of measuring 
performance".
The evidence from this research was on small firms at inception and 
growing stage of development and their large private enterprise counterparts 
provide confirmation to Timmons (1978) and in some respect challenge the 
Bolton (1971) contention and statement. The vast majority of entrepreneurs 
in this survey (76#), ranked economic rewards as a most critical motivating 
factor in forming their business. Based on matrix analysis of the motivating 
factors reported and ranked by respondents, tables (10-1/a,b,c) show that 
family as a socio-economic factor has been ranked as a second motive for 
going into business, either to expand family business or to meet family 
demand. This finding was observed in Nigeria and The Philippines by Harris, 
(197*0 and Carroll (1965) respectively. Family as a motivating factor stems 
from the fact 382 of company founders in this survey had parents, father or 
brothers who were company owners and belong to the family business. Borland 
(197*0 found that the variable most commonly associated with a business 
student's declared entrepreneurial expectations was the professional 
independence of the student's father. (Shapero and Sokol, 1984).
In response to the question why did you decide to start this enterprise, 
602 of entrepreneurs of the current starting-up small firms sample reported 
that industry is more profitable. The entrepreneurs of small growing firms 
had the same opinion. This finding based on the total sample of small firms 
provides a positive support to Timmons (1978) and other studies on 
entrepreneurship (Morris and Somerset, 1974; Finney, 1973 and Borland, 1974).
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TABLE 9.1 -a
MOST IM PO RTANT FACTORS WHICH M O TIVATED FOUNDERS TO S E T-U P  
THE BU SIN ESS -  CURRENT S TA R TIN G -U P  SM ALL FIR M S SAMPLE 
"M A T R IX  REPR ESENTATIO N "
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total
Score
Motivating Factors: No % RA­
NK
1. Outlet, for personal
abilities 2 3 l- 1 55 11 3
2. Independence - 3 l - 33 6.4 6
3. Status - - 2 3 32 6.7 5
4. Job Satisfaction 2 - 1 - l - - - - 30 6.2 7
5. Economic Rewards 16 1 1 1 1 - - - - 170 3 5 1
6. Meet Family Demands i 3 3 45 9.4 4
7. Expand and Diversify
Family Business - 5 4 l 74 15.4 2
8. Market Niche 1 8 2 9
9. Create Family Enterprise - 2 - 2 28 5.8 8
10. New Company in the Field - 1 8 2 10
TOTAL 20 19 13 8 2 - - - - 481 100
%




TABLE 9.1 - b 
CURRENT SMALL GROWING FIRMS SAMPLE:




1, Outlet for personal
abilities - 3 2 1 - - - 34 1 0 4
2. Independence 2 1 1 1 - - - 29 8.2 5
3. Status 1 2 1 - 1 - - 27 7.6 6




14 3 1 1 1 128 36 1
Family Business - 4 3 - - - - 39 11 2
7. Meet Family Demands - - 2 1 1 1 - 19 5.4 8
8. Market Niche - 1 - - - - - 6 2 9
9. Create Family Enterprise 
10. Level of achievement is
2 2 1 1 — 35 10 3
high - - 1 - - - - 5 1.4 11
11. Successful Endeavour - 1 - - - - - 6 2 10
TOTAL
/
20 18 14 6 3 1* - 355 100
FAMILY (6+7+9) 93 26
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The large private enterprises taken as a contori gorup in this study 
shared the opinion of small firm sample, that the economic reward is a most 
important motivating factor (35%)* This could be explained by the fact that 
most of the large firm sample in this survey started very small under family 
domination (53/0 • The main difference between small and large sample 
reflected in the fact that less emphasis has been put on family dimension by 
large firms which started very large. This observation can be attributed to 
ownership structure of the firms, (see Table 9»l~c).
Based on the classification of entrepreneurs sample on occupational 
origins into those originated from family business or father business ( 58% )  
and those started from scratch as ex-employees or developed their business as 
traders from their personal savings (42#), in relation to the motivating 
factors, the analysis of the survey provides interesting results. The matrix 
representation of the motivating factors ranked and reported by entrepreneurs 
shows that the economic reward is the most prominent factor in both groups 
with a certain degree of variation in the weight. The economic reward has a 
higher degree of weight in the group of entrepreneur emerged and operated 
under the family umbrella or business ( 3 5 % )  than those started as an 
independent owner ( 2 8 % ) .  In studying the entrepreneurship in Taiwan, 
Giesbrecht (1968) observed that:
"A person measures the success of his behaviour by how it 
influences the status of his family. Clearly, anything 
that would bring increased honour, power, pleasure, or 
income to the family would be worth striving for. And this
is a good basis for the profit motive”.
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TABLE 9.1-c 





3 4 5 6 7 8 TOTAL SCORE
No % Rank
1. Outlet for personal
abilities 2 1 - 1 - - - - 28 8.5 2
2. Independence 1 2 - 1 - - - - 27 8.2 3
3. Status - - - - 1 - - - 4 1.2 14
4. Job Satisfaction - 1 l - - - - - 13 4 9
5. Economic Rewards 12 - 3 114 35 1
6. Meet Family Demands - 1 10 3 10
7. Expansion and
Diversification of
Family Business - 2 l 22 6.7 6
8. Create Family Enterprise - 2 2 - - - - - 27 8.2 4
9. Ambitious - - 1 - - - - - 6 1.8 12
10. Family Image - - - l - - - - 5 1.5 13
11. Market Niche - 2 1 20 6.1 7
12. Availability of R. Mats - 2 2 26 7.9 5
13. Diversification of Busns. - 1 2 19 5.8 8
14. New Industry in The Sudan - 1 7 2 11
Total 15 15 13 3 1 1 1 1 328 100
Family (6+7+8+10) 5 3 1 1 1 1 64 20
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The main difference between the two groups embodied in the fact is that 
those emerged from family business or connected to family business put more 
emphasis on family as a second motivating factor in terms of creating family 
enterprise, expansion and diversification of family business and meeting 
extended family demands (42.7#). By contrast, the other group of 
entrepreneurs maintained the desire for independence as a second motivating 
factor, in connection with job satisfaction, outlet for personal abilities 
and status (41.4#). Table 10.2-a shows that the desire for independence is 
not an important factor for an entrepreneur who emerged or belong to a family 
business with a score of 0.9#. The explanation of this observation is that 
this group of entrepreneurs is already independent, working for themselves 
and/or for their families. Thus the motivating factors in forming the 
business is determined partially by the occupational origin of an 
entrepreneur and to what extent they belong to family business.
It deserves to be noted that, despite the importance attached to 
independence by those who formed their business under no family umbrella 
(group -2), table 10.2-b shows that job satisfaction also seemed to be 
important with 8.8# score. Boswell (1971) identifies that:
"the emigration of frustrated men from corporations as a 
prime generator of new engineering and hosiery/knitwear 
firms in the United Kingdom".
Shapero and Sokol (1984) observed in the U.S. that:
"job dissatisfaction of many kinds is mentioned with great
frequency by company formers; they include boredom and what
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might be called technical frustration".
One of the entrepreneurs in the research sample told that:
”1 entered the field of business to stand by my own, 
to build my image and reputation out of my business.
Moreover, the government .job was too narrow to embody 
my ambition and innovative ability”.
The last rows of tables 10.2-a and 10.2-b show clearly the effect of 
occupational origin on entrepreneur motivation in forming a business. As has 
been explained before, the first group of entrepreneurs identified in this 
study put more emphasis on family dimension with (42.7/0 score whereas the 
other group put emphasis on desire for independence, job satisfaction, outlet 
of personal abilities and status with ( 5 0 . 5 % )  score as motivating factors.
In response to the question on what currently is your motivation, small 
firm research sample put more emphasis on expansion and development of 
business activities and profit motive as an over-riding current motivating 
factor; ( 5 & % ) • 35 per cent of small firms at inception sample reported that
continuity and survival in the market was the most important factor. This 
finding explained the difference between small firms at start-up facing a 
critical stage of development and established and growing firms (Churchill 
and Lewis, 1983). The vital and pertinent question to be raised in this 
context is to what extent the classification of entrepreneurs into two groups 
with a degree of variation in the motivation of forming business, can be 
explained by entrepreneurial profile measured into level of education, age, 
occupational origin and industrial experience. To this point, we direct
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attention now.
TABLE 9.2-a
HOST CRITICAL FACTORS WHICH MOTIVATED FOUNDER/S TO SET-UP BUSINESS 
- EMERGED FROM FAMILY BUSINESS GROUP 1 32/55 = 58#
Matrix Representation
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 TOTAL SCORE
MOTIVATING FACTORS No % RANK
1. Outlet for personal
abilities 3 - 2 1 - - - - 41 5.8 5
2. Independence - 1 - 1 - - - - 7 0.9 12
3. Status - - - 1 1 - - - 9 1 11
4. Job Satisfaction - 1 1 13 1.8 10
5. Economic Rewards 26 4 2 248 35 1
6. Meet Family Demands - 4 2 47 6.6 4
7. Expansion and
Diversification of F.B. - 7 7 1 2 - 1 - 106 15 3
8. Market Niche 1 1 2 2 - - - - 37 5 6
9. Create Family Enterprise 2 9 8 4 1 - - - 151 21 2
10. Level of Achievement High 0 0 0
11. Successful Endeavour 0 0 0
12. New Industry - 2 14 2 9
13. Availability of R. Mats. - - 3 - - - - - 18 2.5 8
14. Diversification of Bus. - 3 21 2.9 7
15. Ambitious





1+2 +3 +4- 70 9.8
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TABLE 9.2-b
GROUP 2 23/55 = 42% (NOT FAMILY BUSINESS ORIGIN ENTREPRENEURS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 TOTAL SCORE
No X RANK
1. Outlet for personal
abilities 2 5 2 2 - - - - 73 12.8 3
2. Independence 6 7 3 - - - - - 115 20 2
3. Status - 2 5 1 - - - - 49 8.6 5
4. Job Satisfaction 2 2 1 2 1 - - - 50 8.8 4
5. Economic Rewards 13 1 4 3 2 - - - 158 28 1
6. Meet Family Demands - - - 2 - 1 - - 13 2.3 9
7. Expansion of
Diversification of F.B. - 1 - 2 - - - - 17 3 8
8. Market Niche - 3 1 - 1 1 - - 34 6 6
9. Create Family Enterprise - - 1 3 2 - 1 - 29 5 7
10. Level of Achievement
is High - - 1 6 1 12
11. Successful Endeavours - - - 1 - - - - 5 0.8 13
12. New Industry - 1 7 1.2 11
13. Availability of R. Mats - - 2 - - — — — 12 2.1 10
TOTAL 23 22 20 16 6 2 1 - 568 100
FAMILY DIMENSION (6+7+0) 59 10.4
Outlet of personal abilities
+ independence & Job Satis­
faction + Status
- 287 50.5-
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9.2 ENTREPRENEURAL PROFILE
Many studies suggest that there is a significant association between 
personal traits such as age, education and work experience and the capacity 
to become an entrepreneur (Ahmed, 1977). In this part of the study, an 
attempt is made to give insight and provide a clue for the understanding of 
the Sudanese entrepreneur as an individual, as a platform for public policy 
aiming to develop entrepreneurial activities. Broehl, Jr. (1983) rightly 
articulated that:
"A better understanding of entrepreneurship in the 
less developed countries could have a particularly 
high return for mankind”.
9.2.a AGE
TABLE 9.3
AGE DISTRIBUTION OF SMALL FIRM ENTREPRENEURS .
AT FORMATION STAGE AND AT PRESENT
AT FORMATION AT PRESENT
Range of Age: No % No %
1. Under 30 years 4 10 - -
2. 30 - 40 20 50 11 27-5
3. 4l - 49 17 42.5 18 45
4. 50 - 59 - - 11 27.5
5. 60 and over* - - - -
some founders of growing firms died, second generation reported the data.
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Table 9*3 shows the percentage of entrepreneurs falling in different age 
groups at formation of business and at the present. It can be observed that 
more than 9 0 %  of the sample entrepreneurs formed their business between 30 
and 49. The proportion in the years 30-40 years age group is higher than 
that in the group 41-49 years of age. The survey provides inevitable 
evidence that the Sudanese individual's entrepreneural debut to be 
concentrated in their thirties. This finding is consistent with an 
observation made by Watanabee (Japan) (1970). John Deeks (1972) in U.S. and 
Oorman (1973) in Irish industry.
Regarding the age distribution of the sample entrepreneurs at present 
(field work time), 45% of the sample are in the 41-49 years age group, and an 
equal distribution between 30-40 and 50-59 age group with 27.5 %• This 
classification and grouping of the sample entrepreneurs according to age will 
help explain the profile of entrepreneurs in terms of educational level and 
stands as a platform for a public policy and initiatives to develop the 
supply of entrepreneurs in The Sudan.
9.2.b iSDUCATION
Most studies on entrepreneurship in developing countries have found that 
the entrepreneur is one of the most highly educated members of his community 
(Papanek, 1971; Carroll, 1965 and B. Osaze, 1981). Moreover, there was a 
contention that education is of more importance for the large and more 
complex firm than the small firm and highly education entrepreneurs perform 
better than the less educated entrepreneurs. Cooper (1983) argued that the 
education and the prior experience of the founder are related to company 
success.
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In their study on Kenyian entrepreneurship, Morris and Somerset (1971) 
articulated that a success-bound entrepreneur needs at least three major 
skills: practical imagination, administrative ability and enough general
knowledge (B. Osaze, 1981). It is the intent of this part of the study to 
establish the educational profile of the Sudanese entrepreneurs in the small 
manufacturing industry and to what extent the established statement and 
contention held true in Sudan that the educational level of the entrepreneur 
is higher than that of the rest of the population.
TABLE 9.4





Base 10-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60 and over
1. Total 13071 100 100 23.9 15.1 11.2 7.7 4.5 4.2
2. Illiterate 8039 61.5 100 10.2 12.5 12.1 9.3 5.6 5.4
3. Khalwa 549 4.2 100 8 14.3 21.9 21.9 14.9 15.6
4. Primary 3245 24.8 100 49 14.8 8.2 3.2 1.3 0.6
5. Intermediate 699 5.3 100 68.8 20.2 7.6 2.1 0.7 0.6
6. Secondary 444 3.4 100 35.4 50.1 10.4 2.7 0.9 0.5
7. University 77 0.59 100 9-7 51.6 25.2 8.4 2.4 2.7
8. Other 4 0.03 100 26.5 36.5 15.7 14.2 2.2 4.9
9. Not Stated 14 0.18 100 41.4 5.50 12.5 3.1 6.2 4.2
S o u r c e :  Household Income and Expenditure Survey, 1978-80; Ministry of
Finance and Economic Planning; Sudan
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Table (9*4) based on 1973/74 population census shows that the rate of 
literacy in the Sudan as a text example of under-developed countries was very 
low accounting to 38.5#* As far as the entrepreneurial age group identified 
in this study (30“59). the Table shows that 702 of this age group is 
illiterate.
The last rows of the Table (9*5) shows the percentage distribution of 
the smaple entrepreneurs, according to their level of education, classified 
into below and over secondary school level. That table shows that 402 of 
small firms' entrepreneur sample had educational level in terms of Khalwa 
and primary school and 602 had a secondary and university degree. The Table 
shows that 33% of small firms entrepreneur sample had a university degree and 
292 received secondary school certificate. This finding in conjunction with 
the results of Table (9*4), provides an inevitable empirical evidence that 
the level of education of an entrepreneur in the Sudan is higher than that of 
the general public.
Table (9.5) illustrates an interesting point that the level of education 
of those who started a business in the 80's (start-up) is higher than those 
who started a business in the 60's and early 70's, with 802 and 452 
respectively. This observation could be explained at macro level, by an 
increase in the level of education, from a 152 literacy rate in 1966 to 38.52 
in 1973/74 (UNISCO, 1985)• Moreover, an observation can be stated that there 
is a continous flow of educated people from the Civil Services and public and 
private sectors to industry and informal sector as entrepreneurs. This 
symptom can be explained in macro economic factors, mainly inflation, 
unemployment, flow-back of immigrants and other contingent factors.
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TABLE 9.5











No % To % No % No % No %
1. Dropped out of Khalwa or
primary school 0 0 5 25 0 0 5 11 1 7
2. Finished Khalwa or primary
school 4 20 6 30 3 60 13 29 5 33
3. Secondary Schools 8 *40 *4 20 0 0 12 27 2 13
4. Commercial Schools 0 0 1 5 0 0 1 2 1 7
5- University/Technical Coll 8 *40 5 25 2 *40 15 33 6 40
6. Business Admin. Studies 1 5 0 0 1 20 2 4 0 0
7. Post Grad Studies 0 0 0 0 1 20 1 2 0 0
8. None 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 100 20 100 5 LOO 45 100 15 100
* below secondary school level *4 20 11 55 3 60 18 40 4 27
* secondary school level and
over 16 80 9 45 2 *40 27 60 11 73
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Table (9.5) presents a cross classification between the entrepreneurs' 
level of education and size of firms. The results obtained from the Table 
suggest a positive association between the size of the firm and level of 
education. The Table shows that 73# of founders, entrepreneurs and 
shareholders of the large firm sample had a secondary and a university 
degree, compared to 6 0 %  of small firm sample.
In making a comparison between the level of education of entrepreneurs 
of small growing and declining firms, the survey shows that there was no 
positive correlation between growth, success and the educational level of 
entrepreneur. The limitation of this analogy and comparison is embodied in 
the fact that it is not based on pairing sampling in terms of numbers and 
identify (20 against 5) and does not take into consideration the variation in 
the nature of industry and other contingent variables. This remained 
unanswered question in this research effort, building a dichotomy between 
successful and unsuccessful small firms from the angle of entrepreneurial 
typology, profile and characteristics.
This topographical map of the educational profile of small firms 
entrepreneurs, furnishes a platform for a public policy action plan to 
promote and develop the entrepreneurs as individuals in the Sudan, and 
provides a ground for management development institutes to launch their 
programmes for entrepreneurial development. The limitation of this 
generalisation, and influence on the level of education as well as other 
variables is based on a small sample, as compared to total the number of 
entrepreneurs in the Sudan.
With respect to management training, 55# of entrepreneurs of the small 
firms sample reported that they had not attended any sort of management 
training programme or seminar.
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TABLE 9.6
ENTREPRENEURS SAMPLE AND MANAGEMENT TRAINING
1 2 3 = (1+2)
CURRENT CURRENT TOTAL
ST-UP S.F. G.S.l? . SAMPLE
NO % NO % NO %
1. NONE
2. Busin. Admin course
11 55 11 55 22 55
one year programme 
3. Mgt Training programme
1 5 0 0 1 2.5
- local 
4. Mgt Training programme
5 25 l \ 20 9 22.5
- abroad - - 3 15 3 7-5
5. Ent with mgt edu training
6. Son of founder ent with
6 30 7 35 13 32.5
mgt. degree 2 10 1 5 3 7-5
7. mgr. with Busin, education 1 5 1 5 2 5
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Table (9*6) shows that 32.5# of the entrepreneurs sample had management 
education and training. The survey shows that most of these entrepreneurs 
received management training before establishing their businesses, as 
employees in public and private large enterprises. This observation 
indicates non-hard surprising result that management training is associated 
with occupational origin and industrial experience. Those who received 
management training reported that the training is not relevant to the 
problems of their businesses. It is beyond the capacity of this study to 
assess the management training services provided in the Sudan, and to what 
extent match the needs of entrepreneurs of small firms rather to state a 
public policy issue; that is to what extent educational and management 
development institutes can be organised and structured so as to enhance the 
supply of entrepreneurs in the market and to improve their efficiency along 
the way to develop a small enterprise sector in the Sudan, (see Chapter 12 
for more details).
9.2.c OCCUPATIONAL ORIGINS AND INDUSTRIAL EXPERIENCE
Occupational origins, mobility and industrial experience are 
important determinant factors of entrepreneurial profile and the way he runs 
the business. To what extent does this hold true for the Sudanese 
entrepreneurs in small manufacturing industry and from what occupational 
background do they come? And what is the industrial experience of the 
entrepreneurs sample and to what extent is influenced by family domination 
as a socio-economic phenomena? These questions and points are examined in 
depth in the following discussion.
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TABLE 9.7
INDUSTRIAL EXPERIENCE OF ENTREPRENEURS SAMPLE 
BEFORE ESTABLISHING BUSINESS






NO % NO % NO %
1. Civil Service and Public
Sector 5 25 2 10 7 20
2. Banking Industry
3. Family Business (Trade,
1 5 0 0 1 2.5
Com, Manuf.) 14 70 15 75 29 72.5
4. Professional 2 10 2 10 4 10
5. Private Sector employees 3 15 2 10 5 12.5
6. Traders 1 (own business) 2 10 2 10 4 10
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Table (9*7) shows the different occupations in which the entrepreneurs' 
samples were engaged preceding their establishment of their own small 
manufacturing firms. The Table shows that 1 2 . 5 %  of the entrepreneurs sample 
(small firm) had an industrial experience in working in a family business and 
ex-employees, professional and small traders make up the rest { 2 1 . 5 % ) .  Th© 
Table shows an interesting point that despite the importance of agriculture 
in the Sudanese economy (80% of population in agriculture; Hassan, 1975). 
none of these entrepreneurs sample come from the farming father or farming 
family as farmers. This could be explained by the low level of education in 
the population engaged in agriculture and farming activities, which is most 
widely to be found in the rural areas.
The occupational origin, background and industrial experience has an 
implication on entrepreneurial managerial knowledge and the way the business 
is run (Hoad and Rosko, 1964). The activities of the entrepreneurs emerged 
from family business and operating under the family umbrella in the summer 
and rainy season, are affected by the family ability to provide needed 
capital for start-up and funds for further investment as well as executive 
personnel. This controversial issue on the positive and negative side of 
family involvement in business has been raised by many writers on 
underdeveloped and developed economy (Carroll, 1965. Harris, 1974; Leyder, 
1983).
The survey shows that family enterprise in the Sudan is the rule, in the 
sense that a vast majority of small firms in the sample received and were 
financed at inception from entrepreneurs or their family. Table 9*8 shows 
that 6 0 %  of entrepreneurs of small firms' sample had a managerial experience 
as a chief executive or assistant manager in a family business before 
establishing their own enterprises. The concerned entrepreneurs were most
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likely to move to their businesses with the preceding managerial experience 
and managerial practice of a family business. In their research work on 
Michigan manufacturing firms - US -, Hood and Rosko, (1964), found that the 
prior experience in managerial or non-mangerial work has an influence on the 
way entrepreneurs run the business and seemed to correlate with greater 
success (A. Cooper, 1983).
The occupational origin and background combined with industrial and 
managerial experience has an implication on the management set-up of 
business. The survey shows that an entrepreneur and/or his relatives held 
the office of the chief executive and performed key management functions in 
most cases and the offices of chief executives have tended to remain 
throughout stages of development in the family of entrepreneurs or founders. 
This finding was observed in developed countries, Anthony, Japan, 1983; 
Beckhard - US, 1982; Bolton - UK, 1971; and in developing countries, Kilby, 
1974; and Carroll, Philipinne, 1965* Allen and Parion (1982) rightly 
articulated that:
"Controlling families may be willing to sacrifice 
some degree of corporate profitability in order to 




MANAGERIAL EXPERIENCE OF ENTREPRENEURS 
SAMPLE BEFORE ESTABLISHING BUSINESS







NO % NO X NO %
1. Chief executive In their
Faally Business 10 50 10 50 20 50
2. Chief executive In private
sector - - 2 10 2 2
3. Chief executive In public
sector - - 3 15 3 7.5
4. Asst. Mgr in their fsmlly
Business 3 15 l 5 4 10
5. Asst. Mgr in private sector - - 1 5 1 2.5
6. Asst. Mgr In public sector - - l 5 1 2.5
7. Finance Director in F. Bus - - - - - -
8. Finance Director in private
sector - - - - - -
9. Finance Director in public
sector - - - - - -
10. Production Director in
Faally Business - - - - - -
11. Production Director in
Private Sector - - - - - -
12. Production Director in
Public Sector - - - - - -
13. Inspector/middle mgt
in private sector 2 10 2 10 4 10
14. Inspector/middle mgt
in public sector 4 20 - - 4 10
15> Entreneurshlp in Trading 4 20 5 25 9 22.5
16. Entreneurshlp in Manu­
facturing - - 4 20 4 10
17. Others - - - - - -
18. Managerial experience 
in Faally business 13 I* \\ S5 0-4 60
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9.3 ENTREPRENEURIAL MANAGEMENT PRACTICE AND ATTITUDE
The survey indicates that small firms were based round the technical 
knowledge and managerial ability of their owners and managers. The survey 
shows that 60% of the small firms1 sample were registered as an individual 
ownership; 20% as a partnership and 20% as a limited liability companies 
under family domination in most cases.
TABLE 9.9 










NO % NO % NO %
1. Individual Ownership 13 65 11
1
55 24 60
2. Partnership 4 20 4 20 8 20
3. Registered Company -
1925 Act 3 15 5 25 8 20
20 100 20 100 40 100
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In contrast, the survey shows that all large private enterprises samples 
were registered as limited liability companies under the 1925 Company Act.
In response to the question: was any technical advice or assistance
received at the outset, the respondents reported that the technical advice 
and assistance received was based on an informal and personal basis and 
ground, and in most cases from friends in the concerned field of industry or 
relatives.
Table (9.10) shows that most of the small firms covered for this study 
was established round the technical ability of entrepreneurs and informal 
advice received from friends on personal grounds (72.5#). This result was a 
good indication of the personalised way of forming business and reflects the 
traditional way of establishing on industrial establishment in the Sudan.
This practice, in turn, has an implication on the way business is handled, 
controlled and managed, built round the ability of an authoritarian 
entrepreneur. This observation and finding proposes an empirical 
justification for an action of public policy, look for fostering and 
developing small business sectors in the Sudan. Hood and Rosko (1964) 
articulated that:
“That successful founders were somewhat more likely 
to have sought information and advice from professionals 
and consultants".
With respect to the experience of developed countries (U.S., U.K. Japan) 
and developing countries (India, Nigeria, Egypt), in relation to small 
business development, a public policy and comprehensive schemes have been 
launched by governments to provide technical and managerial advice to small
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TABLE 9.10 
TECHNICAL ADVICE OR ASSISTANCE RECEIVED
AT THE OUTSET. AND IP SO. FROM WHOM?








NO % NO X
A. RECEIVED TECHNICAL ADVICE 15 75 13 65 28 70
. From local specialist body 3 15 1 5 10
. Froa FORIEN specialist body 4 20 3 15 7 17.5
X Formal Advice 7 35 4 20 11 27.5
. On informal and personal basis 8 1*0 10 50 18 *♦5
A. From friends in the field 9 *»5 9 *•5 18 **5
B. From Banker 0 0 0 0 0 0
C. From Relatives 2 10 1 5 3 7-5
D. From Partner/s 1 5 1 5 2 5
E. Other (s) 1 5 - - 1 2.5
DID NOT RECEIVE (POR/INPOR)
ADVICE 5 25 7 35 12 30
. Skill inherited by father
(family) 0 0 1 5 1 2.5
. Entrepreneur expert in the
field 0 0 1 5 1 2.5
. Simple and traditional
industry 20 <♦ 20 8 20
. Previous experience of
entrepreneurs 5 25 3 15 8 20
. Son of the founder expert
in the field 1 5 0 0 1 2.5
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TABLE 9.11
MANAGEMENT SET-UP OF BUSINESS AND FAMILY RELATIONSHIP 







NO I* NO % NO %
1. Entrepreneur/s and ... 20 100 18 90 38 95
2. Brother/s 13 65 11 55 24 60
3. Son/s
4. Brothers/s + son/s and
7 35 8 40 15 37-5
other F.M.
5. Non Family Members
5 25 3 15 8 20
(outside management) 1 5 7 35 8 20
6. Bank Rep under Musharaka 1 5 0 0 1 2.5
7. Shareholder/s (non family) 0 0 1 5 1 2.5
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scale industries at formation and throughout stages of development.
The historical background of the firm, ownership structure, and 
personalised ways of forming has an effect on the way a firm is organised, 
controlled, run and managed. The size of management in most of the survey 
firms was found relatively small built round the entrepreneurs and members of
his family, and the power was centralised in the entrepreneur who was in
charge of almost all activities of the business. This finding on small 
management practice was observed in the U.K. (Bolton, 1971). U.S.; K. Said 
and Hughey (1977); Philippine, (Carroll, 1965). Christensen, C.R. added 
that:
"These men are “enterprisers” whose primary skill lies
in "doing" rather than in "delegating". In small companies
these managers can work with a smaller executive group 
and participate personally in the .job of producing and 
selling . In this way the small business offers the 
"non organisational manager a chance to work and make a 
contribution".
Table (9 .11) shows the domination of owner-managers and the degree of 
family involvement in the management of small firm. The Table illustrates 
the non-existence of professional management and outsiders at start-up stages 
of development and their in-significant existence at growing stage. The 
Table shows that 8 0 %  of the small firms sample were managed and controlled 
wholly by entrepreneur and his family members. This observation can be 
explained by the ownership and personality of an entrepreneur, who has an 
often authoritarian personality and is adverse to sharing responsibilities.
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This conclusion is somewhat similar to the conculsions of Pondy (1969), Allen 
and Ponien (1982) and Geeraerts (1984) and the effect of ownership on 
administrative intensity and management of the firm. Pondy (1969) added 
that:
"Owner-managers are unwilling to dilute their personal 
power and control over the organisation by adding 
professional, non family personnel".
The non-existence of professional management in most of the small firms 
sample is aggravated by the fact that very few owner-managers (3 2.5/0 have 
any training in management. With respect to the small growing firms sample, 
the research finding challenged the contention and statement made by scholars 
(Peiser and Wooten, 1969; Levington, 1971). that growth is often accompanied 
by professional management. Atabani (I98O) offered an explanation, arguing 
that the introduction of family members, usually at higher echolons in the 
hierarchy was acting as a frustrating and alienating factor as far as other 
personnel and their careers were concerned.
Table (9.12) shows that the Sudanese entrepreneurs tended to keep all 
decisions on sales (87*5/0. finance (9 2.5/0 and overall planning (9 2.5%) 
under their sole responsibilities and in some cases with the assistance of 
their son/s and/or brother/s, regardless of the stage of enterprise 
development. This observation might give a clue and insight into 
understanding of the personality and typology of an entrepreneur as a money 
seeker, with financial gain as a prominent objective. The centralisation of 
decision-making on financing and any transaction with direct monetary 
connotation in the hands of an entrepreneur, provides an empirical
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examination of the research analytical framework and gives inevitable 
evidence that small firms financing is influenced among a number of variables 
by typology, profile and attitude of an entreneur.
The centralisation of power and decision-making on financial issues on 
entrepreneur, questioned the management knowledge of an entrepreneur, 
entrepreneurial competence in handling financial management issues of 
business at critical stage of development - survival - and at expansion and 
development stage, as well as the entrepreneurial ability to present a good 
case to financiers. Bolton (1971) observed the inability of small firms 
owner-managers in presenting a case for raising institutional finance, (see 
Chapter 7)•
The entrepreneur's sole responsibility for overall planning of the 
business, was an indication of fate, growth, development and prospect of the 
business is contrained by entrepreneurial ability, perception and vision.
"In search of excellence", Peters and Waterman, (1982) articulated that, 
entrepreneur vision is a critical factor on efficiency and effectiveness of 
management as well as the fate and prospect of the business. "Mechenz 
Model".
Table (9.12) shows an interesting point and hardly surprising result 
that entrepreneurs of small growing firms, as compared to small firms at 
start-up stage, were more willing to delegate to outside subordinates the 
production and personnel functions. This finding explains the effect of the 
life-cycle of the firm on management practices. This observation gives and 
suggests a proposal for a comprehensive research effort to examine the 












1. SALES NO X NO X NO X
A. Sole Entrepreneur 
responsibility 9 *♦5 12 60 21 52.5
B. Entrepreneur/s ♦ 
Brother/s ♦ Son/s 10 50 4 20 14 35
C. Brother/s ♦ Son/s
and other Faally Members 0 0 1 5 1 2.5
D. Entrepreneur ♦ non . 
faally aember/s 1 5 4 20 5 12.5
2. FINANCE
A. Sole Entrepreneur 
responsibility It* 70 17 85 31 77.5
B. Entrepreneur/s ♦ 
Brother/s ♦ Son/s 5 25 1 5 6 15
C. Brother/s ♦ Son/s
and other Faally Meabers 0 0 1 5 1 2.5
D. Entrepreneur ♦ non 
faally aeaber/s 1 5 3 15 4 10
3- PRODUCTION 
A. Sole Entrepreneur 
responsibility 4 20 9 45 13 32.5
B. Entrepreneur/s ♦ 
Brother/s ♦ Son/s 15 75 8 t*0 23 57-5
C. Brother/s ♦ Son/s
and other Faally Meabers 0 0 4 20 4 10
D. Entrepreneur ♦ non 
family aeaber/s 1 5 10 50 11 27-5
4. PERSONNEL
A. Sole Entrepreneur 
responsibili ty i* 20 8 40 12 30
B. Entrepreneur/s ♦ 
Brother/s ♦ Son/s 1*» 70 6 30 20 50
C. Brother/s ♦ Son/s
and other Family Members 0 0 6 30 6 15
D. Entrepreneur ♦ non 
faally aeaber/s 2 10 10 50 12 30
5- OVERALL PLANNING 
A. Sole Entrepreneur 
responsibility 12 60 17 85 29 72.5
B. Entrepreneur/s ♦ 
Brother/s ♦ Son/s 7 35 1 5 8 20
C. Brother/s ♦ Sons/
and other Faally Meabers 0 0 1 5 1 2.5
D. Entrepreneur ♦ Non 
Faally Members 1 5 3 15 4 10
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To establish the management style of the Sudanese entrepreneurs in the 
small manufacturing industry, respondents were asked about their approach in 
making decisions and what did they consult in making major decisions. The 
survey shows that the decision style of entrepreneur as measured and 
operationalised by Sales (1977 (see Research Methodology Chapter) is 
authoritative at a lower level and consultative at upper level, which in most 
cases was dominated by family members. Thus, the entrepreneurial style of 
management is influenced by the degree of family involvement in the 
business. This observation does not rule out the established contention in 
the literature of the small firm that the authorative and paternalistic 
style of management is predominent in the small firm, (Ray and Hutchinson, 
1983), in the sense that a high degree of power is wielded by the owner- 
manager over the sub-ordinates.
The centralisation of power in the entrepreneur and members of his 
family, explains the personality of an entrepreneur and his desire to be 
independent and to keep family domination on the business. This is reflected 
in his characteristics of reluctance to use outside professional staff.
To find out what the entrepreneur does about delegation of authority, 
the respondents were asked, who takes charge of the business in the absence 
of the entrepreneur. The survey results reflect the family domination and 
its association with an implicit and explicit management succession plan, in 
the sense that delegation is made in most cases to a family member according 
to entrepreneurial family hierarchy, regardless of age and experience. 
Broadly, we can state that the delegation in h small business is not 
formalised, it is made on ad hoc basis with an entrepreneur keeps in most 
cases the finance responsibility in presence and absence. This is a good 
indication of the Sudanese entrepreneur attitude to sharing of power. In
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this regard, the researcher observed that there is some sort of fighting 
between old-style entrepreneur "who puts his nose into everything and acts as 
an ultimate decision-maker" and the new generation in the process of 
generation cycle as a management successor.
The foregoing discussion suggests that the Sudanese entrepreneurs in the 
small manufacturing industry managed and controlled their businesses in a 
personalised way (Bolton, 1971). as authoritarians, confined the sharing of 
power to family members, with characteristics of reluctance to use or trust 
outside personnel. (Carroll, 1965; Boswell, 1971; Bolton, 1971)* The style 
of management is a ’craftsmen' one (Cooper and Dunkelberg, 1984), with a 
significant degree of informality; and centrally controlled by the 
entrepreneur and members of his family. This observation provides inevitable 
evidence of the interaction between entrepreneur and financing and financial 
control, identified in this study as a main facet of small enterprise 
development in the Sudan. (See Chapter Three on Research Analytical 
Framework). The management succession plan is implicitly and explicitly 
associated with the hierarchy of the entrepreneur family. A number of 
things, notably Islamic principles and the Sharia Code (religion) has an 
influence on the determination of management succession. A Further research 
into the question of management succession in the small firm in the Sudan, 
will advance our understanding of entrepreneurial process and what critical 
variable/s are to be considered in adopting a policy for the development of 
the entrepreneurial supply and improvement of efficiency and effectiveness of 
entrepreneurial activities.
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9.4 CONCLUSIONS
The empirical findings of this investigation have been stated at various 
points throughout the preceding parts. It may now be possible to combine and 
summarise the main conclusions of the study and their theoretical and policy 
implications. First, we turn to the main conclusions of the study.
The economic rewards and the financial gain have been cited by vast 
majority of entrepreneurs samples as a main motive for forming their 
businesses. Based on the classification of entrepreneurs samples according 
to occupational origin and background, the development and diversification of 
family business and meet of family demand has been ranked by entrepreneur 
working under a family umbrella as a second motivating factor. In contrast 
the other group cited desire for independence, job satisfaction and outlet 
for personal abilities as a second motive. The financial gain as a main 
motivating force at formation and as a current motivating factor is cited by 
entrepreneurs as a symbol of achievement of other goals: independence,
family image and status, power, standard of living and prestige.
Most entrepreneurs in small manufacturing industry made their debut in 
the industry in their thirties and early forties (30-49). The survey shows 
that entrepreneurs in small manufacturing was more literate and educated than 
their age group and the general public.
Small firms were built around technical and managerial ability of an 
entrepreneur. This posed the occupational origin and industrial experience 
and their effect on performance of entrepreneur. The small firm was managed 
in a personalised way by the authoritarian entrepreneur with characteristics 
of reluctance to use and consult outside professional management and a 
negative attitude towards sharing of power.
-  382 -
The centralisation of power and decision making in an entrepreneur’s 
hands and notably financing issues, is a good indication and reflection of 
the influence of entrepreneurial understanding, knowledge and attitude in the 
way the company is financed, managed and the company's fate and prospects.
The main research findings stated above have theoretical and policy 
implications. On the theoretical level the survey provides a positive 
support to Timmons (1978) and other writers, that the financial gain is the 
most prominent motivating factor for going into business and continuing 
within the process of a money-making cycle. The survey provides inevitable 
evidence that entrepreneurial motivation for going into business cannot be 
explained only from economic or non-economic forces; motivation is based on 
interaction of economic, social and psychological motives. In this study 
entrepreneurial motivation has been tackled from the perspective of an 
entrepreneur as an individual, which implies that more research efforts are 
needed to explain and investigate the entrepreneurial motivation on an 
longitudinal basis and on a large sample, along the way to provide insight 
into understanding of elusive heftalump.
The survey provides and gives support to the established contention in 
the entrepreneurial literature that entrepreneurs are more educated than the 
general public. It also shows that there is a positive correlation between 
the size of the firm (small and large) and the educational level of an 
entrepreneur.
An analysis of the Sudanese entrepreneur in a small manufacturing 
industry as an individual gives and provides an empirical support to small 
enterprise development models (Patel, 1977; Neck, 1977; Bolton, 1971; Ray and 
Hutchinson, 1983), that entrepreneurship has an influence on the way the 
company is financed, organised and its prospect (Mechenz Model), which in
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turn provides an empirical examination of the research analytical framework.
With respect to implication for policy, a vital question and pertinent 
focal point need to be raised at the outset; what are the circumstances over 
which the policy maker has some control and which are likely to contribute to 
the development of entrepreneurship along the way to develop and foster the 
small business sector in the Sudan, A strategy for the development of 
entrepreneur would seem to involve the following points:-
First, at macro level the concerned strategy is to start with the 
establishment of an integrated public policy towards the development of an 
entrepreneur, commencing with the conceptualisation of the term leading to 
public policy and a well-detailed action plan and institutionalisation under 
Government sponsorship.
Second, initiation of policy and programmes to enhance the supply of the 
entrepreneur in the market as an agent of change and to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of entrepreneurial activities. The enchancement 
and promotion of entrepreneuial supply can be assigned to universities and 
other academic institutions in order to stimulate and encourage potential 
entrepreneurs (Harvard and Babson College approach; U.S,). Based on the 
contention and allegation that educated people operate better as 
entrepreneurs, McClleland's approach in stimulation and promotion of 
entrepreneurial supply can be adopted and used in the Sudan. The subject 
apporach can be built round a comprehensive entrepreneurial scheme focussing 
on educated, unemployed and/or disguised employees. This approach has 
social, economic and political values and merit in the Sudan nowadays, as a 
result of unemployment of university graduates in certain specialisations and 
the flow-back of immigrants from Arab petroleum countries following the 
recession and falling of petrol prices. At macro-level this programme can
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guarantee the promotion and development of productive sectors and curtailment 
of parasite economic activities.
The combination of management training, management knowledge and 
education is positively correlated with greater success. Thus, in order to 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of entrepreneural activities, 
specialised management training programmes according to the needs of small 
entrepreneurs have to be launched, taking into consideration the relevancy of 
contents, instruction style and timing. To attain this point of strategy, 
more effort is needed to identify first the entrepreneur, entrepreneurial 
management training needs and the proper way to approach the entrepreneurs. 
This requires the institutionalisation of a specialist body as a part of the 
existing management development institutions; mainly the Management 
Development Centre (M.D.C.) with objectives of providing management training 
services and managerial advice to small entrepreneurs. This requires 
qualified and specialised staff and instructors as well as specialists in the 
field of small business.
The Sudan as a text-book example of underdeveloped countries, looks to 
industrialisation as one of the most important keys to the realisation of its 
economic independence and ambitions. To attain this objective an action 
plan and programme is needed to be launched to provide technical advice to 
entrepreneurs at formation and throughout stages of their development. The 
suggested programmes will stand as a national strategy for technology and 
development based on the country’s needs, along the way to abolish the 
traditional and personalised way of forming an industrial establishment in 
the country. The Ministry of Industry and its affiliated bodies and 
institutes, mainly the Industrial Research and Consultancy Institute 
(I.R.C.I.) can be strengthened in terms of legislation, financial resources
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and staff to shoulder this responsiblity. The concerned proposal will 
furnish a platform for planned industrial development in a country of meagre 
financial resources, facing economic crisis, and categorised as one of the 
least twenty five developed countries in the world, with a very low per- 
capita income.
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C H A P T E R  T E N
FINANCIAL CONTROL CHARACTERISTICS AND PRACTICE 
OF SMALL FIRMS IN THE SUDAN
Accounting is conceived and practiced as an information measurement 
system dealing with the generation, verification and reporting of relevant 
data for micro and macro economic activities and resources (Enthoven, 1979). 
An American Accounting Committee (1966) defined accounting as: "The process
of identifying, measuring and communicating economic information to permit 
informed judgements and decisions by uses of the information". Enthoven, 
(1977) articulated that:-
"Accounting also has its impact on capital formation 
and the capital market mechanism ... Thus, a good 
accounting and auditing help in generating sufficient 
investor confidence to stimulate the flow of capital 
and to measure the efficient use of capital".
With respect to accounting practice in developing economies, a number of 
scholars and writers including. Whittle (1980); Perera (1975); and Qureshi 
(197*0 . concluded that accounting practice was very poor, and the level of 
financial accounting practiced has taken the form of mere technical recording 
rather than being an adjunct to planning and control functions. Parker 
(1984) rightly added that: "Deficiencies in developing country financial
accounting and reporting practices are varied ... The potential use of 
management accounting information for analysis and decision-making in both
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the macro and micro sectors of developing country economies has often been 
neglected".
Regarding small firms, it was established that the financial control 
systems operated by small firms in developed and developing economies tend to 
be poor and inadequate (see Chapter Two). Review of literature suggests that 
there is no significant difference between developed and developing 
economies, regarding the small firm financial control practice. Ray and 
Hutchinson (1975) and Osaze (1981) found that growth has an influence on the 
financial control practice of small firms. The main objective of this part 
of the study is to examine to what extent these findings hold true for small 
firms in the Sudan, and to what extent the financial control systems 
maintained by small firms is responsible for the identified finance gap.
To establish the Sudanese experience, its theoretical, and relevant 
policy implications on small enterprise development, the chapter is organised 
as follows: Part I, provides insight into the entrepreneurial attitude
towards financial control practiced by small firms. Analysis of the 
financial information produced by small firms at inception and growing stage 
of development as well as control of the key variables is presented 
thoroughly in Part II. Part III and IV, give an outline and insight into 
budgeting and strategic planning practice of small firms in the Sudan. The 
concluding section summarises the main investigation findings and theoretical 
and policy implications that emerge from this study.
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10.1 ENTREPRENEURIAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS ACCOUNTING
An attitude is an orientation toward certain objects or situations 
(Corne, 1975)* In measuring the entrepreneurial attitude towards accounting 
and accountant role, a surrogate measure approach (McKinlay, 1979; Said and 
Hughey, 1977; and Larson and Clute, 1979) and Sathe (1982) approach based on 
opinion, have been used in this study (see Chapter Four).
On development of the accounting profession in industralised developed
countries, Fregman (1976) argues that: "An empirical reason for this
advancement of the accounting profession is the fact that managers have come 
to appreciate the importance of accounting data and analyses in the effective 
administration of an enterprise". Sathe (1982) lends support to Fregman 
adding that management expectations regarding the controllers and accountant 
role can also influence the controller and accountant involvement in the
management of the business.
The empirical evidence from this study provides positive support to the 
body of knowledge findings that an entrepreneur has a poor understanding of 
the significance of accounting and does not understand accounting language. 
With respect to the status of book-keepers and/or accountants in the small 
business, the survey shows that 50% of book-keepers maintained by small firms 
at inception were either recruited on a part-time basis or a combination of 
full and part-time book-keepers. Table (10.1) presents an interesting result 
in that 75% of small firms at Inception tended to retain book-keepers as 
family members, relatives or entrepreneur's friend with little or no formal 
education and training in accounting ( S 0 % ) . The incompetent and untrained 
book-keepers employed by small businesses holding themselves out as qualified 
and trained accountants, from the standpoint of family belonging or as
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friends to entrepreneur. The low level of education and knowledge of 
accounting of book-keepers employed by small businesses at Inception can be 
reflected in the fact that 1 5 %  assigned the responsibility of annual final 
accounts - if any, and balance sheet preparation to external auditors or 
part-time accountants on personal grounds and friendship basis.
The small growing firms sample shows a slightly different profile for 
accountant status, as compared to small firms at Inception, in the sense that 
30# of the sample tended to retain a full-time chief accountant with 
accounting and industrial experience. Table (10.1) shows that 75/** o f  the 
small growing firm retained book-keepers on a full-time basis, with a very 
low percentage of family members and friends ( 2 5 % ) .  The accounting knowledge 
and experience of book-keepers employed by small growing firms is higher than 
that maintained by book-keepers retained by small firms at inception. This 
can be measured by responsibility of final accounts preparation in-house of 
the enterprise, with 45 # and 25% respectively.
This slight variation between the small firm at inception and small 
growing firms, regarding status of accountants and book-keepers can be 
attributed to the experience of the owner of the small growing firm and 
expansion and growth influence on the management practice of the small firm.
As far as qualification and accounting knowledge and training of book­
keepers retained by the small business, regardless of stage of development, 
Table (10.1) shows that 80# of book-keepers had no accounting education, nor 
any sort of training on accounting. Nearly 1 0 %  of the small firm experienced 
accounting problems, because the owners had neither the time nor trained 
accountants to provide expertise in this deficient area of small business 
management.
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The non-existence of qualified accountants in small businesses can be 
attributed to a number of factors: First, unawareness of the entrepreneur to
the significance of accounting and record-keeping system in managerial - 
decision-making process and in obtaining institutional credit. Second, the 
inability of the small firm, particularly at the inception stage to afford 
in-house accounting division and recruitment of qualified accountants which 
lead to the hiring of unqualified and incompetent bookkeeping services. The 
third factor is embodied in the fact that most of small firms were built 
around family ownership and management, with an entrepreneurial reluctance to 
approach, trust and recruit an outside professional staff (see Chapter Nine). 
One of the small business owners said that:
"We have the belief and conviction that every industry 
has its own secrecy, and particularly in accounting and 
financed records, and that is why we appoint family 
members as accountants".
The Table (10.1) denotes that, under Musharaka financing,the bank is 
involved in the maintenance of accounting records and recruitment and 
selection of book-keepers as well as external auditors. Thus the bank 
involvement in the management has an influence on the status of accountants in 
terms of qualification, terms of recruitment and the role in the management 
of the business. The Table shows that in some cases, the responsibility of 
final accounts were assigned to bank representative attached to the financed 
firm. This observation provides an empirical confirmation of Enthoven (1979) 
contention that banks can play an active role in up-grading accounting 
practice in third world countries.
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TABLE 10.1
















1. Chief Accountant - Full time 3 15 12 60 15 31.5
2. Chief Accountant - Part time 0 0 1 5 1 2.5
3. Bookkeepers - Full time 10 50 15 75 25 62.5
4. Bookkeepers - Part time 2 10 1 5 3 7-5
5. Bookkeepers - Full & Part tim< i 6 30 3 15 9 22.5
6. Chief Accountant/: 2 10 1 5 3 7-5
. Family Member 1 5 2 10 3 7.5
. Non Family Members 2 10 6 30 8 20
. Friend/s 0 0 4 20 4 10
. Bank Representatives 0 0 0 0 0 0
. Owner/s 0 0 1 5 1 2.5
7. Accountant/s Bookkeepers
. Family Members 8 40 4 20 12 30
. Non Family Members 4 20 14 70 18 45
. Friend/s 7 35 1 5 8 20
. Bank Representatives 4 20 0 0 4 10
8. Qualifications: 
Chief Accountants:
. University 2 10 4 20 6 15
. Professional 0 0 0 0 0 0
. Commercial secondary 1 5 1 5 2 5
. Academic secondary 0 0 7 35 7 17.5
. Intermediate 0 0 1 5 1 2.5
9. Qualifications: Accountants
8. University 4 20 4 20 20
. Professional 0 0 0 0 0 0
. Commercial secondary school 1 5 1 5 2 5
. Academic secondary schools 16 80 16 80 32 80
. Intermediate 2 10 0 0 2 5
Responsibility for the 
preparation of profit and loss 
A/C and B/sheet
8 20. Chief Accountant - F. time 2 10 6 30
. Accountant - Full time 5 25 l 5 6 15
. Accountant - Part time 6 30 3 15 9 22.5
. External Auditor 6 30 5 25 11 27-5
. Bank Representative 5 25 2 10 7 17.5
. Entrepreneur/s 1 5 1 5 2 5
. Friend/s 0 0 1 5 1 2.5
. General Manager 0 0 1 5 1 2.5
CONTINUED.
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who advised on the maintenance 
of accounting records
. External Auditor 7 35 14 70 21 52.5
. Self 6 30 6 30 12 30
. Bank 6 30 3 15 9 22.5
. Private Consultants 0 0 0 0 0 0
. Friend/s 7 35 2 10 9 22.5
. Family member/s 2 10 0 0 2 5
. Partner/s 0 0 0 0 0 0
who advised on appointments 
of Accountants
. External Auditor 5 25 9 45 14 35
. Self 15 75 2 10 17 42.5
. Bank 4 20 14 70 18 45
. Private Consultants 0 0 0 0 0 0
. Friend/s 6 30 0 0 6 15
. Family member/s 1 5 0 0 1 2.5
. Partner/s 0 0 1 5 1 2.5
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The survey points out that more than 50# of small firms maintained their 
accounting records, and recruited and retained accounting personnel either as 
self-responsibility or on an informal basis though advice provided by friends 
or relatives. The survey shows that the entrepreneur resists advice from 
qualified sources, but accepts it readily from those least qualified, in the 
sense that none of the entrepreneurs had consulted a private consultant on 
appointments or maintenance of accounting systems, other than an external 
auditor as a part of accounts approval, or as a legal action and prequision. 
This situation is aggravated by the fact that most of the entrepreneurs (90#) 
are entirely un-trained in accounting and do not understand the role of 
accounting in managing an enterprise.
In response to the question on the opinion of the entrepreneur on the 
role of accounting and accountants in the decision-making process and help in 
raising finance (Sathe approach), most of the entrepreneurs (90#) reported 
that accountants have no role in decision-making and in managing and 
operating the business. Very few, (30#), pointed out that the role of 
accountant in raising finance is confined to preparation of documentation.
An accountant of one of the small firm, commented that:
"It is a general practice in the Sudan, that the owner 
is taking the whole responsibility in raising finance 
and controlling cash resources. In small firms, manage­
ment is not capable to identify and specify the accounting 
information needed, and this is mainly attributed to the fact 
that many of them have not had a minimum knowledge of accounting”.
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This observation is consistent with Perera (1975) finding in 
investigating the accounting practice in private enterprises in Sri Lanka.
He stated that: "The control of private enterprise by a small elite group of
owners - managers has allowed them to believe that they need only a minimum 
of accounting information".
The research findings cn entrepreneur attitude towards accountants and 
the accounting role, explained the phenomenon why small businessmen attempt 
to run a firm without adequate and complete accounting system. Bates and 
Hally (1982) asserted that:
"Many owners of small businesses are horrified by 
accounts of any sort, because they rarely seem to 
tell them very much, and hardly ever seem to have 
much relevance to current operations. The terminology 
of the accountant is precise and meaningful to 
profession, but it is frequently obscure and 
misleading to the layman, and many owners of small 
businesses are simply overawed".
the empirical investigation provides evidence that accounting problems 
experienced by small businesses could be attributed to the fact that an 
entrepreneur has a poor understanding of the significance of accounting.
Given this attitude, the vital question to be raised, what is the financial 
control profile of the small firm. To this point that we direct attention 
now.
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10.2 FINANCIAL CONTROL CHARACTERISTICS OF SMALL FIRMS 
10.2.1 CLASSIFICATION OF FINANCIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS
The primary problem of classifying and stating the financial control 
characteristics and profile is that there are no generally accepted or 
readily available means of describing and classifying financial control 
systems (Hutchinson, Piper and Ray, 1975)* To establish the state of the art 
of the financial control systems of small firms at inception and growing 
stage of development, the description adopted was based upon the frequency 
and type of information produced within the company. The weakness of this 
approach of analysis is based on the assumption that the information produced 
is used by an entrepreneur for a decision-making process or for the 
presentation of financial documentation to lenders and financiers, (see 
Chapter Four).
To build a dichotomy and a basis of comparison between small firms at 
inception and small growing firms, a scaling model has been developed as a 
surrogate for classification of information produced by the two groups.
Construction of the Scale
The established scaling model is an ordinal one, in the sense that 
numbers are assigned to the various instances of the property, so that the 
order of the numbers corresponds to the order of magnitude of the objectives 
and instances. The data collected were based on opinions and descriptions of 
the financial control system of the sample firms, provide the basis of the 
model, and facilitates the measurement and build up this classification and 
dichotomy. This measure is based on a range of a continuum using a scale of
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'O' for non-documentary and non-reporting of accounting information, to *5* 
for sophisticated or formal and very frequent historical and forecasted 
financial information and reporting of the key financial variables. [Ray, 
1979]* The subject model has been developed in this study as a surrogate for 
the lack of quantification in this area (see Research Methodology Chapter - 
Chapter Four).
The weakness of the scaling model is based on frequency and type of 
information produced. The scaling model is built and structured round a 
numbering of objects and stimuli, which does not explain the distance and 
variation within the rank. Ray (1979) pointed out that:
"Care is needed in the interpretation of these classification, 
since it should be borne in mind that sophistication is a 
description of frequency and type of information, not an 
evaluation of the efficiency or effectiveness of the system".
Based on the scaling model (10.2), the survey shows that most small 
firms at inception, (95%) started, with a rudimentary and non-documented 
accounting information. This observation provides positive support to 
Lievegaed (1973) and Ray and Hutchinson (1979) on what they called a pioneer 
enterprise. Table (10.3) shows that 95% of current small firms at inception 
tended to maintain informal and ad hoc reporting of a key financial 
variables, identified in this study as sales, cash, wages, debtors, 
creditors, stocks and materials. The survey shows that the small growing on 
the whole (average basis) tended to have better accounting systems in terms 
of degree of formality and frequency of information produced within the 
company. Table (10.4) and figure (10.1) show that 65% of the small growing
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TABLE 10.2 
RANKING OF SCALING MODEL
RANK OBJECTS AND STIMULI
0 Non documented and non-reporting of 
accounting information. Control systems 
would be completely inadequate, 
rudimentary and based on adhoc and 
informal reporting
1 Adhoc and informal reporting of key 
financial variables and annual reporting 
of financial statements of historical 
nature
2 Informal and formal reporting of key 
financial variables with annual and half 
yearly reporting of historical financial 
statements, with informal reporting of 
forecast financial information
3 Most frequent reporting of financial 
variables with half-yearly reporting 
of financial statements and formal and 
informal reporting of forecast financial 
information
4 Most frequent formal reporting of key 
financial variables, with a quarterly 
reporting of historical and financial 
information
5 Most frequent reporting of key financial 
variables on formal basis, and monthly 
and weekly reporting of financial 
information, planning practice, budgeting 
and responsibility centre concept.
-  398 -
firm can be accommodated within score (2) according to the classification of 
the scaling model and 35# of the sample shares the characteristics of small 
firms at inception.
On an aggregate basis, the survey shows that 6 5 %  of the small firm 
sample, tended to keep informal and adhoc reporting of key financial 
variables, and the accounting system is confined merely to recording of 
actual transactions with a historical profit and loss account and balance 
sheet as an end product for taxation and raising of finance purposes.
Perera, (1975); Ogon, (1978), and Tuchau, (1978) concluded that financial 
accounting practice in developing countries has often been seemed to be 
concerned primarily with manipulating accounting records and reports, for the 
purpose of taxation evasion (Parker, 1984).
Trade (10.4) in conjunction with the pattern of financing and financial 
facilities available to small growing firms (Chapter 5; Table 5). provides an 
empirical evidence that financing is associated and interacted with financial 
control, in the sense that small growing firms with relatively adequate 
financial control systems, were successful in obtaining institutional 
finance. The degree of adequacy does not represent the whole story of 
raising finance, rather it explained the interaction between financing and 
financial control (see Chapter Seven and Eight).
The survey shows an interesting point in that there is a positive 
correlation between the level of education of an entrepreneur with management 
and accounting knowledge and the degree of adequacy of the financial control 
systems. The survey shows that 3 5 %  of the small growing firm with a 
relatively adequate system, as compared to the rest of the population, were 
managed by an educated entrepreneur with some sort of management knowledge 
and enlightment. Bamberger (1983) observed that: ’’Small and medium-sized
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firms are usually family-owned firms. The principal owner is often 
identified with the top manager. His personality, values, convictions, 
education and experiences overwhelmingly influence the information and policy 
decisions".
Based on the ranking of the scaling model, the survey provides positive 
support to the research hypothesis that the degree of adequacy and inadequacy 
of the financial control systems of small firms varies from one stage of 
development to another.
FIGURE 10.1 
RANKING OF THE FINANCIAL CONTROL 


































0 9 5 % 5 % 0 0 0
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TABLE 10.4 
RANKING OF SMALL GROWING FIRMS SAMPLE;
NO. SOPHISTICATION MODEL






















0 352 652 0 0 0
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10.2.2 TYPE AND FREQUENCY OF INFORMATION PRODUCED
Having classified the financial information produced by the small firm 
and built a dichotomy between small firms at inception and small growing 
firms, this part of the chapter will explain in more detail the ranking 
adopted according to the scaling model, in attempt to establish the financial 
control characteristics of the small firm.
Table (10.5) shows that all small firms prepared annual accounts. The 
Table shows hardly surprising result, that growth did not change or increase 
the frequency of the historical financial statements. This observation can 
be explained by the fact that a financier requires historical data, (see 
Table 8.17; Chapter Eight). The Table indicates that the majority of the 
small firm (98#) did not produce a projected profit and loss account and 
balance sheet. It was noticed that entrepreneurs of small firms had no idea 
of the importance and significance of forecasted financial information and 
often reported that they had not heard of it.
The picture and symptom of poorness and inadequacy of the financial 
control practice of the small firm can be drawn as influence based on absence 
and non-existence of historical and forecasted cash flow and non-existent of 
use and sources of funds statement. Said and Hughey (1977) argued that:
"cash management is another essential ingredient of business success. Both 
planning for adequate cash levels and for sources from which funds can be 
obtained cheaply and conveniently can be facilitated if the owner-manager 
knows about alternative sources of financing and appropriate ways to manage 
cash flow and outlaw". The survey provides an empirical confirmation of 
Larson and Clute (1979) observation that the entrepreneur's understanding of 
cash-flow is that, if the firm earns a high profit, the cash flow will be
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adequate. This misconception stands as an indication of lack of accounting 
knowledge in the small firm under the direction of the owner as a dominant 
coalition. The first step to solve this problem of misconception is to make 
an entrepreneur aware of these accounting terms and techniques. This is a 
mission of educational and management development institutes.
The review of waking capital is built round the review of raw-material 
which needs to be financed from private sources or instituionally. Table 
10.5 shows that 42.5 %  of small firms received their raw-material needs at 
finance application. Under 'Murabaha' finance, which is the most common 
financing instrument used by banks in providing funds to clients (see 
Chapters Five and Eight), financing is highly associated with goods, which 
are raw-materials, in case of industry. The Table shows that 5 5 %  of small 
growing firms, which depend largely on external finance; review their working 
capital needs for Murabaha finance as a documentation at the negotiation 
table. This in turn, reflects the effect fo the financing instrument on the 
financial control practice.
The difference between small firms at inception and small growing firms 
can largely be seen in the review of fixed assets, evaluation and re- 
evaluation of fixed assets inventories. This can be attributed to the fact 
that small growing firms at various stages of grwoth are external finance 
seekers, so as to meet growth needs in terms of fixed assets or capacity 
expansion. The participating-capital agreement - Musharaka - based on 
capital sharing stimulate the re-evaluation of fixed assets. Moreover 
financing under both Islamic and interest-based system is provided under 
guarantee and higher valued security (see Chapters Seven and Eight), which 
can be satisfied by the assets of the applicants. Thus, the institutional 
finance has an effect on entrepreneur awareness of the importance of
TABLE 10.5 
TYPE AND FREQUENCY OF INFORMATION 
PRODUCED WITHIN SMALL FIRMS























































2. Historical Balance Sheet
a. 0 0 0 0 0 0
b. 0 0 0 0 0 0
c. 0 0 0 0 0 0
d. 1 5 0 0 1 2.5
e. 20 100 20 100 40 100
f. 0 0 0 0 0 0
g- 0 0 0 0 0 0
3. Planning p/c A/c
a. 0 0 0 0 0 0
b. 0 0 0 0 0 0
c. 0 0 0 0 0 0
d. 0 0 0 0 0 0
e. 0 0 0 0 0 0
f. 0 0 0 0 0 0
g- 20 100 20 100 40 100
4. Projected Balance Sheet
a. 0 0 0 0 0 0
b. 0 0 0 0 0 0
c. 0 0 0 0 0 0
d. 0 0 1 5 1 2.5
e. 0 0 0 0 0 0
f. 0 0 0 0 0 0
CONTINUED.
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g. 20 100 19 95 39 97.5
5. Review of Working Capital
. weekly 0 0 0 0 0 0
. monthly 0 0 2 10 2 5
. seasonal 5 25 4 20 9 22.5
. on finance application 6 30 11 55 17 42.5
. annual 1 5 2 10 3 7.5-
. on review of production 7 35 4 20 11 27-5
. not done 4 20 1 5 35 12.5
6. Review of Financial Gearing
a. weekly 0 0 0 0 0 0
b. monthly 0 0 0 0 0 0
c. on finance application 0 0 0 0 0 0
d. annual 0 0 0 0 0 0
e. not done 20 100 20 100 40 100
7. Review of Inventory and of 
fixed assets
. on finance request 1 5 6 30 7 17.5
. annual 0 0 9 45 9 22.5
. not done 19 95 8 40 27 67.5
. new contract 0 0 2 10 2 5
8. Historical Cash Flow
. not done 20 100 20 100 40 100
. annual 0 0 0 0 0 0
9. Forecasted C.F.
. not done 20 100 20 100 40 100
. annual 0 0 0 0 0 0
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financial control.
10.2.3 CONTROL OF THE KEY FINANCIAL VARIABLES
In order to determine the difference between the small firm at 
inception and the small growing firms, with regard to entrepreneur awareness 
of the importance of formal and most frequent financial reporting, and what 
they perceived and considered as most important items for them to control and 
their association with pattern of financing, respondents were asked about 
which three items in profit and loss account and three items in the balance 
sheet, did they regard as most important to control.
Table (10.6) shows that sale was regarded as a most important profit 
and loss item to be controlled by all sample firms. The survey shows that 
sale control is the founder's and entrepreneur's sole responsibility and 
direct supervision in most cases. This practice stemmed from the fact that 
small businessmen often emphasize the volume and amount of sales as 
indicators of success. The other items signled out by the small firm as 
most important to control were raw-material and overhead charges. The Table 
shows that there was no difference between small firms at inception and small 
growing firms, with regard to ranking of these items, but the difference lies 
in their weight of importance.
The survey shows an interesting observation that some of the small 
growing firms { 1 0 % )  regarded bank charges as a most important item to keep an 
eye upon. This observation was an indication of the volume of extenral 
source of finance received by firms in question. Regarding frequency, sales 
and raw-materials were reported daily, but the difference between the small
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TABLE 10.6 
CONTROL ITEMS - MOST IMPORTANT ITEMS
ST. UP. GROWING TOTAL
NO. % NO. % NO %
1. Profit and Loss items:
(1) sales 20 100 20 100 40 100
(2) raw-material costs 19 95 13 65 32 80
(3) net profit of the year 5 25 7 35 12 30
(4) overhead expenses 12 60 8 40 20 50
(5) Excise duties 2 10 0 0 2 5
(6) Factory expenses 2 10 1 5 3 7-5
(7) Bank Interest Charges 0 0 2 10 2 5
2. Balance Sheet Items:
(1) Cash and Bank balances 19 95 16 80 35 88
(2) Bank as a Creditor 13 65 10 50 23 57.5
(3) Suppliers as T. Creditors 4 20 15 75 19 47-5
(4) Stocks 14 70 14 70 28 70
(5) Debtors 8 40 12 60 20 50
(6) Assets (F.A.) 0 0 2 10 2 5
firms at inception and the small growing firms practice lies in the degree of 
variation of process of reporting into formal and informal communciation.
The survey shows that most of the small firms at inception (90%) relied on 
verbal communication, whereas the small growing firms on average (^ 5%) 
maintained a system built round a certain degree of formality and informality 
relationships. The degree of informality stemmed from the fact that sales 
and all other items with direct monetary connotation, were under entrepreneur 
responsibility in most cases.
The most important balance sheet items perceived by the entrepreneurs 
reflect the financing pattern. Table (10.6) shows that & & %  of small firms 
regarded cash and bank balances control as a most important item. The survey 
shows a hardly surprising result that cash control was given the highest 
priority by all firms, regardless of stage of development. This observation 
generally explained small business reliance on internal finance, which 
brought about this sort of concentration on cash control. It was noticed 
that entrepreneurs were shouldering the sole responsibility of cash control 
and in most cases were involved in the detailed works of cash recording.
This observation explains the mentality of entrepreneur with more emphasis on 
cash control, perceived as a key success factor, and lack of any sort of 
planning on cash flow, which questioned cash management in small firms and 
the capability of the owner-manager to manage cash resources properly.
In addition to cash control, small growing firms (75%)♦ ranked trade 
creditors as the second most important balance sheet item to control. This 
factor put the demarcation line between small firms at inception and small 
growing firms, with regard to financing and control emphasis (see Chapter 
Five; Table 5*13)• In response to the question: "did you have a system for 
aging and following up of debtors and creditors", 60% of small firms at
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inception reported that they did not maintain any sort of control on debtors 
and creditors, simply because they did not deal on credit transactions, 
whereas 95# of small growing firms tended to keep a system.
With respect to costing data, the survey provides empirical confirmation 
of Bolton, (1971) observation in the U.K., that the costing data of small 
firms were very poor. This can be reflected in the calculation of costing 
data and prices of product accordingly. Most of the small firms relied on 
prices decided by the Government, as a small producer with little or no 
influence on price determination - financial mobility concept - Despite the 
poorness of costing data maintained by the small firm, this factor brought 
further slight difference between small firms at inception and small growing 
firms. The empirical investigation shows that 50# of small growing firms 
prepared a historical cost sheet of their products. This could be attributed 
to the fact that some small growing firms as also well established ones had 
some sort of influence on price determination, competing with large and mass 
producers. The survey shows non-use and non-existence of standard cost 
techniques in controlling operation and evaluation of performance.
The non use of project appraisal techniques in evaluation of new 
projects by the majority of small firms (92.5#). was an indication of poor 
accounting knowledge and low level of sophistication or in other words, a 
crude and rudimentary system of performance evaluation and investment and 
appraisal decision practice in the small firm. Small growing firms, with 
15# showing slight difference, reported that they used payback method in 
project appraisal. One noticed that the entrepreneur's lack of knowledge of 
these terms and most of them (70#) reported their ignorance and had not heard 
of them.
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10.3 PLANNING PRACTICE IN THE SMALL FIRM
There has long been a concern among management theorists about the 
failure of the small business in developed and developing economies to 
practice planning. Godde, (1983) pointed out that "the basic tendency of 
small business is to shy away from planning ... the struggle for day to day 
survival in small companies saps the amount of attention which can be devoted 
to planning ... Another tendency of small business planning is that it 
concerns with the short-run". Still, (1980) concluded that planning in 
small firms is unstructured, irregular and uncomprehensive.
The evidence from this research effort based on examination of 
presence and absence of budgeting and strategic planning of the small firm at 
inception and small growing firms, provides an empirical confirmation of the 
body of knowledge that financial planning in the small firm is very poor and 
confined to informal and short-term thinking.
10.3.1 BUDGETING
V. Horn (1975) defined budget as a quantitative expression of a plan 
of action and an aid to coordination and control. Despite the gloomy picture 
of budgeting practices in small firms as a whole, in the Sudan, this area 
brought out a clear difference between small firms at inception and small 
growing firms. The survey shows that 85% of small firms at inception did not 
experience a preparation of any sort of budgeting, as compared to of 
small growing firms experienced very short budgeting practice. On aggregate, 
72. 5% of small firms did not maintain any budgeting system.
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The empirical investigation shows that of those who experienced 
budgeting practice (2 7-5%)• their forecasts and budgeting was based round the 
production and manufacturing equation, with a complete non-existence of other 
types of budget. The survey shows that banks under Musharaka finance or big 
volume under Murabaha finance, had an influence on the budgeting practice, 
based and built round the financed transactions.
The reasons reported by entrepreneurs for not practising or producing a 
budgeting system could be summed up into the following:
- they did not need it
- it is necessary; but we are busy
- lack of ideas and lack of understanding 
of its significance and importance
- lack of qualified accountants
Regarding the use of budget as a tool of performance evaluation, most of 
entrepreneurs reported that a budget is based round an estimation of 
production needs, on an informal basis, and none of the survey firms reported 
using a system of budgetary control. On budget choice as a planning and 
control mechanism and device in a small firm, Churchill (1984) concludes 
that:
"Large companies concerned about operational efficiency
should focus on the coordination and control aspects of
budgeting while small and innovative companies should be
concerned with planning aspects".
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The focal point worth pointing out in this context is what logical and 
practical steps should be taken so as to remove the barriers to budgeting 
practice in the small firm. Churchill (1983) added that: "whatever the
focus, budget preparation and implementation are important in carrying out 
company strategy and in professionalizing the smaller company".
10.3.2 STRATEGIC PLANNING PRACTICE
As far as long-range planning is concerned the survey shows non­
existence of systematic thinking and formal and written strategic planning in 
the small firm. This area of management based on informality process marked 
to a lesser extent the difference between the small firm at inception and the 
small growing firms, with tendency of expansion and development. The 
empirical investigation shows that none of the small firms at inception 
reported their tendency to keep a long-range plan, as compared to 40% of 
small growing firms, which tended to keep informal thinking or formal and 
written proposals either as an application for finance or merely as a 
feasibility study.
There is no need to provide more evidence of an entrepreneur’s lack 
of knowledge. Most of entrepreneurs ( 7 0 % )  reported that they did not need it 
and 23% reported that they were not aware of it and had not heard of the 
significance of strategic planning in business management. Walker and Petty 
(1978) argued that:
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"Many entrepreneurs lack interest in planning, since 
most of them achieved their position as a direct result 
of their technical, rather than managerial knowledge".
The degree of informality in the planning process, was explained by 
Golde (1983) in that: "part of the leaning toward informality is explained
simply by the fact that writing things down and figuring out details takes 
time, time which may be well worth expending in the long-run, but which can 
appear extravagent in the short-run". The empirical investigation adds 
another dimension that the low level of education of an entrepreneur, lack of 
managerment skill and misconception of management has an influence on the 
degree of informality if not non-existence. Thurston (1983) found a 
justification for the degree of informality in the small business planning 
process, arguing that: "executives in a small business can take various
approaches, ranging from the informal and unwritten to the formal and 
written. The best approach depends on variables such as administrative 
style, officers ability and business complexities".
The vital question to be raised in this context is, what are the 
barriers to planning on the short and long range basis in a small business.
It was contented that planning is concerned with the determination of the 
basic objective/s of the enterprise and the taking of necessary actions to 
achieve the objective/s. From the empirical survey, the evidence is clear 
that goals and objectives in specific forms are seldom considered and 
enunciated. In response to the question, "what level of profitability, 
liquidity and financial gearing did you aim to maintain, most of the 
respondents reported non-existence of specific objective and an objective to 
them was general and very broad reflected in profit-generation, expansion and
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survival tendency. Still (1980) concluded that: ”... basic company goals
... are considered very infrequently, goal setting behaviour is unstructured 
and subjective”. Thus, lack and non-recognition of specific objectives is 
one of the barriers to planning in the small business.
Lack of knowledge and understanding of the significance of planning in 
business management, which formed the entrepreneurial attitude towards 
planning is strong evidence of entrepreneural neglect of the importance of 
planning function. Golde (1983) observes that planning to small businessmen, 
means grappling with tremendous uncertainties over which it seems they have 
little control.
Lack of qualified staff and specialists in small firms could be one of 
the reasons behind the planning deficiency. A growing number of authors and 
scholars including Golde (1964), Timmons, Smollen and Dingee (1977)* Gilmore 
(1971) argue that outside professional staff and specialists may be very 
valuable aids to planning in small businesses as a vehicle to close the 
entrepreneural knowledge gap. The main constraint of the use of outside 
professionals and specialists is the attitude of entrepreneurs who are 
reluctant to use and consult outside professional management (see Chapter 
Nine). Thus, the first and most necessary requirements for solving and 
introducing planning concepts in small firms with varying degrees of 
processes and contents is to make an entrepreneur aware of the cost of non­
existence or poor planning and resulting lack of specific objective and 
financial information. Thus, in the final analysis the issue is the question 
of attitude and understanding.
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10.4 CONCLUSIONS
The empirical findings of this study, have theoretical and policy 
implications. Some of the implications that emerge from this study are of 
especial significance for management development institutes and other 
specialised bodies attempting to help the small business and financial 
institutions, looking for involvement, in the area of small business 
financing under various financing mechanisms particularly those instruments, 
which are based upon capital and management sharing.
Essentially, the empirical study provides confirmation of the research 
hypothesis (Hypothesis 5) based on a dichotomy between small firms at 
inception and the small growing firm's financial control practice.
The empirical evidence from this study provides positive support to the 
conclusions made by scholars (Bolton, 1971; Boswell, 1972; Ray, Piper and 
Hutchinson, 1975; Golde, 1983)# that the financial control systems maintained 
by small firms are either incomplete, rudimentary or non-existent, and in 
most cases they are confined to mere technical recording of actual 
transactions. The research effort has on observation that most small firms 
have little written communication and the control procedures are usually 
adhoc and informed, built round an entrepreneur as a dominant coalition 
acting as an enterpriser managing and controlling a pioneer organisation. An 
inference can be drawn strongly from this study that the planning in small 
businesses is very poor, confined to informal and short-term thinking. The 
lack of planning and poor and inadequate control procedures as a 
complementary process, implies the neglect of the use of management 
accounting information for analysis and decision-making.
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The empirical investigation has identified that there is a positive 
correlation between growth and the degree of adequacy of the financial
control systems. This, in turn provides confirmation of the contention that
there is an interaction between financing and financing control. The crudity 
and rudimentary profile of the financial control systems maintained by the 
small firm, in conjunction with the importance of financial documentation in 
raising institutional finance, a principal inference that can be drawn that 
the financial control profile is partially responsible for the identified 
finance gap.
Based on a description of accounting and financial information produced 
by the small firm, accounting problems experienced by the small business, can
be summed up as follows:
1. incomplete and inadequate accounting system
2. no cash flow analysis
3. lack or improper cash management
4. no working capital analysis
5. no budget and no long-range plan.
The accounting problems and rudimentary profile of the financial control 
system maintained by small businesses can be attributed to the fact that the 
entrepreneur has a poor understanding of the significance of accounting and 
does not understand accounting language. This attitude explained the 
phenomenon of why small businessmen attempt to run a firm without adequate 
records and trained accountants.
Regarding policy implication as a practical and logical step to provide 
management assistance to the small business, so as to fill a deficiency in
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financial control practice, one should start with an entrepreneur and 
managemnet of a small business, making him aware of the significance and 
importance of accounting information in operating and managing an enterprise. 
Educational sessions and management training programmes stressing methods of 
structuring and administering financial information systems and means of 
presenting and utilising financial information should be conducted by 
management developing institutes and other bodies attempting to help the 
small firm.
Banks and particularly development banks, under the Islamic financing 
instrument - Musharaka - are usually involved in the management of the 
business with varying degrees of involvement. This practice questioned the 
capability of bankers to provide this specialised services and their ability 
to assess and evaluate the accounting services needed by the small business. 
This in turn will initiate the role of management development institutes in 




THE RESEARCH FINDINGS 
AND
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
11.1 In this empirical study five basic questions have been
discussed at length. These are the conceptualisation of small business 
in the Sudan; the question of financing characteristics and financial 
profile, as well as the identification of financial difficulties 
experienced by small firms, the financial institutions' behaviour 
towards small business financing in a developing economy, the characteristic 
of the Sudanese manufacturing entrepreneurs and to what extent they 
affect the financial behaviour and financial control profile of 
the small firm; and finally, the issue of the financial control 
practice and to what extent its degrees of adequacy varies with growth 
rate. These questions have been built round the research analytical 
framework, and expressed precisely in the research hypotheses.
By virtue of their origin, the research hypotheses stood as a link 
between theory and practice, being derived logically from the Sudan 
experience (See Chapter 3 and Volume 2).
The empirical investigation has been classified into two 
phases. Phase one is a pilot study based on a case study approach, 
with the objective of testing empirically the conceptual framework 
and developing a testable research hypothesis. The second phase is 
the empirical test of the research hypotheses on a large sample of 
both small and large firms, as well as financial institutions operating 
in the country.
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In addressing empirically the research question, the 
researcher adopted a rational, logical and scholarly precedents of 
methods, based on conventional analysis of accounting data, supported 
with material obtained from in-firm interviews. The scope and 
methodological approach add to the value of the research findings as 
salient factors in the body of knowledge and as firm platform for 
practical policy implications. The vital question to be addressed 
first is what are the major conclusions from the study, and how do 
the research findings fit into the general body of knowledge, 
particularly as it relates to small firm financing.
The empirical findings of this investigation have been 
stated at various points throughout the preceding chapters (5-10).
It may now be possible to combine and summarise the main conclusions 
of the study in relation to the hypotheses and their theoretical 
implications.
11.2 Hypothesis I
Essentially, the empirical study provides confirmation of 
the first research hypothesis. The empirical investigation singled out 
the financial dissimilarities between small firms at inception, small 
growing firms and large firms in developing economies like the Sudan. 
(See Ch. 5; 5.3).
With regard to the finance theory, the study provides 
confirmation of the applicability of the ’’Even Hypothesis” to such 
economies as the Sudan, that the life cycle of the firm and stage of 
development have an influence on financing pattern and financial
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behaviour of the small firm. The study went further in providing 
a documented modification to the traditional financial theory that 
owners’ personal savings, supported by family resources, are the most 
important source of finance at inception stage of development. The 
small growing profile provides a true and full applicability of the 
traditional theory.
Regarding family contribution, the study provides 
conclusive evidence that the role of the family in financing 
business operations correlates inversely with growth, whereas its 
involvement in the management of the business correlates positively 
with growth. The former point explains the accessibility of growing 
firms to external sources of finance and the latter one emerged from 
the prevailing social system in the Sudan, built around the extended 
family concept. This observation leads to a principal inference 
that small business in developing counties is not only a form of 
economic activity built solely on commercial footing, but also an 
interaction of economic, social and psychological forces.
As far as external sources of finance were concerned, the 
study challenged the established contention in the literature on 
Trade Credit finance, in the sense that the survey shows that small 
firms at inception were relatively large users of bank borrowing than 
of Trade Credit. The small growing firm and large private enterprise 
show that there is a positive correlation between bank and trade 
credit facilities and Government credit facilities under bank 
guarantee and coverage.
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The empirical study shows that the very smallest companies 
at inception tend to finance a large part of their financial needs 
from internal resources, whereas the very largest companies tend to 
rely on institutional and external sources of finance. This extends 
support to the financial mobility concept of Donaldson and the large 
firm’s influence and say on the environment and its ability to raise 
institutional finance.
On choice of finance, the study provides confirmation of 
the contention made by behavioural economists that the financial 
behaviour of the firm is affected largely by the attitude of 
entrepreneurs and to what extent this will affect the ownership and 
control of the business. The research identified that the divorce of 
ownership from control, which is most likely to be found in very large
firms, has an influence on the pattern of financing, and mainly on the
use of equity finance. Regarding the Musharaka financing instrument, 
the study has identified that there was an indirect congruence of 
attitudes between banks and entrepreneurs. Banks do not like
Musharaka because the administrative cost is very high, and
entrepreneurs disapprove on the grounds that banks become involved in 
management of the business.
11.3 Hypothesis II
This study has made a significant contribution to the body 
of knowledge by establishing the financial profile of the small firm 
at the inception stage of development in developing economies. Small 
firms at inception rely more heavily on their savings than do small 
growing firms and large firms, and this has implications for the 
liquidity, financial gearing and profitability profile of the said
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small firms at inception stage. The study provides support to the 
traditional view of the financial life-cycle of the firm (Weston and 
Brighton, 1978), that under-capitalisation is one of the financial 
characteristics of the small firm at inception stage of development.
The research goes further, providing support to previous 
research findings that the small growing firm tends to possess a 
unique profile, with a certain degree of similarity to that of failed 
firms, in terms of liquidity and high financial gearing, but 
differentiated by profitability as a compensation for illiquidity.
The empirical investigation shows that small firms were 
less debt-oriented than their large private enterprise counterparts.
The empirical finding on profitability challenges the 
development effect of economxes of scale in developing economies like 
the Sudan, showing that the small business is more efficient in 
utilising capacity, and is more profitable. This Inverse Correlation 
between size and profitability is explained by the fact that large 
enterprises are more subject to macro economic factors than small 
firms. The observation provides support to the Schumacherian Slogan 
that "small is beautiful", and provides an answer to the controversial 
issue of which economic sector plays a leading role in the process of 
economic development.
The relatively higher degree of profit-retention maintained 
by the small growing firm was an indication of the success of the 
management of small growing firms in striking a balance and 
reconciling the demands of the family and business needs. That sort
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of financial and investment behaviour in the light of capital 
shortage posited that the growth question is not confined only to 
the availability of finance, but rather both finance and management.
11.4 Hypotheses III and IV
Based on rigorous analysis of accounting and non-accounting 
data of the small firms, in conjunction with their large private 
enterprise counterparts, the empirical study on multi-dimensional 
measurement has identified the existence of a small business financing 
gap in the Sudan. Thus, this research states that a chronic shortage 
of finance for start-up, expansion and working capital finance is one 
of the most widespread and typical characteristics of small firms in 
developing economies. The conclusion reached in this study of the 
small business financing gap in the Sudan differs sharply from those 
reached and strongly expressed by scholars in developing countries, 
into false demand of capital. This finding does not argue the 
validity of the contention raised by scholars (Bates, 1961) that small 
business finance gap does not really exist because most small businesses 
unable to obtain adequate long-term finance are not worthy of these 
funds, but rather provides firm evidence that small business is 
discriminated against in the financial market. The average small firm's 
low level of retained earnings together with a lack of institutional 
long-term financial facilities, is an indication of the financial 
difficulties small businesses experience in both meeting start-up 
capital needs, and sustaining growth.
The finance gap identified in this study, is created by 
capital market operations, an institutional and information gap,
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entrepreneurial typology, and financial control deficiency. Thus, the 
identified finance gap is a consequence of multiple factors beyond the 
macro-economic factors embodied in shortage of finance in developing 
economies.
As to the financial institutions’ relationship with small 
business, the research extends support to the criticism of banks’ lack 
of response to new ideas, and their negative attitude towards small 
business financing. Using a loan-to-deposit ratio, the survey proved 
that there existed large amounts of un-utilised loan capacity with the 
Commercial banks in the Sudan. This finding in conjunction with small 
business finance gap was a good indication of the Commercial banks’ 
behaviour towards small business financing. This state of affairs 
could be explained by the fact that Commercial banks were highly 
security-conscious and profit-oriented.
With respect to the development financial institutions, the 
research findings questioned the philosophical, theoretical and 
practical justification for establishing these institutions, since 
they tended to provide finance on stringent security terms and at 
rates of interest similar, if not higher than those charged by 
conventional Commercial banks.
Regarding information and advice on financial facilities, 
the analysis of the supply-side result is consistent with the inference 
derived from the opinion of the demand-side, leading to a principal 
premise that there is a 'Bolton Gap’ in the Sudan. The information 
and advice gap was a direct consequence of the policy, and small 
business institutional gap in the Sudan.
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Examination of small business financing from both the 
demand and supply-side shows that there was an interaction between 
financing and financial control, in the sense that the documentation 
has been ranked as an important factor in raising institutional 
finance. The nature of the bank is an influential factor in providing 
funds to clients.
The uniqueness of this approach of small business financing 
gap identification provides a strong and well documented premise as a 
foundation for relevant and practical policy, and strategy for small 
business development in the Sudan. The point of strength in this study, 
apart from the methodological approach, is embodied in the consistency 
of findings derived from both the supply and the demand-side perspective.
11.5______ Hypothesis V
Essentially, the empirical study provides confirmation of 
this hypothesis based on a dichotomy between small firms at inception 
and the small growing firm's financial control practice. Empirical 
evidence from this study shows that the financial control systems 
maintained by small firms are either incomplete, rudimentary or non­
existent, and in most cases they are confined to mere technical 
recording of actual transactions. The research indicates that most 
small firms have little written communication and the control 
procedures are usually adhoc and informal, built on the entrepreneur 
as a dominant coalition acting as an enterpriser, managing and 
controlling a pioneer organisation. The lack of planning, and 
inadequate control procedures as a complementary process, implying 
neglect of the use of management accounting information for analysis 
and decision-making.
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The empirical investigation has identified that there is 
a positive correlation between growth and the degree of adequacy of 
the financial control system. This in turn provides confirmation of 
the contention that there is an interaction between financing and 
financial control profile.
The major accounting problems experienced by the small 
business, can be summarised as follows
1. Incomplete and inadequate accounting systems
2. Lack of or improper cash management
3. No cash-flow analysis
4. No working capital analysis
5. No budget and no long-range plan.
The accounting problems and rudimentary profile of the financial 
control systems maintained by small business can be attributed to 
the fact that the entrepreneur has a poor understanding of the 
significance of accounting in business management.
In spite of the methodological issues and limitations of 
the analysis of the financial control practice of the small firm, 
being based on description of the information produced within the 
Company, rather than adoption of methodology for the use of accounting 
information i.e. participant observation, the research findings have 
implications for the accounting and financial control theory. The 
research findings on the financial planning and control practice of 
the small firm, compared with the observation made by Scholars in 
developed economies (Bolton, 1971; Boswell, 1972; Said and Hughy, 1977; 
Larson and Clute, 1979; Lovett, 1980; Ray and Hutchinson, 1983) and
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developing economies (Besong, 1978; Ohioma, 1979; Osoze, 1981), 
lead to the principal inference that the rudimentary nature of 
financial control in the small firm is the common symptom, regardless 
of the stage of development of the economy. The other theoretical 
implication of this part of the study is that the attitude of 
entrepreneurs towards the significance of the accountant's role 
explain the phenomenon o f  the small businessman's attempt to run his 
firm without adequate accounting systems. Thus, the main barrier to 
the adoption of adequate financial planning and control systems is the 
entrepreneur himself. Outside professional staff may be very 
valuable as a vehicle to close the entrepreneurial knowledge gap, but 
the main constraint lies in entrepreneurial reluctance to consult 
outsiders.
This investigation not only explains the state of the art, 
it also present the effect of other variables, mainly family and bank 
involvement in the management of the business and the degree of 
informality and formality of the financial control practice of the 
small firm respectively. The empirical investigation shows that the 
unique financial profile of the small growing firm is accompanied by 
a relatively adequate financial control practice, marking the 
distinction between growing and declining firms on financial control 
perspective. The direct bank influence under certain types of 
financing instrument - Musharaka - provides support to Enthoven's 
(1977) contention on the role of banks in up-grading accounting 
standards in the Third World.
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11.6______The Main Research Findings on the Entrepreneur
We believe that a first step towards establishing the 
financing and financial control profile of the small firm, is the 
understanding of the enterpreneur: The empirical Investigation shows
that the attitude and vision of the entrepreneur has an influence on 
the financial behaviour and financial control practice of the small 
firm.
Economic reward and financial gain were cited by the vast 
majority of entrepreneurs as the main motive for forming their 
businesses. Financial gain as a major motivating force at formation 
and as a current motivating factor is cited by entrepreneurs as a 
symbol of achievement of other goals; Independence, family image and 
status, standard of living and prestige.
The research has identified entrepreneural deficiency and 
entrepreneurial gap in the Sudan, in that the small business was 
managed in a personalised way. The empirical investigation lends 
support to the established contention in the body of knowledge that 
the authoratative style of management is predominant in small firms.
The research has identified the influence of family involvement as 
well as banks on the management style adopted.
With respect to the research contribution into entrepreneur­
ship body of knowledge, the empirical finding on the prominance of 
financial gain, lends positive support to Timmons (1978) and other 
writers. The research goes further giving evidence that entrepreneurial 
motivation for going into business cannot be explained only by 
economic forces but is rather an interaction of multiple goals.
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The study shows that the Sudanese individual’s entrepreneurial age at 
debut is typically within the thirties and early forties. This 
finding is consistent with the observation made by Watanabee (1970) 
in Japan, Deeks (1972) in U.S; and Gorman in the Irish Industry. 
Although the level of education of entrepreneurs in the Sudan is low, 
the study lends positive support to the established contention in the 
literature, that entrepreneurs are more educated than their age groups, 
in a country with a 61.5 illiteracy rate (UNISCO, 1985)
Another significant implications for the entrepreneurship 
body of knowledge is that there is a positive correlation between the 
size of the firm and the educational level of entrepreneurs and 
management, regardless of ownership. This study provides no evidence 
of a correlation between growth and educational level of entrepreneurs.
11.7______ Overall Review:
Apart from the examination of the phenomena of small 
business failure, we believe the current research has satisfied its 
stated objectives. The empirical investigation has contributed to 
closing the small business information and knowledge gap in developing 
economies. The empirical examination of the traditional view of the 
financial life cycle of the firm at inception stage of development in 
developing economies is a real measure of significance and originality 
of this research effort, addressing the weaknesses of the literature. 
The scope and methodology of the work indicates that this study has 
taken one little step to establish the financing experience and 
financial profile of the small firm at various stages of development 
in developing countries.
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The re-emergence of the importance of small businesses in 
developed countries, indicates that the small business sector is of 
major economic significance in advanced countries. This degree of 
importance and constant stress on the role of small business in 
developed economies, should provoke developing countries, with 
meagre resources, scarce capital and shortage of management cadres, 
like the Sudan, to pay particular attention to their own small business 
sector. This research as a pioneer empirical effort set out with the 
objective to participate in closing the small business conceptualisation 
gap in the Sudan, and to establish a platform for further research and 
policy implications. It provides evidence that research in small 
businesses in developing countries, and particularly in the Sudan, is 
a fertile field and of great theoretical and practical value.
11.8______ Direction for Further Research1
It is a truism that no research study is ever really 
complete, or provides a solution to all questions. This is no 
exception. During the investigation and process of analysis, many 
avenues for further research were opened up. This stems from the 
fact that research is a continuous process, and a logical and 
scholarly answer to a research question is a stimulus to other 
research problems. The opportunities and needs for research on 
small business financing and management are limitless. It may 
therefore be useful to list a number of topics which the researcher 
feel deserve further research in the field of small business.
1. Although, the research has identified the symptoms of the
small business financing gap, "Sudanese Macmillian Gap", institutional, 
information and advice gaps, much remains to be done to ascertain why
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they exist. Research effort to identify and eliminate the various 
gaps in their entirety, could make a significant contribution to the 
body of knowledge and major policy implications.
2. The study examined the financial profile of small firms at 
inception, the small growing firm and large enterprises on a very 
short-time series, with small number of sample, addressing a macro 
issue from a micro perspective, at one point of time, on a classical 
and conventional scientific approach. Brophy (1983) argues that:-
"A major deficiency in research on small business 
finance has been the absence of reliable data for 
longitudinal, rather than episodic studies".
There is a crying need for further research based on large samples
and on the longitudinal approach. The present study may serve as a
point of departure for in-depth analysis.
3. This research has discussed in a generalised form, small 
business financing in interest-based system and Islamic financing 
mechanism. Research with the objective of examining thoroughly 
small business financing under both system, will make a good 
contribution to the controversial issues, following the Islamisation 
trend and Islamisation of the banking system in the Sudan. Small 
business and Islamic financing Instruments are new areas and 
avenues, which will add significantly to the body of knowledge and 
reveal major practical policy implications for bankers, jurists and 
policy makers.
4. This study was designed at the outset, with one of its 
objectives the provision of additional knowledge concerning the factors 
which contribute to the cause of small business failure in developing
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counties. The lack of data on failure in data-poor developing 
countries, like the Sudan and on the typical psychological 
ingredients of failure inhibit the realisation of such an objective. 
But the matter need not end here: research proposes a further 
programme with the objective of examining the small-business failure 
syndrome in developing countries, with special reference to the 
Sudan.
5. In this study, extrepreneurial motivation has been tackled
from the "entrepreneur as an individual" angle, which appeals for 
further research effort, exploring and investigating the motivation 
of potential and present entrepreneurs in a large sample, on a 
longitudinal approach and cross-sectorial basis, so as to provide a 
valuable insight into understanding this "elusive heffalump".
6. In making a comparison between the level of education of
entrepreneurs of small growing firms and declining firms sample, the 
survey shows that there was no positive correlation between growth 
and success and educational level. The limitation of this analogy 
is embodied in the methodological approach, in the sense that it was 
not based on pairing sampling in-terms of nunbers and did not take into 
consideration the variation in the nature of industry and other 
exogonous and endegenous contingent variables. A suggested topic for 
further research is the building of dichotomy between successful and 
unsuccessful firms, from the angle of entrepreneurial typology and 
profile in developing countries. This would be a multi-disciplinary 
theme.
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7. The analysis and examination of the financial control 
systems of small firms in this study, was based on the assumption 
that what is produced is used by entrepreneurs in the decision-making 
process, and in presenting a case to lenders. This methodological 
limitation is of high appeal for further research effort, taking the 
same theme on participant-observation approach. The proposed research 
effort has both theoretical and policy implications, and would be of 
great value to management development institutes with the objective
of raising the standard of management practice, and banks operating 
under Musharaka finance.
8. This empirical investigation presents an interesting point, 
that entrepreneurs of the small growing firm are more willing to 
delegate production and personnel functions to outside subordinates, 
while retaining control of finance, sales and other elements of 
direct monetary connotation. This observation suggests a proposal for 
a comprehensive research to examine the entrepreneurial attitude 
towards different managerial functions. The findings would be of 
major value to management development centres in determining small 
businessmen's training needs and in selling their programmes.
To build a foundation and infrastructure for small 
business research in the Sudan, there is an urgent need for the 
development of a data-base. A group effort must first develop a list 
of the pertinent data required. Information must then be collected 
from small businesses in all the various stages of the life cycle.
This collaboration would be possible only under institutional back-up, 
sponsorship and financial support. This idea will be the first step 
in the process of conceptualisation and institutionalisation of the
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small business sector in the Sudan. In the long-run research in 
small business in data-poor developing countries like the Sudan, can 
be eased by Legislation, similar to the 1948 Act passed in Britain 
or through the establishment of bank data Companies and departments 
(i.e. Dun and Bradstreet Inc, U.S.A.).
- 435 -
CHAPTER TWELVE
RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS FOR 
SMALL ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
IN THE SUDAN
The empirical findings of this investigation have policy 
implications for small enterprise development in the Sudan. This 
is a very natural process of empirical research, starting with the 
formulation of the research question - Grounded theory examination 
of the research analytical framework and development and empirical 
test of the research hypotheses. This chapter sets out to explain 
the practical policy implications that emerge from this investigation.
This part of the study is addressed primarily to those 
who are responsible for, engaged in, or otherwise interested in providing 
financial facilities advisory, technical and management training and 
educational facilities to small business, as well as policy makers.
It is hoped that this part of the study may be of interest to small 
businessmen’s association and to individual heads of small firms, for 
it emphasises the framework for small enterprise development in the 
Sudan, as well as of Government proposed actions and other relevant 
agencies. This policy proposal might well turn out to be a starting 
point for conceptualisation and macro-economic policy, supported by 
well structured measures for small enterprise development in the Sudan.
12.1 Integrated Approach for Small Enterprise Development:
The objective of any development strategy is to optimise 
the use of the country’s resources for achieving long-term socio­
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economic objectives (Dave, 1980). To introduce a policy for small 
enterprise development, a vital question needs to be raised at the 
outset, what are the circumstances over which the policy maker has 
some control and which are likely to contribute to the development 
of small business. The establishment of a thriving small industry 
calls for collective measures of various kinds to help the individual 
small owner-manager overcome the disadvantages associated with the 
small scale of his operation.
The need for an integrated approach to develop small business 
has been expressed on many occasions and implemented in many developed 
and developing countries. Table 12.1 shows the policy measures used 
by developed and developing countries in promoting the small enterprise 
sector. In the United Nations publications on small enterprise development 
(Bulletin No. 14, 1968), an authority stated that:
"individual measures will be ineffective unless 
supported by Complementary action ...".
The collective measures used in this study are biased 
towards financing and management. A combination of financial and 
management assistance, not only helps to prevent waste of scarce 
resources, it is also perhaps the best means of ensuring that 
managerial performance will improve. Lewis (1955) has pointed out 
that
"...lending money to inexperienced small 
business people without supervision is often 
equivalent to pouring it down the drain. What 
these people need is first supervision and advice 
and only secondarily capital....".
- 437 -
Based on the research findings, the proposed integrated policy is 
directed to eliminate and/or close the identified small business' 
finance gap, information and institional gap and entrepreneurial and 
managerial deficiency. A strategy for the development of small business 
has to start with the establishment of macro-integrated public policy, 
commencing with the conceptualisation of the sector, leading to a 
well detailed and integrated action plan.
TABLE 12.1 USE OF INTEGRATED APPROACH IN THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF SMALL ENTERPRISE SECTOR
DEVELOPED COUNTRTF.S DEVELOFING COUNTRIES
1 2 3 4 ' 5 1 6
7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9








SIA NIGERIA KENYA UGANDA ETHIOPIJV EGYPT
SUDAN
PROPOSAI
i 1. FINANCIAL FACILITIES
J  1. Publicly-backed financial scheme X X X X X X X X X X X X X X _ _ X
1 2. Commercial Banks' initiatives X X X X X X X X X - - X - y _ _
3. Specialised Financial Bodies X X X X X X X X X - X X _ x _ _
4. Ceiling system - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ X
I 5. Concessional Interest Rate - - - - - - X - _ X X _ X _ _
i 6. Leasing Finance X X X X X X 1 X X _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ X
| 7. Relaxatn of Conventional Finance - - - - - - - X X _ _ _ _ _ _ • _
8. Schemes with operating bodies X X X X X X X X X X X X X X - - X
2. RELATED SERVICES:
1. Information & Advisory Services X X X X X X X X X _ X _ _ _ _ X
| 2. Counselling X X X X X X X - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ X
3. Tax Incentives X X
4. Investment Incentives X X X X X X X X
I 5. Local Protection X X X X X
| 3. ENTREPRENEURSHIP DEVELOPMENT:
1. Supply Promotion Scheme X X X X X X X X X _ X _ _ X X
2. University involvement in Supply
Promotion X X X X X X X - X - X - - - _ _ X
3. Management Training X X X X X X X X X X X X
4. Entrepreneur Incentives X X X X X X X X X X X
4. MANAGERIAL AND TECHNICAL ASST:
L. Specialised Institutions X X X X X X X X X
2. Technical Follow-up X X X
5. INSTITUTIONALISATION:
1. National Small Business Unit X X X X X X X X X - X _ _ _ _ _ X
2. Regional Small Business Unit X X
3. Industrial Estate X X
4. Small Business Office
6. POLICY: ,
1. Declared and Publicised Policy X X X X X X X X X X





Although small businesses have special advantages, they also 
have special problems and difficulties. The empirical research has 
identified the entrepreneurial deficiency (Ch. 9). The entrepreneur’s 
creditworthiness, most likely, would not be good enough to enable 
him to get sufficient finance from banks (Ch. 7 and 8). Thus, small 
business position is quite vulnerable as compared to large industry 
which has the power and say in the economic environment. (Donaldson, 
1970). The proposed public policy has to be declared and publicised 
round these issues.
For a successful and practical small business development 
programme, certain measures are necessary at the policy level
a) The expression of the political ’will’ and commitment of 
the Government.
b) Translating the policies to strategies and operational
measures, full public knowledge and information about the programmes 
to be achieved. In this regard Bannock (1985) pointed out that:-
"The reasons for the previous lack of sucess "of the
small business policies" are numerous and differ for
each respective policy innovation. One common and 
fundamental indirect cause can, however, be identified: 
The inability of interested parties to publicise what 
needed to be done".
c) Enumerating incentives to the small business sector in 
terms of financial, fiscal policy and others.
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d) An important policy measure requiring considerable
attention is the proper monitoring of the development programme and 
its progress. Many developing countries (Egypt, Sri Lanka, etc) 
have set up small industries programme for the sake of having a 
programme. In the absence of any monitoring or co-ordinating 
mechanism incorporated into it, the programme will lose the necessary 
impact. (U.N., 1968). To create a factor of success for the proposed 
policy, the level of authority directing policy measures has to be 
raised sufficiently. It will be prudent to take the successful 
experience of other countries and to make persuasion from the very 
beginning, bearing in mind the issue of formulation, implementation 
and follow-up process of the programme. The services and facilities 
needed to support small business is an explanation and translation of 
the public policy. To these points, we direct our attention now.
12.3 Financial Facilities:
One of the most crucial gaps identified in this study 
inhibiting initiation, survival and growth of small business 
relate to the non-availability of financial faciliteis on easy terms 
to small businesses. (Small business financing gap - Ch. 7). The 
vital question to be raised is what policy measures can be introduced 
to eliminate and/or close the identified finance gap. The subject 
policy measure is not a discrimination in favour of small businesses, 
although it is logical and justifiable, but rather to create an equal 
opportunity for small business. The research has identified that there 
is a vicious circle operating in the country. On the one hand, 
banks feel handicapped in providing credit to small businesses in the 
absence of satisfactory security and the credit squeeze system,
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whereas on the other hand, small businesses lack information on 
financial facilities available and are incapable of producing a 
good financial case to lenders (Bolton Gap).
12.3.1 Financing Strategy and Philosophy:
To establish a financial package, to design and implement 
a financial scheme for small enterprise development, the basic 
questions needing to be addressed at the outset are what is the 
theme of the financial strategy to be adopted, and what are its logical 
and practical justifications ?
A number of scholars (Myrdal, 1968; Lipton, 1976; M yint, 
1971; Shaw, 1973 and McKinnon, 1976) argued that the control of 
interest rates in most developing countries, apart from limiting the 
capacities of the intermediaries to raise resources, has necessarily 
led them to concentrate their lending on low-risk, large borrowers.
A financial strategy based on concessional rates of interest has been 
proposed by some writers and practitioners in the field of small 
business and adopted in many developing countries. This financial 
philosophy and practice could mainly be criticised on the grounds of 
financial institutions’ difficulty to keep interest rates low and 
accept high risk and losses in the short and medium term. (Anderson, 
1982). This argument of imbalance following a concessional rate of 
interest is familiar from the literature on uncertainty in capital 
market (Akelof, 1970). Based on this argument the financing schemes 
and programmes proposed in this policy have to be based on non­
concessionary interest rate. The logical justification of this 
financing strategy is that uncertainties faced by financial
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institutions, both public and private and high risk of default and 
death of small businesses, would still lead them not to lend to 
small firms.
A publicly backed risk guarantee scheme is needed, to 
absorb the initially high risk involved in small business financing 
and to provide a partial solution to the vicious circle identified 
in the capital market. This scheme has to be built round the formula 
that the lending to financial institutions is likely to be profitable 
and interest rate equates to volume of risk involved. Otherwise 
the justification of the proposed loan guarantee scheme is in 
question and financial institutions, regardless of type and ownership 
will not respond to it.
A number of problems have been singled out in different 
countries which adopted public guarantee schemes. Problems in 
putting the scheme into practice relate to:~
1. How can Government share the risk, and what Government
institution takes the responsibility of selecting suitable firms for 
investment.
2. The gaining of co-operation of the financial institutions.
3. The accountability of public funds.
The first problem could be solved within the administrative 
arrangement of establishment of a Small Business Unit within the 
Central Bank, as a policy-making organ. Thus, the Central Bank, 
under this proposal, will be in charge in controlling the proposed 
publicly-backed guarantee scheme, providing a guarantee to financial
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institutions involved. The second issue can be solved by creating 
a balance between risk sharing and profitability, so as to gain a 
positive response from financial bodies. As to public fund 
accountability, in the I.L.O. Report (1971) an authority stated that 
the question of small enterprise development is how much public money 
should be spent on financial assistance to small business. In proposing 
a loan guarantee scheme under Government security, there are two 
questions of priority involved: First, given the shortage of capital
and the many competing demands for it, and given the broad economic 
and social objectives of public policy, how much public money should 
be spent on all forms of assistance to small businesses and second, 
how much of this should be devoted to financial assistance under a 
loan guarantee scheme, as distinct from other terms of assistance.
This empirical investigation into efficiency and optimum utilisation 
of resources provides a justification for devoting public money to 
small business development. The importance of the sector is shown 
by the fact that Small Business represents 97% of the industrial 
economy and, thus plays an important socio-economic role.
The introduction of a loan -guarantee scheme under 
Government sharing of risk, implies public intervention in the capital 
market, not only as a regulator, but also as an operator. The Public 
Intervention in this form has found practical justification even in 
free market economies. Wilson (1983) argues that:
” The main thrust of public sector intervention in the 
UK has been to eliminate alleged discrimination against 
small enterprises, ensure equal access to capital, 
premises and product market and provide incentives to 
increase the supply of entrepreneurs and hence the 
birth rate of new firms”.
Hanlen adds that:-
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".... The thrust of public sector intervention is
very much in line with the removal of discrimination”.
On 'Report to the President on Minority Business Enterprises', (U.S., 
1970) Stans states that:-
"The United States can not afford to continue wasting 
the potential contribution to economic progress which 
rests with those who have in effect been excluded 
from the system. Productive capitalism thrives 
on broad competition. Increasing our base of 
entrepreneurs will not exhaust a limited market place. 
On the contrary, it can increase both the size and the 
quality of the enterprise economy. In that process, 
all can benefit".
A Credit Guarantee Scheme proposed in this policy measure, 
based on risk sharing between the Government and financial institutions 
is borrowed from the experience of other countries in developed and 
developing economies. (U.K., Japan, Uganda, Nigeria, India and Mexico). 
Anderson (1982) in the World Bank paper articulated that:
"A relaxation of the administrative control is a 
necessary criteria for achieving an efficient flow of 
finance to small-scale industries, but in itself, it 
is not a sufficient condition. The right combination 
of policies, it is argued, is a relaxation of the 
controls combined with intervention to address 
shortcomings, essentially of an institutional nature 
in the capital market. The suggested interventions 
take the familiar forms of lending by the development 
banks (at non-concessionary rate) and publicly-backed 
risk-sharing schemes available to the private sector".
From this review, the financing philosophy and financial 
strategy measures under this policy proposal for small enterprise 
development in the Sudan, is based on the following dimensions:-
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1. Financing of small business has to be based on non- 
concessionary rates of interest.
2. Creation of publicly-backed guarantee schemes based on 
the balance between interest rate and risk involved in providing 
finance.
3. Consideration of small business financing in the national 
credit policy, with a directive to banks followed by quantative and 
qualitative control.
4. Development finance.
5. Financial facilities must be supported by managerial advice
as a complementary process.
12.3.2____ Small Business Requirements and the Policy:
In formulating a scheme or policy of institutional small 
business credit and financing, a particular requirement of small businesses 
needs to be considered: the fact that small businesses require long 
and medium term finance for acquiring fixed assets, and short-term 
finance for working capital.
1._________Seed Capital:
The research has identified that the most crucial problem 
of small business financing is usually that own capital is insufficient 
(under-capitalisation). Admittedly, this is not a problem peculiar to 
small business in Sudan, it is encountered in many businesses of all
- 446 -
sizes in developed countries (Bolton, 1971; Weston and Brigham,
1978) and developing countries (India, Nigeria). Secondly, the 
traditional attitude of bankers all over the world is to be guided 
primarily by considerations of security, rather than of eligibility.
’*The lack of start-up and seed capital is explainable 
by the fact that the risk capital, which owners are
willing to run the risk of losing in the hope of high 
returns - is scarce". (U.N., 1968)
The difficulty in getting start-up capital has been partially
solved in some countries (U.S., U.K.) by setting-up a specialised 
investment and financing body of sufficient size and standing. In the 
U.K., another Government innovation in the field of finance for new 
businesses is the "Business Start-Up Scheme". A start-up scheme based 
on equity financing is neither acceptable norworkable in developing 
countries like the Sudan, where small business is built around the 
extended family concept and entrepreneurs are not willing to dilute
their control and power, by providing a stake in the business to a
partner outside the boundary of the family.
A proposed Credit-Guarantee Scheme may create a guarantee 
level for banks to provide finance to small businesses at formation 
and would not affect the psychology of the entrepreneur. To maintain the 
risk and profitability formula, the Government has to bear 80% of the 
risk sharing against financing start-up capital, under a loan 
guarantee scheme, and the financier the remaining 20%. This equation 
of balance stems from the fact that small firms at formation stage are 
unlikely to provide satisfactory security and the death rate of small 
businesses at inception is very high. (Birth, 1975).
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2. Institutional Long-Term Debt Gap:
The research has identified that small business is commonly 
at a considerable disadvantage in obtaining long-term loans (MacMillian 
Gap). A first reason why small firms find it difficult to raise 
institutional long-term loans is that commmercial banks and other 
lending institutions are usually principally concerned with short-term 
credit, since lending institutions which accept short-term deposit 
must observe their liquidity ratios.
Governments in many countries (U.S., U.K., Sweden, Denmark, 
Japan, Nigeria, South Africa, etc) have provided long-term financial 
facilities to small businesses either directly, by initiating 
specialised schemes, or indirectly through financial intermediaries.
The question of long-term finance is the issue of development finance 
which requires special institutionalisation set-up.
To provide development finance, there are three approaches 
to follow on individual or a collective basis. One is. tha.establishment 
of a development financial institution wholly owned and operated by 
the Government. In the Sudan, the Sudanese Industrial Bank (S.I.B) 
was established in 1962, with the stated objective and intention to 
promote and enhance industrialisation trends in the country (See Ch. 5 
and Ch. 8). This approach with the experience of the ’S.I.B.1 in the 
Sudan has proved a failure, because of Government lack of resources, 
Government intervention, and the inability of the Bank, as a Government 
unit, to deal with international lenders in raising funds.
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’’The effectiveness of development banks in the Third 
World countries, may have been lessened by the general 
lack of information concerning objectives for 
development and conditions for providing funds”.
(U.N., UNIDO, 1979).
To enhance the ’S.I.B.’ experience, detailed policy formulation 
towards the small business financing, as well as capital, needs to be 
injected into S.I.B., so as to up-grade the activities of the bank. 
According to the S.I.B. Act (1962), the bank does not provide working 
capital finance. This Act increased the outstanding debt of the bank, 
and thereby affects both its financial capacity and financing operations. 
The Bank Act requires amendment.
The second approach, adopted by many countries is to render 
financial facilities in indirect form, often by setting up a finance 
corporation owned and operated jointly by Government and private 
institutions, or in the form of Government guarantee provided by 
private or public financial institutions.
Borrowing the experience of other countries in both 
developed and developing economies, development financial institutions 
proved to be useful and efficient development instruments in mobilising 
local and external resources. Development financial institutions have 
the power, channels and creditability to raise foreign aid, particularly 
in an economy experiencing a severe shortage in hard currency. Nouvel, 
(1977) showed that the World Bank has, in response to the increased 
attention to small enterprise development, been putting more emphasis 
on employment creation in urban areas through assistance to small- 
scale relatively labour intensive enterprises. This has meant enlarging 
the spectrum of end users of World Bank assistance, and also enlarging
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the spectrum of intermediaries to provide this assistance (Ray and 
Hutchinson, 1983). The World Bankas an international lender 
usually channelling funds to development financial institutions 
(DFIs). Mistry (1979) articulated that:-
nThe World Bank saw DFIs as catalysts for capital 
market development in the Third World”.
In ”UNIDO and World Bank Symposium, Zurich, 1979” an authority (I.B.R.D. 
Representative) states that:-
”The DFI mechanism has proved to be a highly efficient 
means of assessing investment needs and proposals, and 
of allocating investment resources - mainly for 
industry -, but increasingly in other sectors as well. 
It permits a flexibility in the administration of 
block funding, and adaptation to local needs and 
changing oonditions, that national plans and 
international project financing are often incapable 
of achieving. If used as a channel for international 
finance, the DFI helps to enlist local initiatives 
and reinforce local criteria for decisions regarding 
use of external funds. They also reassure foreign 
lenders or dcnors that the reserves made available 
will be used rationally under proper supervision - 
towards agreed objectives".
Based on these arguments, the S.I.B. and Sudan Development 
Corporation (S.D.C.) and its subsidiary company, Sudan Rural Development 
Finance Company (S.R.D.F.C.), have to participate actively as development 
agencies in providing development finance to small businesses at 
various stages of development.
To augment the development finance provided by development 
agencies, along the way to close the institutional long-term debt gap, 
a Third approach to be followed lies in the Bank of Sudan’s monetary, and 
financial and credit policy governing the supply of money in the capital
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market and commercial banks’ operations. Under the proposed measure, 
a certain percentage of lendable resources of the commercial banks 
in both the public and and the private sector should be earmarked for 
supply of credit and finance to small business on long-term basis.
It should be obligatory for the banks to extend a certain percentage 
of their total credit supply to this priority sector. The practical 
justification of this measure is the existence of unused lending 
capacity maintained by commercial banks, identfied in this empirical 
investigation (discussed in Ch. 8). To attain a good result from this 
policy measure, both quantitative and qualitative control need to be 
maintained by the Central Bank, namely the proposed Small Business Unit.
The main non-conventional method of financing which could 
broaden the horizon of development banks and private and public 
commercial banks and make more significant their developmental 
contribution to small business sector is leasing arrangements. Leasing, 
as a medium-term finance, represents a contract, which gives a company 
possession and use of a particular asset/s in return for payment of a 
rental charge over a period of time. Leasing is an attractive source 
of finance for firms seeking expansion which are otherwise unable to 
raise capital in the market place or for firms whose scale of operations 
would not justify outright purchase of costly equipment.
Under this financial package proposal, leasing arrangements 
could be introduced to stimulate demand for capital goods, and could 
assist in closing the small firms’ long-term debt gap, and also motivate 
banks to provide institutional long and medium-term finance. Leasing 
arrangments fit into the Islamic banking mechanism under ’IGARA’ 
finance.
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Leasing arrangements are not free from problems. The 
system has obvious drawbacks and they must carefully be examined 
before putting the scheme into practice. On the macro-economic level, 
leasing could be criticised on the ground that it might stimulate 
demand for capital goods before the economy is in a position to 
increase supply. In such circumstances, the primary burden may fall 
on imports and foreign exchange reserves and be seen as economically 
inopportune (Richardson, 1979). Secondly, leasing requires well 
trained personnel and a highly skilled cadre in the financiers and 
financed firms, a condition unlikely to be satisfied by small firms 
in the Sudan, with crude and rudimentary financial information systems. 
With respect to banks and bankers, a participant in a small Business 
Seminar (January 1985, Sudan) commented that:
"Bankers are trained in banks which are large and 
traditional. We need new training bankers to satisfy 
small firms".
Thus, the introduction of leasing schemes requires an economic policy, 
a well designed and structured importation policy, management assistance 
and advice to small firms, and finally, training programmes for banks' 
managements.
3. Short Term Credit:
Despite the shortage of capital and the existence of 
"The Sudanese Macmillian Gap" identified in this investigation, the 
research has proved that it is usually relatively less difficult for 
small firms to obtain short-term loans than institutional long-term 
credit. In the Sudan, the credit system is not sufficiently well 
developed or widely spready to meet the needs of small industries for
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short-term credit. To close this gap, a certain policy measure has 
to be introduced in the financial market, to put a certain percentage 
of the loan capacity of commercial banks into short-term small business 
financing. Moreover, development financial institutions (DFIs) have 
to introduce a new measurement, shouldering the responsibility of 
providing initial working capital finance. This appeals for a change 
in development banks' conventional approach in providing funds and 
increasing the velocity of the bank resources, by minimising the 
outstanding debts.
12.3.3 Institutionalisation of Small Business Financing:
The financial system in the Sudan is entirely regulated 
and managed by the Government. The Central Bank exercises quantative 
and qualitative credit control in the Sudan, primarily by deciding the 
Credit ceiling of the Commercial banks and the allocation of banks' 
resources, (discussed in Ch. 8). The financial institutions 
operating in the country possess the capacity or potential for small 
businesses to develop. The research has identified that banks in 
the Sudan are notin favour of small businesses, because of lack of 
policy and existence of small business conceptualisation gap at policy 
and at financial institutions level. The policy under review is not 
proposing establishment of a specialised financial body for small 
business financing at this initial stage, but rather to direct and 
inject small business financing programmes and measures within the 
existing framework thus, the question is, the issue of policy, 
co-operation, understanding and power to implement a small business 
development programme within the existing financial bodies. This 
approach would validate this proposal under cost-benefit formula, 
as a cost effective approach.
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FIGURE 12.1










Short and Long Term Finance
Small Business Financing 
“ International finance to DFIs
Government financial policy
To implement the proposed financing programme, the study 
proposes a new department or unit within the Central Bank, which will 
co-ordinate the development of small business programmes with other 
concerned agencies and departments. The subject unit would be a 
part of the integrated model as a policy making body on financial 
issues, in co-ordination with other units set up, or involved in the 
development of the small business sector.
The ’Small Business Unit’ in the Central Bank should be 
given the duties to co-ordinate the flow of funds to development 
agencies in co-ordination with the Ministry of Finance, and to control 
the Government Stake in development agencies directed towards small 
business financing, as well as the Government share in the risk 
invovled in the proposed loan-guarantee scheme. The unit should be 
given the power to negotiate on behalf of the Government on
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International finance, and to allocate the raised funds to development 
agencies for channelling funds directly to small business. (Figure 
12.1). The proposed Small Business Unit can be treated as a seed for 
Small Business Administration,, similar to that established in the 
United States (S.B.A., 1953).
The propsed ’Small Business Unit’s' activities can be 
expanded to reduce or close the information gap identified in this 
study between banks and entrepreneurs. On behalf of the banks, this 
can be done by establishing offices in Commercial and development 
banks to provide information and advice to small businessmen. A 
co-ordination on technical level needs to be maintained by the 
proposed specialised offices and Small Business Unit. The Bolton 
Committee in the U.K. produced evidence of the importance of the branch 
bank manager as a major advisor to small firms. The main conclusion 
of Bolton that the branch manager could best help his small firm 
customers by insisting on them preparing budgets, and providing 
advice on the costs and availability of different forms of finance 
(Back, 1980). Wilde (1973) states that:-
’’Bankers now need to know about investment, taxation, 
leasing and factoring, to name only a few of the 
financial services and to advise their corporate 
customers on a whole range of financial matters”.
In examining financial institutions and small business relationships 
in the Australian economy, Bird and Juttner (1974) argue that:
”.... it might be more effective to create a new
position, small business adviser .... the bank
manager would then put the small businessman into 
contact with the specialist when financial advice or 
long term financing was sought”.
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On behalf of the entrepreneur, the unit can produce regular printed 
material on financial facilities available to small businesses on 
central and regional levels. To close the identified information gap, 
the proposed measures have to be substantiated by creating a communication 
channel between the Small Business Unit and the Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry, and also the Sudanese Businessmen’s Association.
More specifically, the function of the Proposed Small 
Business Unit in the Central Bank can be detailed as follows:
1. Supervise and direct Commercial banks lending to small 
business in collaboration with the Credit Control Department.
2. Co-ordinate and negotiate the flow of development finance 
from international lenders to DFIs.
3. Collect and disseminate information about available sources
of finance, in collaboration with the Commercial banks and DFIs.
4. Participate in setting up a development policy for small 
business as a part of the proposed national Small Industry Board.
(S.I.B.).
The institutionalisation of small business financing 
requires banking staff with an understanding and knowledge of small 
business. The proposed Loan Guarantee Scheme under Government 
participation and Control requires Small business specialists with 
financing and accounting knowledge geared to small business.
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"The banking system and bankers1 attitude has to be 
changed so as to furnish room for small firms”.
"Small Firm Seminar, Khartoum, 1985;" (FIB Rep).
On the organisational level, the Director of the Small 
Business Unit should report directly to the Governor of the Bank of 
Sudan. This power will facilitate the influence of the unit on the 
formulation of the national credit policy. To create and furnish 
a co-ordination base, the Director of the Unit would be a member in 
the proposed Small Industry Board (S.I.B.)
12.4_____ Entrepreneurship Development
The programme for development of small business essentially 
should contain the programme of entrepreneurship development. The 
encouragement, motivating and entrepreneurship training programme, 
when initiated, should aim at:-
1. Motivate entrepreneurs to take positive action in the 
promotion of small Industrial projects, and
2. Provide information and knowledge on the subject of 
involvement.
A strategy for the devleopment of entrepreneur would seem 
to involve the following points: First, at macro level, to start with 
the establishment of public policy (12.2). Second, initiation of 
programmes to enhance the supply of entrepreneurs in the market, as an 
agent of change, and to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
entrepreneurial activities. The first part of this strategy is 
discussed within the public policy (12.2). Thus, this part of the
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chapter is devoted to initiation of programmes capable of enhancing 
the supply of entrepreneurs, so as to increase the small business 
birth rate, and to improve the entrepreneurial efficiency, in an 
attempt to minimise the small business death rate.
12.4.1_____Entrepreneurial Supply:
The enhancement and promotion of entrepreneurial supply
in the market can be achieved by various measures and policies.
Based on the contention that the educated people operate better as 
entrepreneurs, the McClelland approach in stimulation and promotion of 
entrepreneurial supply can be adopted in the Sudan. This approach 
can be built round a comprehensive scheme in connection with the 
proposed publicly-backed risk guarantee scheme, focusing on educated, 
unemployed or people in disguised employment. This approach has a 
social and economic value in the Sudan as a result of unemployment of
University graduates in certain specialised fields and flow-back of
expatriates and immigrants from Arab petroleum countries, following 
the recession and international fall of oil prices. At macro-economic 
level, this approach can guarantee the promotion and development of the 
productive sector, with positive impact on the G.N.P. and curtail 
parasitic activities.
The universities and other academic institutions within the 
educational system, could take a significant role in stimulating and 
encouraging potential entrepreneurs. (Harvard and Babson College 
approach in the U.S.A.). The experience of developed countries 
proved the sucess of universities' influence on entrepreneurship 
promotion. A recent report at the Stockholm School of Economics 
concluded that 20 per cent of students taking the small business
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option between 1977-1982 have started their own firms. In the U.K., 
a similar result at the Cranfield School of Management showed that of 
the 50 students taking the first credit course offered in entrepreneur­
ship and small ventures, about half subsequently opt for the longer 
follow-up option on the same topic (Harper, 1981).
The educational system, and particularly higher education 
in the Sudan, is structured to provide a specialised cadre to public 
and private sector and civil servants (Yagoub, 1972). There is no 
University or academic institute providing courses in small business. 
Thus, there is no entrepreneurial education in the Sudan. The 
objective of this part of the policy is to fill this gap and to 
initiate programmes for Universities in shouldering this responsibility. 
This appeals for the introduction of small business courses as an 
under-graduate subject for Business, Economics and Engineering Students 
as a starting phase. Business, Economics and Engineering students would 
be given priority, because they are most likely either to establish 
their own businesses or to be recruited by small businesses. The 
proposed course has to address the issue of small business, entrepreneur­
ship, and other aspects of small business financing and management.
The proposed course has two purposes; to create knowledgeable potential 
entrepreneurs and to build a platform for policy-makers, consultants 
and advisors with small business understanding. Business Schools or 
departments have to shoulder this responsibility of formation, content, 
teaching and continuous evaluation and improvement of the programme. 
Departments of business administration in the University of Gezira 
and Khartoum could take the initiative to implement such a programme.
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Despite the importance of small business courses as an 
approach to promote the supply of entrepreneurs, it is no easy task 
to introduce and develop this sort of programme. It is a very long 
process and requires considerable effort for universities as well as 
education policy makers. Haskins (1986) enumerated a number of 
problems and difficulties in western developed countries, which are 
most likely to be found in developing economies like the Sudan, and 
are aggravated by the characteristics of developing countries.
1. Small business teaching requires specialised staff. To
the researcher's knowledge, there is not one such specialist in small 
business in all the universities in the Sudan or the Management 
Development Centre.
2. Course content and focus: a great deal of time and care is 
required to develop an appropriate course content and focus and how 
to match small business courses with specialisation.
3. Material and Method: different teaching materials and 
approaches are required with more emphasis on case-study approach 
(Harvard'Style). This implies the need for financial support to put 
into practice the proposed programme.
4. Continuous evaluation and improvement requires specialists
in the development of courses, which are unlikely to be found in the 
Sudan.
To find remedies to the identified difficulties, the 
universities, with Government support, has to start the implementation 
process, by developing staff in the area of small business.
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to create a base for the universities in shouldering this responsibility, 
it is proposed that the universities have to be represented as members 
in the proposed Small Industry Board. This membership will create 
a foundation of co-operation between Government units, banks, research 
centres and management and technical institutes and universities in 
the promotion of the small business sector. The success of the McClelland 
approach as a complementary process depends largely on the degree 
of involvement of universities and other academic institutes.
In the Sudan, there appears to be sufficient potential 
entrepreneurs; what is lacking is motivation, which in turn depends 
on other factors, external and internal. Proper information and 
guidance is one of the most important factors. The horizontal 
growth or the duplications of similar types of industries in the 
Sudan is the result of lack of information or knowledge on the 
part of entrepreneurs. Here, institutional assistance is needed 
to give proper guidance.
The potential entrepreneurs have to be supplied with 
information covering the business opportunities and their basic 
requirements in the forms of human and financial resources. They 
are to be made aware of other external factors which affect their 
endeavour, such as Government regulations, and other economic indicators. 
The Investment Bureau has to issue a continuous flow of information 
through all information media. This requires economic inteligence 
and investigation services for the Government and the Investment 
Bureau in particular. The National Research Council and the Development 
Studies Centre (U. of K.) have to serve as the Government's eyes.
This could be done; first, these institutes would undertake industry- 
wise studies to identify the problems inhibiting development, and
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suggest remedial measures. Secondly, they would identify the scope 
and prospects for the manufacturer of different items on the small- 
scale. Thirdly, they would undertake certain specific topic or 
problem studies and make available useful information to the Government 
for the formulation of policy from time to time. Finally, these 
institutes could conduct economic studies on a regional basis to 
bring out the prospects and scope for the development of small business. 
This in turn would help regional authorities in formulating their 
programmes.
To furnish a foundation for a healthy small business 
sector, integrated technological and economic research is needed.
The Ministry of Industry has one Institute, the Institute of Industrial 
Research and Consultancy (I.I.R.C). The Institute orientation 
is towards the provision of technical advice and its main activities 
are technical consultancy and feasibility studies. This Institute, 
in collaboration with specialised schools in the universities, 
would be assigned the responsibility for technological research 
as a provider of information to policy makers.
Regarding economic and technological research, the main 
question is the issue of funding, which hampers and inhibits research 
work in the Sudan. The proposed Small Industry Board has to allocate 
funds for research into small business. Regional Governments, as 
well as banks, could participate positively in funding the research 
effort. Some research projects will probably be undertaken on 
the initiative of the research institutes themselves, because 
they are felt to be of national importance, or at least of importance
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to large numbers of small industrialists. International organisations 
could be approached for help on financial and techncial levels.
The entrepreneurship development is not to flood the 
market with ’parasites’, but rather to supply efficient and knowledgeable 
entrepreneurs. To this point, we direct our attention now.
12.4.2 Management Training:
The other meaure of entrepreneurship development strategy 
proposed in this study is to increase the efficiency and effectiveness 
of existingvsmall businesses, by providing managment assistance, 
management training, counselling and advice to entrepreneurs.
This stems from the research findings showing the entrepreneurial 
and managerial deficiency of small businesses in the Sudan.
The combination of education and management training 
is positively correlated with greater success. Thus, in order 
to improve efficiency, and to close the entrepreneurial gap, specialised 
management training programmes meeting the needs of small entrepreneurs 
have to be launched. The researcher believes that management assistance 
to small business could be carried out through both entrepreneurs’ 
training and advisory services.
With respect to problems and difficulties encountered in 
management training of small business owner-managers, an I.L.O. 
authority states that:-
"The major problem is to convince small-scale industry 
managers that they need and can benefit from training. 
This difficulty is aggravated by the fact that .. .
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... it is often extremely difficult for the man at 
the top to leave his business even for a day or 
two to attend courses. The experienced owner- 
manager is usually a knowledgeable man in his 
own field and is seldom prepared even if he has 
the time, to sit at the feet of a teacher and 
absorb uncritically what the latter has to tell 
him"
The other problem is that data concerning the training 
needs of small business sector in the Sudan is lacking. The reason 
for the difficulty of obtaining such data is that the small business 
sector is not officiallly recognised by the Government.
Despite the difficulties surrounding management training 
for small businessmen, a number of training programmes and specialised 
bodies have been established in developed and developing countries.
In Europe, there is an increasing number of programmes offerred 
in this area (Polytechnic of Central London, London Business School, 
(Britain)); Management Centre, Ireland; University College, Dublin 
(Ireland); IMI, Geneva; Swedish Institute of Management and the 
Research Institute for Management Science at Delft, Netherland.
In the U.S. the (S.B.A) and its specialised affiliated institutes 
provide management training and couselling throughout the country, 
through a well structured and developed network in collaboration 
with management institutes and universities. In d e v e l o p i n g  economies, 
a small industry service institute was established by the Indian 
Government, to provide managerial training to entrepreneurs. The 
experience of India has been borrowed and replicated in some African, 
Asian and Carribean countries - (Malaysia; South Africa; Philippines; 
Nigeria).
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Throughout the Sudan, there are a considerable number 
of -training centres attached to Minist-ri.es. Government departments 
and banks in both the public and the private sectors. These centres 
specialise in tailor-made courses to suit the needs of the units 
to which they belong.
The Ministry of Labour controls the Management Development 
Centre (MDC) and the Sudan Academy for Administrative Science -(SAAS).
The Management Development Centre is an autonomous national body
set up for training, consultancy and research in the field of management
with the objective of upgrading managerial ability and practice of
businesses in the public and private sector. The MDC activities are in General
Management, Marketing, Management Accounting, Personnel and Industrial
Relations and Supervisory training. In 1976, the M.D.C had established 
a small business section under I.L.O sponsorship. Due to the lack 
of understanding of the issue within the M.D.C, the section has 
not developed as hoped. The training programme of the M.D.C. has 
no small business orientation, although there is a recognition 
in the management of the centre of the need for recreating the 
section and initiating management training programmes for small 
business.
Under this policy proposal, the researcher believes 
that the M.D.C. is a suitable national body to take the responsibility 
for providing this sort of service to small businessmen in the 
Sudan. The Centre could borrow the experience of other institutes 
in this area. Before taking this plunge, the M.D.C. has to answer 
satisfactorily the questions posed by Haskins (1986), which could 
be summarised as follows:-
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1. Are we committed to this area ? and does it complement the 
image we have already developed ?
2. Have we looked into the challenge of establishing this 
programme ?
3. Is our staff motivated and equipped to carry them out ?
4. Do we have the interest, time and money to develop special 
material and methods for small business training ?
5. Given the difficulties in ’reaching the small businessman’
do we also have the time and money to use the variety of marketing 
channels required to promote these kinds of programmes ?
6. Is Government or other sponsorship available for small
business programmes, or will we have to 'go it alone’ ?
To provide management training to small business, training 
programmes have to be set up on a research basis. Thus, the first 
activity to be carried out by the M.D.C is to conduct a comprehensive 
research with the objective to determine the training needs of small 
businesses at various stages of development. This foundation could 
be carried out by the Small Business Section in collaboration with 
the Research Section in the M.D.C.
In management training, a distinction is sometimes drawn 
between appreciation and application courses. The appreciation 
courses are short and designed to provide managment with a general
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understanding, using practical illustrations of basic factors affecting 
the operation of the business. Appreciation courses may well benefit 
lower level management, but are primarily intended for top managers. 
Application courses on the other hand, are designed to provide 
training in practical application of modern management methods 
and usually have to be longer and more systematic than appreciation 
courses (I.L.O, 1982). The research has identified the involvement 
of entrepreneurs in all operations and their attitude is the main 
factor behind the managerial profile of small business. In this 
regard, the research has proposed the setting-up of a training 
programmes based on a (Combination of the appreciation and application 
approach. Appreciation courses will be addressed to entrepreneurs 
of small businesses at various stages of development, with the 
objective of improving overall management practice of small business, 
whereas the application courses will be mainly for the small growing 
firm.
Based on this research observation, the proposed training 
programmes should address the following issues at the initial stage
1. To provide entrepreneurs with tools that will help to 
manage the business efficiently and effectively.
2. To impart to entrepreneurs the knowledge required and 
importance of accounting and other functional areas in the business 
management, with the objective of changing the entrepreneurial 
attitude.
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3. The research has identified the relationship between
family and management succession; thus the proposed programmes 
have to help deal with these problems and provide training to 
sucessors and those who will be owner-managers.
To provide effective and useful training programmes, 
three factors have to be satisfied; the content, the training methodology 
and the quality of the trainer or instructor. As far as the training 
methodology is concerns! an authority has stated:
"The particular method of management training.to 
be used must be adapted to the subject being taught 
and to the preference of the participants".
(I.L.O., 1968).
Taking into consideration the variety of entrepreneurs, in terms of 
education level, experience and management knowledge identified 
in this study (See Ch. 9), the proposed training programmes could 
be delivered by a combination of formal and informal methodology, 
measured into formal courses, discussion groups and circuit schemes 
as an informal device. Workshops, seminars and training courses 
will be used collectively to acquaint entrepreneurs with all aspects 
of the small enterprise management. Regarding instructors’ development, 
the Small Business Section has to devise a short and a long term 
plan for staff development, in line with the section overall plan 
and activities. In this regard, the section may work in collaboration 
with local, regional and international organisations, and experts 
in this area.
The importance of having periodicals, books, brochures 
or pamphlets for reference and study in any institute providing
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research, training, information or couselling services for small 
business cannot be over-emphasised (S.B.A., 1984). The Small Business 
Section may issue regular printed information in the native language 
(Arabic) for wide circulation, primarily for the publicising of the 
Section activities.
Entrepreneurship development with the objective of increasing 
the birth rate and decreasing the death rate of small businesses 
is not an easy task. It requires an optimal combination of finance 
and human resources. To carry out this critical task in small 
enterprise development, local, regional and international support 






















FIGURE 12.2 MODEL FOR ENTREPRENEURSHIP DEVELOPMENT





Management training and advisory services (M.D.C.) 
(x) Establishment of S. B. Section (M.D.C.) 
(x) Identification of training needs 
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(x) Appreciation and Application courses
(x) Staff Development
(x) Seminars and printed materials
(x) Re evaluation of Services
(x) Consultancy and advisory services















12.5______ Financial Control Practice:
This study has identified that the accounting systems 
maintained by small firms, regardless of stage of development is 
incomplete and rudimentary, and in most cases confined to technical 
recording of actual transactions (Ch. 10). Regarding improvement 
of financial control practice, the management training institutes, 
development financial institutes and commercial banks under Musharaka, 
and long-term finance, can be of immence assistance and significant 
help.
The Small Business Section of the M.D.C, as a means of 
changing the attitude of entrepreneurs, and based on the proposed 
research results, can establish programmes and courses in this deficient 
area of small business management. The contribution of the section 
can be directed to training and consultancy services. The proposed 
training courses have the following purposes:-
1. To improve accounting practice in terms of system, manpower 
(accountants) and the use of accounting information.
2. To introduce the concept of planning in small business 
management, and other modern techniques (cash-flow analysis, working 
capital analysis, budgetary control).
As far as the banks’ role in the imporvement of accounting 
practice, entrepreneurship development and promotion of small industries, 
Fasricha (1979) argued that training programmes by development banks 
for entrepreneur development all over the world is especially promising. 
Enthoven (1979) added that:
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"Development banks could prepare standard accounting 
forms and procedures for enterprises, covering financial
and managerial accounting .... such efforts may be
part of the pre-financing as a technical assistance 
project, or as part of the project financing itself".
Under the Musharaka financing instrument, the financier is 
involved in the management of the business. This necessitates for 
the recruitment of staff and qualified accountants so as to carry 
out the follow-up function properly. With respect to small business, 
the banks have to start first with the training of their own staff 
on small business management and assessment of the accounting services 
needed by small business and the sort of measures and mechanism 
to be adopted in following-up small business under Musharaka financing. 
Here comes the role of the M.D.C., Institute of Bankers, and training 
centres belonging to banks, in providing specialised training courses 
on small business to bank ’managements’. This, in turn provides 
justification of the adoption of the integrated model in the development 
of the small business sector, and shows the necessity of a co-ordination 
mechanism to carry out this poicy. The vital question is how to 
institutionalise this policy and how to build a co-ordination mechanism. 
To this point we direct attention now.
12.6______ Small Enterprise Development Corporation:
Borrowing the experience of other countries in small 
enterprise development (U.S., U.K., India, Norway, Cammeroon, Australia, 
and Mexico), the necessity to set up a central agency responsible 
for the development of small industry in a developing country 
like the Sudan cannot be over-emphasised. P. Neck (1981) rightly 
stated that:-
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"Every Government needs a Strong unit or division 
within its framework, capable of providing central 
guidance and control of diverse programme small 
enterprise developments which are either underway 
or being planned".
The experience of other countries in developed and developing 
economies shows that small enterprise development is an integrated 
issue, with wide differences in process, and requires collective 
and co-ordinative measures, in the sense that financial assistance 
is of no value if the entrepreneur does not know the effective way 
to use the capital, and productivity would not increase with all 
the inputs if the manager is not adequately motivated or trained.
- P. Neck Model, 1977 -. This integrated approach requires the 
institutionalisation of services supported with a well defined 
co-ordination mechanism.
The proposed Development Corporation for small industries 
in this practical policy would be the principal body responsible 
for the promotion and development of small industries in the Sudan.
It would also be responsible for the initiation of policy measures, 
and for devising measures for formulation and implementation of 
the programmes. The Corporation will be given the responsibility 
in all respects for the promotion of small industries, in co-ordination 
with relevant units and institutes. Due to the nature of the economic 
activities of the units under the umbrella of the proposed corporation 
as small manufacturing firms, the Ministry of Industry, where the 
Corporation is located, would be accountable for the working of 
the Corporation. The proposed body, as a device to close the small 
business institutional gap, would also act as a co-ordinating and 
monitoring organ, apart from policy formulation. Thus, the main 
functions of the proposed corporation would be:
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1. Evolving a country-wide policy and programme for the 
development of small industries at various stages of development.
2. Maintaining liaison betwen different organisations
at central and regional level, like financial institutions, central 
Ministries, Universities, management development institututes 
and other units and agencies connected with small enterprise 
development.
3  ^ Providing assistance to Regions on formulation and
implementation of small industries programme.
4. Co-ordinating the development programmes and extension 
services provided by specialised bodies.
5. Evaluating, supervising and monitoring the small industries 
programme in the country as a whole and providing sit-reps
to the proposed Small Industries Board (S.I.B.).
The experience of U.S., U.K., India, South Africa,
Tanzania and Canada shows that the small business development 
body should have enough administrative power and sanctions to 
be effective. Based on this experience, it is thus recommended 
that the head of the propsed Corporation should at least in the 
status of a managing-director of a public corporation, and report 
directly to the Minsiter of Industry. This administrative arrangement 
will create flexibility and minimise central Government rules 
and regulations. This arrangement implies the creation of this 
proposed body as an autonomous organ. These arrangments are 
not means to stop Government intervention but rather to furnish
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flexibility and to put the Corporation on both regional and inter­
national footing in carrying out its designed objectives. The 
Director of the proposed Corporation would be held accountable 
to the Small Industry Board and Minister of Industry. The Director, 
as a specialist, will act as an advisor to the Minister of Industry 
on small business issues. Due to lack of specialists in small 
business in the Ministry of Industry, the Minister in consultation 
with the Minister of Finance, can assign the Director's position 
to national staff form other bodies on permanent or secondment 
basis.
To establish a foundation for integrated effort on 
an institutional basis, the Small Industries Board is proposed 
as a consultative and policy formulation body, acting as a forum 
for participation in small enterprise development, providing 
advice to the Government. It is recommended that the relevant 
Board be chaired by a national expert in small business and macro- 
economic policy formulation from outside the Ministry of Industry.
It is further proposed that all units directly connected to small 
enterprise development be represented on the Board at senior 
level ♦ The suggested members are:
1. National expert to be appointed by the Minister of
Industry as Chairman.
2. Director of Small Industries Corporation.
3. Director of the proposed Small Business Unit in the
Central Bank.
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4. Representatives of Universities.
5. National Research Council.
6. The Management Development Centre - Head of Small Business
Section.
7. Managers of Commercial and Development Banks.
8. The Investment Bureau
9. The Institute of Industrial Research and Consultancy.
10. Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning.
11. Ministry of Commerce.
12. Sudanese Businessmen's Association.
13. Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
14. Ministry of Public Governments.
To create a certain degree of flexibility in the (S.I.C.) 
activities and operations, the Board should be given the power and authority 
to formulate, implement and monitor the policy. At this initial stage, 
the Board should meet on a quarterly basis, and be kept informed on 
a regular basis by the Director of the S.I.C. as an executive body.
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The Board budget would be part of the S.I.C budget and a system of 
renumberation and encouragement has to be established in order to provide 
incentives.
Figure 12.3
Organisation Structure of the Proposed Small Industries Corporation
(S.I.C.)
MINISTER OF INDUSTRY
SMALL INDUSTRY BOARD 
(S.I.C.) (B. OF D.)
DIRECTOR OF S.I.C.




















The Corporation would start operations with six specialised 
technical divisions as a simple set-up at the initial stage, focusing 
on conceptualisation of small business and, thereby, policy formulation. 
The main function of the policy and co-ordination Division is 
to implement the policies stated by the Board and to co-ordinate 
all policy matters. In this proposal, a separate division is suggeted, 
to handle and to co-ordinate regional policies and programmes, 
and to create a network between the S.I.C. and the Regional Governments. 
This division will be a seed-bed for regional agencies. Ihe Economic 
Investigation Divison, in co-ordination with the economic and 
technological research institutes, has to act as the eyes of the
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of the Board and the Government, conducting technio-economic 
surveys, and analysing suitable areas and opportunities. The 
technical and Management Consultancy Division, as the name implies 
will be in charge of entrepreneurship development dimensions.
The Financing Arrangement Divsion, in co-ordination with the Small 
Business Unit would be in charge of policy implementation and 
follow-up. At the initial stage this division would be assigned 
the responsibility of raising local, regional and international 
finance for the S.I.C. and its board operations.
As a national body, the proposed Development Corporation 
would have sole responsibility to ensure that the small business 
development takes place in a balanced manner throughout the country, 
and that the services meant to be given through the Corporation 
are evenly spread. It must observe the macro-economic policy 
stated in March 1986 National Economc Summit with the .objective 
of concentrating Investment in the import-substitution industries. 
Given these responsibilities the proposed development organ has 
to co-ordinate the process of small business development. An 
I.L.O. Authority stated that:-
MThere is no one "best” solution to the problem 
of ensuring the most fruitful co-operation between 
public and private interests in the field of 
small enterprise development. Nor is there any 
one best solution to the very real problem of 
co-ordination of the activities of the differen t 
Government departments, or other public agencies 
who may have contributions to make, because action 
to promote the healthy development of small scale 
industries touches the life of the Community at 
so many different points”.
I
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Though a structure is needed for administrative purposes,
in practice the flexibility and mobility of staff for specific
tasks should be assured (Sen, 1986). The quality of staff at
all levels is the essence of the operation. Therefore, much care
should be taken to see that the right person is chosen for the
right job. Due to the lack of expertise in small business in
the Sudan, it would be necessary to get some experts in the field
from outside sources. This combination of national, regional
and inter-national experts, would avoid mistakes at the initial
stage, and provide a healthy foundation for small enterprise 
development across the board.
Table (12.2) shows the extension services described 
in this integrated policy proposal, and the organisations involved 
in carrying out this policy. Based on integrative approach, Figure 























L, Small Industries Corp. X X X
1. Small Industry Board X X
3. Universities X X X
+ . Managemt Dev. Centre X X X X X
3. Ind. Res. & Cons Inst. X X X X
b. Nat Research Council X X X
7. Bank 0f Sudm/S£.U. X X X
3. Commercial Banks X X X X
9. DFIs X X X X
10.Businessmen’s Assoc. X X
11.Ministry of Finance X
12.Ministry of Commerce X
13.Investment Bureau X X
14.Vocational T. Centres X
15.Regional Governments X
16.Chamber of Commerce X
17.1nternat. Organisations
A. World Bank X
B. Arab League X
C. European D.F. X
D. UNIDO X X
E. I.L.O. X X















Since overall needs and small enterprise development 
conditions and parameters change, a continuous programme of research 
into economic and technological problems is called for. This research 
effort offers a starting point for an empirical research, with the 
objective of conceptualising and providing a sound framework for 
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GENERAL INFORMATION ON 
ESTABLISHMENT AND ENTREPRENEUR
1. Name of Company.
2. Location of the Company. Region:
Town:
3. Name(s) of person(s) interviewed, position held in the company 




d. Other (please specify)
4. Date of commencement of the business.




d. Other (please specify)
(State the number of partners or shareholders)
6. What were the main and secondary activities of the business?
a. On commencing business
b. At present
7. Total number of persons employed.
a. Un-skilled (primary education or less)
b. Skilled
c. Managerial and professional staff
8. Total number of family members employed.
a. Un-skilled
b. Skilled
c. Managerial and professional staff
-495-
9. a. Who were the founders of the company?
b. Who took the initiative in starting the enterprise?
c. How many persons were originally involved?
d. How were they known to each other?
e. How many partners/shareholders belong to the same
family?
f„ Ages of the founders:
(i) At establishment
(ii) At present
10. a. Why did you decide to start this enterprise?
b. Why this kind of business, rather than another?
c. Why go into business rather than any other way of 
earning a living?
11. Was any technical advice or assistance received at the outset?
Yes...............  No................
(If so, from whom?)
12. What motivated the founders to set up the business.





f. Meet family demands
g- Other (please specify)
13. What currently are your main motivations?
14. What are your educational qualifications?
a. None
b. Dropped out of "KHAL"/ primary school




g. Any other (please specify)
15. What types of management training did you have?
16. What industrial experience do you have?
a. Civil service — public sector
b. Banking
c. Trade and commercial
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d . Manufac turi ng
e. Professional
f. Other (please specify)

















18. How many years experience?
a. Less than 2 years
b. 2 to 4 years
c. 5 to 10 years
d. Over 10 years
19. Who are the present Directors and what, if any, are their family 
relationships?






21. How many years has the present owner/manager worked with this firm?
22. How many years of managerial experience has this manager had in 




23. With how much did you commence the business?
24. What was the total amount of funds invested by the owner in
this firm when it was formed?
25. Did your firm obtain credit at the beginning of the operation?







e. Others (please specify)














27. What were the most important sources of finance?















Large Firm Small Firm
Inception Growing Declining
28. Why were these the most important?
a. Cheapest














29. For each of the following sources of finance, state which you did 








g. Other significant sources (please specify)
Bank Borrowing
30. If used (bank borrowing), please specify the type and nature of the 
bank:
a. Public Commercial Bank
b. Public Development Bank
c. Private Commercial Bank - Western
d. Private Islamic Bank
31. Explain why you used bank borrowing?
a. Cheap
b. Flexible
c. Most easily accessible
d. Sharing of risks
e. Other reasons (please specify)




d. Other and why?
33. For what specific purpose did you use the money?
a. Purchase fixed assets
b. Purchase raw materials
c. Paying creditors
d. No particular purpose





35. Do you have a relationship with the Bank Manager or Branch 
Manager in the area?
36. Do you feel the Bank Manager was sympathetic to small businesses? 
Trade Credit
37. What are the normal credit terms generally observed in your 
industry for credit given by your suppliers?
38. Please specify:
a. Period of credit received
b. Uusual discount terms offered by you
c. Other (Please specify)
39. A. Did you get more or less credit than usual?
If more, why?





B. If less, why?
a. Poor relationship with supplier
b. Inception
c. Declining
d. Other finance preferred
(A) Long-Term Loans (B) Financing
40. From where did you obtain (A) Long-term Loans (B) Financing?
a. Commercial Public Banks
b. Development Public Banks
c. Private Islamic Commercial Banks
d. Private Commercial Banks - WESTERN
e. Private sources (Please specify)
41. In what form did you get (A) Long-Term loans (B) Financing?
a. Participating - capital agreement - Musharaka
b. Mudaraba
c. Loan (Western system) (I.B.S.)
d. Share capital - Family
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e. Share capital - Non-family
f. Other (Please specify)





e. Furniture and fixtures
f. Other (Please specify)
43. Did you approach the Sudanese Industrial Bank (S.I.B.) for finance?
44. If reply to question 43 is No, why not?
a. Terms not acceptable
b. Too expensive - cost of finance
c. Not in need of additional finance
d. Sufficient finance available from other sources
e. Too bureaucratic
f. Unknown to you
g. Collateral arrangements
h. Other (Please specify)
45. Did you approach the private Islamic Banks for finance?
46. If reply to question 45 is No, state why?
a. Terms not acceptable
b. Too expensive - cost of finance
c. Not in need of additional finance
d. Sufficient finance available from other sources
e. Too bureaucratic
f. Unknown to you
g- Collateral arrangements
h. Other (Please specify)
i. The terms of finance not clear to you
j- Based on ideology
k. Other (Please specify)




c. Bank or Branch Manager
d. Family
e. Friend
f. Other (Please specify)
48. What level of documentation was required by the Banks?
a. Last years' accounts
b. Cash budget
c. Cash flow analysis
d. Statement of uses to which loan is to be applied
e. The net worth of the company
f. The current valuation of the company
g. None
h. Other (Please specify)




50. What was the major initial source of funds available to the 
founder(s) at inception of the business:
a. Savings (Please specify)
b. Loan from family
c. Loan from friends
d. Loan from Bank
e. Other (Please specify)
51. Did your firm obtain funds to finance growth and expension from 
any source outside or beyond its retained earnings?
52. If reply to question 51 is affirmative, please provide the following 
information?
a. Financier
b. Length of loans
c . Total number of loans
d. Amount of loans
e. The cost of money
f. Collateral requirements
g- Payment methods
h. Uses of the loan
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53. If reply to Question 51 is No, please state the reason?
a. Internal funds are sufficient to meet growth 
Needs
b. Could not obtain loan on a satisfactory basis
c. Could not obtain equity capital
d. Did not know about all available sources of outside 
funds
e. Other reasons (Please specify)
54. Were you forced to rely on equity financing more than you would 
have liked?
55. If reply to question 54 was affirmative, why?
a. Not aware of other funds being available
b. Lack of other finance
c. Your preference
d. Other (Please specify)
56. Have you ever lacked external finance?
57. For what purposes were funds needed, but were not available?
a. Current assets - working capital needs
b. Fixed assets
c. Promotional purposes
d. Other needs (Please specify)
58. What do you regard as the main constraint on:
a. Financing start-up (inception)
b. Growth and expansion
c. Re-organization and liquidity problems
59. How extensively did you document your case in attempting to 
obtain funds from the sources mentioned in question 27?
a. Did not document the case
b. Historical financial data
c. Cash budget
d. Projected P/L a/c and B/sheet
e. The estimated cost of transaction (project)
f. Cash flow
g- The evaluation of the company assets
h. Other (Please specify)
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60. What minimum level of documentation would you say in your 
experience is usually necessary?
a. Summary of requirements
b . Cash budgets
c. Projected Profit and Loss Account and Balance 
Sheets
d. Other (Please specify)
e. None
61. Overall, how important do you think documentation is in raising 








63. If reply to Question 62 is 'very successful' or 'successful', please 
give most important reason why?




e. Obviously growing firm
f. Type of fund requested
g. Other (Please specify)
64. If 'not successful' please give most important reasons why.
a. Credit squeeze
b. Case not well presented
c . No contacts
d. Other (Please specify)
65. Did lack of success in raising external finance impede the company?





66. What were the reasons given by financial institutions (public 




67. Who was responsible for the financial aspects of the business?
a. Entrepreneur
b. Accountant
c. Other (Please specify)
68. When was the first occasion a finance specialist was appointed?
69. Was the appointment full or part-time?





e. Government body (Please specify)
f. Other (Please specify)
71. Which external source provided the best advice (Please specify)?
72. If you did not seek external advice on finance, please state why not?
a. Not in need of external advice
b. Did not trust outsiders
c. Sufficient expertise within the company
d. Had not heard of advice being available
e. Reluctant to approach outside advisors
f. Other (Please specify)
73. Did you feel overall that there was a lack of advice about financing 
f or:
a. Start-up
b. Growth and expansion




74. A. How is the business managed? (Give brief description of
experience; record of jobs, activities and previous 
business ventures).
B. How many Directors are members of:
The same Family .......................
The same Tribe .......................
75. Who is in charge of the technical aspects of the business?
76. Is any change in management proposed?






78. Do you keep any books of account? (Give brief description)
79. If reply to Question 96 is No, why not?
80. If reply to Question 96 is affirmative, how many accountants did
you have?
81. What were their qualifications
82. How many accountants are members of the same Family?
same Tribe? 
and why?
83. On what terms were they appointed?
a. Full-time
b. Part-time
c. Other (Please specify)
84. A. Who advised on the maintenance of accounting records?







f. Other (Please specify)
85. What did you think of the role of accounting and accountants in 
the decision-making process?
86. Did you think it useful to maintain an accounting system and why/
why not?
87. A. To what extent did you think the accountant could help in
raising finance?
B. Accounting records - (give brief description)







89. Which three items in the Profit and Loss Accounts did you regard as 
most important to control?
90. How often were the undermentioned items reported upon:
a. Sales
b. Materials - stocks
c. Overheads
d. Wages/salari es
91. Did you have a budgeting system?




d. General admin, budget
e. Other (Please specify)
93. Who advised you to maintain budgeting systems? (Please specify).
94. How often did you compare performance with budget?
95. How often were physical stock (material and finished goods) 
checked and reported on?
Planning P/L
96. How often did you prepare a forecast Profit and Loss Account?
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Who wa3 responsible for the preparation and maintenance of the 




d. Other (Please specify)
e. Bank Representative





e. Other (Please specify)
98. How often did you prepare a forecast of your future cash flow?
99. How often were forecasts prepared for each of the under-mentioned 





Balance Sheet - Historical
100. How often did you prepare the company Balance Sheet?







g- Other (Please specify)
102. Which three items in the Balance Sheet did you regard as most 
important to control?
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103. How often were the under-mentioned items reported upon:





104. How often did you review your working capital?
105. How often did you review your investment in fixed assets?
106. How often did you review your gearing?
107. How often did you prepare inventories of fixed assets?
108. How often did you re-value fixed assets?
109. Did you have a system for ageing and following-up debtors?
110. Who was responsible for the follow-up of debtors?
111. Who was responsible for following-up creditors, the preparation 
of a creditors' inventory, and how often?
Balance Sheet Planning
112. How often did you prepare Balance Sheet forecasts?
113. Who advised you, and who was responsible?





115. Did you have strategic planning systems?
116. If the reply to Question 115 is No, state briefly why?
a. We did not need it
b. We were not aware of it or heard of it
c. Other (Please specify)
117. If the reply to Question 115 was affirmative, what type of planning 
did you have?
- Short-range policy 
Long-range policy
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118. How frequently did you prepare strategic policies?
119. What were the processes for strategic policies, and why?
a. Formal
b. Informal
c. Other (Please specify)
120. What level of documentation was embodied in the formal planning?
121. To what extent was the degree of formality/informality influenced 
by:
a. Bank involvement
b. Nature of the industry
c. Stage of development of the enterprise
d. Family involvement
e. Quality of the finance specialist
122. What in order of importance were the main objectives of the company 
inception, growing and declining stages:
a. Maximum profit earned
b. Build-up of fixed assets
c. Create family enterprise




h. Other (Please specify)
123. How significant has the influence of financial control systems 
been in:
a. Raising funds
b. In developing the business
c. In re-creating the company




124. Over the past 5 years, have any other major developments 
affected the firm's progress?
125. Over the next 5 years, do you want to expand or not, and why 
do you think so?
126. Do you feel it is desirable or not that the firm should stay
in your family? Why do you think so?
127. Do you want any changes in the circumstances in which firms
like your own operate?
128. In your kind of business, what qualities do you regard as 
necessary for success?
129. What do you think are the outstanding problems of small 
businesses in the Sudan?
130. What should the Government do to help small businesses that 
would be most effective?
131. What should public and private banks do to promote small 
business efficiency and effectiveness?
132. To what extent is your business affected by the credit-squeeze
system?
133. What are the most important factors that you consider have 
prevented your business from:
a. Successful - start-up




The last 5 years Profit and Loss Accounts and Balance Sheets of small
firms at inception, growing and declining stages.





COMMERCIAL & DEVELOPMENT BANKS 
INTERVIEW GUIDELINE
A. POLICY
(1) Have you maintained a policy regarding small Business?
Give description.
(2) If reply to Question 1 was affirmative, please state the 
criteria used by the Bank in defining a small firm?
(3) What was the logic stated by the Bank behind the selection 
of the criteria?
(4) What sort of policies and measures were adopted and used 
by the Bank to develop the small firm sector, and why?
B. FINANCING
(5) What criteria was used by the Bank in providing funds to 
the client.
(6) Do you have standard procedures in financing decisions?
(7) What return do you expect for certain types of risk, under 
different types of finance?
(8) Please rank these factors in order of importance to your Bank 
in a financing decision:
a. Nationality of the owners of the firm
b. The size of the firm
c. The firm's financial position
d. The firm's management
e. The growth potential of the firm's industry
f. The personal and ideological values
g. The established loan policies of the bank
h. The Bank's financial position
i. The Central Bank's regulations 
j. Other factors
(9) What type of collateral arrangement is required by the Bank in 








(10) What could the Bank do if a client failed to pay?
(11) How does the Bank determine the cost of finance under the 
source of finance mentioned in Question (9)?
(12) Do you have any source of finance similar to overdraft 
facilities?
(13) What type of finance does the Bank consider as most profitable, 
and preferred by the Bank, and why?
(14) What were the preferred terms of financing used by the Bank 




(15) To what extent does the credit-squeeze system controlled by 





(16) In your opinion is the formation and growth of small manufacturing 
firms in the Sudan limited and inhibited because of an 
insufficient supply of funds?
(17) How would you rate Banks in the Sudan on their eagerness to 
help finance industry?
(18) Other comments on how to improve the situation.
C. DOCUMENTATION









(19B)To what extent is financing influenced by the Financial 
Control System maintained by small manufacturing firms 
and vice versa?
(20) What minimum level of documentation would you say in your 
experience is usually necessary?
a. Summary of requirements
b. Cash budgets
c. Projected Profit and Loss Account and Balance Sheet
d. None
e. Other (Please specify)
(21) Overall, how important do you think documentation is in 





(22) Do you have a follow-up section. Give brief description.








(24) What sort of communication channel is maintained between the 
Bank and its' clients?
(25) Did the Bank monitor the types of financing in different ways 
and state the reasons?
(26) To what extent is the Bank's involvement in the management of
the business under the types of finance mentioned in Question (23)?
(27) To what extent are monitoring techniques employed by the Bank 
under the interest—based system different from ones used under 
Islamisation?
(28) To what extent were the used monitoring techniques efficient 
and effective in securing the Bank resources?
-516-
E. FAILURE
(29) How does the Bank define failure?
(30) Would you please state the experience of the Bank in financing 
and monitoring failed companies. Please give examples.
(31) How does the Bank finance declining and failed small 
and large manufacturing firms?
(32) What were the mechanisms used by the Bank to anticipate 
failure?
(33) What type of finance does the Bank consider as most appropriate 
in financing failed and declining companies?
F. GENERAL
(34) Did your Bank provide an advisory service to small firms in 
addition to the provision of finance? Please state the type 
of advice provided.
(35) What type of training on small firm management and financing, 
were your Bank staff enrolled in (specify)?
SECONDARY DATA
(1) Bank's Annual Reports and Statement of Accounts.
(2) Bank's policies, regulations and Bank of Sudan's policy.
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These small manufacturing companies were selected as case 
studies to further the research process, on the basis of 
qualitative and quantitative criteria identified in defining the 
small firm in the Sudan, as well as its development stages. Thus, 
the research case studies were classified into inception, growing 
and declining stages.
The research case studies were built around the research 
conceptual framework (see Ch. 3). The methodology adopted in 
collecting data was semi-structured interview, with interview 
guidelines built around the concerned variables. The Boswell model 
(1972) in researching the small firm was used as a guiding 
methodology in conducting interviews and in organising and 
presenting the data.
The interviewees were the owners and managers of the relevant 
small firms, accountants, family and non-family members and others 
connected with the company, identified through the process of
i.nves tigation.
Based on stages of small enterprise classification, this volume 
will be classified and categorised as follows:
PART I: Inception Stage
PART II: Growing Stage
PART III: Declining Stage
The research case studies were analysed (Ch. 3) with the 
objective of examining empirically the analytical framework, and of 




CASE STUDY I: REMAZ SWEETS FACTORY - KHARTOUM
CASE STUDY II: KOSTI NATIONAL SWEETS FACTORY
CASE STUDY NO. I 
REMAZ SWEETS FACTORY
1. Corporate Background:
The initiator of Remaz Co., Mr. Sultan, had formed a wood
products factory in 1976, as a joint venture project with a
businessman-trader {Mr. Hana). The wood factory had failed in 1979, 
due to financial, marketing and technical problems. The wood 
factory partnership was dissolved in 1979, the year of collapse, by 
the withdrawal of Mr. Hana. In 1980, Mr Sultan shifted to the field 
of food processing, in a partnership agreement with Mr. Abdo
forming Remaz Sweets Factory. The main motives behind the change to 
food processing industry as enumerated by the owner, could be 
summarised as follows:
. The machinery of sweets factory could be obtained from the 
local market, which protects the investors from the
persistent shortage in hard-currency.
. The availability of raw-material: 75% of it in the local
market.
. There was a market niche and opportunity, as a result of the 
collapse and failure of most similar public enterprises.
. The sweets industry, and Alpha in particular, required a 
simple technology and therefore only semi-skilled labour.
Remaz Sweets Factory started operation in 1980, producing and 
marketing Alpha in the local market with 10 employees. In December 
1984, keeping pace with the development of the company, and 
introduction of two lines of production, the total number of people 
employed, including management, increased to 36. This number could 
be broken down into the following:






2. En trepreneurs1 Background:
2.1 Origin and Education:
The founders of Remaz Co. were born, brought up and 
educated in an urban area (Khartoum). They were 40 - 45 years old, 
which means that founders all belonged to one generation, but not 
to one family. The owners of Remaz were university graduates, thus, 
the level of education of the owners was very high, taking the 80% 
illiteracy in the Sudan in the 1970s. This level of education 
affected significantly industrial experience as well as management 
and financing of the business.
2.2 Industrial Experience:
After graduation from the university in 1966, Mr. Abdo 
joined the Ministry of Finance as Inspector, and then moved to the 
Custom Duties Dept., until he left the Government job in 1976. This 
sort of experience affected Mr. Abdo's perceptions of his business 
and how he regarded its financing and management control. Mr. 
Sultan, joined the Labour Dept., also in 1966, as an Industrial 
Relation Officer. In 1973, he joined a large private family 
business - Hilal Co. - as a deputy director. In Hilal Co. , he had 
experience in managing a large pri.vate company, highly dominated 
and influenced by the family members. This experience was a main 
motive factor in setting up Remaz.
2.3 Motivation:
The factors which motivated the owners to set up their own 
business, as reported by the owners, could be summarised as 
follows:
. Dissatisfaction with the Government job 
. Search for independence
. Tendency to capitalise on their previous experience 
. Economic rewards 
. Social status
2.4 Management Training
The owners had attended a number of management training 
programmes, both in the Sudan and abroad, being government 
employees. This sort of management talent would be an injection to 
management practice in the indigenous small private business in the 
Sudan. The co-founder, Mr. Abdo, had a fruitful view of the 
applicability and usefulness of training programmes to the 
management of small businesses. He stated that:
"The management-training programmes that I had attended were 
tailored to meet the needs of large companies in a developed 
economy. As far as the size of our company is concerned, we are 
looking for pragmatic training courses which meet our needs.
In spite of this sophisticated attitude to management-training, 
Remaz had not sent any of its staff for managerial training. The 
founders argued that Remaz was under establishment and constrained 
by time and resources.
The characteristics of the owners, in terms of origin, 
education, industrial experience and management knowledge, had an
effect on financing and how they succeeded in securing funds at 
inception, overcoming the infancy period, which caused collapse to 
most small businesses. The level of education was a great help in 
presenting their ease to bank managements, using their language and 
its subsequent logic.
3. Family Influence:
The Remaz Company was managed by its owners, who did not belong 
to one family. Notwithstanding this, the company was highly 
influenced by the families of the owners, in the sense that all key 
positions were manned by family members on an equal basis. In this 
sense, Remaz shares the characteristic of family businesses in the 
sudan. The underlying logic of this profile could be extracted 
from the statement of Mr. Sultan:
"We have the belief and conviction that, the best way to create 
an opportunity for success in the business, is to establish 
family commitment within the business boundaries."
The involvement of the family members in the formal business 
management and operation could be seen through the organisation 
structure which was built round the family. Regarding finance, the 
family contribution represents 17 - 21% of short-term financing. Mr 
Abdo added that:
"We are thinking seriously in creating more avenues for the 
families within Remaz' operations. The expansion policy could 
be one of the avenues to absorb family members."
4. Financing Characteristics and Financial Profile:
The seed capital of the company was derived from the owners'
personal savings and resources, and the disposal of the machinery 
of the wood factory. The authorised capital of the company in 1980 
all of which was needed, was L.S. 500,000, but the paid-up capital 
L.S. 260,000 representing only 52% of requirements, showing that 
Remaz at start-up under-capitalised. Family finance, as well as
owners' resources, were the major sources of working capital 
finance at inception.
The seed capital was deployed in machinery and equipment. The 
company had not received credit or financial facilities from the 
bank in the early days of its life. During the first two years, the 
company relied heavily on owners' resources, family and trade 
creditors, as well as friends in financing working capital. This 
lack of institutional finance had been attributed by the owners to 
be banking policy in the Sudan favouring established and big
producers.
In 1982, the owners had succeeded in securing short-term 
working capital finance from Faisal Islamic Bank (FIB) on Murabaha
basis for 3 months. The cost of finance charged by FIB was 1.75 per
month, and the amount L.S. 100,000. The bank credit facilities on 
Murabaha were increased in 1983/84 from 200,000 in 1982/83 to L.S. 
300,000; 60% of that financing was allocated to working capital and 
40% to finance purchase of two lines of production from the local 
market. This arrangement had been made with the consent of the 
bank. That was to say the short-term finance, had been allocated 
partly to fixed asset financing, as a result of lack of 
institutional long-term finance. The cost of expansion in 1983/84 
was deteriorating liquidity which adversely affected the operation
at the mid season.
The company received no longer term loans, whether from public 
or from private banks, either before or after Islamisation. The 
'FIB1, made a financing offer to the company under Musharaka 
agreement. Under the proposed offer, the bank would finance all 
operations of the company, under profit and loss sharing agreement. 
The owners rejected the bank's offer, on the ground that Musharaka 
financing was usually followed by the bank involvement in the 
management of the business. This revealed the influence of the 
entrepreneur's motivation in setting-up his business on the choice 
of finance.
Regarding the raising of funds, the owners relied on personal 
channel, in the sense that they capitalised on their relationship 
with banks and other Government units, in securing and raising 
funds. The owners admitted that the personal relationship, at a 
given volume of finance, was more important than documentation. The 
owners had not presented any financial documentation for finance 
less than L.S. 100,000.
Regarding advice on finance, Mr Abdo stated that;
"We have not heard of any advice being available and we are 
experienced enough to handle Remaz's financial and managerial 
affairs.
The control of cash was given a high priority, under the direct 
control of the owners. The information on cash movements was 
usually derived from the bank statement and kept in the owners' 
heads. Big transactions in financing and allocation of finance were 
under the direct control, and follow-up of the owners.
The difficulties faced by the company in raising funds at 
inception for working capital as well as expansion finance, as 
enumerated by the owners, could be summarised as follows:
1. The financial institutions' behaviour towards industry 
financing and small firms in particular.
2. The Government regulation, and the Bank of Sudan ceiling 
system, which put constraints on bank financing, narrowed 
the chance of small firms in getting finance, compared with 
the giant and well-established enterprises
3. The non-availability of long-term loans for establishment 
and expansion finance.
4. The timing of finance. This factor had a great impact on the 
industry financing and performance in the Sudan, because 95 
percent of industry was a gro-based industry depending on 
seasonal raw-materials.
5. The cost of finance was too high for a very short-term 
finance, which put the company under continuous pressure.
6. Instability of the banking policy in the Sudan, from 
interest-based system to Islamisation, which delayed all 
operations in 1984, and lack of information on the new 
system.
7. The financing was based on personal relationship and contact 
with the bank managements, rather than on company or project 
viability, and therefore financing decisions were subject to 
bankers' perceptions, and subjective opinions.
The problem in determining the financial profile of the 
company, was the non-existence of financial information, in the
form of final accounts and balance sheet at the early stages of the 
comany's life (1980-1982). In 1980/81 the financial profile of the 
company, as revealed by scattered information, was under­
capitalisation, liquidity, low profitability and high equity to debt 
ratio. The company after two years of operations (1982/83 -) , had 
received external finance for working capital as well as fixed 
assets finance on short-term basis. That finance affected the 
liquidity profile of the company in 1983/84. The company remained 
under-capitalised in its e&rly years (30%), liquidity varied, low 
profitability remained as also high equity to debt. Table (1.1)
shows the ratios chosen to measure 
financial gearing of the company. 




A. Current ratio 1.14 1.03 .98
B. W.C./T.A. Ratio 6% 1%
2. Profitability
82 83 84
A. Rota 7% 6% 4%
B. Profit Margin 11% 6% 4%
C. Assets T.O.R. .636 1 1
3. Financial Gearing
82 83 84
Equity 244 251 264
Debt 170 186 259
Ratio 1.44 1.35 1.02
5. Organisation Set-up and Management Style:
The organisation structure of the company was very simple built 
round the owners, who were the ultimate decision makers - dominant 
coalition. The upper echelons of the set-up were manned by the 
family members. The experience, family relationship and age, were 
considered in locating family members in the set-up. The company at 
the top level was managed jointly by the owners, with no defined 
responsibilities or line of authority. This sort of joint management 
had an advantage of sharing ideas and decision making, but created 
an overlap, because of lack of defined lines of responsibility. The 
owners were all aware of this situation.
The second man in the echelon was the production manager, who 
was in charge of all technical and production functions, the 
production manager, who was a brother of one of the owners, was 55 
years old; and the brother of the other owner worked as assistant 
production manager. The production manager and his assistant were 
delegated to take only routine and insignificant decisions. It 
became clear that the production manager had two superiors of equal 
power and equal rights as owners of the business. Moreover, he had 
to report to his brother who was younger than him. This point 
illustrates the complexities created by the involvement of the 
family in business operations.
The owners of the company were responsible for all operations. 
The accounts section, which was newly established, was under the 
direct control and supervision of the owners. The management style 
of the owners was thus consultative of family members at the top
echelon, and highly authoritative at lower levels. The involvement 
of family in finance and business management had an influence on 
the degree of formality and informality and style of management. 
The owners admitted that the cost of family financing and 
psychologial support is a sacrifice of accountability. This sort of 
cost places a challenge before the survival of the start-up firm, 
and raises the question of balance between family involvement and 
survival and growth of the business.
Lack of objectives in the small firm, is echoed in the practice 
of Remaz Co. The company had no specific and defined objective for 
a specific period of time as either target or measurement device. 
The company also had no system of evaluation. The manufacturing 
equation had been used as evaluation criteria. In answering 
questions on financial assessment, the owners revealed little 
knowledge. The owners had not had any inside or outside advisers on 
these issues.
The lack of. objective/s, a complete absence of an evaluation 
system and the limited understanding and knowledge of the owners, 
bring into question the use of financial control and accounting 
information.
6. Financial Control Characteristics and Profile:
The financial control system maintained by the company was 
highly monitored and built round the ability of the owners, who had 
no accounting knowledge or training. Mr. Abdo was capitalising on 
his experience in the Ministry of Finance by keeping an eye on the 
operation of the system, and the recruitment of the relevant staff.
The existing system, comprising five books of accounts (general 
expenses, work in process, bank book, cash book, and sales book) 
had been introduced in 1982, after two years of operation. The 
system was designed by the auditer, and implemented by the owners. 
At start-up, the recording system was confined to informal 
information. The rate of formality came into being as a result of 
expansion of business operation and banks' interactions.
The second phase of development of the company's accounting 
system, was the recruitment of a bookkeeper from outside the 
family. This bookkeeper was a commercial secondary-school leaver, 
with an experience of 20 years as an accountant in the public 
agriculture scheme. He was trained in governmental accounting, 
which was not based on a commercial accounting footing. In 1985, as 
a result of owners' recognition of the importance of accounting and 
qualified accountants, a university graduate was appointed. These 
surrogates revealed the entrepreneurs attitude. This positive 
attitude could be attributed to the level of education, managerial 
training, as well as advice of the external auditor.
There was no reporting system and the information was confined 
to historical accounting records. That is to say, the accounting 
system of Remaz Co. was very crude with incomplete records and lack 
of a continuous and frequent reporting system. The owners of the 
company were well aware of the deficiency of the accounting system. 
Mr Abdo stated that:
"The financial control system stood as one of the weaknesses of 
the management, it is incomplete, mere historical and of no use 
in reflecting the actual position and in providing relevant and 
reliable information for decision-making. It is the area that 
needs more attention and consideration and this is why we had
appointed a university graduate as an accountant."
Even with that sort of understanding of the important role of 
accounting in decision-making, Remaz still maintained a poor and 
incomplete system. A vital question to be raised in this context is 
whether such a poor and crude financial control system is a natural 
phenomenon of the start-up stage, or a variable, influenced by the 
entrepreneur's attitude and financier involvement.
As a measurement for the crudity of the financial control 
system adopted by Remaz, was non-existence of any sort of budgeting 
system. Mr Sultan added that: "production based round the
manufacturing equation is our guide". As a result of an L.S. 2 
million login grainted under Murabaha, FIB introduced a planning and 
scheduling system for production covering the whole year (Jan 1985 
- December 1985). This plainning behaviour was influenced by the 
volume of finaince and type of financing instrument, and the nature 
of the financier. Mr Sultan added that:
"The annual production planning system was imposed by the 
financier for disbursement and settlement purposes. We followed 
the plan, as an imposed condition."
In spite of the attempt of the owners to improve the financial 
control system of the company, we could conclude that the financial 
control of Remaz, was less than adequate, built only round the 
ability, capability and understanding of entrepreneurs, and 
designed to provide information,for external users, mainly taxation 
and Zaka house.
CASE STUDY NO. 2 
KOSTI NATIONAL SWEETS FACTORY
1. Corporate Background:
The origin of the idea of the factory could be derived from the 
statement of the owner and initiator of the factory, who added a 
new dimension in the field of motivation and public policy.
"In 1979/80 the Investment Act had been passed by the Ministry 
of Finance. The theme of the Act was to promote private sector 
involvement in different fields of investment, and particularly 
in the field of industry. Responding to this Act as well as the 
financial and technical support of the Sudanese Industrial Bank 
(SIB), the Kosti Factory came into existence."
The activity of the enterprise at start-up and at present was 
and is the production and distribution of tahina and Tahnia in the 
regional market (Kosti). The factory started operations in 1981/82 
with two machines, manned by 10 semi-skilled workers. In 1983, the 
earnings of the enterprise had been capitalised partially by 
acquiring another two machines from the local market. Consequently 
the number of workers was doubled to 20. Due to expansion, the 
number of workers increased to 25 in 1984, showing 150% increase on 
the base year (1981).
2. Entrepreneur Background:
The initiator and owner of the factory was born and brought up 
in an urban area in a family business. Mr Riyah was a secondary 
school leaver. After schooling he joined his father's business 
(1963),which mainly traded in the local market, but also exported 
cash-crops. In the family business as an elder son, he was assigned
various jobs and responsibilities in trading, agriculture and 
contracting. In 1975, after 12 years experience, Mr El Riah 
established his own business as owner and manager of an agricul­
tural scheme for the production of sesame, groundnuts and sorghum 
in the Kosti area. The subject scheme was funded by the family 
business. The entrepreneur added that:
"I was encouraged by my father to build my own business and 
image following the style of our Grandfather. The agricultural 
scheme was financed by the family business as a reward of 12 
years of loyalty and devotion to the family and to give a 
chance for my brothers to take an active role in the family 
business. The agricultural scheme, as well as the sweets 
factory, could be considered as an expansion to the family 
business, rather than segregation and destruction of family 
business and wealth.”
This sort of origin, industrial experience, and the beliefs of 
the owner in the family and business relationships had a great 
effect in shaping the financing profile and management approach of 
the owner.
As far as motivation was concerned, it suffices to state the 
argument of the entrepreneur:
MTo build my own image in the market and to get involved in a 
new field of investment as well as economic rewards, I shifted 
my business from trading in oil seed crops to the processing of 
oil seeds."
The motivation of the founder in setting-up the business could be 
derived from his statements on independence, image seeking, 
economic rewards, and diversification and expansion of family 
business. Moreover, the founder was encouraged by the availability 
of seed capital from family resources and bank loans, as well as
marketability of the products.
3. Family Influence:
To examine the roots of family in El Riah business and the 
degree of influence on business management and finance, it is 
sufficient to start with the statement of the father of the 
founder, whose opinions and views had an influence on El Riah 
business. He stated that:
"Our business was inherited from our grandfathers, we developed 
the family business into the field of exports and imports so as 
to keep pace with business development in the Sudan. El Riah 
and his brothers were entitled to lead the business to another 
stage of growth and development. That is why I encouraged El 
Riah financially and psychologically to go into the field of 
industry. The family business to me is a school and El Riah is 
a graduate, therefore his progress or failure, is a true 
assessment of the school's value."
With this sort of understanding, and perception the elder son 
of the family had been supported financially to set up his own 
business. The family financed the factory directly, by providing 
the working capital in the period 1981 - 1983 and indirectly by 
financing the agricultural scheme for the production of sesame 
which constituted 75% of the raw-materials needed.
The financing extended by the family, as well as origin had an 
effect on the way the business was organised and managed. The 
business was managed at operational and strategic levels by family 
members. Due to the lack of education of the family members, a 
foreman had been recruited in 1981 from among their relatives. 
Following that experience, they decided to recruit a foreman from 
non-relatives, and to concentrate on the operational level, so as 
to compensate for the absence of family members at the plant. The 
entrepreneur added that:
MDue to the complexity of the situation, we found it difficult 
to build a demarcation line between family emotion and business 
requirements. This is why we changed the recruitment policy for 
foremen. This does not change our belief that the family 
involvement in business operation is the key success factor.”
The family members were working in the business at formal and 
informal level.
4. Financing Characteristics and Financial Profile:
The initial capital of the company was derived from the owner's 
and family resources. The total initial cost of the factory was 
L.S. 85,000; 65% was financed from the founder's resources. That 
portion had been allotted into buildings, equipment and cars. The 
machinery was financed by the Sudanese Industrial Bank (SIB) on 
long-term basis, amounting to L.S. 30,000. The cost of long-term 
loan ranged from 11 - 17% P.A. The paid-up capital represented 70% 
of the needed funds, which means that the enterprise started 
operations with insufficient capital.
The working capital for the first year, 1981/82 was financed 
from family resources (80%) and the friends of the founder (owners 
of agricultural schemes) in providing raw-materials on credit 
terms. In 1982, the owner succeeded in securing working capital 
finance from the Co-operative Bank on overdraft. The overdraft 
ceiling approved by the bank in question was L.S. 60,000 at 17% 
P.A. The Kosti Factory was unique lies in the success securing 
finance from the Sudanese Agricultural Bank (SAB) for the 
agricultural scheme, indirectly solving its problem of working 
capital. The 'SAB1 funding was L.S. 40,000. The external working 
capital obtained by the factory in 1982 was L.S. 100,000. This
volume of finance had increased the sales of the company by 100% to 
L.S. 230,000. The retained profits were used and capitalised for 
expansion and development. Due to the abolishment and amalgamation 
of the Co-operative Bank with Bank of Khatoum, the factory had 
faced a problem in securing working capital finance (1983).
In 1983/84 the owner approached Faisal Islamic bank for working 
capital finance under Murabaha. Under this instrument, FIB had 
funded the factory with L.S. 200,000 for the purchase of sesame and 
other raw-materials. The cost of finance under Murabaha was 1.75% 
per month. Murabaha was considered by the owner as a reasonable 
financing instrument, compared to Musharaka:
"We prefer to work with FIB on Murabaha rather than Musharaka 
because, under the latter mechanism, the bank has to be 
involved in all management aspects of the business."
The owner's attitude towards types and form of financing, question 
the correlation between the objective and motivation of the founder 
in setting up his business and financial behaviour.
As far as raising funds was concerned, the owner admitted that 
personal channels were the most important and successful ways of 
getting finance from banks at headquarter and regional branch 
level. The difficulties and obstacles in raising institutional 
finance as perceived and stated by the entrepreneur could be 
summarised as follows:
1. Unavailability of long-term finance for start-up and 
expansion.
2. The commercial banks policy - public and private - was not 
directed to the promotion and development of industry. They 
were trading-oriented.
3. The banking policy was not clear to businessmen; all 
information was acquired through personal channels. There 
was no avenue of communication betwen the banks and people 
in the industry. The Islamisation, its ways and methods 
employed was not clear.
4. The Central Bank regulations.
5. The bank branch managers in the region had no power to take 
a decision in approving finance above a certain limit, 
adversely affecting the timing of finance, in an industry 
based on seasonal agricultural raw-materials.
Concluding these points which illustrate the difficulties and 
problems facing the small firm in the Sudan, the owner added that:
"In spite of all these difficulties in raising finance, it was 
very difficult, if not impossible, for a manufacturing firm to 
survive in the market without the financial support and 
injection of banks. Moreover, the main reason behind the 
collapse of most factories in the Sudan could be attributed to 
unavailability of finance."
The financing characteristic of the Kosti Sweets Factory could 
be stated as follows:
A. Establishment Cost:
65% owner and family resources 
35% S.I.B. Loan






Overdraft facilities as 
direct-finance W.C.





The control of cash was given a high priority. The owner kept
the records of all bank balances and position as a sole responsible
man for raising and allocation of finance. The founder capitalised 
on his family name and his personal contact in securing finance.
In determining the financial profile of the enterprise, the
financial data for the last three years (1982-1984) which repre­
sented the economic life of the factory, has been analysed 
critically. Based on the selected dimensions and ratios, the Kosti 
factory experienced under-capitalisation and tended to maintain 




A. Current Ratio 1.79 1.37 1.40




A. Rota 17% 27% 18%
B. Profit Margin 10% 12.1% 6.7%
C. Assets T.O.R. 1.7 2.2 2.7
D. Pricing Formula
N.P./Sales 10% 10% 10%
3. Financial Gearing
1982 1983 1984
Equity 000's 78 111 142
Debt 000's 59 64 66
Ratio 1.30 1.73 2.15
5. Organisation Structure and Management Style:
The life of the factory (1981 - 1985) could be broken down into 
two sub-periods, as far as management of the enterprise was 
concerned. At an early age (1981 - 1983), the business was managed 
and supervised by the owner at all levels. There was no 
organisation set-up, and the owner was the ultimate decision-maker. 
In 1982, the brother of the owner - Mohd Ali, had joined the 
business, on profit and loss sharing agreement, working under the 
direction of the owner, with no defined lines of authority and 
responsibilities. In 1984, Mohd Ali was appointed manager of the 
factory, with a delegation to control production, personnel and all 
technical and operational aspects of the factory.
The organisation set up was very simple, and the business was 
managed in a personalised way. There was no regular reporting 
system to the owner. The reporting was based on the interest of the 
founder and on emergencies. This sort of managerial behaviour could 
be attributed to the entrepreneur's industrial experience in 
trading and family business.
The style adopted in managing the businesses was highly 
authoritative and paternalistic. The owner established the 
justification for the adoption of this style, stating that:
"I do believe in this sort of management style on the grounds 
that I possess and I have an access to all information for 
decision making. Moreover the factory was manned by semi­
skilled and unskilled labour who were not enlightened to 
participate in decision making. We were in need of simple and 
effective system to organise our work, but this will go in line 
with the business development."
6. Financial Control Characteristics and Profile:
At the establishment stage of the factory, the financial 
control system was confined to daily records of expenses kept by 
the owner in a non-systematic way. The main objective of this crude 
recording system as perceived by the owner was to monitor cash. 
There were no records for assets. The financier of machinery 'SIB* 
kept records of machinery as a security against its long-term 
loans. In 1982, after six months of operations, under the advice of 
a friend on an informal basis, the owner started to keep records 
for sales, purchases, bank debtors and cash. This system was copied 
from other companies in the region - Ahmed Koko Factory. By mid 
1982, an accountant had been appointed. The recruit was an inter­
mediate school leaver, with an experience of 30 years in a govern­
mental agricultural scheme. He was trained in agriculture and 
governmental accounting systems based on the famous three chapters. 
The accountant installed a system based on factory expenses and 
sales.
The second stage in the development of the company's accounting
system was the appointement of a part-time accountant with rich 
experience in commercial and manufacturing enterprises. He had been 
the chief accountant of Kenana Sugar Company (KSC). The part-time 
accountant designed and implemented the existing accounting system. 
The existing accounting system was based on historical accounting 
records comprising cash and bank book, sales book, purchas book, 
assets records, general expenses and payroll. The recording was the 
responsibility of the full-time accountant. The end result of the 
accounting system was the financial statements.
On the importance of accounting systems and accounting 
information; the owner stated that:
"We keep an accounting system and two accountants so as to 
provide information on taxation and Zaka people. Raising of 
finance depends on your name, rather than on your balance 
sheet."
This statement reflects the entrepreneurial attitude towards 
accounting and accountant's role.
The enterprise did not maintain a budgeting system. There was 
neith a cash budget, nor a production budget. Information on cash 
as well as the production was very casual. On the basis of 
manufacturing equation the working capital needs were determined.
The overall view of the accounting system of the Kosti Factory 
that was improved and developed over time from informal and very 
crude to a systematic historical records to satisfy external users, 
mainly financier and taxation and Zaka House.
PART II
GROWING STAGE
CASE STUDY III: ALADDIN PRINTING AND ADVERTISING CO. - KHARTOUM
CASE STUDY IV: ELSAIM OIL MILLS
CASE STUDY V: DENA PRINTING PRESS - KHARTOUM
CASE STUDY NO. 3 
ALADDIN PRINTING AND ADVERTISING COMPANY
1. Corporate Background:
Due to the nationalisation and confiscation policy which had 
been implemented by the Government in 1969/70, the Sudan Publicity 
Co. was nationalised in 1970. Mr Osman - the founder of Aladdin 
P.P. - was a manager of Sudan publicity for 5 years (1965 - 1970).
In October 1970, Mr Osman formed Osman Enterprise for reasons 
of independence and his dislike of working in the public sector, as 
also for economic rewards. Osman Enterprise was based and built on 
the experience of the founder in the field of printing and 
publicity. In 1972, on invitation from the initiator, Mr. Salah 
joined Osman Enterprise as a partner. Consequently Aladdin Company 
was formed as a partnership in 1972.
The start-up capital was L.S. 8,000, which was derived mainly 
from the savings of Mr Osman. Mr Salah joined the company as a 
partner on the basis of technical skills. The capital in 1984 was 
L.S. 100,000 with an increase of L.S. 92,000 in ten years time.
In 1972/73 the company had faced a major problem in raising 
finance for working capital as well as expansion. For the sake of 
business survival at inception, a new partner was invited to join 
the business as a source of equity finance. The new comer was a 
rich man, very influential in social and political aspects in the 
Sudan. The new comer injected L.S. 4,000 into the company, raising 
the capital of the company by 50% to L.S. 12,000 in 1974. Mr Osman 
stated that:
"Due to the financial difficulties the co. experienced at 
inception and the co's limited ability to finance working 
capital as well as machinery, Mr Hakim was invited. He was a 
sleeping partner as far as management of the co. was concerned, 
but he was entitled to one third of the company profit."
Activity: Aladdin Co., since its establishment in 1972, was
operating in the field of publicity and printing. In 1984, the 
company had entered the field of colour printing.
Manpower: Osman Enterprise, which had been converted into Aladdin 
Co., started operations with 8 workers, 50 percent skilled. In 
1984, the total number of people employed, including owners was 26 
employees. As far as manpower was concerned, the company was 
suffering from the shortage of trained and skilled workers and the 
high turnover of skilled employees, inside and outside the country. 
Mr Osman stated that:
"To cater for this problem, we launched job training 
programmes. In overcoming this problem, we are constrained by 
cost, time and the high labour turnover."
The market: In the field of printing, the company was competing
with large, well established firms in the local market and the 
public and private sectors. The uniqueness of Aladdin Co. lies in 
its specialisation in the field of publicity and advertising where 
there was a market-niche. The company monopolised this market after 
the collapse and failure of the Sudan Publicity Co. (public 
sector).
2. Entrepreneurs * Background:
2.1 Origin and Education:
The founders, owners, and managers of the company were born
in Khartoum. Mr Osman was 60 years old and Mr Salah was 40 years 
old. They thus belonged to different generations, and were brought 
up and educated in an urban area.
Mr Osman graduated from Kambani schools in 1942, whereas Mr 
Salah graduated from the K.T.I. in 1967. Therefore the level of 
education of the company's owners was high.
2.2 Industrial Experience:
In 1942, after leaving school, Mr Osman joined the British 
Army as a civil servant. In 1956, he had been recruited by the 
National Ministry of Information. Osman worked for the Government 
Department for 2 years. In 1958, he joined a foreign private 
company which specialised in advertising. In the private company, 
Mr Osman had been assigned various jobs and responsibilities and 
took the position of manager in 1965 until its nationalisation in 
1970.
The co-owner Mr Salah joined the Sudan Publicity Co. in 1967 as 
a technical manager working closely with Mr Osman. He continued as 
a technical manager for the nationalised company until 1972, when 
he joined Aladdin Co. as co-owner.
We may conclude that the shared experience, origin led the 
partners to form the company as distinct from the family dimension, 
which dominated the profile of most small businesses and the 
private sector in general in the Sudan.
2.3 Motivation
The expansion and development of Osman Enterprise into
formation of Aladdin Co., reflected the attitude of the initiator 
who forewent part of his capital recruiting a partner on technical 
skill basis. This could be taken as a sign of the business and 
growth orientation of the initiator. The main factors which 
motivated the initiator to change his profession from employee to 
business owner as enumerated by him could be summarised as follows:
1. Dissatisfaction with the Government job.
2. There was a market-niche and there was market-imperfection 
as a result of nationalisation.
3. He was motivated by his rich experience in the printing 
industry at technical and managerial level.
4. His work with experts and foreign companies, in both junior 
and senior jobs, had injected him with self- confidence in 
managing and operating a small company.
The co-owner, Mr Salah stated that:
"I had no plan to set up a business before 1970. In 1971, after 
one year working in a Government unit, I was dissatisfied with 
the Government job and its routine regulations and procedures 
which was not at my level of achievement, and ambitions as a 
technical manager in a big enterprise.1’
2.4 Management Training:
The founder of the company, Mr Osman had attended a number 
of management training programmes and seminars, inside and outside 
the Sudan being an employee. Most of these programmes centred on 
the management of printing enterprises. On the other hand, the co­
owner, Mr Salah had no sort of management training; he was a 
technically orientated man. This difference in background between 
the owners, led to the allocation of all management responsibility
to Mr Osman and all technical work to his co-owner Mr Salah.
However, in spite of the belief of the owners in the importance 
of management education and training, the company had not had any 
sort of programme of staff training in supervision and management.
2.5 Overview:
Summarising the entrepreneurial profile of Aladdin company 
could be depicted into the following:
1. The company was based on previous experience and career.
2. Dissatisfaction with the Government job, as well as 
independence, were the main motives behind the company.
3. Economic-reward seekers.
4. Level of education was very high.
5. Brought up and educated in an urban area.
6. They were not family orientated.
7. Self-fulfilment seekers, lacking a plan for management 
succession
3. Family Influence:
In Aladdin Co. there was no family involvement at any level. 
This situation emerged from the origin of the owners who neither 
belonged to one tribe, nor to one family. Mr Osman stated that:
"I have no idea to build a link between the company and the 
family; all my sons are professionals in medicine, not in this 
line of my business, and I have no plan for management 
succession."
On the other hand, Mr Salah admitted implicitly the importance of 
family to the management succession as a key factor for survival 
and growth, contradicting Mr Osman approach. The unique ownership
structure of Aladdin Co. might put formidable difficulties before 
the owners in this regard in the future.
4. Financing Characteristics and Financial Profile:
The initial capital of the company, which was derived from the 
personal savings of the initiator, had been deployed in very small 
and traditional machines bought from the local market. The
financial difficulties experienced by the company at inception had 
been attributed by the owners to the size of the business, bank's 
policy, and its negative attitude towards small firms.
Due to the good name of the newcomer in the financial market, 
Aladdin Co. had secured a long-term loan for 5 years with a cost of 
capital ranging from 10 - 14% in 1976, from the (S.I.B.). The
owners reported that the personal relationship and the name of Mr 
Hakim played a great role in securing the subject loan for the
importation of machinery. As far as working capital finance was 
concerned, the company was funded by the People Co-operative Bank 
on an overdraft basis. The availability of continuous finance 
provided by the Co-operative Bank put the company into growth and 
doubled its sales in 1979 to L.S. 380,000, and doubled them again 
in 1983, reaching L.S. 711,000.
After Islamisation of the banking system in February 1984, the
company dealt with Murabaha in financing its working capital needs. 
The owners complained of the cost of finance, as well as shortening 
period of debt settlement under Murabaha instrument.
Creditors were the main and cheapest source of working capital, 
representing 74% of the total current liabilities in 1984 and 
amounted to 50% to total assets. On the other hand, the company
kept a very small part of its resources in debtors, insisting on 
cash payment, and monitoring debtor-aging and follow-up system 
under the control of Mr Osman. The control of cash was given a high 
priority. The owner justified this emphasis on the grounds that the 
nature of industry, with production only against orders.
The main problems in raising funds, as had been perceived by 
the owners of the company could be summarised as follows:
1. Unavailability of long-term loans for expansion and 
development. The 'S.I.B.' was working with limited resources 
and the cost of borrowing was very high.
2. The Bank of Sudan credit policy and Government regulations
was not clear to people in the industry, and there was a
lack of information.
3. The banks always favoured big producers and big customers.
4. Instability of financial institutions' policy.
Having identified the source of finance of Aladdin Company, its
persistent initial problems in raising funds, and its problems at
growth stage, the financing characteristics of the Co. throughout 
its economic life (1972 - 1984) could be depicted as follows:
1. INCEPTION 1970-1975 Source of Finance
1. Owners resources 4. creditors
2. Retained earnings 5. 0/D
3. Equity Finance
2. Growing stage 1976-1983 1 + 3 + 4 + 5
+ long term loans
3 ft It 1983 1 + 2 + 4
+ Murabaha
Financial Profile:
The financing characteristics of the company, based on internal 
sources of finance at inception, and an external source of finance 
at growing stage, implied that the company at growing stage 
succeeded in securing external source of finance. The company had 
achieved the growth rate partially by the financial support it 
received from the bank in 1976, pushing the capital sevenfold to 
L.S. 100,000 in 1978, compared to 1974. Financial statements for 
the last four years (1979, 1980, 1982, 1983) were examined, and
verified critically using the financial ratios, so as to determine 
liquidity, profitability and financial gearing of the company.
1. Liquidity
RATIO 1979 1980 1982 1983
C.R. 1.30 .88 .21 .19
N.W./T.A. 6.6 -4.5 -50 -57%
This profile indicates that the company in 1979-80 was il­
liquid, whereas in 1982-83 it was highly illiquid. Its illiquidity 
profile indicates that the company relies heavily on short-term 
finance.
2. Profitability
RATIO 1979 1980 1982 1983
ROTA % 16.30 17 17 17
2. Financial Gearing
RATIO 1979 1980 1982 1983
EQUITY/T.D. 238 142 43 31
The higher financial gearing maintained by the company was a 
reflection of the external source of finance received by the 
company to purchase fixed assets, which had increased by 132% in 
1982.
From this review, we could state that Aladdin, as a growing 
company, tended to maintain low liquidity, compensated by 
profitability, and highly geared as a result of short-finance it 
received mainly in the form of overdraft, Murabaha and trade credit 
facilities.
5. Organisation Structure and Management Style:
The organisation set-up of the company was very simple, built 
round the owners, in the sense that owners managed and controlled 
all operations. Owners stood as a dominant coalition, having all 
authority as well as responsibility. The founder was playing a dual 
role in management being both chairman and managing director, and 
taking sole responsibility for all aspects of management, except 
technical, through sharing responsibility with the co-owner.
The management style adopted by the owners was highly authori­
tative. The observation of the case writer and opinions of owners 
state that the company was managed on a direct and very close 
supervision basis. The owners kept an open window against the
plant, supervising and directing workers from their offices; and 
the foreman at the platform working and directing workers under the 
eyes of two superiors:
"This direct supervision was followed by an effective system of 
reward and punishment decided by the owners."
The uniqueness of Aladdin Co. was the absence of family influence 
on management.
6. Financial Control Characteristics
The financial control system was less than adequate being 
confined to mere historical recording, compiled at the end of the 
year by a part-time accountant. The accounting system was built 
around the ability, perception and understanding of the owners.
The recording system maintained by the company had been 
introduced in 1978, only after six years of incorporation. The 
owner stated that:
"We had not been influenced by financiers in setting up the 
system. The system was designed to provide information on taxes 
and excise duties."
The subject system was designed by the auditor of the company in 
1980, a part-time accountant had been recruited with the specific 
jobs of bank reconciliation on a monthly basis, preparation of 
final accounts, and presentation of tax statement. As far as stores 
and other financial items, the owner, Mr Osman in charge of keeping 
all records.
The company maintained an adequate system of invoicing, classi­
fied into printing, general production, handling and advertising.
The founder reported that the categorisation of invoices was used 
as a way to figure out cost and revenue of each product, so as to 
determine profitability.
There was no budgeting, nor any cash-flow statement. The 
production schedule and cash movement were made by the founder on 
an irregular basis. There was no written plan and no specified 
objectives, sharing the phenomenon of small business in the Sudan.
As to the use of financial information provided by the 
financial control system in the decision making process and raising 
of finance, the observation is that the owners had no knowledge on 
accounting and how to make use of accounting information. The final 
accounts were used as a documentation in raising institutional 
finance. The part-time account of the company added that:
MThe problems of accounting and development and effective use 
of the financial control system in this sort of company are 
embodied in the perception, financial and accounting knowledge 
of its owners. To introduce an adequate system, first you need 
to change the perception and attitude of its owners and 
management.M
From this review, we may conclude that the financial control 
systems maintained by Aladdin Company lack the primary factors and 
was not in line with growth and development of the company. It was 
noticed that the system was based on provision of tax information 
and not with a view to securing funds from the banks.
CASE STUDY No. 4
EL SAIM OIL MILLS
1. Corporate Background
El Saim Oil Mills is owned, controlled and managed by the 
founder and his family. As far as the historical background of the 
oil mills was concerned, the departure point, would be the statement 
of the founder:
"You could not speak about oil mills without mentioning the 
Vermicelli Factory, it marked the date of my birth in the field 
of industry. Its success was the main motive, as well as a 
psychological and financial force in support for the oil mills."
The vermicelli factory was established in 1968, initiated, 
managed and wholly financed by the founder. The founder enumerated
the factors which pushed him into the field of industry, and the
food processing industry in particular as follows:
1. Availability of internal finance.
2. There was a market niche.
3. The simplicity of the technology.
The factory was ruined in 1972, making the initial experience of the 
founder in the field of industry.
In 1974, Mr El Saim made another attempt, encouraged by his
experience and success in vermicelli factory, approaching the 
Ministry of Industry, which was responsible for licencing all
industrial establishment in the country in the 1970s. The licence
for the oil mills was issued in 1974.
In 1974, the founder approached the S.I.B. for finance, and in 
1975 they agreed to finance machinery and equipment on a long-term 
basis.
The oil mills started operation in 1977, and work began with 8 
machine manned by 8 workers. Due to the financial support of Faisal 
Islamic Bank under Musharaka finance, which enhanced its operations
and capacity, employment increased to 25 in 1979.
2. Entrepreneur Background:
The founder of El Saim Oil Mills was born in Guitena in 1930. 
He was born into a religious family, where he started his informal 
and formal education. He left school at 14 seeking a job so as to 
improve the financial position of his family. The origin, education 
and upbringing had a great effect on the way oil mills managed,
financed and its prospect viewed.
"I was trained in business management in how to operate and 
manage a grocery, a rich experience at an early age. But
grocery was below my level of achievement and ambition and that 
is why I left the grocery to go south in 1950, seeking fortune 
and risking my life in the Civil War."
The level of education of Mr Elsaim was low for the 1970/80s,
but could be said to be reasonable for the 1940s, having regard to
the illiteracy rate in the sudan at that time. Elsaim oil mills
achieved a high degree of growth under the direction of its owner, 
in spite of a poor education and lack of management training. The 
entrepreneurial success level could be attributed to the industrial 
experience of the owner, which compensated to some extent for his
lack of formal education and management training.
The characteristics and motivation factors of the founder which 
might cast light on how the business was financed and managed, 
could be detailed as follows:
1. The founder was a wealth seeker.
2. Family conscious and family orientated.
3. Level of education was low.
4. Image and self-fulfilment seeker.
5. Debut the business between 40 and 50.
These factors had a positive and negative influence on the way the 
company was managed and financed.
3.1 Family Influence:
The company was highly influenced by the family, in the 
sense that all key jobs were manned by family members. The logic 
behind this practice could be extracted from the statement of the 
founder:
"Industry in the sudan was built on secrecy, because it is 
bound by problems and risks. I had the belief that the right 
people for this sort of secrecy is the family members. 
Moreover, Islamic principle (Quran and Hyidth) encouraged the 
man to help and give support and priority to his family and 
relatives, and from this ideology I developed my concepts and 
ideas on involving my family in the business."
The management of the business was based on the hierarchy of 
the family. The founder of the company had serious and systematic 
intentions in converting his business from individual ownership to 
a private limited company. He argued that, under a private limited 
ownership, sons and daughters would be the main shareholders of the
proposed company. The founder's objective could be extracted from 
his statement:
"To protect the family and the business, and to be fair to all 
members of the family, I am planning to adopt the subject 
arranagement. Moreover, the failure of most family businesses 
in the Sudan, has been due to conflicts between its members, 
which could be avoided by appropriate company structure."
As far as management succession plan was concerned, the 
involvement of the son of the founder in all operations of the 
company and his wide responsibilities could be taken as material 
evidence of an effective management succession plan.
4. Financing Characteristics and Financial Profile:
The start-up capital of the oil mills was L.S. 60,000, deployed 
in buildings, land and local equipment. The capital was derived 
from owner's resources. The oil mills had not experienced family 
financial support, standing as a pioneer company in the El Saim 
family. The oil mills had obtained long-term loan facilities from 
the S.I.B., in 1975. The loan amounted to L.S. 100,000 with
interest ranging from 10 - 14% P.A. The subject loan had been
deployed in machinery, imported from India by the financier. The
founder was supported by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce in 
securing its finance.
The company had faced a persistent problem in raising working 
capital at inception. These difficulties, as enumerated by the
owner, could be summarised as follows:
1. The founder was new in the field of external finance, and 
did not know how to raise funds, or how to present a case to
the financier.
2. Banking policy and available sources of finance were not 
known to the owner. Moreover, the location of the mill was 
at Kosti, where there were only bank branches.
3. People in the market, were not aware of the needs and
requirements of industry, most people were trade-orientated, 
that is why we faced a problem of balance between debtors 
and creditors.
These points indicate that the problem of small firms at 
inception consist of getting finance embodied in information gap, 
banking policy and typology and experience of entrepreneurs.
In 1977, the People's Co-operative Bank, through personal 
channels, agreed to finance the working capital needs of the
company on an overdraft basis. The cost of finance was 12% P.A., 
which was considered very high by the owner, taking into 
consideration the pricing of products which was determined by the 
Government. The owner added that:
"This was due to lack of coordination between Government units
and the absence of general and Government policy for industry
promotion and for small firms in particular."
In 1979, El Saim Oil Mills entered a new era in financing, i.e.
Islamic finance. In 1979, the Faisal Islamic Bank provided a loan 
to the oil mills, under a profit and loss sharing agreement - 
'Musharaka1. The FIB funded the company with L.S. 100,000 to settle 
the loan of the S.I.B. on the grounds that it was usury finance 
(Haram), and L.S. 600,000 as working capital.
Regarding the banking finance for working capital, under both
Islamic and interest-based systems, the owner added that:
"The financial support of the People's Co-operative Bank, and 
FIB in particular, had a great impact on the development and 
growth of the business."
The FIB funding of the business on Musharaka basis, was 
followed by an organisation structure, an accounting system and a 
bank representative, attached to the company, participating in 
management and control of all business operations. According to the 
Musharaka contract, the bank representative had the right to be 
involved in all activities and to report all information to the 
Investment Section of FIB. This sort of disclosure and involvement 
in all aspects of business operations challenges the secrecy of the 
business and the image of the entrepreneur and his absolute power 
in making decisions. Due to these factors and conflicting issues 
between the entrepreneur and the bank, an entrepreneur put an end 
to Musharaka agreement in 1980. The founder argued that:
"I have no objection to bank involvement in all operation 
decisions, but there should be a certain limit to their 
involvement. Moreover, the cadre of the bank were not trained 
in, and not acquainted with, the business environment; they 
acted in the business as bank employees, regardless of the 
image and the reputation of its owner."
Stating the views of the financier, it suffices to quote the 
Assistant-Director of the Investment Section (FIB), who argued 
that:
"Under Murabaha finance, I could accept all arguments of Mr 
Elsaim, because the control mechanism used by the bank is the 
post-dated cheque issued by the client. But by virtue of 
Musharaka, the bank has to be involved at all levels 
controlling and developing its own resources, so as to satisfy 
investors."
The financing of the 'FIB' had raised the sales of the company 
by 100% to one million. The external finance on short-term basis 
was the main source, representing 96% of short-term finance. The 
availability of finance in a large volume and its continuity was 
considered by the owner as a main factor in its growth and 
development.
After termination of Musharaka finance, the owner returned to 
dealing on interest basis with the 'P.C.B.' on overdraft basis. The 
ceiling approved by the Central Bank for El Saim Oil Mills was 
L.S. 200,000. On a personal level, the finance as working capital 
raised by the 'P.C.B.', amounted to 2.00 million in 1980. The owner 
added that:
"We were funded generously by the P.C.B., because of our 
personal relationship with the director at H.Q., and the branch 
manager at Kosti."
In 1984, and due to amalgamation of the P.C.B. with Bank of 
Khartoum, the company had faced a problem in securing a 
satisfactory and continuous working capital finance, since the 
decision depended on the management of the bank and on the personal 
relationship, rather than on business consideration, as the owner 
stated. In 1984, the owner approached FIB for finance under 
Murabaha, but his application was rejected. To explain the reason 
behind the rejection, it is sufficient to quote the owner:
"I was rejected because I am not a brother Muslim member, and 
this supports my idea about the FIB as existing mainly to 
support certain people and certain groups."
The financing characteristics of El Saim Oil Mills, throughout 
its life could be stated as follows:
1. Inception 1975: Owner resources L.S. 60,000
L.T.L. (S.I.B.) L.S. 100,000




3. 1984 Murabaha, R.P., Creditors
For expansion purposes, the company had approached the
S.R.D.F.C. for capital expenditure finance in 1985, under Murabaha 
agreement as a long-term loan. The proposal was under investigation 
by the S.R.D.F.C. in 1985.
The financial profile of the company was typical of growing
firms. The fixed assets of the company had increased by 40% from 
L.S. 430,000 in 1979 to L.S. 600,000 in 1983. The company tended to 
maintain a negative working capital indicating the short-term 
nature of finance used by the company. This illiquidity symptom had 
been compensated by the level of profitability, which was more than 
the authorised (legal) profit by 50%. The company on average showed 
a high gearing ratio.
The financial profile, based on balance sheet data provided in 
the Appendices, reflected the volume of finance extended to the 
company from outside sources, and to what extent internal sources 
were deployed in nurturing the business.
43.
1. Liquidity
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
CURRENT RATIO .84 .67 .80 .80 1.20
N. WORKING CAPITAL (82) (100) (90) (50) 47
2. Profitability
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
ROTA 15% 11% 11.5% 14% 15.8%
PRICING FORMULA 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%
+ 5% 1% 1.5% 4% 5.8%
3. Gearing
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Equity 350 330 310 450 647
Debt 500 300 470 250 280
Ratio .7 1.1 .66 1.8 2.4
5. Organisation Set-up and Management Style:
The organisation set up of the company was built round the
hierarchy of the family, in the sense that it was headed by the
founder, and his brothers. That set-up was influenced by the founder's
views about family and management succession. That shape vested all
authority and responsibility in the family members.
The organisation set-up of the company in a formal form was put 
into practice in 1979, as a result of the 'FIB' involvement in the 
business. The organisation set-up of the company was designed and 
implemented by the bank, with the consent of the owner, who allocated 
family membership in the structure.
Organisational set-up:
G. MANAGER
r SALES 1 PRODUCTION ' ACCS.AND ADMIN.
PLANT ACCS. G. OFFICE
The organisation structure was very simple, and the founder acting 
as the ultimate decision-maker. The owner was responsible for 
purchases of raw-materials, raising of finance and allocation of 
finance and other strategic and operating issues brought to him from 
subordinates. The owner managed the business, with a centralised 
authority, gave some room for participation by his subordinates in the 
formulation of decisions, but not in decision- taking. The owner added 
that:
"The formal structure of the business helped us to assign 
responsibility and to maintain accountability. The business and 
organisation was built around the concept of accountability 
which mentioned in Quran and Hydith"
Accounts had been assigned to the second man, which indicated 
the degree of importance of cash control. The experienced brothers 
who had a great stake in the management of the business, had been 
assigned responsibility for production and sales. Financing and 
planning - if any - were the sole responsibility of the owner.
El Saim Oil Mills was a family business, managed on formal and
informal bases. The owner stated that:
"In managing the business, we considered first what is good for 
the business regardless of the formality involved in the 
organisation set-up."
Regarding management style adopted by the owner, it suffices to 
quote the statement of the owner, which elaborated two schools of 
thought in the field of management style - participation and 
consultation and authoritarian style.
"From experience, I learned that the delegation of authority 
and assignment of responsibility was the main factor behind the 
success of any business. But this delegation has a certain 
limit. The delineation of the limit is based on experience. In 
managing the oil mills, the participation in decision making 
was based on this formula:
a. routine and operational decisions 80% line supervisors
20% owners
b. strategic and general policy 20% line supervisors
80% owners
delegation is restricted to family members."
These varied degrees of participation of the family members in the 
management of the business, was based on argument that line 
supervisors were made acquainted with operational issues, while the 
owner was well informed by external information which formulate 
strategic decisions. This sort of knowledge and understanding of 
management from an entrepreneur* with a low level of education and 
with no management education or training, gave a logical positive 
correlation between industrial experience and the way the company 
was managed, as well as growth and success.
In 1980, the owner moved with his family to the location of the 
mill (industrial area), so that both were together. The owner added
that:
•'The oil mills are more than a commercial enterprise and source 
of income, it is my social status and family belonging. It has
become one of my sons and needs to be nurtured with care and
attention."
In this degree of attention to the business, El Saim Oil was
unique.
6. Financial Control Characteristics:
The financial control system had been influenced by the 
entrepreneur's knowledge and attitude, and the views of the owner 
as to which items required oversight, as well as financial
involvement in the management of the business.
The company had no system before 1979. In 1979, an accounting 
system was introduced by FIB, following its Musharaka financing. 
The system designed by the financier, was built round the Musharaka 
operation with the objective of providing the bank, as well as the 
owner, with information. The owner had abolished the system on 
termination of the Musharaka agreement.
In 1980, the auditor of the company was consulted formulating 
an accounting system. The system designed was based on historical 
accounting practice - accruals - with final accounts and balance 
sheet prepared by the auditor on an annual basis. The system was 
manned in 1980 by the son of the founder, who took responsibility 
for supervision of all accounting work. This reflected the attitude 
of the owner towards accounting and accountants. The son of the 
founder had no background in accounting and his accounting 
knowledge was very poor.
Under the advice of the auditor, two commercial school leavers 
were appointed in 1982 as accountants. From this observation, we 
can state that El Saim Oil Mills, in terms of techniques and 
accounting personnel, had kept pace with the development and growth 
of the company. It developed from the provision of informal and 
haphazard information at inception, to a formal system based on 
financing transactions operating with historical accounting 
records, and manned by trained and qualified bookkeepers (non­
family) .
Regarding the reporting system, the owner received a weekly 
report on sales, production and stores position. Cash control was 
given a high priority, in the sense that the owner and his son kept 
a daily balance of bank position and major credit transaction 
items. There was no costing system; the manufacturing equation was 
used as a device for the determination of working capital needs and 
the pricing of its product. Neither the bookkeepers, nor the 
supervisor, were trained in cost accounting.
There was equally no budgeting system, and no cash flow 
statemet, nor was there any formal plan for business operations. As 
far as stores accounting was concerned, the owner intended to 
assign it to his youngest son, identifying stores as a cornerstone 
of company success in the oil industry field. The assignment of 
this job to a family member may be taken as an indication of the 
attitude of the founder towards business management and his degree 
of trust in outsiders. This and other managerial functions deprived 
the company of any effective contribution by professionals in 
various fields. The potential store manager as well as the existing
accounting supervisor had no experience. This showed the influence 
of family dimension on the quality of the financial control system 
of a family business.
As far as evaluation of assets of the business was concerned, a 
professional body "Engineering Economics House" had been consulted 
in 1983. An evaluation report had been issued in October 1984, 
showing that the value of the company was L.S. 2.5 million. That 
piece of information would be used by the founder as documentation 
in raising funds from commercial and development agencies. The 
owner added that:
"This report was made to meet the Islamic financing, which was 
based on the value of the business as a security for finance."
The level of documentation required by the bank varies with the 
bank, as well as the volume of funds requested. In experiencing 
financing from the S.I.B., the machinery and later the factory, the 
bank maintained a follow-up reporting system. In raising working 
capital finance from conventional commercial banks, the owner 
reported that the higher the volume of finance applied for, the 
more information and documentation were needed. The minimum level 
of documentation required by banks under both Islamic and 
non-Islamic system was an annual balance sheet and profit-and-loss 
data. The owner added that:
"Personal relationship with banks management is important and a 
short and effective channel for raising funds. Documentation is 
important but only after you have found an open door in the 
bank management office."
CASE STUDY NO. 5 
PENA PRINTING PRESS 
’DPP1
1, Corporate Background:
Dena Printing Press 'DPP' was established in 1938 as a joint 
venture project between Mr Ahmed and two of his friends. The 
partners bought Sarah printing press which had been owned by 
foreigners. The cost of machinery was L.S. 250. After two years the 
partners of Mr Ahmed withdrew leaving the founder to the present 
DPP as sole owner.
The DPP started operations in 1940, with traditional, and very 
primitive machinery. In 1943 the founder of the DPP had invented a 
simple machine based on catalogue and his mechanical experience in 
printing industry. In 1984, the DPP was equipped with highly 
advanced, modern and computerised machinery, making the growth 
cycle of the firm. The net book value of machinery in 1983 was L.S. 
500,000. The DPP started operations in 1940 with three workers. At 
start-up the founder recruited members of his family. The total 
number of people employed in 1984 was 120.
2. Entrepreneur1s Background:
The founder of the DPP was born in Khartoum (1909) and received 
informal and religious education at the religious school (Khalwa). 
He was born into a poor and non-business orientated family. The 
level of education of the founder was reasoanble, taking into 
consideration the degree of illiteracy in the Sudan in the 1920s.
The founder started his career in 1925 as an apprentice in the
Sudan Printing Press. In 1927, he was recruited by Mendial Printing 
Press as a foreman. The founder added that:
"I proved to have skills and interest in the Sudan Printing
Press and that is why I was offered a foreman's job in Mendial
Printing Press."
The founder continued as a foreman in 'MPP' for 9 years.
The factors which motivated Mr Ahmed to debut his business at 
an early age (29 years), as perceived by him could be summarised by 
the following:
1. To improve the financial# position of the family by 
establishing a profitable business, based on his experience 
and field of interest. The entrepreneur had capitalised on 
his technical know-how in the field of the printing
industry.
2. There was a market niche, since there were only two printing 
houses in the Sudan and these printing houses were owned and 
managed by foreigners. The founder was also motivated by the 
emergent trend of Sudanisation and supported by the
Independence National Front, as he himself claimed.
From this, we may conclude that the founder of the DPP was a 
technical-oriented entrepreneur and family-oriented with deep 
belief in the family commitment to the business. We will now
examine how these characteristics affected the busines.
3. Family Influence:
The DPP was built around the family and was manned, managed and 
controlled at strategic and operational levels by its members.
Moreover, the business was tailored to suit the family structure 
and hierarchy. The founder added that:
"I have the belief that the main factor behind the success of 
any business is the commitment and loyalty of its employees. To 
secure success, I have built a great link and connection 
between the DPP and the family."
The founder has put this belief into practice, ever since the 
establishment of his business. In 1940, he recruited his cousin as 
an assistant. In 1957, he sent his elder son to England for formal 
education and training in the field of printing industry at 
•L.C.P.'. His elder son assumed responsibility as managing director 
of the DPP in 1962. The founder stated that:
"The technical qualification and experience of my elder son has 
played a great role in formalising and modernising the DPP."
To maintain a continuous flow of qualified and trained family 
members in the business and to keep pace with the family hierarchy, 
the founder sent his son Adil to 'LCP' in 1968, and his son Gamal 
in 1975. Adil assumed the responsibility as a managing director in 
1975 and the latter was production manager of the factory.
The family involvement in the business can be seen clearly in 
the organisation set-up of the business. The Board of Directors 
headed by the founder comprised all members of the family inside 
and outside the business as shareholders in a limited private 
company.
4. Financing Characteristics and Financial Profile:
The initial capital of the DPP was derived from the savings of
the founder and family resources. In 1948, an expansion scheme had 
been put into practice by building a house as PP presmises in the 
city centre - KH. The said expansion was financed from the owner's 
resources and retained earnings, plus an insignificant family 
contribution. The company relied on the owner's resources, friend's 
financial support in financing operations at the inception stage of 
development. The company under the management of the founder (1940 
- 1962) had not experienced banking facilities because of the 
founder's perception, views and attitude towards interest-based 
financing as usurious finance. The injection of the new generation 
in the DPP brought institutional finance as a short-term one. The 
son of the founder added that:
"The overdraft facilities were usually arranged for big bids, 
without the notification of Mr Ahmed, who did not believe in 
0/D systems, from the Islamic point of view, and he had doubts 
about Islamic financing instruments employed by banks."
At the growing stage, creditors stood as a main short-term 
finance representing 83% of current liabilities in 1983. Creditors 
of the DPP were the suppliers of raw-materials, spare parts and 
machinery.
The financing policy adopted by the company was to rely on 
internal sources of finance, keeping a very low gearing ratio. The 
founder of the company who naturally had an influence on financial 
policy and financial structure of the company, added that:
"The financial policy is very clear to top management, that is 
to rely on our own resources in developing the business."
The main arguments behind the adoption of the self-financing
policy as perceived by the management of the company, could be 
described as follows:
1. The financial institutions’ policies and behaviour, before 
and after nationalisation in 1970: Before nationalisation 
all banks were managed by foreigners and in favour of 
foreign companies, which were more capable of presenting 
their case. After nationalisation, all banking policies were 
laid down by the Government and were directed towards public 
enterprises and large firms.
2. There were no long-term loan facilities in the banking 
system; banks provided only overdraft facilities, which were 
very costly and subject to stringent conditions.
The raising of funds was the responsibility of the managing 
director and his assistant under the approval of the founder on 
non-detailed issues. The management contended that the personal 
relationship with managements of banks as well as the name of the 
entrepreneur were an effective and efficient media in raising funds 
from banks. The main difficulties in raising finance as stated by 
the DPP management could be summarised into lack of hard-currency 
and bankers attitude towards industry, as well as the continuous 
change in Government regulations and banking policy as also in bank 
management.
Based on the adopted financing policy, the control of cash was 
given high priority. Cash flow and cash control was the sole 
responsibility of the 'M.D.’ who received daily reports from the 
chief accountant, and kept records for all cash transactions, as a 
control account. There was a debtor aging and follow-up system
under the direction of the top management. The M.D. was in charge 
of the collection of big debts. The company had no clear cut credit 
facilities policies, but the management of the company was well 
aware of the necessity of keeping a degree of balance between 
debtors and creditors.





3. Growing and R, 
Growth
Source Qf Finance 
1. Owner's personal savings
(A) 2. Family resources
3. Friends
1. A + trade creditors
(B) 2. Basic Guarantee
3. Retained earnings
1. B + overdraft facilities
(C) 2. Mortgage finance
3. Hire-purchase
To identify and determine the financial profile of the company, 
financial statements for the last five years (1979 - 1983) were 
examined and verified clearly. Liquidity, profitability and 
financial gearing were used as a surrogate to identify the 
financial profile of the company (see Table 5.1).
During the period 1979 - 1981, the company tended to maintain a 
high degree of liquidity, keeping a positive net working capital 
(1.17 - 2.20), accompanied by a low profitability rate, and a very
low gearing ratio. Due to a 90% increase in credit facilities 
received from trade creditors in 1982 and 1983, the liquidity rate 
decreased to less than (Cr = 1), giving an illiquidity profile, 
with improvement in profitability and a high gearing ratio compared 
to 1979 - 1981. This could be explained by the expansion policy 
adopted by the company based on credit-facilities provided by 
overseas suppliers.
5. Organisation Set-up and Management Style;
The organisational arrangement and structure of the DPP was 
built round the structure and hierarchy of the family. The 
Assistant M.D. added that:
"Although DPP was owned, managed and controlled by the family, 
we handled and treated the company as a separate entity, in the 
sense that emotional involvement was kept to a minimum."
The DPP was managed on both formal and informal bases at family 
membership level (top echelon), in the sense that operations were 
managed and decisions were taken by the top management team, 
regardless of the position of the man. The degree of formality and 
informality was kept by top management taking into consideration 
the business interest. A top management team was formed as a 
managerial approach in managing the operations of the company. The 
1TMT* headed by the M.D. comprised the key people, who were all 
family members.
Table 5.1 Financial Profile. 
A. Liquidity
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
1. CURRENT RATIO


















































1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
EQ/T. DEBT Ratio 224 374 273 163 160




CHAIRMAN- B OF D
PRODUCTION MANAGER
By virtue of initiation, foundation and age, the founder of the 
company was the Chairman of the Board.The Chairman's position was 
created as a result of the conversion of the DPP from individual 
ownership enterprise to a limited private company. The chairman 
played a dual role; he kept himself in charge of all operations, 
and in charge of policy formation. The Managing-Director was 
responsible to the Chairman of the Board and acted as head of the 
TMT. The M.D. was in charge of job estimation, pricing, control of 
cash and other major issues in production and stores. Thus, the 
M.D. was operating, as well as managing the business. Regarding the 
stores control, the M.D. was responsible for maintaining a balance 
between production and stores. The stores management was manned by 
the son of the founder for more than 30 years. The Assistant M.D. 
argued that:
"The printing industry is based on optimum utilisation of raw- 
materials and paper in particular, and this is why the stores 
of the DPP are under the control of the son of the founder who 
has been responsible for it since 1955."
Regarding the set-up of the organisation, the Management 
Development Centre, and the Sudanese Consultancy firm had been 
consulted in 1979 and 1981 respectively. The Assistant M.D. 
contended that the outcomes of these consultancies were un­
practical. He added that:
"We found it difficult to translate line and staff relationship 
terminology into practice, as stated by the consultants and as 
taught by management training programmes. These terminologies 
might pertain and be relevant to the needs of large enterprises 
in developed economies."
The management philosophy adopted by the management of the DPP
was neither authoritative (classical) nor participative (modern 
school of thought): It was a combination of both. Decisions were 
taken at the top management level. The TMT was formed as an organ 
for the flow of information and decision-taking on a participative 
basis. To get the benefit of homogeneity the founder kept aloof 
from issues at the initial planning and formulation stage. The 
founder usually informed at execution stage.
As far management of employees was concerned, the owner added 
the dimension of human relations and the creation of family 
atmosphere, hand in hand with the authoritative approach, in 
managing the business. The owner reported that the crystal remark 
of this unique approach was the absence of a trade union in a 
company employing more than 100 employees. The owner added that:
"For the family members, the equation is quite clear, that they 
are working for their enterprise and wealth. Non-family members 
are managed by maintaining a good and solid human relationship, 
both inside and outside the business."
The educated and trained M.D. commented that the DPP is managed as 
one family following the Far-East-style.
The objective of the DPP in terms of profit-making and 
profitability, was embodied in the estimation make-up formula, 
ranging from 25 to 40% of the total cost of the job. There was no 
specific level or objective maintained on profitability or 
liquidity. Thus, there was no strict criterion for the evaluation 
of company performance.
Based on 60 years of experience in the field of printing 
industry, the founder managed the business with his educated and 
trained sons. Although the founder had not received any formal or
any sort of managerial training, he could be considered as a pillar 
of business growth. This questioned critically the correlation 
between level of education and management knoweldge of entrepreneur 
and growth. The founder had belief in the correlation between 
education and development of the business. He argued that:
"Education, technical and non-technical, and management 
training, are the main factors behind the development and 
success of the DPP. Our key success factor is embodied in the 
interaction of experience and education."
The T.M.T. members received and attended a number of management 
training courses in the field of management, and printing industry 
in particular. Technical training was based on the needs of the
DPP.
6. Financial Control Characteristics
The financial control system of the DPP was developed to keep 
pace with expansion and development of the business, as an outcome 
of interaction between the experience, education, management 
training of the management and the consultation services provided 
to the company by specialist institutions. The accounting system of
the DPP started as crude records kept by the founder. In 1962, a
clerk was appointed to keep records. The existing accounting system 
was introduced in 1970 by the auditor of the company.
The accounts section was manned by the chief accountant, a
cashier, a costing clerk, and a collector of debts. The chief 
accountant who was a university graduate, and non-family member 
participated actively in the development of the accounting system. 
He was appointed on the advice of the auditor of the company.
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The accounting procedure adopted by the company was based on 
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These accounting procedures were applied to all transactions 
including cash, bank, expenditure, assets, creditors etc. The chief 
accountant and his crew (school leavers) were in charge of all 
records, bank reconciliation and other accounting work. The M.D. 
and his assistant were highly involved in the detailed work of the 
accounting, keeping daily records on cash-in and cash-out. At the 
end of the working day, the M.D. checked the cash-book against 
receipts and requisition orders issued by the company.
Regarding the preparation of final accounts and balance sheets, 
the chief accountant work and responsibilities ended with the 
preparation of the trial balance. The external auditor of the 
company prepared on an annual basis the historical income statement 
and balance sheet. The outcome of the existing accounting system 
were daily, weekly, monthly and annual reports.
In the printing industry, which is usually based on an ordering 
system, time has a special connotation. To satisfy this factor, a
daily report was prepared by the costing clerk showing jobs needing 
to be completed and the time of collection. The subject report as 
an information device usually made a day ahead. The relevant report 
was sent to the M.D. who accordingly directs production people. The 
production manager was usually supplied with the same report.
There was no comprehensive planning or budgeting system. In 
planning and controlling cash and production the company maintained 
a weekly cash and production budget on an informal basis. The 
relevant budgets were set by the TMT under the tight control of the 
M.D. There were no cash-flow statements or cash and funds 
projection.
The attitude of the management of the DPP towards accounting 
and accountants and their importance in managing the business was 
positive. The consultation made by the company for the improvement 
of the accounting system, the involvement of the management in all 
accounting work, the appointment of qualified accountants from 
outside the family and the continuous follow-up of the system by 
the M.D., could be taken as surrogates in measuring the positive 
attitude of DPP management towards the role of accountants. The 
M.D. added that:
"It is useful in decision-making because it is based on daily 
and weekly reports. We are looking for a proper costing 
system."
The evaluation of the accounting system of the DPP reads that 
it was adequate, highly influenced by management skills and a very 
positive attitude of the founder and his crew.
7. Key Success Factors of the DPP:
The key success factors as perceived and stated by the founder 
and the top management of the company could be summarised as 
follows:
1. Family involvement in the business operation and management. 
The management succeeded in overcoming the family-business 
conflicts and problems by striking a good balance between 
business and family interest.
2. The company was managed and controlled by educated, 
experienced, and management knowledgeable cadre.
3. The style adopted in treating, handling and managing non­
family staff, based on good man-management was a factor 
influencing their loyalty and devotion to the business.
4. The financial policy, based on the philosophy of self- 
financing relieved the company from banking regulations, 
from the frequent changes in financing mechanism and their 
consequent impact on the performance of the industry. 
Moroever the management had capitalised on the name and 
reputation of the company in seeking finance and credit 
facilities from local and overseas suppliers.
5. The financial control system was of great help in decision 
making, by providing daily accurate information. The system 
was closely controlled by top management.
6. As a part of the decline and collapse of most public 
enterprises in the 1970s, the great competitor of the DPP, 
the Government printing press 'GPP' had failed to maintain 
its market share in the economy. Moreover, the high quality
of work and services rendered by the DPP was a vital success
factor.
Thus, most of the key success factors were internal, 




CASE STUDY NO. VI: THE KISSRA-MAKING FACTORY (K.M.F.)
CASE STUDY NO. VII: THE SUDANESE TOMATO-PASTE AND CANNING COMPANY
CASE STUDY NO. 6 
THE KISSRA* MAKING FACTORY 
"K.M.F.'
1. Corporate Background:
The Kissra-making industry was begun in 1960 by traditional 
businessman, by forming a traditional and simple workshop, using 
unskilled workers under one shed to produce food manually. A 
serious attempt to develop this industry in the Sudan was 
undertaken by an engineer from the university in 1961/62. Again, 
the promoter used the same type of labour, but a minor improvement 
in baking equipment was added.
The vital improvement to Kissra-making industry had followed 
the invention of a local machine to process and produce Kissra. The 
subject machine and this vital breakthrough was invented by the 
founder of the K.M.F. The invention was a watershed between manual 
and mechanical production of this traditional product.
The inventor commercialised his invention by establishing the 
K.M.F. in 1970. The inventor added that:
"This particular invention started in 1960 as an idea and then 
developed into a mechanical invention, converted into a unique 
factory for kissra-making in developing country."
The factory started operations in 1970, using only one machine 
and 7 unskilled workers. Due to the financial support of the S.I.B. 
in financing the production of machines, the factory started mass 
production in 1974 after 4 years of establishment. In 1984, the
* popular Sudanese diet
factory was equipped with 3 machines employing 20 workers. In 1980, 
the factory ceased the production of kissra. The factors behind 
this decision, and the deterioration of the factory accordingly as 
enumerated by the founder, could be summarised as follows:
1. There was a finance gap and the cost of finance was very 
high.
2. The competition for raw-material in the market.
3. The changed outlook of the founder for the future.
"My vision for the future is to produce and commercialise
machines based on my invention rather than to produce kissra."
The third factor is the over-riding one, in the sense that the 
entrepreneur thought that he achieved his position as a result of 
his technical and mechanical ability.
2. Entrepreneur Background:
2.1 Origin and Education:
The owner was born in a rural area in 1927. He invented the 
machines, and established his business when he was 34 years old. He 
got all his primary and secondary school education in Khartoum 
(urban area), he graduated from the Faculty of Arts, University 
College of London in 1952. Thus, the entrepreneur of the K.M.F. was 
highly educated, born in a rural area, but educated and conditioned 
to life in an urban area.
2.2 Industrial Experience:
After graduation, the entrepreneur joined the Labour 
department as a Labour officer. He participated in the Sudanisation
of jobs and the restructuring of national ministries and 
departments before and after independence. In 1957, he was 
appointed a Deputy Commissioner of labour. In 1960, he left the 
Government job, and started his own business by establishing a 
consultancy firm, mainly in the field of wages and industrial 
relations.
2.3 Motivation:
The main motives behind his move and sacrifice of the 
Government job which was prestigious and socially appreciated 
during the 1960s, and his involvement in the field of business 
could be derived from his statement:
"I entered the field of business to start on my own, to build 
my image and reputation out of my business. Moreover, the 
Government job was too narrow to embody my ambitious and my 
innovative ability."
The innovative activity of the entrepreneur was a sort of dream and 
happiness culminating in a unique factory for kissra-making. The 
entrepreneur added that: "I started off with the usual
misconception and inhibitions of a potential third-world inventor, 
namely: that inventing was the prerogative of specialised
scientists, engineers or technicians, and that humanities graduates 
and lay people had no chance to contribute."
The idea and plan of the entrepreneur to debut his business, 
started in 1956 by his making an agreement with one of his 
colleagues to form a factory for the production of folklore items. 
The subject establishment was built, but for technical reasons, 
they went out of business. The KMF was formed as a natural
development of the entrepreneur's interest in folklore products, 
which were highly rooted to his origin and as a public and common 
food in the Sudan at large.
From this review, as well as the conversations of the case- 
writer with the entrepreneur, the profile of an entrepreneur could 
be stated as follows:
1. Innovation-oriented.
2. Educated.
3. Knowledgeable in management.
4. Family-oriented.
5. Brought up in a rural area, but educated and lived in an 
urban area.
3. Family Influence:
The entrepreneur was supported by the family at innovation and
the formation of the factory. At the innovation level, the family
could be considered a main source of finance. At this level there
was a gap in understanding between the financiers and the inventor,
that gap forced the entrepreneur to rely on family resources.
The founder had the belief that the family involvement and 
commitment had a vital role to play. He stated that: "our
experience in the sudan confirmed that the key success factor of 
most private enterprises is the involvement of a family in 
ownership and management." The entrepreneur had set a plan for his 
sons to succeed him in running and managing the business. Although 
the entrepreneur's venture was highly influenced by his rural roots 
and social values, there was no recognition of the value of
extended family in the business management and its future plan.
4. The Financing Characteristics:
The financing characteristics of the kissra-making factory 
could be broken down into two stages:
1. The innovation stage, and
2. The commercialisation of invention
The invention stage was financed by the inventor, his family 
and friends. The financial institutions had no policy for financing 
inventions and the entrepreneur added that:
"With my meagre financial resources, I managed to develop my 
machine to the stage where I actually put it to the test of 
full-scale production. The results were very gratifying, and I 
started looking round for buyers, partners, and financiers. But 
the response was disappointing, and I had to go it alone."
Having obtained the requisite approval from the Ministry of 
Industry to form the factory, the entrepreneur turned to banks for 
finance. In 1970/71 he received a Government grant from the 
Ministry of Finance of L.S. 4.5 thousand as a support and 
encouragement from the President for the particular invention and 
kissra industry. That grant was unique in the financing of a 
private enterprise in the Sudan.
Based on the entrepreneur's contact and personal relationship 
with management of the Sudanese Industrial Bank (S.I.B), and as a 
member of the Bank Board, he succeeded in securing long-term 
finance, secured by the value of machines invented and produced by 
him, at a cost of 11% P.A. The S.I.B. loan had pushed the factory 
into full-scale production phase by 1974/1975.
As far as working capital was concerned, the factory was funded 
by the Bank of Khartoum in 1974/75 on overdraft basis. The 
creditors and the family represented the main source and cheapest 
source of working capital. Due to financial institutions' policy 
towards industry, their instability after de-nationalisation, the 
factory had suffered a working capital finance gap.
In 1978, the entrepreneur approached Faisal Islamic Bank to 
finance the factory under Murabaha or Musharaka finance. The 'FIB' 
provided a meagre fund in 1978/79 and 1980 on Murabaha basis, L.S. 
30,000 and L.S. 50,000 respectively. Other commercial banks 
provided insignificant loans. The entrepreneur claimed that the 
finance gap jeopardised the existence of the factory in the market.
As far as raising of finance was concerned, we would suffice by 
the statement of the entrepreneur:
"What may be accepted as exceptional, however, is not the kind 
of problems I encountered, but the exceptionally fortunate 
position in which I found myself. The majority of the top 
people in Government, banks or other institutions were my 
contemporaries from school days or else knew me through other 
contacts."
Cash control and all financial matters were the sole 
responsibility of the entrepreneur. There were no records or cash 
budget. The entrepreneur was not required to present financial 
documentation for fund generation; all finances obtained were 
raised through personal channels.
5. Organisation Structure and Management Style:
The KMF is wholly managed by the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur 
is the ultimate decision-maker. There was no organisation set-up
and management was built round the ideas and perception of the
entrepreneur. The time of the entrepreneur was divided between the 
consultancy firm and the factory. Moroever, the time devoted to the 
factory was divided between the management and operation of the 
factory and innovative activities. Therefore, the factory lacked 
attention.
The management style adopted was highly authoritative, in the 
sense that nobody was delegated to force decisions or to
participate in the decision-making. A vital question remains
unanswered: why should a management consultant adopt such a
management approach, in managing his business? What were the
reasons for the failure of a management consultant in applying 
management jargon. The entrepreneur justified his approach stating 
that:
MThe way I managed the factory was conditioned by the nature of
invention, the uniqueness of the factory and its size."
6. Financial Control Characteristics:
The financial control practice was a reflection of management 
practice of the entrepreneur discussed before. There was no 
accounts section, all records were kept and controlled by the 
founder. Creditors and cash were recorded in the diary of the 
entrepreneur, and there was no separate recording for the firm. 
There had been no final accounts, or financial statements since the 
establishment of the factory, therefore taxes were based on 
estimates. The entrepreneur received no advice, assistance or 
instruction from financiers in forming a financial control system.
This observation led to contradicting results, that a 
management consultant with negative attitude towards accounting, 
and lack of understanding of the significance of accounting in 
business management. This negative attitude towards accounting role 
by a knowledgeable entrepreneur could pertain to his nature as an 
innovator. This argument supported by the future vision of the 
entrepreneur and his plan to get out of the kissra-making business 
and revert to the technology business, based on his invention.
The crudity and inadequacy of the financial control system 
adopted, could be considered as a symptom of mismanagement.
7. General Remarks on Deterioration and Collapse of the Factory:
The main reasons behind the deterioration and collapse of the 
factory as identified by the case-writer could be denoted by the 
following:
1. Mismanagement of the factory: The mismanagement was 
reflected in the controlling methods and the crudity of the 
financial control system adopted - if any. The factory was 
managed solely by the entrepreneur on a part-time basis, 
therefore it lacked attention.
2. The founder's future intention, to develop his invention 
into a technology-based business for the production of 
machinery for kissra-making, rather than the production of 
kissra, affected the factory adversely. Therefore the 
typology of entrepreneur-innovation-oriented man was one of 
the reasons behind its collapse.
3. The kissra-making industry was a new field of investment,
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therefore the entrepreneur faced persistent problems in 
raising finance.
4. The financial resources of the factory had been allocated 
and allotted to the innovation activities of the entre­
preneur. The factory had been financed by overdraft 
facilities, which did not offer an opportunity for the 
financier to be involved.
5. The kissra industry was based on the seasonal production of 
wheat and sorghum. The timing of bank finance was neither 
adequate nor proper so as to meet the season. This was due 
to the routine banking system and the quality and poor 
knowledge of industry of the bankers.
6. The factory faced great difficulties in competing with the 
traders and exporters in the sorghum market.
CASE STUDY NO. 7 
THE SUDANESE TOMATO-PASTE 
AND CANNING COMPANY 
"S.P.C."
1. Corporate Background:
The Sudanese Tomato-Paste and Canning Co. (S.P.C.) was formed 
in 1967 as a joint-venture project between the founders and a 
Bulkan Company. The foreign company was responsible for the
technical part, and the founders were assigned the responsibility 
of securing finance.
According to the records the S.P.C. initially started in 1967 
as a partnership of 5 people, with a capital of L.S. 50,000. In 
1972, it converted into a private limited company, with a share 
capital of L.S. 105,000 held by two principal shareholders (Mr
Rahma and Mr Musa). The other three partners were Mr Ezzidien 
(Minister of Industry, 1966) and the two sons of Mr Rahma. These 
three partners were shown as creditors to the company. The sons of 
Mr Rahma withdrew from the business in 1975.
From 1968 until operations started in 1971, the partners were 
engaged in securing finance, ordering plant and machinery, and 
building the factory.
The performance of the factory since it started operations in 
1971 had been quite inadequate. It was below the production target
of 5,600 tons of tomato paste per annum. The main reasons for the
poor performance, as enumerated by the owner and manager of the 
business could be summarised as follows:
1. Supply of raw-material and the seasonality of the production
of tomato (3 months).
2. Scarcity of cash resources.
The Elnilean Bank consultant in charge of S.P.C. case argued that:
"The main reason behind the poor performance and the collapse 
of the S.P.C. rests to an appreciable extent on inadequate 
management."
2. Entrepreneur's Background:
The S.P.C. was owned and managed interchangeably by Mr Rahma 
and Mr Musa. The other two partners, Mr Ezzidien and Mr El Sherief 
joined the business as sleeping partners at formation and inception 
stage, and at the reformation stage, respectively.
The co-founder, Mr Musa, was the initiator of the company. He 
took the position of company manager during the periods 1967-1973 
and 1977-1984. During the period 1973-1977, the company was managed 
by Mr Rahma's son.
The co-founder, Mr Musa, was born in a rural area. He was 60 
years old. He got an informal religious and formal primary eduction 
at his village. He started his career as a trader in regional cash 
crops. In 1950, he moved to Egypt as a result of the immigration 
trend of the youngest people in the Northern Region. There he 
worked as a trader. He added that:
"My experience in business was enriched in Egypt. The 
civilisation stage of Egypt compared to Sudan in the early 
fifties had a great impact on my business knowledge and 
experience."
The co-founder, Mr Musa, re-started his business in Sudan in 
1957 as a trader in cash crops. In 1967, he developed his business 
into processing of tomato and other fruits. The main motive factors
behind the involvement of Mr Musa in industry as enumerated by him 
could be summarised as follows:
1. His previous experience in the field of tomato and fruits 
trading.
2. The position of the sleeping partner, Mr Ezzidien as a 
Minister of Industry in 1966.
3. The availability of institutional finance from the S.I.B.
In this regard, Mr Musa added that:
"The position of the partner as a Minister of Industry 
1966-1969 had offered the chance for us to get access 
to related bodies, inside and outside the Sudan. 
Moreover in 1967, the Sudan was governed by our
political party. All these factors helped us work with 
the foreign company; to get finance from the S.I.B. and 
to get concession and facilities from the Government 
bodies."
The other partner, Mr Rahma, started his business as a trader 
in cash crops. He joined the business at the stage of project
implementation. Mr Musa added that: "The shortage of finance, the 
position of Mr Rahma in the market, and his reputation could be 
considered as a main factors behind the acceptance of Mr Rahma as a 
principal owner."
This review indicates that the level of education of the
principal owners was very low and there was no family or tribal 
connection between them.
3. Family Influence:
The interviews conducted revealed that some family members who 
had no official status as far as S.P.C. was concerned, were acting 
as ghost managers. Family relationship in managerial functions
exist both openly and latently. The S.I.B. official who was in
charge of S.P.C. evaluation in 1983 against the bank finance,
expressed the view that:
"The introduction of family members into S.P.C. (usually at 
higher echelon in the hierarchy) acted as a frustrating and 
alienating factor, as far as other personnel and their careers 
were concerned."
The involvement of family into business shows the contradicting 
view between the principal owners. The co-founder, Mr Musa, did not 
believe in family involvement. He believed in a qualified profes­
sional management regardless of the family commitment, whereas the 
other partner had different and completely opposite opinions. Mr 
Musa added that:
"I derived this conclusion from my experience of family
businesses in the Sudan. Most of the family firms collapsed 
after the absence of the founder ... To me, this would be the 
fate of most family firms built round family emotions; S.P.C. 
was one of the victims of family involvement."
The co-founder, Mr Musa, claimed family involvement in the S.P.C.
operation and management, as one of the reasons behind the company 
collapse. He added that: "In reforming the company, we considered 
this problem and this is why we appointed a professional manager 
for the S.P.C., under the advice and consultation of Elnilean Bank 
as a financier."
4. Financing Characteristics and Financial Profile:
The initial capital of the company was derived from the 
personal savings of owners. The capital of the company throughout 
its life could be summarised as follows:








The S.P.C. borrowed heavily from the S.I.B. on long-term basis, 
mainly for financing fixed assets (machinery). The company received
5.1.B. loan in 1969/70, amounting to L.S. 190,000, which was
equivalent to 380% of the capital of the company. The cost of the
5.1.B. loan was 8% P.A. In 1984, the S.I.B. long-term loan was 
settled on factoring basis by Sudanese businessman (Mr El Shaif), 
who consequently became a partner in the company.
The S.P.C. had borrowed heavily as well, from Elnilean Bank for 
working capital, in the form of overdraft facilities. The cost of 
Elnilean Bank finance was 11% in 1974, 14% in 1978 and 21% in 1983.
The Elnilean Banks loans to the S.P.C. amounted to L.S. 1.8 million
in 1982 and L.S. 2.3 million in 1984. The company had succeeded in 
seeking loans from the Elnilean Bank to reorganise and to
rehabilitate the company, and to pay its financial obligations to
the bank. The overdraft facilities provided by Elnilean Bank were 
deployed partially in financing fixed assets and in making money
outside and beyond the S.P.C. activities.
Due to the absence of a financial policy, financial planning
and optimum allocation of the company resources, the obligations 
and commitments of the company towards financiers and suppliers 
exceeded its resources:



















In spite of the banks' financial support, the company had 
experienced persistent financial difficulties, aggravated by 
accumulated losses and deficits throughout its life. Elnilean Bank 
official in the Credit Department argued that:
"The problem of the S.P.C. was not the availability of finance, 
but the management of the available resources so as to serve 
the S.P.C. objectives."
As far as raising of finance was concerned, the owners had 
capitalised on their contacts and personal relationshipos with bank 
managements. The principal owner Mr Musa, added that:
"The personal channel was important and an effective way to 
generate funds from different institutions and banks in the 
Sudan."
The Elnilean Bank official had expressed his view in this regard, 
adding the dimension of political power. He stated that:
"The S.P.C. was a unique case. It was financed and re- financed 
by the bank because of its owners; Mr Ezzidien was the third 
man in the Government and Elnilean Bank is a public bank."
The company had shown losses for the period 1973-1981. If the 
accumulated losses were to be deducted from the capital of the 
company, the latter would be drastically reduced. Throughout the 
life of the company, the solvency position of the company had been 
so weak. The company was working with negative working capital 
since its inception in 1973. The current ratio for the period 
1977-1981 could be read as follows:
Current
1977 .73 : 1 (208)
1978 . 50 : 1 -
1979 . 35 : 1 -
1980 .38 : 1 (1.081)
1981 .32 : 1 (1.232)
1984 .72 : 1 (1.733)
atio N.W.C. (000's)
In conclusion, we could state that the S.P.C. was heavily
dependent on borrowing from banks and its creditors. Most finance
was short-term, except the S.I.B. loan at inception. The company
relied heavily on mortgage to overcome the liquidity and insolvency 
crisis. The factory assets under the control and supervision of the 
financier - Elnilean Bank - as security for its money. The
political influence, as well as other factors were major factors 
behind the flow of funds into S.P.C. The financial profile is a 
good example of a collapsed and declining firm, maintaining 
illiquidity, insolvency, accelerated losses and high gearing ratio.
5. Organisation Set-up and Management Style:
The S.P.C. was being run on the basis of "Management by 
Rotation - MBR" in the sense that the co-owner Mr Musa managed the 
company as a general manager for the period 1967-1972; the son of 
the co-owner (Mr Rahma) took over in 1972. Again, the co-owner Mr 
Musa, held the position of the G.M. in 1977 - the start-up of 
collapse. This situation imposed certain restrictions and had a 
detrimental impact on the continuity of management.
The G.M., namely the co-owner was acting in a dual capacity, 
i.e. as a G.M. of the S.P.C. and as integral part of the policy­
making body (Board).
The factory had witnessed a series of problems of liquidity in 
1977 and 1982. These crises led to the company collapse and 
reorganisation either voluntarily or under the financier's 
supervision and control. Thus the organisation set up of the 
company, before, during and after 1982 collapse will be discussed, 
so as to identify the features of the organisation and the way the 
company was managed.
The Board of Directors comprised the owners of the company 
chaired by Mr Musa. The factory was located in Khartoum North, 
while the G.M.'s office was located in Khartoum. The factory was 
under the responsibility of the factory manager. The first factory 
manager was a foreigner. The new manager under the financier 
arrangement added that:
"Under the 1977 organisation structure, the status of the 
personnel in charge of sales and accounts was not clear at all. 
Those in charge of sales and accounts were responsible to the 
G.Mgr., and the factory engineers were responsible to G.Mgr. 
through the factory manager."




The Board of Directors had issued a memo in 1976, delegating Mr 
Musa to take authority and responsibility for the board. Therefore 
the G.Mr. (1976-1977) was playing a passive role in managing the 
business, according to the wording of the subject memo.
Under Elnilean Bank re-forming and refinancing programme the 







As conditions for refinancing, the bank appointed the G. Mgr. under 
the owners' consent. The new manager was a professional with 
experience in managing a public canning factory, and had been a 
management trainer and consultant for 5 years.
The bank involvement and influence on the set-up reflected 
clearly in the creation for the first time in the life of the
S.P.C. the position of the financial controller. According to the 
bank proposal, the production and Financial controller would be 
selected and appointed by the owners and the bank, under the 
consultation and advice of the G. Mgr. Under this new arrangement, 
the sales would be the responsibility of the bank and the owners.
Due to the Islamisation of the financial institutions system in 
the Sudan, the programme of the bank had been implemented partially 
and remained under investigation, so as to see how it could be 
executed under Islamic financing mechanisms.
The style of management adopted by the management was highly 
authoritative, in the sense that all decisions were taken by the 
top management. The co-owner added that:
"We followed an instruction style so as to avoid collapse and 
death; we tried to keep the face of the S.P.C. , its owners and 
its management before the public and banks."
On the influence of financiers on decision-making, the co-owner, Mr 
Musa, added that: "After 1977, most of our management decisions
were influenced by the financiers either directly or indirectly. We 
were managing the S.P.C. as an insolvent company."
The interviews with the key-man, Mr. Musa, revealed a great 
deal of misconception, as well as misunderstanding of the basics of 
proper management. This observation explained the entrepreneurial 
profile of the owners and its correlation to the collapse and 
decline of the S.P.C.
6. Financial Control Characteristics:
The accounting system adopted by the company was very crude, 
lacking accounting procedures, techniques, proper books and 
competent staff. The accounting system was confined to three books 
of accounts: (1) cash book; (2) creditors and (3) assets, assigned 
to a bookkeeper who had been trained in Government accounting for 
more than 25 years. The system was designed to provide final
accounts and a balance sheet at the end of the financial year. The
annual balance sheets were prepared by the external auditor of the
company. There was no costing system, and the cost of product was
based on estimates and market price. The owner quoted as "Shishina" 
- rough estimates.
There was no reporting system and the owner controlled all 
operations and used the word of mouth in communicating with
subordinates. The owner's attitude and understanding of the role of 
accountants and accounting in managing the business, explained the 
crudity of the financial control system adopted by the company. In 
this regard, it suffices to state his view:
"The accounts section existed mainly to provide information on 
taxes and excise duties. Financial information related to 
decisions and banks are kept in my diary."
The other symptom of crudity of the system is non-existence of
budgeting or planning system. Production is based on the
availability of raw materials.
Under Elnilean Bank re-financing and its subsequent reformation 
and re-arrangement, a financial controller was planned to be
appointed. The new management of the company under this arrangement 
had a tendency to change the system and its profile. The
involvement of the bank had a great influence on the operation of 
the system, in spite of the opinions, views and understanding of 
the owners, as to the role of accountants and accounting 




REMAZ SWEETS FACTORY 
BALANCE SHEET (OOO's)
DEC. 82 DEC. 83 DEC. 84
FIXED ASSETS:
MACHINERY 83 85 100
BUILDINGS 130 120 110
FURNITURE 5 10 12
M. VEHICLE - 25 40
OTHERS 2 5 7
T.F.A. 220 245 269
2. CURRENT ASSETS:
STOCK AT END R.M. 80 42 45
CASH AT BANK 35 10 8
CASH IN HAND 4 2 1
PARTNERS C/A 15 18 20
DEPOSITS (FIB) MUR. 60 120 180
T.C.A. 194 192 254
* TOTAL ASSETS 414 437 523
3. CURRENT LIAB:
1. MURABAHA-'FIB'(RM)
2. LETTERS OF CREDIT
100 150 200
(FIB) 13 - -
3. FIB - MUR. 'MACHINE' 24 7 -
4. CREDITORS(FAMILY) 28 25 49
5. OUSTANDING EXPENSES 5 4 10
170 186 259
* WORKING CAPITAL 24 6 (5)
86.
DEC. 82 DEC. 83 DEC. 84
WORTH 244 251 264
CAPITAL 215 225 251
R.P. - - -
PROFIT YEAR 29 26 23
LESS DRAWINGS - - (10)
EQUITY 244 251 264
PROFIT AND LOSS DATA
DEC. 82 DEC. 83 OCT. 84
SALES 263 440 649
OTHER REVENUE - - -
STOCK AT END 80 42 45
343 482 694
LESS DIRECT COST:




IMPORTED R.M. 40 30
FUEL AND ELECT. 12 14
GROSS PROFIT 136 48 50
MAINTENANCE 7 -
MAN REMUNERATION 20 18 20
DEPT. 10 4
NET PROFIT 29 26 23
Appendix 2.
KOSTI NATIONAL SWEETS FACTORY 
PROFIT AND LOSS DATA (OOO's)
1982 1983 1984
SALES 230 388 562
STOCK AT THE END 20 26 10
STOCK AT BEGINNING 20 26
SESAME R. MATERIAL 82 148 232
SUGAR " 27 40 60
GLUCOSE " 6 10 20
SALT 5 9 10
OTHER R.M. (IMPORTED) 26 — —
146 227 348
LABOUR (DIRECT) 12 25 35
GROSS PROFIT 92 162 189
OTHER EXPENSES:
POWER 11 20 42
PACKING 5 10 18
DEPRECIATION 6 8 12
EXCISE DUTIES 10 21 33
DIRECTORS (REM.) 18 20 30
OTHER EXPENSES
NET PROFIT 23 48 37
80.
KOSTI NATIONAL SWEETS FACTORY 
BALANCE SHEET DATA (OOO's)
1982 1983 1984
FIXED ASSETS:
MACHINERY 30 34 48
BUILDINGS 35 42 49
LAND 3 3 3
CAR 14 13 12
EQUIPMENT 3 16 16
TOTAL FIXED ASSETS 85 108 128
CURRENT ASSETS:
DEBTORS (Gen) 32 18 20
DEBTORS (Agric. Scheme) - 23 50
STOCK AT END 20 26 10
T.C.A. 52 67 80
CURRENT LIABILITIES:
SIB (Int on loan) 3 8 10
Family Business 26 41 47
T.C.L. 29 49 57
WORKING CAPITAL 23 18 23
TOTAL ASSETS 137 175 208
LONG T.L. (SIB) 30 15 9
NET WORTH 78 111 142
REPRESENTED BY:
CAPITAL 55 55 55
RETAINED PROFIT - 8 50




ALADDIN PRINTING AND ADVERTISING COMPANY 
BALANCE SHEET DATA (OOO's)
1979 1980 1981 1S82 1983
FIXED ASSETS AT C. DEP. 110 135 313 418
CURRENT ASSETS:
STOCKS IN HAND 4 35 30 8
DIRECTORS C/A/C 9 2 - —
DEBTORS 24 22 19 21
DEPOSITS 10 1 1 1
CASH/HAND/BANK 8 2 1 23
T.C.A. 55 62 51 53
TOTAL ASSETS 165 197 364 471
LESS C. LIABILITY:
DIRECTORS C/A/C — — 23 38
TRADE CREDITORS 26 42 175 238
ACCRUALS AND PROVISION 16 16 18 40
BANK 0/D - 12 12 6
T.C. LIAB. 42 70 228 322
NET C.A.- W.C. 13 (8) (177) (269)
NET WORK 123 127 136 149
REPRESENTED BY:
SHARE CAPITAL 1000x100 
RESERVE FOR STAFF
100 100 100 100 100
GRATUITY 3 7 13 13
PROFIT BALANCE RET. 7 10 3 2
PROFIT OF THE YEAR 13 10 20 34
123 127 136 149
ALADDIN PRINTING AND ADVERTISING CO. 
TRADING AND PROFIT AND LOSS DATA (OOO's)
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
REVENUE LESS DEV. TAX 397 336 620 711
ADD STOCK AT END 
LESS PURCHASES 













GROSS PROFIT 90 78 130 153
LESS ADMIN AND SELF 
EXP:
DIRECTORS' REMUNERATION 14 14 18 19
SALARIES AND WAGES 21 24 40 49
OTHER EXPENSES 26 13 22 47
TOTAL EXPENSES 61 51 80 115
NET PROFIT BEFORE TAX 29 27 50 38
LESS TAX PAID (2) (4) (8) (4)
PROVISION FOR B.P.T. (14) (13) (22) -
NET PROFIT AFTER TAX 13 10 20 34
Appendix 4.
EL SAIM OIL MILLS (KOSTI)
BALANCE SHEET DATA (OOO's)
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
FIXED ASSETS:
MACHINERY 200 180 160 260 300
BUILDINGS AND STORES 150 140 130 120 150
TRUCKS AND CAR 42 40 36 45 60
LAND 10 10 10 10 10
EQUIPMENT 30 35 40 35 50
OTHER F. ASSETS 0 24 24 30 30
TOTAL FIXED ASSETS 
CURRENT ASSETS:
432 432 400 500 600
STOCKS IN HAND 377 188 348 145 200
DEBTORS 40 7 25 42 40
CASH/HAND/BANK 2 4 5 10 72
OTHERS 0 1 2 3 15
TOTAL CURERENT ASSETS 418 200 380 200 327
TOTAL ASSETS 850 630 780 700 927
CURRENT LIABILITIES:
FAISAL ISLAMIC BANK 480 0 0 0 0
PEOPLE CO. B. BANK ) 295 388 180 200
CREDITORS 20 5 82 70 60
UNITY - BANK (END) 0 0 0 0 20
TOTAL CURRENT 
LIABILITIES 500 300 470 250 280
WORKING CAPITAL (82) (100) (90) (5) 47
LONG-TERM LIAB. (SIB) 0 0 0 0 0
NET WORTH 350 330 310 450 647
REPRESENTED BY: 
CAPITAL (1st PERIOD) 200 200 200 300 400
RETAINED EARNING 20 60 20 50 100
PROFIT - YEAR 130 70 90 100 147
350 330 310 450 647
ELSAIM OIL MILLS (KOSTI) 
PROFIT AND LOSS DATA
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
SALES 1080 700 900 1000 1225
Change in Sales 36% 29% 11% 22.5%
STOCK AT END 377 188 348 145 200





F. MEMBERS ( 3 3 - 0  42)
PROFIT B.I. & TAX 130 70 90 100 147
33.
Appendix 5.
DENA PRINTING PRESS 
BALANCE SHEET DATA
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
NET FIXED ASSETS 355 340 501 564 500
INVESTMENTS — — 10 60 170
T.F.A. & INV. 355 340 511 624 670
CURRENT ASSETS:
STOCKS - S. PARTS 5 25 29 40
STOCKS - PAPER & INK 57 154 81 118 101
DEBTORS 5 27 58 56 18
DEPOSITS 1 5 - - -
BANKS - S. COM. BANK - 67 41 19 -
OTHER 131 38 46 26 90
CASH IN HAND 9 8 3 3 8
TOTAL C. ASSETS 203 304 254 251 257
TOTAL ASSETS 558 644 765 875 927
CURRENT LIAB:
CREDITORS 170 135 157 307 297
O/ST. EXPENSES 2 3 2 3 4
ACCRUED/CREDITORS — — 36 22 56
TOTAL C.L. 172 138 195 332 357
WORKING CAPITAL 31 166 59 (81) (100)
NET WORTH 386 506 570 543 570
REPRESENTED BY: 
AUTHORISED CAPITAL 
500 x 1000 500 500 500 500 500
PAID UP CAPITAL 250 250 500 500
RESERVE 128 250 56 20 55
LESS B.P. TAX PAID (17) (24) (33) (34) (50)
PROFIT OF THE YEAR 25 30 47 57 65
386 506 570 543 570
94.
DENA PRINTING PRESS 
MANUFACTURING, TRADING AND PROFIT 
AND LOSS DATA
(OOO's)
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
REVENUE 515 705 1,399 2,130 2,274
OTHER INCOME 2 3 4 10 8
TOTAL REVENUE 517 708 1,403 2,140 2,282
EXPENDITURE
RAW MATERIALS 
SALARIES, WAGES AND 












GROSS PROFIT 77 98 132 186 239
SELLING AND ADMIN EXP 
B. OF DIR. REMUNERATION 









NET PROFIT 25 30 47 57 65
Appendix 6.
THE KISSRA MAKING FACTORY 
BALANCE SHEET DATA
"Compiled and prepared by economic and engineering consultancy 
firm, approved by the certified accountant and external auditor of 




MACHINERY 85 71 62
BUILDING (EVALUATION) 120 140 150




MATERIALS - SORGHUM 15 25 30
DEBTORS - — —
CASH/HAND/BANK - - -
(UNDEFINED)
TOTAL ASSETS 230 275 282
CURRENT LIABILITY:
CREDITORS
FIB 15 35 30
BANK OF KHARTOUM 4 10 20
S.I.B. 6 6 -
WORKING CAPITAL (10) (25) (20)
L.T. LIAB. - -
CAPITAL 200 200 200
ACC. P PROFIT/LOSS 5 24 32









SUDANESE TOMATO PASTE AND CANNING FACTORY 
BALANCE SHEET DATA















TOTAL FIXED ASSETS 877 705 1.333 1.333
CURRENT ASSETS
STOCKS OF R.M. 350 83 83 -
STOCKS OF F. GOODS 87 113 113 -
GOODS IN TRANSIT 101 - - -
DEBTORS 23 110 55 55
PRE-PAYMENTS - 5 - -
SPARE PARTS - 20 - -
DEPOSITS - 72 77 77
LETTERS OF CREDIT - 237 237 1.737
CASH IN HAND/BANK - 7 7 10
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE - 25 - -
OTHER C .A . 6 ““ — —
TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS 567 673 573 1.880
TOTAL ASSETS 
LESS CURRENT LIAB.
1.444 1.378 1.906 3.213
ELNILEAN BANK LOAN 656 1.443 1.493 2.300
UNITY BANK LOAN 
BANK OF KHARTOUM
- 28 28 28
LOAN - 9 9 9
CREDITORS - 274 274 275
ACCRUED EXPENSES 118.50 1 1 1
OTHER C. LIAB. .50 - - -
TOTAL CURRENT LIAB. 775 1.755 1.805 2.613
WORKING CAPITAL (208) (1.081) (1.232 (733)
LONG TERM LOAN
SIB LOAN 194 119 119 -
OTHERS - - — —
TOTAL L.T.L. 194 119 119 -
NET WORTH
CAPITAL
RESERVE
ACCUMULATED CASH
475
350
125
(495)
548
50
(1093)
(18)
548
600
475 (495)
